evaluating the statute de novo and concluding that “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, its logic, and common sense,” PSGs must be “narrowly defined” and possess factors like “immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness”
How later courts described this case
- evaluating the statute de novo and concluding that “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, its logic, and common sense,” PSGs must be “narrowly defined” and possess factors like “immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness”
- “‘Guatemalan women’ is not a cognizable PSG.”
- “Honduran women” is not particular
- “[G]ender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular group.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0326p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
ELIZABETH CRISTALES-DE LINARES; DANIELA
│
VALENTINA CRISTALES-DE LINARES; KEIRY
│
TATIANA CALDERON-CRISTALES, > No. 25-3152
Petitioners, │
│
│
v. │
│
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, │
Respondent. │
┘
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Nos. A 209 440 368; A 209 440 369; A 209 440 370.
Decided and Filed: December 1, 2025
Before: GRIFFIN, THAPAR, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Russell Reid Abrutyn, ABRUTYN LAW PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, for
Petitioners. C. Frederick Sheffield, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Karen Musalo, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE
STUDIES, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. Elizabeth Cristales-de Linares, a native and citizen
of El Salvador, was denied a U.S. visitor visa. Two months later, she entered the United States
illegally along with her two daughters. At a later removal hearing, Cristales-de Linares sought
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 2
She asserted fears that, if removed to El Salvador, men potentially associated with an unknown
gang would target her because she is a Salvadoran woman and a business owner. The
immigration judge denied her application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
Because Cristales-de Linares failed to establish that she qualifies for the relief she seeks, we
deny the petition.
I
Petitioners Elizabeth Cristales-de Linares and her two daughters are natives and citizens
of El Salvador. Each was placed into removal proceedings after unlawfully entering the United
States in October 2016. Through counsel, all conceded removability. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Cristales-de Linares then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). She included her daughters—both
minors at the time—as derivative beneficiaries. Id. § 1158(b)(3). Neither daughter sought relief
independently.1
Cristales-de Linares’s claims centered on her time as a salon owner in El Salvador. She
asserted, among other things, that she was a member of a particular social group (PSG) subject to
persecution by gangs in her home country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); id. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
Cristales-de Linares based her application on two proposed PSGs: “Salvadoran women” and
“single Salvadoran women who are working professionals.” A.R. 4, 105.
In November 2019, an immigration judge (IJ) held a hearing on Cristales-de Linares’s
application. Cristales-de Linares testified that, before coming to the United States, she lived in
Santa Ana, El Salvador with her daughters. Before her time in Santa Ana, Cristales-de Linares
had for years resided in San Salvador. Her husband, who has temporary protected status in the
United States, visited his family once or twice a year and planned to permanently relocate to
El Salvador.
1We have held that withholding-of-removal claims do not allow derivative beneficiaries, see Kukalo v.
Holder, 744 F.3d 395, 401 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011), and said the same about CAT protections in unpublished decisions,
see, e.g., Sica Ixcoy v. Holder, 439 F. App’x 524, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2011) (collecting authorities). Regardless, the
daughters press no argument separate from Cristales-de Linares’s application. So we refer only to that application
throughout.
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 3
Cristales-de Linares testified that she opened her own beauty salon in 2012. For two
years she operated the salon without incident. Then, in mid-2014, Cristales-de Linares claims
she was approached by individuals she assumed to be gang members, though they never
identified themselves as such. She testified that these men demanded that she “collaborate with
them” by making regular “rent” payments—an arrangement she saw as a normal part of doing
business in El Salvador. A.R. 115, 118. For the next two years, Cristales-de Linares made
regular payments—about $25 a week—without telling her husband or law enforcement. At
times, the men collecting her payments would bring their wives for free haircuts. The men never
gave Cristales-de Linares any trouble otherwise.
Cristales-de Linares says that changed when she stopped making payments in 2016.
About two months later, three men entered her shop, threatened her with a gun, and demanded
$5,000 in retaliation for the missed “rent.” A.R. 121. Cristales-de Linares explained that she
didn’t have cash on hand. The men then left—but not before making veiled threats towards her
and her daughters. Cristales-de Linares testified that the incident prompted her to seek advice
from a police officer she knew in a nearby town. The officer allegedly suggested that she leave
the country. Cristales-de Linares did just that, taking her daughters and traveling through
Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico before arriving in the United States in late 2016.
At the removal hearing, Cristales-de Linares stated that she feared returning to
El Salvador because the men to whom she paid “rent” might kill her or kidnap one of her
daughters. When asked if she could relocate elsewhere in the country—including the capital,
where she lived for many years—Cristales-de Linares claimed the extortionists were part of a
criminal organization that could find her anywhere. Yet she admitted that she had no
information to confirm that the men belonged to an organization, let alone which organization
might be involved. Her speculation about the men was instead based on “how they looked” and
their mention of a “boss.” A.R. 139.
In February 2020, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Cristales-de Linares’s
application. The IJ first determined that Cristales-de Linares was not credible and failed to
submit sufficient evidence to corroborate her claims. It then identified two reasons why her
asylum claim failed on the merits. First, her particular social groups were not cognizable under
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 4
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because they were “overbroad and not socially
salient.” A.R. 79. In reaching its decision, the IJ considered the two social groups in Cristales-
de Linares’s application—“Salvadoran women” and “single Salvadoran women who are working
professionals”—and added a third based on her testimony: “salon owners,” later refined to “salon
owners in El Salvador.” A.R. 4, 79. Second, the IJ held that Cristales-de Linares failed to show
that she could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador to avoid future persecution. Having
found Cristales-de Linares ineligible for asylum, the IJ concluded that she necessarily failed the
more stringent standard for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ denied Cristales-de Linares’s
CAT claim because she failed to show that she would face a particularized threat of torture
committed by or at the acquiescence of El Salvadoran officials.
Cristales-de Linares timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which upheld
the IJ’s decision. With respect to the asylum claim, the Board affirmed the IJ’s alternative
holdings that Cristales-de Linares failed to show (i) membership in a cognizable PSG and (ii) an
inability to relocate to a different part of El Salvador. The Board agreed that its asylum analysis
also required rejecting Cristales-de Linares’s request for withholding of removal. And it
affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief under CAT applying the clearly erroneous standard. This
petition for review followed.
II
We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of Cristales-de Linares’s application.
Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). When the Board
issues its own decision but agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we focus our review on the Board’s
decision and examine the IJ’s decision to the extent the Board adopted it. Harmon v. Holder,
758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 2014). De novo review applies to questions of law—including
whether a PSG is legally cognizable. Reyes Galeana v. Garland, 94 F.4th 555, 558 (6th Cir.
2024). We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and may not reverse
“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 5
III
Cristales-de Linares first challenges the Board’s resolution of her asylum and
withholding-of-removal claims. She primarily argues that her proposed PSGs—“Salvadoran
women,” “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals,” and “salon owners in El
Salvador”—are cognizable for purposes of securing relief. Cristales-de Linares Br. 24. She
further contests the Board’s internal-relocation analysis. Cristales-de Linares then raises several
peripheral challenges to the agency’s handling of her claims. None of her arguments prevails.
A
Before addressing Cristales-de Linares’s contentions, we briefly set out the relevant legal
standards for evaluating asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.
Asylum. Only refugees are eligible for asylum. By statute, a “refugee” is an individual
“unable or unwilling to return to” her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Cristales-de Linares’s asylum application
relies on her asserted membership in several PSGs. She bears the burden of establishing that her
proposed groups are legally cognizable. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). When a PSG involves
“underlying” factual determinations, like group size or composition, those findings are subject to
substantial-evidence review. Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2023).
Identifying a cognizable PSG is necessary for asylum relief. But it is not sufficient to
prevail. The statute also requires past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution
based on the PSG asserted. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). An applicant lacks a well-founded fear of
persecution if she “could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of [her] country of
nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Internal relocation must be reasonable based on the
“totality of the relevant circumstances.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(3). The reasonableness inquiry is a
factual determination subject to substantial-evidence review. Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d
778, 796-97 (6th Cir. 2020).
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 6
Withholding of Removal. Withholding of removal requires an applicant to demonstrate
that her “life or freedom would be threatened” because of her “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 907 (6th Cir. 2024). So an applicant who is unable to
show persecution on account of one of those grounds cannot qualify for either asylum or
withholding. Beyond that, withholding of removal has a higher bar for proving persecution than
does an asylum claim. Vasquez-Rivera, 96 F.4th at 907-08. An applicant must demonstrate a
“clear probability”—not just a likelihood—that her “life or freedom would be threatened” upon
removal. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). An applicant’s reasonable ability to relocate
within her country of origin defeats that showing. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2). An
applicant who fails asylum’s “well-founded fear” standard necessarily fails to qualify for
withholding of removal. Vasquez-Rivera, 96 F.4th at 908.
B
Cristales-de Linares first argues that all three groups she presented to the Board—
Salvadoran women, single Salvadoran women who are working professionals, and salon owners
in El Salvador—qualify as PSGs entitled to the protections of asylum and withholding of
removal. The IJ and the Board disagreed with Cristales-de Linares, and so do we.
1
To secure protection based on membership in a PSG, a “petitioner must show that [her]
proposed group (1) shares a common immutable characteristic other than the fact that it is
targeted for persecution; (2) is particular and defined with sufficient precision to delimit its
membership; and (3) is socially distinct such that members of the group are perceived as a group
by society.” Mateo-Esteban v. Garland, 125 F.4th 762, 766-67 (6th Cir. 2025).
The Board concluded that Cristales-de Linares’s proffered groups were not cognizable.
Based on its precedent and ours, the Board held that two of Cristales-de Linares’s groups—
“Salvadoran women” and “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals”—are too
“amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective” to satisfy the particularity requirement. A.R. 4
(citation omitted). The Board then summarily rejected her third proffered PSG—“salon owners
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 7
in El Salvador”—as foreclosed by our precedent. Id. (citing Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d
187 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Cristales-de Linares sees “particularity” as a lower bar; in her view, it requires nothing
more than an ability to determine “who is in and out of the group.” Cristales-de Linares Br. 27;
see also Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Stud. Amicus Br. (Ctr. Br.) 10. She says the group
“Salvadoran women” thus clears the particularity hurdle because it straightforwardly defines all
women from El Salvador as “in.”
That sweeping view of particularity does not square with this Court’s caselaw. 2 Instead,
we have long understood particularity to require more than an ability to determine who falls
within a given group. See Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2013)
(collecting cases); cf. Cabrera-Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 25-3123, 2025 WL 2940692, at *2 (6th
Cir. Oct. 16, 2025) (noting “the particularity determination does not rest on descriptive clarity
alone”). Particularity also requires some “unifying relationship or characteristic narrowing th[e]
group.” Reyes Galeana, 94 F.4th at 559. When that relationship or characteristic isn’t narrow
enough, it yields a group that is “too broad to satisfy the particularity rule.” Id. Consistent with
that understanding, our published precedents instruct that “generalized and far-reaching”
classifications are insufficiently particular to qualify for PSG-based protection. Kante v. Holder,
634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011); accord Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir.
2005).
Those standards have led us to routinely reject groups based on expansive demographic
categories. Such groups, we’ve explained, are too “far-reaching” and diverse to be considered
particular. Kante, 634 F.3d at 327. Examples include cases rejecting the groups “young male
Guatemalans,” Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi, No. 22-3365, 2025 WL 2337021, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 13,
2Cristales-de Linares accepts and applies our caselaw’s existing framework in her opening brief. The
Government responded on those terms. It’s not until her reply brief that Cristales-de Linares suggests our approach
may warrant “revisit[ing]” (without offering any de novo statutory analysis). Reply Br. 5. Under our forfeiture
rules, that new argument comes too late to preserve a request to overrule decades’ worth of cases. Scott v. First S.
Nat’l Bank, 936 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2019). Nor would that tack necessarily favor Cristales-de Linares in any
event. Cf. Perez-Zenteno v. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2019) (evaluating the statute de novo and
concluding that “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, its logic, and common sense,” PSGs must be “narrowly
defined” and possess factors like “immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness”).
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 8
2025); “Guatemalan children under fourteen,” Gomez-Guzman v. Holder, 485 F. App’x 64, 66-
67 (6th Cir. 2012); and “young women,” Paplekaj v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 844, 846 (6th Cir.
2011); see also Cabrera-Hernandez, 2025 WL 2940692, at *2 (collecting cases).
We’ve similarly declined recognition of groups that could seem narrow on their face, but
whose application risks sweeping in broad demographics. For instance, we’ve held that a
proposed PSG of “young Salvadorans who ha[ve] been threatened because they refused to join
the MS gang” fails “because it could include all Salvadoran youth who are not members of the
MS gang.” Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 673-74. The same went for “young, attractive Albanian
women,” which would encompass “any young Albanian woman who possesses the subjective
criterion of being ‘attractive.’” Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556. Nor could the group “children who
are unable to leave their families” be a PSG because it rests on a “near-universal fact of
childhood,” capturing virtually all children. Orellana v. Sessions, 722 F. App’x 443, 449 (6th
Cir. 2018). Likewise, “Guatemalans afraid of kidnapping” and “women who oppose gangs” are
not cognizable PSGs because those groups “would encompass nearly all segments of the
population.” Juan-Mateo v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 446, 447 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
These same rationales have twice led us to reject proposed PSGs defined by gender and
nationality. Though these opinions are unpublished, they illustrate how our standards for
evaluating PSGs play out in practice. In Rodriguez-Lopez v. Garland, No. 20-4087, 2021 WL
3140324, at *4 (6th Cir. July 26, 2021), we concluded that neither “Guatemalan women” nor
“indigent Guatemalan women” were cognizable PSGs after observing that both were “more
expansive than many of the groups previously rejected by this court.” Just recently, in Cabrera-
Hernandez, 2025 WL 2940692, at *2, we concluded that a PSG of “Honduran women” was not
cognizable because it “sweep[s] over large, diverse swaths of the population.” Other circuits
have reasoned similarly.3
3Chavez-Chilel v. Att’y Gen., 20 F.4th 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2021) (“‘Guatemalan women’ is not a cognizable
PSG.”); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[G]ender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular group.”); Jaco v. Garland, 24 F.4th 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Honduran women” is not
particular); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other grounds (“Iranian
women” is not a cognizable PSG); Amezcua-Preciado v. Att’y Gen., 943 F.3d 1337, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“[T]he immutable characteristic of being women . . . alone is insufficient” to make a cognizable PSG).
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 9
So too, we have denied PSG status to groups that revolve around occupations, economic
activity, “perceived wealth,” or “perceived . . . access to funds.” Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808
F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); Gonzalez-De Leon v. Barr, 932 F.3d 489, 493
(6th Cir. 2019). Economic-based groups, we’ve explained, are often “neither discrete nor
definable” because they capture individuals working across diverse positions, industries, and
geographic locations. Reyes Galeana, 94 F.4th at 559. Examples include cases rejecting the
groups “Mexican business owners,” id.; “taxi drivers in Guatemala,” Gonzalez-De Leon, 932
F.3d at 493; “business owners who refuse[] to pay for protection from the mafia,” Khozhaynova,
641 F.3d at 195; “small businessmen,” Jelkovski v. INS, 103 F. App’x 578, 579 (6th Cir. 2004);
“female home or business owners,” Mendez v. Sessions, No. 17-3148, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
22256, at *8 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2017); and “upwardly mobile women trying to build a better life
through business,” id.
We need not fashion an exhaustive judicial definition of “particular social group” that
would govern beyond those groups proposed here. We simply conclude that our caselaw
requires a far more robust showing than Cristales-de Linares contends.
2
The above principles require rejecting each of Cristales-de Linares’s proffered PSGs.
Salvadoran Women. Groups including all country members of a particular age or sex
generally encompass large, diverse portions of the population and thus fail the particularity
requirement. See supra pp. 7-8. So it is with Cristales-de Linares’s proposed group comprising
all “Salvadoran women.” Such a group contains roughly half the country. It sweeps in millions
of women across varied social, economic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. Indeed, the group
stretches even further than groups—like “young male Guatemalans,” “women who oppose
gangs” in Guatemala, and “young, attractive Albanian women”—that we have previously
deemed too broad to qualify for protection. See supra pp. 7-8 (collecting cases). We agree with
the Board that a such a broad and diverse cohort of the population does not constitute a
cognizable PSG under this Court’s framework.
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 10
Single Salvadoran Women Who Are Working Professionals. The Board also rejected
Cristales-de Linares’s next group, which adds the “single” and “working professionals”
qualifiers to her first PSG, as insufficiently particular. Again, we agree.
Cristales-de Linares sees her group as narrower than others we have recently rejected,
such as “Mexican business owners.” Reyes Galeana, 94 F.4th at 559. But she offers nothing to
show that “single Salvadoran women working as professionals,” Cristales-de Linares Br. 31,
“would be recognized” as “a discrete class of persons,” Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 674 (citation
omitted). “Salvadoran working professional women” includes women of every age, in every
occupation and trade, at all skill levels, working any number of hours, and in every region of El
Salvador. A group covering every woman “who has ventured into the [Salvadoran]
marketplace” is not particular. Reyes Galeana, 94 F.4th at 559 (quotation marks omitted). Nor
does the qualifier “single” firm up the definition: It apparently covers women who are married
with the potential for male protection, like Cristales-de Linares. Particularity does not permit
such malleable boundaries, see Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556, even under Cristales-de Linares’s and
her amicus’s account, Ctr. Br. 9 (“subjective” group definitions not permitted); Cristales-de
Linares Br. 27 (same). Overall, each component of this group—“women,” “working
professionals,” and “single”—is overly broad, and they fare no better when combined.
In practice, the key characteristic underlying Cristales-de Linares’s proposed working-
professionals group is “perceived wealth” or access to money. Sanchez-Robles, 808 F.3d at 692.
Yet groups premised on a risk “of persecution for economic gain” are not cognizable under the
INA. Id. Cristales-de Linares’s testimony helps show why: She described indiscriminate
economic extortion in El Salvador targeting everyone from “the guy who sells popsicles” to “an
old lady selling bread in a park.” A.R. 132-33. Understood this way, her PSG is premised on a
fear of general crime that affects anyone with real or perceived economic resources. Nothing
meaningfully distinguishes that amorphous cross-section of society from others we have already
rejected. See Sanchez-Robles, 808 F.3d at 692 (collecting cases).
Salon Owners in El Salvador. Cristales-de Linares believes her final group is sufficiently
narrow because it covers just one type of business. But salon owners are indistinguishable from
other professional groups—like “taxi drivers in Guatemala,” “small businessmen,” and “female
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 11
home or business owners”—that we have rejected because they lack adequate narrowing
characteristics. See supra p. 9 (collecting cases). Cristales-de Linares does not engage with
these precedents or give us any reason to set salon owners apart from those operating other kinds
of businesses. In fact, she admits that changing her occupation would be meaningless because
every Salvadoran is subject to the same demands. This shows that, at base, her salon-owner
group is also tied to “perceived wealth or a ready access to money.” Lorenzana-Montepeque v.
Barr, 781 F. App’x 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2019). As discussed, the INA does not cover such
classifications.
3
Cristales-de Linares’s remaining counterarguments do not persuade.
Alternative Particular Social Groups. On appeal, Cristales-de Linares unveils two new
proposed PSGs she says the agency was obliged to consider sua sponte: “single Salvadoran
women small business owners” and “single Salvadoran women salon owners.” Cristales-de
Linares Br. 31, 33. Citing our decision in Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland, 114 F.4th 487 (6th
Cir. 2024), she contends that the agency cannot limit its asylum or withholding analysis to an
applicant’s proposed PSGs. Instead, in her view, the IJ and the Board have an affirmative
obligation to search the record for “a better defined group.” Cristales-de Linares Br. 32.
We disagree that Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip obliges the agency to hunt for new, unraised
grounds for relief. That case instead faulted a particular decision of the Board for analysis that
rested on a “boilerplate invocation of circularity” that “was not premised on any evidence in the
record” and “was in direct conflict with our own precedent, current immigration authority, and
the caselaw in other circuits.” 114 F.4th at 503. We then remanded so that the agency could
properly tie its PSG discussion to the facts. Id. at 508. Nothing in Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip requires
the agency to craft a new PSG or mix and match elements of a petitioner’s existing groups.
See id. at 503-04. That case instead stands for the straightforward rule that the Board must
analyze the groups actually proposed and cannot “wholly disregard the record” when rendering
decision. Id. at 504. Here, the Board fulfilled its obligations by assessing “the plausibility of
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 12
[Cristales-de Linares’s] application on the record as a whole.” Id. at 498 (quoting Zometa-
Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970, 979 (6th Cir. 2021)).
Broader PSG Cases. Cristales-de Linares and her amicus identify a handful of our
decisions that they read to require recognizing her PSGs. We disagree that those precedents cut
against our conclusion. Instead, the cited cases either (1) assumed without deciding that an
unchallenged group was cognizable, Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 790-91; (2) declined to consider a
PSG on exhaustion grounds, Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 666 (6th Cir. 2024);
or (3) remanded to the Board after only addressing one PSG element, Turcios-Flores, 67 F.4th
at 356-57. None affects our analysis today. The same goes for some of our other cases that
might facially gesture at broad PSGs. See, e.g., Sabastian-Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923, 931
(6th Cir. 2024) (decided on nexus grounds); Amaya-Hernandez v. Garland, No. 21-3704, 2022
WL 1112771, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (same); Zuniga-Martinez v. Garland, No. 21-
3312, 2022 WL 2160668, at *5 (6th Cir. June 15, 2022) (same).
Recent Board Precedent. During the pendency of Cristales-de Linares’s appeal, the
Board published Matter of K-E-S-G-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 145 (BIA 2025). That decision sets forth a
categorical rule that “a particular social group defined by the alien’s sex or sex and nationality,
standing alone, is overbroad and insufficiently particular to be cognizable under the INA.” Id. at
151. Applying that rule, the Board specifically rejected the petitioner’s proposed PSG of
“Salvadoran women.” Id. at 154. In response, Cristales-de Linares dedicates a significant
portion of her reply brief arguing that we should disregard Matter of K-E-S-G- because “[t]he
Board’s application of the particularity requirement” is “not the best reading of the statute.”
Reply Br. 4; see generally Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
(overruling Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). But our
decision today is not born out of deference to Matter of K-E-S-G-, which came after the Board’s
analysis on review here. It reflects that our precedent independently supports the conclusion that
the group “Salvadoran women” is not a cognizable PSG.
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 13
* * *
In sum, Cristales-de Linares cannot identify a legally cognizable PSG in which she has
membership. So her requests for asylum and withholding of removal cannot succeed.
C
After rejecting Cristales-de Linares’s proposed PSGs, the Board identified a second
reason why her application cannot succeed: She failed to show that internal relocation within El
Salvador would be unreasonable. The Board’s conclusion provides an independent basis for
rejecting Cristales-de Linares’s asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.
As mentioned, an applicant cannot qualify for either asylum or withholding of removal if
she can avoid persecution by relocating within her home country. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(2)(ii), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2); see Lin v. Garland, 81 F.4th 629, 635 (6th Cir.
2023). Generally, relocation is presumed reasonable, and applicants must rebut that
presumption. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b)(2)(ii). In two scenarios, though, the burden shifts to
the Government to show relocation is reasonable: if an applicant (i) establishes past persecution
on account of a protected characteristic or (ii) fears future persecution, on account of a protected
characteristic, at the hands of the home-country government or a government-sponsored actor.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Ghanim v. Holder, 425 F. App’x 463, 467-68 (6th Cir. 2011).
Exhaustion. Cristales-de Linares first faults the Board’s approach to the burden of proof.
She posits that the IJ and the Board failed to articulate any finding on past persecution. From
there, she says that because she did experience past persecution, the burden should have shifted
to the Government to prove that relocation would not be reasonable. She claims that the Board
thus erred by requiring her to disprove the reasonableness of internal relocation.4
Cristales-de Linares’s burden-shifting arguments are not properly before this Court. The
statute authorizing judicial review allows us to review a final order of removal only when “the
4A district court preliminarily enjoined a 2020 amendment that would have altered that burden-shifting
rule. See Pangea Leg. Servs. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 512 F. Supp. 3d 966, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (enjoining
85 Fed. Reg. 80274 (Dec. 11, 2020)). Cristales-de Linares suggests that the Board might have applied the enjoined
rule. Cristales-de Linares Br. 36. But she concedes that the Board cited the proper regulation, id., and we see no
evidence that the now-enjoined regulation played a role in the Board’s analysis.
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 14
alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). That is a “mandatory” claim-processing rule we “must enforce” when one of the
parties “properly raises it.” Mazariegos-Rodas, 122 F.4th at 664 (citation omitted). The
Government has done so here. Once the Government contends that an issue is unexhausted, we
may only consider that issue if it was “reasonably developed in the petitioner’s brief to the
[Board].” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2009).
Here, Cristales-de Linares’s brief to the Board never mentioned the IJ’s allegedly
deficient finding on past persecution. Nor did it argue that the IJ’s analysis required shifting the
internal-relocation burden to the Government. And while her brief asserted that she suffered
“past persecution,” she made no effort to link her contention with the burden-shifting framework.
A.R. 30, 35, 42, 47. That is insufficient to preserve the issue for our review. Khalili, 557 F.3d at
433.
Substantial Evidence. Cristales-de Linares next challenges the merits of the Board’s
internal-relocation determination. She claims that she cannot relocate within El Salvador
because of widespread gang violence, police corruption, and endemic violence against women.
The Board considered those conditions. But it affirmed the IJ’s finding that Cristales-de Linares
had not established that relocation would be unreasonable. We review that finding under the
“highly deferential substantial evidence standard.” Hernandez-Hernandez v. Garland, 15 F.4th
685, 687 (6th Cir. 2021). Under that standard, Cristales-de Linares must identify evidence that
“not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.” Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445,
451 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Before the Board, Cristales-de Linares argued that organized-gang violence and gender-
based violence exists in El Salvador. But she did not establish which gang her extortionists
belong to—if any. Her only evidence that they belonged to a gang was speculation stemming
from “how they looked” and their references to a “boss.” A.R. 139. Nor did Cristales-de
Linares offer any evidence to suggest that her extortionists have either the means or desire to
track her down if she relocates. If anything, Cristales-de Linares’s testimony undercuts her fear
of gender-based violence. She told the IJ that neither she nor her daughters have ever been
physically harmed in El Salvador, and that her mother and sisters continue to safely reside there
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 15
and have never been threatened or harmed. None of that evidence compels us to upset the
agency’s factual determination under substantial-evidence review. See Ouda, 324 F.3d at 451.
In short, even if Cristales-de Linares identified a cognizable PSG, the Board’s internal-
relocation conclusion independently forecloses her asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.
D
Cristales-de Linares raises two ancillary issues related to her asylum and withholding-of-
removal claims. We consider and reject each in turn.
Notices to Appear. In a footnote, Cristales-de Linares characterizes the Notices to
Appear for her and her daughters’ removal hearings as “defective.” Cristales-de Linares Br. 6-7,
n.1. That “perfunctory” statement cannot preserve any notice-based challenge to the validity of
the removal proceedings, Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 947 (6th Cir. 2022),
which would fail in any event, see Ramos Rafael v. Garland, 15 F.4th 797, 800-01 (6th Cir.
2021).
Humanitarian Asylum. Next, Cristales-de Linares believes the agency should have
considered whether she qualifies for humanitarian asylum—even though she never sought that
form of relief—and asks us to remand for that purpose. That argument misunderstands our
caselaw. Humanitarian asylum is a discretionary form of relief only available to applicants who
prove past persecution. K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 479 (6th Cir. 2019); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). We have therefore held that petitioners who raise a past-persecution claim
before an IJ with no mention of humanitarian asylum can still request humanitarian asylum
before the Board. Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 798. We have also directed the Board to reconsider
an alien’s prior request for humanitarian asylum when its past-persecution analysis was flawed.
Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 851 (6th Cir. 2023). In each of those cases,
however, the applicant specifically requested humanitarian asylum before the Board. See Juan
Antonio, 959 F.3d at 798; Sebastian-Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 851. Cristales-de Linares did not do
so, meaning the Board had no obligation to consider her eligibility. Nor, per exhaustion
principles, may she newly request such relief from this Court. Mazariegos-Rodas, 122 F.4th at
664.
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 16
IV
Finally, Cristales-de Linares claims that she is entitled to CAT relief. An applicant
seeking CAT protection must “establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured” upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Such torture must be at the hands of a public
official, “or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity.”
Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). Cristales-de Linares asserts an acquiescence-based CAT claim, so she must
“demonstrat[e] a likelihood that public officials, aware of the risk of torture, would shirk their
duties to intervene and prevent such activity.” Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377, 382 (6th Cir.
2025).
Cristales-de Linares maintains that she “will be tortured because Salvadoran government
officials turn a blind eye to violence against women.” Cristales-de Linares Br. 41. To address
the acquiescence requirement, she asserts that “Salvadoran officials have demonstrated an
unwillingness and inability” to protect citizens from gang violence. Id. The Board considered
Cristales-de Linares’s evidence, comprising country-conditions reports on gangs and violence
against women, and concluded that it failed to show that “she faces an individualized risk of
torture.” A.R. 5.
Substantial evidence—much of which also bears on internal relocation—supports the
Board’s decision. Supra pp. 14-15. Cristales-de Linares admitted that she and female members
of her family have never been harmed in El Salvador and continue to live there safely. As for
acquiescence, the only potential persecutors she alludes to are gangs in El Salvador. Yet she
never reported her allegedly gang-driven extortion troubles to Salvadoran authorities (she instead
raised them informally with a local police-officer friend in another town), so the Salvadoran
government “never had a chance to acquiesce.” Sabastian-Andres, 96 F.4th at 932 (citation
omitted). And her claim that the Salvadoran government may acquiesce in the future rests solely
on country-condition reports documenting general gang violence in El Salvador. But speculation
“[t]hat the Salvadoran government is unable to control the gangs does not constitute
acquiescence.” Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2015).
No. 25-3152 Cristales-de Linares, et al. v. Bondi Page 17
Outside of her own conclusory statements and the country-conditions reports, Cristales-
de Linares cites nothing to support that she would likely be tortured in El Salvador or that the
Salvadoran government would acquiesce to such torture. Considering the record, we are not
compelled to disagree with the Board’s resolution of her CAT claim. See Sebastian-Sebastian,
87 F.4th at 853.
* * *
We deny the petition for review.