Kilgore

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Sarah Kilgore, et. al., ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 02544

)

)

Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

)

v. )

)

Revlon Consumer Products, LLC, et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order

)

Defendants. )

Pro se plaintiff Sarah Kilgore brought this civil rights action on behalf of her minor son,

I.J.K., against Revlon Consumer Products, LLC, and MacAndrew & Forbes. (Doc. No. 1). Ms.

Kilgore also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). The Court grants

that application.

BACKGROUND

The complaint, in its entirety, states that “the minor suffered injuries, a disability-

ARFID, because of his mother’s injury, he has suffered discrimination, emotion[al] distress,

[and] mental anguish.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #4). The complaint seeks “more than $500,000–

unlimited” in relief. (Id.).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,

109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable

basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the

pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more

than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct.

2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.

1998).

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DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Ms. Kilgore is attempting to bring claims against Defendants on

behalf of her son, I.J.K.. Non-attorney parents, however, cannot appear pro se on behalf of their

minor child in lawsuits in federal court.

A party may plead and conduct his or her case in person or through a licensed attorney.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir.

1991). The statute, however, “does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se where interests other

than their own are at stake.” Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). This rule “‘protects the rights of those before the court by preventing an ill-equipped

layperson from squandering the rights of the party he purports to represent.’” Bass v.

Leatherwood, 788 F.3d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Zanecki v. Health Alliance Plan of

Detroit, 576, F. App’x 594, 595 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)).

Therefore, parents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children “because a

minor’s personal cause of action is [his or] her own and does not belong to [his or] her parent or

representative.” Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970 (citation omitted); see also McCoy v. Akron Police

Dep’t, No. 5:21-cv-51, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88484, 2021 WL 1857119, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May

10, 2021) (“[W]hile a parent may technically bring suit on behalf of a minor child, he or she may

not do so pro se -that is, the parent can only bring suit on behalf of the minor child through an

attorney.”) (citing Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970). The general rule prohibiting a non-attorney parent

from representing his or her minor child in federal court “is designed to protect the interests of

the minor party[.]” Adams v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted);

see also Wirtz v. Medina City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:21-cv-1730, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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121230, *5 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2022) (dismissing without prejudice Section 1983 claims brought

by pro se parent on behalf of her minor children).

Here, there is no suggestion in the complaint that Ms. Kilgore is a licensed attorney who

may lawfully assert the claims of her minor child. Therefore, the purported claims Ms. Kilgore

asserts on behalf of I.J.K. are dismissed without prejudice to any of the child’s claims being

refiled by an attorney.

Moreover, the complaint consists only of one brief, conclusory assertion, providing no

facts upon which a court could find Defendants engaged in any wrongdoing. The complaint,

therefore, fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading requirements and must be dismissed on this basis

as well.

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).

However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not

“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). This

Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf

of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading

requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must give

the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on

which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008);

see also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (all

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complaints must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements

of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).

Here, the complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading

standard, as the pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing

that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief].]’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint is completely devoid

of any factual allegations, it fails to connect any alleged occurrence to a specific injury, and the

complaint fails coherently to identify how each Defendant has harmed Ms. Kilgore’s son.

Additionally, the complaint fails to assert a cognizable claim within the jurisdiction of this Court

based on recognized legal authority. The vague and conclusory assertion that I.J.K. “suffered

discrimination” is insufficient. Plaintiffs’ pleading is nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint, therefore,

fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8, and it must be dismissed on this

basis. Id.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Ms. Kilgore’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and DISMISSES the action WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal

from this decision could not be made in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan

PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

United States District Judge

Dated: 12/4/25

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