The opinion
NOTICE
2025 IL App (5th) 250720-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 12/02/25. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0720 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County.
)
v. ) No. 25-CF-190
)
ERIC D. NABORS, ) Honorable
) Jerry E. Crisel,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial
release and denying the defendant’s motion for relief are affirmed.
¶2 The defendant, Eric D. Nabors, appeals from the September 3, 2025, order of the circuit
court of Jefferson County denying his motion for relief and immediate release and the August 26,
2025, order granting the State’s petition to deny him pretrial release.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 25, 2025, the defendant was charged by information with one count of
aggravated discharge of a firearm, a Class 1 felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon, a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2024); Id. § 24-1.1(a). The
same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny the defendant pretrial release, stating he was
1
charged with a qualifying offense and that his pretrial release would pose a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons of the community.
¶5 The matter proceeded to a hearing on August 26, 2025. At the hearing, the State first recited
the defendant’s criminal history. The defendant had four prior convictions for driving on a
suspended license, two prior Class 2 felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance in
Jefferson County, and a federal conviction for distribution of crack-cocaine. The State proffered
that Officer James of the Mt. Vernon Police Department would testify that on August 21, 2025, at
10:35 p.m., she responded to the 700 block of Conger for gunshots in the area. Upon arrival, she
saw a large crowd at the scene. The crowd indicated they heard gunshots, but there was no
indication that anyone saw an offender. Officer James located six shell casings on the roadway at
the 800 block of Conger. The shell casings were collected into evidence and photographed. Police
obtained video surveillance footage of the 800 block of Conger showing several people gathering
at 7:35 p.m. A black male in dark clothing exited the residence of 806 Conger at 10:36 p.m. while
a red Chrysler Pacifica arrived at the same time. A black male with long dreadlocks, wearing a
blue t-shirt with red shorts that had black and white cuffs at the bottom, exited the front passenger
seat of the red Chrysler Pacifica. The two black males fired six or seven gunshots total toward the
crowd. The video depicts multiple muzzle flashes from both individuals, then shows them running
west down Conger.
¶6 Earlier that same day, at 12:47 p.m., Detective Osborn had contact with the defendant at
1118 S. 13th Street in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, from an unrelated investigation. Nabors had dreadlocks
and wore a blue shirt and red shorts with black and white cuffs at the bottom, and a body camera
captured the interaction.
2
¶7 On August 22, 2025, one day after the shooting, police located the red Chrysler Pacifica
behind the residence where police had made contact with the defendant on the day of the shooting.
A search warrant was executed on the residence the same day. The defendant and Korinthian Davis
were taken into custody and interviewed at the police station. During the interview, the police
informed the defendant that they had located a 9-millimeter pistol under the mattress in his room.
The defendant admitted to possessing the firearm and placing it under the mattress that day but did
not know whether the firearm was stolen. The defendant described the shooting but stated that he
was unaware of any conflict and did not know the identities of anyone present during the shooting.
The defendant told police that Davis had contacted him on the day of the shooting and told him
that he had “some things going on and was scared.” The defendant admitted to being at the scene
of the shooting and stated that he and Davis entered the same vehicle after the shooting. The
defendant stated he did not know how many shots Davis fired and did not see Davis with a firearm
when they returned to the residence.
¶8 Davis told the police that the defendant was his cousin and that he was at the defendant’s
house when he saw approximately 10 individuals outside the residence knocking on the door.
Davis did not have any animosity towards any of the individuals, and he did not know what started
the incident. Davis admitted to exiting the residence and discharging the firearm to protect himself.
He described the firearm and told the police they could recover the gun in a bag on the side of the
television in his room. The firearm was subsequently recovered.
¶9 Officers also interviewed Darin Williams, who was present at the residence when the
search warrant was executed. Williams was the owner of the red Chrysler Pacifica. Williams stated
that he drove the defendant to pick up Davis, who was having issues with a group of individuals.
The defendant was on the phone with Davis as they were driving to the residence, and when they
3
arrived, the defendant exited the vehicle as Davis came out of the residence. Shortly thereafter,
gunfire erupted. Williams panicked and squatted near his vehicle. He then drove to pick up the
defendant and Davis, who had fled the scene on foot. Williams stated that the defendant and Davis
were shooting, but that no one in the group of individuals ever shot back. Lastly, he stated that
Davis discarded the firearm in the weeds near the residence and that the defendant’s firearm might
still be in the defendant’s room.
¶ 10 The 9-millimeter handgun recovered from the defendant’s bedroom was fully loaded with
hollow point ammunition. Live rounds of ammunition were also found in Davis’s room, along
with the gun described by Davis. No one had reported being struck by the gunfire.
¶ 11 The State argued that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, as he had previously
been sentenced to prison and had been convicted of numerous felonies and traffic offenses in both
state and federal court. He was prohibited from possessing a firearm and yet was discharging one
in the direction of others. The likelihood of success at trial was incredibly high given the proffered
evidence. The defendant was facing a serious prison term and a mandatory prison sentence if
convicted on the unlawful possession of a weapon count. The State argued that pretrial detention
was necessary to protect the community and those “as-of-yet unidentified individuals” targeted by
the defendant and Davis. Further, the defendant should not be released where he could shoot at
someone else or where he could be shot by someone. The State argued that there were no
conditions available to prevent the defendant from further violating the law. His status as a
convicted felon was akin to a court order not to possess a firearm, and it had not deterred him from
acquiring a firearm. He would not adhere to orders that he remain on house arrest or not acquire
any more weapons. Additionally, the defendant was currently under bail conditions for a pending
case at the time of his arrest in this case.
4
¶ 12 Defense counsel proffered that the defendant was 40 years old and resided with his wife
and four children in Mt. Vernon, Illinois. He was a high school graduate, employed for three years,
lived in Jefferson County for 18 years, and had strong family ties to the community. He had only
one failure to appear in court, and that was because he had forgotten the case was still pending
against him. He argued that he would submit to any conditions of release, such as electronic
monitoring and home confinement.
¶ 13 The circuit court found that the defendant committed a detainable offense, and he posed a
real and present threat to the community. The court noted that the defendant was a high school
graduate, had ties to the community, and that he was employed. However, this was a very serious
offense involving gunfire in the direction of other people. There was a strong likelihood of
conviction, and if he were convicted, he would be facing mandatory jail time. If someone knows
they are likely going to prison, that raises a threat of flight. The court found his criminal history
was serious. The court did not know whether the guns were stolen. The defendant was a convicted
felon and he could not possess guns. The proffer did not inform the court as to why the shooting
occurred and there may still be a problem that existed, which concerned the court as to danger to
the public or to a particular individual. The defendant was out on bail conditions for a 2014 felony
charge. One of the conditions of bail was that he not violate the law. There was also an implicit
court order that he not possess a firearm if he were a convicted felon. The court did not believe
there was any combination of conditions that would assure the defendant abide by pretrial
conditions, and GPS or home confinement was not sufficient. The court then ordered him detained.
¶ 14 The defendant filed a motion for relief on August 27, 2025. The motion stated that the
circuit court erred in granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release where the State failed to
prove any of the three factors under the dangerousness standard. Specifically, he argued that (1) the
5
court failed to consider the defendant’s ties to the community, (2) the court failed to fully consider
the defendant’s willingness to abide by any terms of pretrial release, (3) no person was physically
injured during the alleged offense, (4) the court failed to fully consider the defendant’s
employment opportunities, and (5) the court failed to fully consider that the defendant had lived a
law abiding life for quite some time.
¶ 15 On September 3, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief
and the defendant’s preliminary hearing on the same date. At the outset, the following exchange
occurred between the circuit court and the parties:
“THE COURT: This matter comes on today for a hearing on the defense Motion
For Relief from the Court’s previous order denying pretrial release and also for preliminary
hearing, and I believe there’s an agreement that these be handled concurrently. Is that right,
[Defense Counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your honor.
THE COURT: And [Assistant State’s Attorney]?
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Judge.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I will state I believe that’s provided by
statute.
THE COURT: I think you’re right, actually. So I will show, then, a hearing on
defendant’s Motion for Relief and preliminary hearing. And the Court is aware that the
Motion for Relief, which is filed by the defense, but I believe it is still the State’s burden
of proof to show that the defendant should be released by clear and convincing evidence.
The counsel [sic] are both allowed to present their evidence by proffer if they desire,
and that the evidence is to be considered in its most liberal light in favor of the defendant.
And I believe that the State, then—I believe counsel have agreed the State will go first here
in carrying forward its preliminary hearing. So are you ready, [Assistant State’s Attorney]?
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: Is that all right with you, [Defense Counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, your Honor.”
6
The State called Detective Osborn for the preliminary hearing. Osborn testified consistently with
the State’s proffer at the initial detention hearing. Osborn added that, during the execution of the
search warrant at the defendant’s residence, they located the blue t-shirt, red shorts, and a pair of
Air Jordans like the ones the shooter was seen wearing in the video. After hearing the evidence
presented, the circuit court found probable cause for both charges.
¶ 16 In addressing the defendant’s motion for relief, defense counsel reiterated the arguments
raised at the initial detention hearing while contending that the court failed to fully consider the
defendant’s ties to the community, his willingness to abide by any terms of pretrial release, and
his employment opportunities. The State opposed the motion and asked the circuit court to consider
Osborn’s testimony, the charges, and the defendant’s criminal history. It argued consistently with
its arguments at the initial detention hearing.
¶ 17 The circuit court acknowledged several favorable factors for the defendant, including his
education, employment, family ties, and minimal prior failures to appear, but found these were
outweighed by the seriousness of the charges and the strength of the State’s case. The court
emphasized that the offenses involved a convicted felon possessing and discharging a firearm
toward people, conduct it deemed highly dangerous and indicative of disregard for human life. It
further noted the defendant’s criminal history and his refusal to disclose the firearm’s source as
additional concerns. Concluding that no conditions of release could adequately mitigate the risk to
public safety or prevent similar conduct, the court denied pretrial release. The defendant timely
appealed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the
defendant. OSAD filed a memorandum pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff.
7
Apr. 15, 2024) on behalf of the defendant. On appeal, the defendant raises two arguments: (1) the
circuit court erred when it failed to comply with the requirement that a probable cause hearing be
held as part of the detention hearing in accordance with the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) and (2) the
State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions could mitigate the risk
of danger posed by the defendant.
¶ 20 Pretrial release—including the conditions related thereto—is governed by Public Act 101-
652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending
various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting
effective date as September 18, 2023). A defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain
statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). Upon filing a timely, verified
petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions
would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or
prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. §§ 110-6.1(e), (f). The State or the
defendant may present evidence to the trial court by way of proffer based upon reliable
information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the
defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the trial court concludes the defendant poses a
real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or
there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).
¶ 21 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. Where the trial court
is asked to consider the testimony of live witnesses, and make factual findings, such as the State’s
8
burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that conditions of pretrial release would not
protect any person or the community, the defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid
prosecution, or the defendant failed to comply with previously ordered conditions of pretrial
release, our standard of review is the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶ 54. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). Alternatively, where the parties
to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or submission of documentary evidence,
this court stands in the same position as the trial court and may conduct its own independent review
of the proffered evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. In
the present matter, live testimony was presented during the probable cause hearing held
concurrently with the motion for relief hearing, so we will employ the manifest weight of the
evidence standard of review.
¶ 22 A defendant may be denied pretrial release only in certain limited situations. 725 ILCS
5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2024). After filing a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial
release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident
or the presumption great that (1) the defendant has committed a qualifying offense, (2) the
defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the
community or a flight risk, and (3) less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight
from prosecution. Id. §§ 110-6.1(e), (f).
¶ 23 Once a court determines that the defendant poses a threat to the safety of any individual or
the community, the trial court must determine whether the State has met its burden by clear and
9
convincing evidence, what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the
likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-
5(a). In reaching its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and
characteristics of the person; 1 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat
to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of
the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. The statute lists
no singular factor as dispositive. See id. The nature and circumstances of the underlying offense
is “just one factor to consider in determining whether the threat posed can be mitigated by
conditions of release.” People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 19.
¶ 24 The defendant first argues that the circuit court erred when it did not hold a probable cause
hearing as part of the detention hearing. The defendant cites section 110-6.1(b) of the Act in
support of his contention, which states in relevant part, “as part of the detention hearing, the court
shall determine whether there is probable cause the defendant has committed an offense.” 725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(b) (West 2024). He asserts that this claim is preserved for review where defense
counsel “raised it at the hearing on his motion for relief” by informing the circuit court that a
probable cause hearing was required by statute and “the circuit court and the parties addressed it
head on.” In the alternative, he requests that this issue be reviewed under the second-prong plain
1
The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of
sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A),
(B) (West 2024).
10
error. The State argues the defendant has waived the issue by failing to include the argument in his
written motion for relief. Additionally, the State argues the defendant mischaracterizes the
exchange between defense counsel and the circuit court, where it is clear defense counsel was not
raising the issue as an argument in support of its motion for relief but instead “acquiescence” to
the circuit court’s inquiry regarding conducting a preliminary hearing simultaneously with the
hearing on the motion for relief. We agree with the State.
¶ 25 Rule 604(h)(2) states, “Upon appeal, any issue not raised in the motion for relief, other
than errors occurring for the first time at the hearing on the motion for relief, shall be deemed
waived.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The language in 604(h)(2) is clear that we
are to consider waived any arguments not advanced in the motion for relief. People v. Nettles,
2024 IL App (4th) 240962, ¶ 33. Issues not raised in the motion for relief are waived and thereby
unreviewable under the doctrine of plain error. People v. Jackson, 2025 IL App (4th) 231311-U,
¶ 19; 2 Nettles, 2024 IL App (4th) 240962, ¶¶ 33-34. Allowing parties to raise an issue for the first
time on appeal would “allow a party to circumvent the rules and ignore the importance of first
placing the argument before the trial court.” People v. Drew, 2024 IL App (5th) 240697, ¶ 44.
¶ 26 Here, the defendant did not include in his motion for relief the argument that the circuit
court erred by failing to hold a preliminary hearing as part of the initial detention hearing, and the
discussion between defense counsel and the circuit court cannot be interpreted as the defendant
arguing this issue before the circuit court as grounds for relief. Instead, the discussion serves as an
agreement between the parties and the circuit court to hold a preliminary hearing simultaneously
with the hearing on the motion for relief. Because the defendant did not raise this argument at the
2
Nonprecedential Rule 23 orders issued on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive
purposes. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021).
11
initial hearing or the motion for relief hearing, we find that the argument is waived and thereby
unreviewable under the doctrine of plain error.
¶ 27 Next, the defendant claims that the State failed to establish, and the circuit court erred in
finding that no set of conditions would mitigate the defendant’s threat to the community if he were
released. Specifically, he argues that such a finding was in error where he (1) was fully employed,
(2) had lived as a law-abiding citizen for quite some time and had been on bail for a 10-year-old
case, and (3) supported his family and had two residences available where he could be placed on
home confinement and electronic monitoring.
¶ 28 Here, the circuit court found that no condition or combination of conditions, including
home confinement and electronic monitoring, could reasonably mitigate the danger the defendant
posed. The circuit court explicitly considered the defendant’s arguments and his ties to the
community but found that those facts were outweighed by the seriousness of the offense and the
strength of the State’s case. Further, the circuit court determined that the defendant was not likely
to comply with an order of release where the offense involved the discharge of a firearm for
unknown reasons, the defendant admitted to acquiring and possessing a firearm despite his status
as a felon, and that further acts of violence or retaliation against the defendant himself or the group
of individuals were possible. Based on the above facts, an opposite conclusion is not clearly
evident or the finding itself is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.
Therefore, we find that the trial court’s decision to detain the defendant was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 38, 43.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s orders of August 26, 2025,
and September 3, 2025.
12
¶ 31 Affirmed.
13