Mordant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ERNESTO ALFONSO PEREZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-00947-SPC-DNF

MATTHEW MORDANT et al..

Respondents,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Ernesto Alfonso Perez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1), the federal government’s response (Doc. 9), and Alfonso

Perez’s reply (Doc. 10). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition.

A. Background

Alfonso Perez is a native and citizen of Cuba who entered the United

States on August 8, 2022, and was placed in immigration detention. The next

day, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Alfonso Perez with

a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). An immigration official determined Alfonso Perez

did “not appear to be a threat to national security, border security, or public

safety” and released him on recognizance pending his immigration hearing.

(Doc. 9-1 at 4). In November 2022, Alfonso Perez applied for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture

by filing a I-589 with the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

On October 8, 2025, Alfonso Perez attended a hearing to adjudicate his

I-589. But instead, DHS moved to dismiss the removal proceedings, and the

immigration judge granted the motion. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) agents then arrested Alfonso Perez, designated him for

expedited removal, and detained him in the detention facility known as

Alligator Alcatraz.

Alfonso Perez claims his detention violates the Administrative

Procedures Act and his Fifth Amendment due process rights because he is not

eligible for expedited removal, he was not provided notice or an opportunity to

be heard, his detention is not reasonably related to a legitimate government

interest, and the revocation of his parole was arbitrary and capricious. The

respondents argue the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Alfonso Perez’s

claims.

B. Legal Framework for Expedited Removal

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) establishes two procedures

for removing noncitizens from the country. The first process—sometimes

called a section 240 proceeding—begins when DHS issues the noncitizen a

NTA. It involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, and it

provides the noncitizen an opportunity to apply for asylum. Noncitizens

seeking asylum are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment. DHS

may release the noncitizen into the country on parole while the process plays

out, but only if the noncitizen demonstrates “that the release would not pose a

danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any

future proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).

Expedited removal is the second process. It allows immigration officers

to remove noncitizens “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Because expedited removal affords substantially fewer

protections to the noncitizen’s rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal “only if they are

inadmissible on the basis that they either lack proper entry documents or

falsified or misrepresented their application for admission.” Coalition for

Humane Immigrant Rights v. Noem, --- F. Supp. ---, ---, 2025 WL 2192986, at

*5 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)).

“Among that set, only two categories of noncitizens are eligible for expedited

removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2) noncitizens who

‘ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the United States’ and cannot

affirmatively show that they have been ‘physically present in the United States

continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the

determination of inadmissibility.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii)).

On January 23, 2025, Acting DHS Secretary Benjamine Huffman issued

a memorandum instructing immigration officials to consider the expedited

removal of “any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable to expedited removal

but to whom expedited removal has not been applied[.]” Benjamine C.

Huffman, Acting DHS Secretary, Guidance Regarding How to Exercise

Enforcement Discretion (Jan. 23, 2025). The next day, DHS published a notice

expanding the application of expedited removal. Office of the Secretary, DHS,

Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139.

In its implementation of the new policy, “the Government began

targeting for expedited removal people already in section 240 removal

proceedings, many of whom are pursuing asylum and other collateral relief.”

Make the Road New York v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2025 WL 2494908, at

*5 (D.D.C. 2025). The D.C. District Court described a common pattern:

[W]ith DHS first moving orally (without any advance notice) to dismiss

the individual’s pending section 240 proceedings, then arresting the

individual at the courthouse immediately upon the dismissal of their

section 240 proceedings, and then, finally, placing the individual in

expedited removal proceedings through which they can be deported far

more quickly, and with far less process, than they would have been in

section 240 proceedings.

Id.

C. Jurisdiction

The respondents argue the INA divests the Court of jurisdiction over

Alfonso Perez’s petition. They point to three jurisdiction-stripping sections,

but the Court only needs to discuss one. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A) bars courts

from hearing certain claims relating to expedited removal. It states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or

nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other

habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title,

no court shall have jurisdiction to review—(i)…any individual

determination or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from

or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of

removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1) of this title, (ii)…a decision

by the Attorney General to invoke the provisions of such section,

(iii) the application of such section to individual aliens, including

the determination made under section 1225(b)(1)(B) of this title, or

(iv)…procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to

implement the provisions of section 1225(b)(1) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). The INA carves out an exception to this jurisdiction-

stripping section for habeas actions “limited to the determinations of (A)

whether the petitioner is an alien, (B) whether the petitioner was ordered

removed under [section 1225(b)(1)], and (C) whether the petitioner…is an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, has been admitted as a refugee…,

or has been granted asylum[.]” Id. at § 1252(e)(2).

The respondents argue section 1252(a)(2)(A) strips the Court of

jurisdiction over Alfonso Perez’s claim because it is a challenge to DHS’s

implementation, invocation, and application of section 1225(b)(1) to him.

Alfonso Perez does not address the effect of section 1252(a)(2)(A) on this action

in any of his filings, and the Court reads the omission as tacit acknowledgment

that the section applies.1 Instead, Alfonso Perez argues the Court has

jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.

1 Other courts have found section 1252(a)(2)(A) inapplicable in similar situations. See, e.g.,

Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL 3022294, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025);

E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *5-6 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025); Noori

The Suspension Clause states, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas

Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion

the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. Art. I ¶ 9, cl. 2. The clause

reflects that “the Framers considered the writ a vital instrument for the

protection of individual liberty[.]” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743

(2008). It ensures “the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to

maintain the delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest safeguard

of liberty” and “protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and

authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.” Id. at 745 (internal

quotation marks removed).

In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court identified three factors

“relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship

and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that

status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension

and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in

resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. at 766.

Alfonso Perez’s status is undisputed. He is a noncitizen who was paroled

into the country upon a finding he was not a flight risk or a danger to the

v. Larose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025), Munoz

Materano v. Arteta, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2025 WL 2630826, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025);

Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2025 WL 1953796, at *6-7 (W.D.N.Y.

July 16, 2025). But because Alfonso Perez does not challenge the applicability of section

1252(a)(2)(A) to his claims, the Court will not address it.

community. DHS revoked Alfonso Perez’s parole status and detained him with

no meaningful process. Without habeas review, he would have no opportunity

to challenge the legal basis of his detention. As to the second factor, Alfonso

Perez was not apprehended at the border or a port of entry. He was

apprehended at an immigration court in Miami, years after his parole into the

country, where he had appeared to participate in his removal case and asylum

application. And finally, there appear to be no practical obstacles to resolving

Alfonso Perez’s entitlement to a writ of habeas corpus. In fact, his claim is

amenable to a prompt resolution based on the pleadings already filed with the

Court. Thus, the Suspension Clause prevents section 1252(a)(2)(A) or any

other section of the INA from stripping the Court of jurisdiction over this

habeas action.2

D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The respondents next ask the Court to dismiss this action because

Alfonso Perez has not exhausted available administrative remedies. They

argue he could have appealed the decision to dismiss his removal proceeding

to the Board of Immigration appeals. But Alfonso Perez’s habeas petition does

2 Other courts applying the Boumediene factors in actions challenging detention based on DHS’s new

practices for expedited removal designations have reached the same conclusion. See Noori v. Larose,

25-cv-3006-BAS-MMP, 2025 WL 3295386, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025); Noori v. Larose, No. 25-

cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F.

Supp. 3d 1123, 1141-43 (D. Or. 2025). Neither party has identified—and the Court has not found—

any opinion declining to apply the Suspension Clause to habeas actions with similar facts.

not challenge that decision. It challenges the legality of his current detention,

which stems from the designation for expedited removal, revocation of parole,

and courthouse arrest. The INA provides no administrative review of those

decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“the officer shall order the alien

removed from the United States without further hearing or review” (emphasis

added)).

The respondents also argue Alfonso Perez could challenge the expedited

removal order in the Eleventh Circuit under section 1252(a)(1) because it is a

final order of removal. Not so. “Neither the court of appeals nor a district court

can review an expedited order of removal[.]” Dubey v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

154 F.4th 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2025).

E. The Petitioner’s Claims

Alfonso Perez asserts the respondents are detaining him in violation of

the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act. Count 1 claims

the respondents violated his procedural due process rights by stripping Alfonso

Perez of procedural safeguards and a forum to adjudicate the legality of his

detention. Count 2 claims Alfonso Perez’s detention violates substantive due

process because it is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

purpose. And Count 3 claims the respondents violated the APA by revoking

Alfonso Perez’s parole without considering his facts and circumstances.

The respondents argue ICE’s decision to place Alfonso Perez in expedited

removal made detention not just lawful, but mandatory. They concede that

Alfonso Perez has a liberty interest to be free of civil detention, and that he is

at least entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. (See Doc. 9 at 13-

14). But they claim he received due process at the October 8, 2025 hearing.

They also argue Alfonso Perez’s detention flows from ICE’s unreviewable

decision to designate him for expedited removal, so there is nothing here for

the Court to review.

1. Due Process

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be…deprived

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend.

V. The clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including

aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). It is thus “well

established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in

deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that “due process is flexible and

calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1976). Courts looks to three factors

when considering what process is due in a given situation: (1) “the private

interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the

Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

All three factors weigh heavily in Alfonso Perez’s favor. First, his

interest in freedom from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty” the Due

Process Clause protects. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Second, the risk of

erroneous deprivation of that interest is substantial here. When DHS detained

Alfonso Perez in 2022, a border patrol agent found he was not a threat to

national security and released him pending his immigration hearing. (Doc. 9-

1). Since then, Afonso Perez’s criminal history has remained clean, and he has

proved he is no flight risk by attending his removal hearing.

ICE issued the order of expedited removal on October 8, 2025, the day of

his courthouse arrest, without any new or additional information suggesting

he is a threat to public safety or a flight risk. What is more, ICE clearly

exceeded its statutory authority when it designated Alfonso Perez for

expedited removal after revoking his parole. See 8. U.S.C. §

1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (excluding aliens who have been paroled in the United

States from the class eligible for expedited removal). The procedure ICE used

did not give Alfonso Perez an opportunity to challenge the legal basis for his

detention or its necessity. It is clear from the October 8, 2025 order that the

immigration judge only considered ICE’s authority to dismiss the removal

proceedings. Alfonso Perez did not have an opportunity to contest the

subsequent expedited removal order, revocation of parole, and detention.

What is more, the Court recognizes significant value in additional safeguards,

like the ones ICE has attempted to circumvent by dismissing his removal

proceeding. Those safeguards ensure immigration detention serves its

statutory purposes.

Third, the government has not established any legitimate interest in

Alfonso Perez’s continued detention. Immigration detention has two statutory

goals: to ensure the noncitizen’s appearance at future immigration proceedings

and to prevent danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Alfonso

Perez’s detention serves neither purpose. The immigration official who

considered his circumstances in 2022 determined that he should be paroled on

recognizance, and he has since remained out of trouble, applied for asylum,

and participated in his removal proceedings.

The Court finds that ICE violated Alfonso Perez’s right to due process by

revoking his parole, designating him for expedited removal, and detaining him

without reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Make

the Road New York v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2025 WL 2494908, at *17

(D.D.C. 2025) (“In short, the expedited removal process hardly affords

individuals any opportunity, let alone a ‘meaningful’ one, to demonstrate that

they have been present in the United States for two years.”); see also United

States v. Smith, 30 F.4th 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2022) (“the complete denial of

the opportunity to be heard on a material issue is a violation of due process

which is never harmless error” (cleaned up)).

2. APA

The APA “requires agencies to engage in ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’”

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 16 (2020)

(quoting Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015)). It directs courts to “hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to

be…arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). An action is an abuse of

discretion if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the

problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to

a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home

Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.

29, 43 (1983)).

The scope of APA review is narrow. Courts “determine only whether the

[agency] examined ‘the relevant data’ and articulated ‘a satisfactory

explanation’ for [its] decision, ‘including a rational connection between the

facts found and the choice made.’” Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S.

752, 773 (2019) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43). A person in

federal custody may seek APA review in an action requesting a writ of habeas

corpus. 5 U.S.C. § 703.

Alfonso Perez claims the respondents violated the APA by revoking his

parole without considering the facts and circumstances. The respondents

argue Alfonso Perez is subject to mandatory detention due to ICE’s

discretionary decision to pursue expedited removal. But they do not claim ICE

examined the facts before making that decision, nor do they articulate any

explanation for it.

It is thus clear that ICE did not engage in reasoned decision-making

here. ICE has not shown it considered any relevant facts when revoking

Alfonso Perez’s parole and detaining him. Nor have the respondents offered

any explanation, satisfactory or otherwise, for that decision. And the decision

to designate Alfonso Perez for expedited removal violates the INA because

noncitizens who have been paroled into the country are not eligible for

expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). Alfonso Perez’s detention is

unlawful because it is based on a set of arbitrary and capricious decisions in

violation of the APA.

F. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds Alfonso Perez’s detention

violates the Constitution and the APA.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Ernesto Alfonso Perez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

GRANTED.

1. The respondents shall release Alfonso Perez from custody within

24 hours of this Order. The respondents shall facilitate Alfonso Perez’s

transportation from the detention facility by notifying his counsel when and

where he can be collected.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on December 2, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

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