Hausner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

PATRICIA HAUSNER, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. RDB-25-1097

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL *

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION,

and TOTE SERVICES, LLC, *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This admiralty and maritime dispute arises from an injury that Plaintiff Patricia Hausner

(“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Hausner”) sustained in April 2023 while working as a crewmember aboard

vessels allegedly owned, operated, possessed, or controlled by Defendants United States of

America (the “United States”), United States Department of Transportation Federal Maritime

Administration (“MARAD”), and Tote Services, LLC (“Tote”), (collectively, “Defendants”).

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 3, 7.) Ms. Hausner alleges that, at the time of her injury, Defendants

employed her as a utility deck and engineer seaman. (Id. ¶ 3.) Ms. Hausner initiated this action

on April 3, 2025, by filing in this Court a four-Count Complaint against Defendants, alleging

Jones Act1 negligence (Count I); negligence or unseaworthiness under general maritime law

1 The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq., commonly known as the Jones Act, extends the

Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) to seamen. See O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S.

36, 38–40 (1943). Although traditional maritime law did not allow seamen a right to recovery for injury, under

the Jones Act, seamen may bring personal injury actions against their employers for injuries sustained in the

course of their employment. Id. at 38–41.

(Count II); maintenance and cure (Count III); and that she filed an administrative claim with

MARAD and Tote on March 28, 2025, (Count IV).2 (Id. at 2–5.)

Presently pending before this Court is the United States’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint (ECF No. 14) (“United States’ Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”) pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United

States also seeks dismissal of the claims alleged against MARAD and Tote on the basis that

Ms. Hausner’s sole remedy is against the United States. Plaintiff has responded in Opposition

(ECF No. 21), and the United States has replied (ECF No. 22). The parties’ submissions have

been reviewed, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Ms. Hausner’s

claims run counter to previous rulings of this Court. For the reasons set forth below, the

United States’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is

DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the

Plaintiff’s Complaint and construes those facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.

Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v.

Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)).

Ms. Hausner’s claims arise from an injury she sustained while working aboard two

vessels allegedly owned and operated by Defendants. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2–4, 7.) Ms. Hausner

2 Only the first three Counts of Ms. Hausner’s Complaint contain titled claims, but her fourth and final Count

appears to allege that she filed an administrative claim on March 28, 2025. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17–18.) Additionally,

although Ms. Hausner does not specifically label her Jones Act and general maritime law claims in Counts I and

II, she alleges negligence and unseaworthiness as the substance of her allegations as to those claims. See, e.g.,

(id. ¶¶ 8–9, 12–13).

alleges that she was employed by Defendants as a utility deck and engineer seaman required

to work as a member of the crew aboard the vessel DENEBOLA. (Id. ¶ 3.) In order to access

land from DENEBOLA, however, Ms. Hausner was required to walk to a second vessel,

ANTERES, which was tethered next to DENEBOLA and accessible via a gangway aboard

the ANTERES. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.) Thus, Ms. Hausner had to utilize the gangway of the ANTERES

to obtain access to the pier, which in turn provided access to land. (Id.) She alleges that, at all

relevant times, DENEBOLA and ANTERES were vessels of the United States registry

owned, operated, and/or in the possession and control of Defendants.3 (Id. ¶ 2.)

Ms. Hausner alleges that on or about April 14, 2023, she was attempting to reach the

pier area by walking cross the deck of the DENEBOLA to the ANTERES via the ANTERES’

gangway between the two vessels. (Id. ¶ 7.) She alleges that the gangway was “bouncy and

defective,” “not properly rigged,” “unstable,” and “unsafe and unseaworthy” such that it

“buckled” while she was descending. (Id.) As a result, her hand collided with the gangway’s

stanchion, which resulted in serious and permanent injury to her hand. (Id.) She alleges that

her injury requires ongoing medical care and attention and continues to cause her significant

pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, permanent disability, and significant lost earnings.

(Id. ¶ 9.)

3 Courts generally construe the term “public vessel” to include vessels owned and operated by the United

States, including through MARAD. See Favorite v. Marine Personnel & Provisioning, Inc., 955 F.2d 382, 385, 385–

86 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining Public Vessels Act does not clearly define “public vessel” and discussing meaning

of public vessel (quoting Santos v. RCA Serv. Co., 603 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. La. 1985))); see generally United

States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976) (discussing merchant vessels and public vessels). In this

case, Ms. Hausner alleges that both DENEBOLA and ANTERES are “owned, operated and/or” possessed

and controlled by United States, MARAD, and Tote. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged that

DENEBOLA and ANTERES are public vessels and, consistent with its obligations at this pleading stage, this

Court accepts such allegations as true. See Wikimedia Found., 857 F.3d at 208 (citing SD3, LLC, 801 F.3d at

422).

On March 28, 2025, Ms. Hausner filed an administrative claim with MARAD and Tote.

(Id. ¶ 18; ECF No. 14-2.) Six days later, on April 3, 2025, she initiated the instant action by

filing in this Court her four-Count Complaint invoking this Court’s maritime and admiralty

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) On May 19, 2025, the United States timely filed its Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 14) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Hausner timely filed her

Opposition (ECF No. 21), and the United States has replied (ECF No. 22). This matter is

now ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges a court’s authority to hear the matter brought by

a complaint. See Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). This challenge

under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed either as a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations in

the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge,

asserting “that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.” Kerns v. United

States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.

1982)). In a facial challenge like the one at issue in this case, a court will grant a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “where a claim fails to allege facts upon which

the court may base jurisdiction.” Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (citing Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F.

Supp. 676, 679 (D. Md. 1996)).

ANALYSIS

In its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), the United States argues that dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate as to all Defendants. (Id. at 1.) First, it contends

that Ms. Hausner’s claims against the United States must be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction due to failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 14-1 at

4–6.) It argues that dismissal should be without leave to amend because the applicable statute

of limitations has run, so any amendment now would be futile.4 (Id. at 6–7.) Second, it

contends that MARAD and Tote must be dismissed as defendants in this matter because,

under the governing federal statutes, Ms. Hausner’s exclusive remedy lies against the United

States. (Id. at 8–9.) In Opposition, Ms. Hausner contends that the United States’ arguments

are premature because the applicability of the administrative exhaustion requirement depends

on the fact-intensive inquiry of whether she was an “employee of the United States.” See (ECF

No. 21 at 1–7). Alternatively, she asserts that even if her claims are subject to administrative

requirements, this Court should apply equitable tolling to allow such claims to proceed despite

her failure to exhaust administrative remedies within the applicable limitations period. (Id. at

1–5, 6–7.) As explained further below, Ms. Hausner has failed to timely exhaust her

administrative remedies such that her Complaint must be dismissed.

As an initial matter, the parties’ dispute of jurisdiction implicitly invokes the United

States’ waiver of sovereign immunity in admiralty suits. “[S]overeign immunity deprives

federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to

sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ackerson

4 As explained further below, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice. See,

e.g., S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir.

2013) (“A dismissal for lack of standing—or any other defect in subject matter jurisdiction—must be one without

prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the

merits.” (emphasis added)).

v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207 (5th Cir. 2009)). As Judge Xinis of this Court has

explained, “[i]t is fundamental that the United States enjoys immunity from suit unless

expressly waived.” Sys. Applications & Techs., Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 3d 73, 80 (D.

Md. 2020) (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). Congress may waive the United

States’ sovereign immunity by statute. See, e.g., Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v.

Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 50–51 (2024) (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity under Fair Credit

Reporting Act). Where Congress conditions waiver of sovereign immunity upon exhaustion

of administrative remedies, however, “any failure to exhaust bars suit in this Court.” Sys.

Applications & Techs., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 3d at 80.

Ms. Hausner’s claims in this case rest at the intersection of three statutes that waive the

United States’ sovereign immunity to “establish the scope of this Court’s power to

hear . . . claims involving operations of seagoing vessels:” (1) the Public Vessels Act (“PVA”),

46 U.S.C. §§ 31101, et seq.; (2) the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901, et seq.;

and (3) the Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4701, et seq. Sys. Applications & Techs., Inc., 491 F.

Supp. 3d at 80 (first citing 41 U.S.C. § 7102(d); and then citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 30903–01, 31102–

03). The SAA and PVA “permit admiralty suits to be brought against the United States for

causes of action arising out of the operation of vessels owned by or operated for the United

States.” Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253, 1255 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1995). The SAA waives

sovereign immunity in “case[s] in which, if a vessel were privately owned or operated, or if

cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a

civil action in admiralty could be maintained.” 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a). The SAA contains an

exclusivity provision under which:

If a remedy is provided by this chapter, it shall be exclusive of any other action

arising out of the same subject matter against the officer, employee, or agent of

the United States or the federally-owned corporation whose act or omission

gave rise to the claim.

46 U.S.C. § 30904. The PVA similarly waives sovereign immunity to allow admiralty actions

against the United States “for ‘damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.’” Sys.

Applications & Techs., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 3d at 81 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 31102). Significantly, the

PVA incorporates the SAA such that “[w]here the PVA or the SAA provides a remedy against

the United States, there is no recourse against the government agent whose actions engendered

the lawsuit.” Servis v. Hiller Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Manuel, 50 F.3d

at 1255); see also 46 U.S.C. § 31103 (“A civil action under [PVA] is subject to the provisions of

[the SAA] except to the extent inconsistent with the [PVA].”).

The Clarification Act expands the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity under

the SAA to include “suits for ‘death, injuries, illness, maintenance, and cure’ brought by

seamen ‘employed on United States [] vessels as employees of the United States . . . .’” Kelly v.

United States, 579 F. Supp. 3d 751, 757 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 4701). It “allows

seamen employed on vessels owned, operated or chartered by the United States to recover for

injuries as if they were employed on privately-owned American vessels.” Id. (quoting Morales

v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 84, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) aff’d 38 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 1994)). Put

differently, “[t]he Act creates the legal fiction of an employment relationship between the

seamen serving on federally owned vessels and the federal government in order to create tort

liability under the SAA.” Id. (quoting Raible v. Campbell, 911 F. Supp. 185, 187 (E.D.N.C.

1996)). Unlike the SAA, which applies to “agents” of the United States, therefore, the

Clarification Act applies only where there exists “an employment relationship between the

seam[a]n . . . and the federal government . . . .” Id. (quoting Raible, 911 F. Supp. at 187). This

generally includes claims of seamen who entered contracts to work aboard vessels “owned,

operated or chartered by the United States.”5 Id.

Seamen raising claims governed by this overlapping statutory scheme must satisfy the

procedural requirements of each statute. As relevant to the instant matter, the SAA imposes

a two-year statute of limitations, 46 U.S.C. § 30905, while the Clarification Act requires

plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing claims in federal court, 50 U.S.C. §

4701(a). Before a plaintiff may file a civil action in admiralty for a claim subject to the

Clarification Act, (1) she must file an administrative claim with MARAD; and (2) that claim

must be “administratively disallowed,” meaning that MARAD either disallows the claim in

writing or creates a presumption of disallowance by failing to address the claim within 60 days

of receiving it. 50 U.S.C. § 4701(a); 46 C.F.R. §§ 327.3, 327.6, 327.7. Importantly, because

these statutes govern the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity, their requirements “are

to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.” McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27

(1951); accord Servis, 54 F.3d at 209 (citing McMahon, 342 U.S. at 27). To properly file a claim

subject to the Clarification Act and SAA, therefore, a plaintiff must satisfy administrative

exhaustion requirements and initiate her civil suit within the SAA’s two-year statute of

limitations. Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 758 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30905). That is, if a plaintiff fails

to complete the administrative exhaustion requirements within the two-year limitations period,

5 As discussed further below, courts have applied varying definitions of when a privately owned vessel chartered

to the United States qualifies as a public vessel subject to the Clarification Act. See, e.g., Williams v. Cent. Gulf

Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1060–61 (5th Cir. 1989) (surveying cases); Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446

(1953) (holding privately owned vessel chartered to the United States was not a “public vessel” because it was

privately owned and operated).

her civil action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the United States only waived

sovereign immunity for timely exhausted claims. See Hebert v. United States, 53 F.3d 720, 722

(5th Cir. 1995) (dismissing civil action filed “less than 60 days before the expiration of the

statute of limitations for [the] legal claim” and before administrative claim had been

administratively disallowed); accord Morales v. United States, 38 F.3d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1994).

I. Applicability of Administrative Exhaustion Requirement

Under this coordinated statutory scheme, this Court’s jurisdiction of Ms. Hausner’s

claims depends on the threshold inquiry of whether she was an “employed on [a] United

States . . . vessel[] as [an] employee[] of the United States” such that her claims are subject to

the Clarification Act. 50 U.S.C. § 4701(a). In its Motion to Dismiss, the United States

contends that the Clarification Act governs, and Ms. Hausner failed to timely exhaust her

administrative remedies because she filed this action before her claim to MARAD was

administratively disallowed. (ECF No. 14-1 at 5–6.) The United States asserts that her claims

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissal should be without leave to amend

because the limitations period has now expired. (Id. at 6–7.) Specifically, it argues that

jurisdiction did not exist at the time Ms. Hausner filed her Complaint and the subsequent

termination of the limitations period renders futile any amendment. (ECF No. 22 at 1; ECF

No. 14-1 at 6–7.) Finally, it contends that under the exclusivity provisions of the PVA and

SAA, Ms. Hausner’s sole remedy lies with the United States such that her claims against

MARAD and Tote must be dismissed. (ECF No. 14-1 at 7–8.) In Opposition, Ms. Hausner

argues that dismissal on these bases is premature because she is entitled to discovery to

determine whether she is an “agent” of the United States subject only to the SAA and PVA

or an “employee” of the United States subject to the Clarification Act and its administrative

exhaustion requirements. (ECF No. 21 at 1–5.) Alternatively, she contends that even if she

is an “employee” subject to the Clarification Act, the Court should apply equitable tolling to

allow her claims to proceed. (Id. at 6–7.) As explained further below, Ms. Hausner’s claims

are subject to the Clarification Act, and equitable tolling is not applicable in this case.

Few courts have directly addressed whether the Clarification Act governs a seaman’s

claims for injuries sustained aboard a public vessel owned by the United States but operated

by a private company under contract with MARAD. Notably, many of the applicable cases

relate to private employers’ liability for injuries sustained by seamen aboard vessels operated

by MARAD’s predecessor agency, the War Shipping Administration, during World War II.

See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791, 794–95 (1949) (explaining that

only one “person, firm, or corporation”—“[e]ither [the private employer] or the

Government”—“can be sued as employer” under the Jones Act and, after the Clarification

Act, the appropriate employer depends on the contracts and relationship between the parties);

Fink v. Shepard S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 810 (1949) (determining Clarification Act prevented liability

of general agent as private employer). More recently, this Court and others have held that the

Clarification Act governs claims by a seaman employed aboard a public vessel by a private

employer that has contracted with MARAD. See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 3d 751,

757 (D. Md. 2022) (holding Clarification Act governed seaman’s claims because he was

“employed on a public vessel, and his claims [we]re for injuries and maintenance and cure”);

Martin v. Miller, 65 F.3d 434, 443, 440 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that contract with private

employer did not preclude application of Clarification Act to seaman’s claims because “[t]he

form of the employer-employee relationship is not dispositive . . . of the question whether she

is a seaman within the terms of the Clarification Act”); Madry v. Interocean Am. Shipping Corp.,

2009 WL 1765652, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009) (holding Clarification Act applied to claims

where private-employer defendant “submitted uncontroverted evidence that the [vessel at

issue] is owned by MARAD and is a public vessel of the United States”); Davis v. United States,

2005 WL 8173915, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 2005) (“As a seaman aboard a vessel owned by

and operated for the Marine Administration [MARAD], the Plaintiff is an employee of the

United States.” (citing Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 337 U.S. at 800)).

Plaintiff acknowledges that this Court has previously applied the Clarification Act to

claims brought by a seaman employed aboard a public vessel by a private employer who

contracted with MARAD, but she urges this Court to conduct its own statutory analysis to

reach a contrary conclusion.6 See (ECF No. 21 at 4–5). Ms. Hausner fails, however, to identify

any cases in which courts have declined to apply the Clarification Act on the basis that the

determination of whether the plaintiff was an “employee” of the United States required

additional discovery. Indeed, as explained above, federal district and appellate courts

consistently apply the Clarification Act to claims by seamen employed under nearly identical

circumstances. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 1540, 1541, 1545 (S.D. Ga. 1995)

(dismissing claim against private employer but suggesting claim against United States could

proceed based on Clarification Act); Morales v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 84, 85–86 (E.D.N.Y.

6 In Kelly v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 3d 751 (D. Md. 2022), this Court considered the Clarification Act’s

application in remarkably similar circumstances. Specifically, it determined that claims by a seaman employed

by Tote “on a MARAD vessel” were subject to the Clarification Act. Id. at 754, 758 & n.10. This Court notes,

however, that the court in Kelly appeared to have access to the contracts governing the relationship between

the plaintiff, Tote, MARAD, and the United States. See id. at 758 n.10.

1993) aff’d 38 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Clarification Act to claim by plaintiff

“injured . . . while employed as a seaman aboard . . . a vessel owned by the United States

through [MARAD] and operated pursuant to a contract by its general agent, American

President Lines, Ltd.”); O’Connell v. Interocean Mgmt. Corp., 90 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1996)

(“[Plaintiff’s] claims, which are based on an injury sustained while employed as a crew member

of a vessel owned by the United States (through MARAD), are governed by the Clarification

Act, which incorporates the Suits in Admiralty Act[.]” (internal citations omitted)). These

decisions reflect that “[t]he form of the employer-employee relationship is not dispositive .

. . of the question of whether [the plaintiff] is a seaman within the terms of the Clarification

Act.” Martin, 65 F.3d at 440 n.3 (citing Doyle v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 504 F.2d 911, 913–14 (5th

Cir. 1974)); Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (determining the Clarification Act applies to seamen

directly employed by private employer on public vessel operated for MARAD because “[t]he

Act creates the legal fiction of an employment relationship” (quoting Raible, 911 F. Supp. at

187).

In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that the “United States of America, [MARAD], and

Tote Services, Inc., owned, operated and/or had in their possession and control the vessels

DENEBOLA and ANTERES, vessels of the United States registry.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.)

Additionally, the administrative claim that she filed with MARAD identifies Defendant Tote

as the ship manager/general agent of DENEBOLA and ANTERES, and states that she is

employed aboard “DENEBOLA – U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION.” (ECF No. 14-2 at 2.)7 Although early applications of

the Clarification Act contemplated evaluation of the specific contracts governing a plaintiff’s

relationship with a general agent and the general agent’s relationship with the United States,

see, e.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 337 U.S. at 799–800, courts subsequently applying these

precedents have consistently applied the Clarification Act to claims by seamen contracted by

private employers serving as general agents for MARAD with little or no reference to the

contracts governing the parties’ employment or agency relationships, see, e.g., Kelly, 579 F. Supp.

3d at 757–58; Martin, 65 F.3d at 440 n.3; Madry, 2009 WL 1765652, at *2; Kasprik v. United

States, 87 F.3d 462, 464–65 (11th Cir. 1996); O’Connell, 90 F.3d at 85; Morales, 866 F. Supp. at

87.8 Accordingly, Ms. Hausner’s claims for injuries sustained aboard a vessel owned by the

United States, through MARAD, but operated by a private general agent are governed by the

Clarification Act. See Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 464–65 (“[S]eam[e]n’s claims arising from

7 As Judge Hurson of this Court recently explained, in a facial challenge to jurisdiction like that at issue here,

“the Court looks only at the complaint and assumes the facts therein to be true.” McMillan v. Kansas City Life

Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 3d 443, 454 (D. Md. 2025) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).

Even where a court is limited to consideration of the pleadings, however, it may consider an authentic document

attached to a motion to dismiss and incorporated by reference in the plaintiff’s complaint or integral to the

complaint. See Gaines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2016). In this case, Ms. Hausner

referenced her administrative MARAD claim in her Complaint without attaching the claim itself, (ECF No. 1

¶ 18), and the United States attached to its Motion to Dismiss a copy of her administrative claim (ECF No. 14-

2). The administrative claim is thus appropriate for this Court’s consideration as referenced in and integral to

Ms. Hausner’s Complaint because it provides a jurisdictional prerequisite to her claims.

8 Many of these cases either do not reference the relevant contracts at all, see, e.g., Madry, 2009 WL 1765652, or

relegate any reference to such contracts to a brief footnote, see, e.g., Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 758 n.10; Martin,

65 F.3d at 440 n.3. Nor is this Court persuaded by Ms. Hausner’s argument that additional discovery is required

to determine the “degree of operational control exercised by the United States.” Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 756;

see (ECF No. 21 at 2 (first citing Servis v. Hiller Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 203, 207–09 (4th Cir. 1995); and then citing

Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 756).) The cases that Ms. Hausner cites for this proposition discuss operational control

only as a factor relevant to determining whether the SAA’s exclusivity provision applies to the claims, not

whether the Clarification Act governs such claims. See Kelly, F. Supp. 3d at 756 (discussing exclusivity provisions

of PVA and SAA); Servis, 54 F.3d at 207–09 (discussing claims under SAA without reference to Clarification

Act).

employment aboard vessels owned by the United States are governed by the Clarification Act,

and enforced pursuant to the terms of the [SAA].”).

II. Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies under the

Clarification Act prior to filing this action

As explained above, under the Clarification Act, this Court only has jurisdiction of Ms.

Hausner’s claims if she has filed an administrative claim with MARAD and that claim has been

“administratively disallowed” either by formal writing from MARAD or by its failure to

address the claim within sixty days of filing. See 50 U.S.C. § 4701(a); 46 C.F.R. §§ 327.3, 327.6,

327.7; see also Hebert v. United States, 53 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining “substantial

compliance [with the Clarification Act’s administrative requirements] is not enough”).

Additionally, under the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), a plaintiff must file her claim within

the two years of her injury. 46 U.S.C. § 30905. Taken together, therefore, these statutes

require that a plaintiff both exhaust administrative remedies and file her properly exhausted

claim within two years of the injury. Where a plaintiff does not timely exhaust administrative

remedies, the United States retains sovereign immunity and this Court lacks jurisdiction of the

unexhausted claims. Kelly v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 3d 751, 758 (D. Md. 2022); see also Smith

v. United States, 873 F.2d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Clarification Act unmistakably

prohibits [plaintiffs] from filing a claim in federal court before obtaining an administrative

disallowance.”). In this case, Ms. Hausner failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies

and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over her claims.

As explained above, an administrative claim is “administratively disallowed”—and thus

exhausted—under the Clarification Act in either of two paths: (1) MARAD gives notice “in

writing” of administrative disallowance, 46 C.F.R. § 327.6, or (2) MARAD “fails to give written

notice of allowance or disallowance of a claim . . . within sixty (60) calendar days following the

date of the receipt of such claim by the proper person designated . . . ,” 46 C.F.R. § 327.7. In

this case, only the first avenue to exhaustion is possible because Ms. Hausner filed the instant

action on April 3, 2025, just six days after she filed her administrative claim with MARAD on

March 28, 2025. See (ECF No. 1; id. ¶ 18; ECF No. 14-2). Her claim is not exhausted under

the first path, however, because she does not allege that MARAD provided notice in writing

that her claim had been administratively disallowed before she filed the instant lawsuit.

Moreover, because Ms. Hausner’s injury occurred on April 14, 2023, (ECF No. 1 ¶ 7; ECF

No. 14-2 at 1, 2), she had to both file this action and satisfy the Clarification Act’s

administrative requirements on or before April 14, 2025. See Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 758; 46

U.S.C. § 30905 (imposing two-year limitations period); 50 U.S.C. § 4701 (imposing

administrative exhaustion requirement). Although Ms. Hausner filed this action within two

years of her injury, she did so without the administrative exhaustion prerequisite to this Court’s

jurisdiction of her claims. Kelly, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 758.

Notwithstanding her failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Ms. Hausner argues in

the alternative that her claims should be subject to equitable tolling because more than sixty

days have now passed since she filed her claim with MARAD, and she filed her lawsuit within

the limitations period imposed under SAA.9 (ECF No. 21 at 5–7.) The party seeking equitable

9 Where a statute of limitations is jurisdictional, it cannot be subjected to equitable tolling. See United States v.

Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408–09 (2015). There appears to exist a circuit split regarding whether the limitations

period under SAA is jurisdictional and, therefore, not subject to equitable tolling. Compare Hedges v. United States,

404 F.3d 744 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding SAA limitations period is not jurisdictional and could be equitably tolled);

Wilson v. United States Gov’t, 23 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1994) (suggesting SAA limitations period could be equitably

tolled); Raziano v. United States, 999 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1993) (suggesting SAA limitations period could be

equitably tolled); Favorite v. Marine Pers. & Provisioning, Inc., 955 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1992) (same) with Smith v.

United States, 873 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding SAA limitations period is jurisdictional); States Marine Corp.

tolling bears the burden to prove her entitlement to such tolling. Warfaa v. Ali, 1 F.4th 289,

294 (4th Cir. 2021). Specifically, she must establish “(1) that [s]he has been pursuing h[er]

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in h[er] way and

prevented timely filing.” Id. (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S.

250, 255 (2016)); see also Irwin v. Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“We have allowed

equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by

filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been

induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.”).

The Supreme Court has explained that “the diligence prong . . . covers those affairs within the

litigant’s control; the extraordinary-circumstances prong, by contrast, is meant to cover

matters outside [her] control.” Menominee Indian Tribe, 577 U.S. at 257. Thus, “the second

prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s

delay are both extraordinary and beyond its control.” Id.

In the context of the SAA, this Court has construed extraordinary circumstances to

require “instances of serious and affirmative government misconduct . . . .” Ammer v. United

States, 881 F. Supp. 1007, 1012 (D. Md. 1994) aff’d 1995 WL 318771 (4th Cir. May 26, 1995);

of Del. v. United States, 283 F.2d 776, 778–79 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding expiration of SAA limitations period

extinguishes claim because SAA waives sovereign immunity). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

has not yet squarely addressed whether the SAA limitations period is jurisdictional, but it has suggested that

insanity is not sufficient to toll the limitations period. See Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129, 132 (4th Cir.

1955). But see Owens v. United States, 91 F.3d 132, 1996 WL 386607, at *1 (4th Cir. July 1, 1996) (unpublished)

(“The two year limitations period under the Suits in Admiralty Act, which also applies to suits under the Public

Vessels Act through 46 U.S.C. § 78, is jurisdictional.” (citing Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.

1955))). Nevertheless, this Court has previously assumed that equitable tolling may apply to the SAA limitations

period, see Ammer v. United States, 881 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Md. 1994) aff’d 1995 WL 318771 (4th Cir. May 26,

1995), and most federal courts of appeal have determined that the limitations period is non-jurisdictional. See

Hedges, 404 F.3d at 748 (collecting cases). In this case, this Court need not determine this issue because, even

assuming that equitable tolling could apply, Ms. Hausner has not shown that such tolling is appropriate.

see also Farhat v. United States, 2022 WL 2840483,at *6 (10th Cir. July 21, 2022) (suggesting that

even the government’s decision to intentionally mislead a plaintiff regarding the SAA’s

limitations period would be insufficient to obtain equitable tolling if plaintiff were not diligent).

Moreover, federal appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the assertion that the government’s

knowledge of a claim due to the existence of pre-suit administrative proceedings or settlement

negotiations justifies equitable tolling. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893, 898–99

(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s filing of administrative claim did not equitably toll SAA

limitations period); Raziano v. United States, 999 F.2d 1539, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding

government’s knowledge of claim due to pre-suit settlement negotiations did not equitably toll

SAA limitations period); Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751–52 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining

to “deviate from . . . precedents” that filing of administrative claim under FTCA does not toll

SAA limitations period); cf. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1951) (holding that

the SAA’s limitations period begins from the date of the injury and not from the date of

disallowance of the administrative claim).

In this case, Ms. Hausner simply has not demonstrated that she diligently pursued her

claim but was unable to timely file this action due to circumstances beyond her control.

Indeed, she does not identify any government misconduct that prevented her from filing her

administrative claim with MARAD with sufficient time to allow, at minimum, for the sixty-

day waiting period required to obtain the presumption of administrative disallowance under

the Clarification Act. Rather, she contends that equitable tolling will not prejudice Defendants

because her MARAD claim provided timely notice of her claim, and initial filing of her

administrative claim was delayed by her ongoing medical treatment. (ECF No. 21 at 6–7.)

Specifically, she asserts that the regulations governing MARAD claims require her to “include

a ‘sum certain dollar amount’ which is specifically itemized for various categories of damages

including both her past and future medical expenses, as well as a copy of all of her medical

records.” (ECF No. 21 at 6–7 (quoting 46 C.F.R. § 327.4(b)(3), (4)).) As discussed above, the

government’s awareness of a claim prior to suit is insufficient to justify equitable tolling, and

Ms. Hausner’s assertions regarding her medical treatment are insufficient to demonstrate the

extraordinary circumstances required for such tolling. See Williams, 711 F.2d at 898–99 (filing

of administrative claim is insufficient for equitable tolling); Ammer, 881 F. Supp. at 1012

(equitable tolling is inappropriate absent affirmative government misconduct).

Finally, Ms. Hausner has not demonstrated that she diligently pursued her claims.

“[T]he principles of equitable tolling . . . do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim

of excusable neglect.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. “Where, as here, the plaintiff had ample time and

opportunity to bring suit within the statutory period, enlarging the limitations period would

defeat the SAA’s legislative purpose.” Rashidi v. Am. President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir.

1996). Diligent pursuit of claims typically includes filing administrative claims with sufficient

time to allow a plaintiff to satisfy exhaustion requirements before the termination of the

limitations period. Accordingly, Ms. Hausner has not met her burden to establish that

equitable tolling is justified in this case, and her claims are now time-barred.

III. Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy lies with the United States

Finally, because Ms. Hausner’s claims are subject to the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”),

her exclusive remedy lies with the United States. As discussed above, the SAA mandates that

“where a remedy is provided by [the SAA] it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action

by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or employee of the United

States . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253,

1255 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 745). “This exclusivity provision precludes recovery

against an agent of the United States operating a government-owned vessel on any claim for

which the SAA or the PVA provides a remedy against the United States.” Id.; accord Servis v.

Hiller Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 203, 207, 209 (4th Cir. 1995). For the reasons discussed above, Ms.

Hausner’s claims in this case are subject to the SAA, PVA, and Clarification Act. Accordingly,

her exclusive remedy lies with the United States, and her claims against MARAD and Tote

must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is

GRANTED. Dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are necessarily without

prejudice. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713

F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, the Court notes that Ms. Hausner’s claim is now

barred by the SAA’s two-year statute of limitations such that any amendment would be futile.

A separate Order follows.

Date: December 1st, 2025 /s/

Richard D. Bennett

United States Senior District Judge