Opinion

PUSHEY

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 1, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.3%

affirming dismissal of a suit as frivolous where it alleged that prison officials took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back

How later courts described this case

  • affirming dismissal of a suit as frivolous where it alleged that prison officials took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back
  • standard of review when no timely and specific objections are filed
  • “The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTWAN L. RICHARDSON, )

Plaintiff,

Vv. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-448

) Judge Stephanie L. Haines

C.O. PUSHEY, ef al., ) Magistrate Judge Keith A. Pesto

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Presently before the Court is a Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff, Antwan Richardson

(“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 4) alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional

Officers Pushey, Hinebaugh, and Divens, and Deputy Warden Buzas (collectively “Defendants”).

Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Greene (“SCI-

Greene”). He contends that the Defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by

subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment, being deliberately indifferent to his need for

medical care, retaliating against him, and by denying his access to counsel and the courts. (/d. at

4).

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Pesto for proceedings in accordance with the

Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, and Local Civil Rule 72.D. Magistrate Judge Pesto

screened Plaintiffs Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed as frivolous without leave to amend. (ECF

No. 7). After careful review, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation.

A. Standard of Review

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to screen complaints brought

by prisoners in all in forma pauperis cases and to dismiss cases that are frivolous or that fail to

state a claim on which relief may be granted.' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(c)(1); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). These

statutes require the Court to review the Complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are

frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “[A] complaint...is

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 US.

319, 325 (1989). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint under these statutes for failure to

state a claim is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d

Cir. 1999); see also D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed. Appx. 70, 72-73 (3d Cir. 2011).

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, a complaint, including one filed by a pro se litigant, must include factual

allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[W]ithout some factual allegation in the

complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice’

but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d

224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). Applying this standard, a court must reject legal conclusions

unsupported by factual allegations, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements;” “labels and conclusions;” and “naked

assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations

omitted). Mere “possibilities” of misconduct are insufficient. Jd at 679. Nevertheless,

because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held

See ECF No. 1, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Memorandum Order

granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2).

to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of |

litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant.

B. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No.

4 at 4). His First Amendment claims are for retaliation and his Eighth Amendment claims are

based on denial of medical care and deliberate indifference. (/d.). He alleges that he sustained

headaches, migraines, neurological injuries, and “other unknown adverse side effects” as a result

of certain defendants pumping “toxic fumes” into his cell. (/d. at 6). He seeks 10 million dollars

in damages, in addition to punitive damages, an immediate transfer, and outside medical treatment.

(d.).

Magistrate Judge Pesto filed a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7) recommending

that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 4) be dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend. He

also recommended that Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining

order (ECF No. 5) be denied. Plaintiff was advised of the fourteen-day time period to file

objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 7 at 6); see 28 U.S.C.§ 636 (b)(1)(B)

and (C) and Local Civil Rule 72.D.2. Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension to reply to the Report

and Recommendation and to appoint counsel (ECF No. 9), which Judge Pesto denied. (ECF No.

10). Plaintiff filed no objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Upon review under the applicable “reasoned consideration” standard, see EEOC v. City of

Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (standard of review when no timely and specific

objections are filed), and pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.D.2, the Court will accept the findings

and recommendations of Magistrate Judge Pesto.

3 .

The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims as they are based on a delusional factual scenario.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A, a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if

it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or

delusional” factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also Deutsch v. United States, 67

F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of a suit as frivolous where it alleged that

prison officials took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

25, 32 (1992) (explaining that where a complaint alleges facts that are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful”

or “delusional,” it may be dismissed as frivolous); Pavalone v. Bush, No. 3:11-1620, 2012 WL

1569614, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted by Pavalone v.

Bush, No. 3:11-cv-1620, 2012 WL 1569791, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012) (stating “[w]ithin the

Third Circuit, courts have found that allegations which are considered fanciful, fantastic, and

delusional are to be dismissed as frivolous.”) (citations omitted). A “fantastic” or “delusional”

factual scenario is one where “the facts alleged rise to the level of irrational or the wholly

incredible[.]” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.

Here, Plaintiff claims that “truth serum” and toxic chemicals are being pumped into his cell

and are causing him to have headaches, migraines, loss of sleep, neurological problems, “and other

unknown adverse side effects that may be irreversible.” (ECF No. 4 p. 11). He alleges that

Defendants have acted deliberately indifferent to his side effects by throwing away his sick-call

forms and refusing to investigate any of the abuse complaints and abuse hotline calls he has made.

(Id. p. 12-15). He further alleges that certain defendants are retaliating against him by tampering

with his grievances and giving him “fake receipts” for such grievances. (/d. p. 11-12). These

grievances contain complaints about the toxic fumes as well as allegations that certain defendants

paid inmates to stab him in the neck and delay medical. (Id. p. 6-7).

Plaintiff presents the quintessential type of “delusional” allegations that district courts

cannot waste judicial resources entertaining. See Allen v. SCI Rockview, et al., No. 4:25-cv-01156,

2025 WL 3015789, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2025) (dismissing as delusional plaintiff's claims that

officials have been pumping unknown gas into his cell and body to “achieve a neural hijacking”).

Additionally, the Third Circuit instructs that “ifa complaint is vulnerable to [Rule] 12(b)(6)

dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be

inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations

omitted). Here, as shown above, amendment would be futile because Plaintiffs allegations are

delusional in nature. As such, Plaintiffs Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice because

amendment is futile.

Further, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary

Restraining Order. (ECF No. 5). In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must

show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to the

plaintiff, (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendants and (4)

granting the injunction is in the public interest. Maldonado v. Houston, 157 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir.

1998); Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The standards for a temporary

restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”); Reilly v. City of Harrisburg,

858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). The first two factors, likelihood of success on the merits and

irreparable harm, “‘operate both as essential clements and as factors that guide the exercise of

equitable discretion. They are elements because the failure of the moving party to make either of

those threshold showings is fatal to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Transcontinental

Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, 108 F 4th 144, 150 (3d

Cir. 2024) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

raises similarly fantastic and implausible claims. (ECF No. 5). Specifically, Plaintiff again avers

that Defendants are continuing to harm him by pumping “truth serum” into his cell and that C.O.

Pushey has paid inmates to stab him. (/d. §§ 1, 3). He also repeats allegations that his medical

request forms and abuse hot-line calls have been ignored. (/d. § 2). Further, Plaintiff states that

this constant abuse is causing him mental distress as he is living in fear for his life and that these

actions will not cease absent court intervention. (/d. ¥ 4-5). Plaintiff's fantastic and delusional

allegations lead the Court to conclude that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his

claims. His allegations rise to the level of “wholly incredible[.]” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Because

Plaintiff did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not address the

other injunction factors. American Exp. Travel Related Servs, Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d

359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Jn re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143

(3d Cir. 1982)) (noting “[t]he moving party’s failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits

‘must necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction.’”).

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's complaint (ECF

No. 4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous and deny Plaintiff's Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 5). An appropriate Order

follows.

ORDER

_

AND NOW, this | day of December, 2025, IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge

Pesto’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7) is adopted as the Opinion of the Court, as

supplemented herein; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 4) is hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and

Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 5) is DENIED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to mark this matter closed.

Stephanie L. Haines

United States District Judge

Notice by US Mail to:

Antwan L. Richardson QC-5728

S.C.I. Greene

169 Progress Drive

Waynesburg, PA 15370

Pro Se

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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