holding that an evidentiary hearing is not 6 necessary when deciding only questions of law
How later courts described this case
- holding that an evidentiary hearing is not 6 necessary when deciding only questions of law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 Case No.: 25-cv-03209-DMS-DDL
GONZALO MIGUEL BAUTISTA-
12 SANTIAGO,
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S
13 P E T I T I O N F O R W R I T O F HABEAS
Petitioner, CORPUS
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v.
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KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
16 Secretary of Homeland Security;
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, in his
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official capacity as Warden of Otay Mesa
18 Detention Center; GREGORY J.
ARCHAMBEAULT, in his official
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capacity as San Diego Field Office
20 Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal
Operations; TODD LYONS, in his official
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capacity as Acting Director of ICE;
22 PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney
General; IMMIGRATION AND
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CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and
24 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
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Respondents.
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1 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
2 (“Petition”). (Pet., ECF No. 1). Respondents filed a return to the Petition. (Return, ECF
3 No. 5). Petitioner did not file a reply. After reviewing the briefs, the Court finds this matter
4 is suitable for decision without oral argument. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1); Tijerina v.
5 Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is not
6 necessary when deciding only questions of law). For the following reasons, the Court
7 grants the Petition.
8 I. BACKGROUND
9 Petitioner, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1999. (Pet. ¶ 1). On or
10 around October 31, 2024, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested
11 Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 17). Petitioner has since been detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center.
12 (Id.). He is charged with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (as being
13 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled) and in removal proceedings
14 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Return 1).
15 On July 18, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) granted Petitioner bond in the amount
16 of $7,500 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Pet. ¶ 2); (Return, Ex. 2, at 1). On July 31, 2025, the
17 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of
18 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).1 (Pet. ¶ 3). On September 18, 2025, the BIA granted DHS’s
19 appeal and vacated the IJ’s bond order. (Id.). The BIA determined that Petitioner was
20 ineligible for a bond hearing per its recent decision, Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N
21 Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id.). Petitioner remains detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center.
22 (Id.).
23 The Petition asserts that Petitioner’s detention violates § 1226(a) and the Fifth
24 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Id. at 7–9). Petitioner requests a writ of habeas corpus
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1 Petitioner alleges in another paragraph that the Respondents filed their appeal on September 31, 2025
27 (clearly in err, as there are only 30 days in September). (See Pet. ¶ 20). However, because it is undisputed
that DHS appealed the IJ’s order, the Court finds this factual discrepancy to be inconsequential to resolve
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1 ordering the immediate release of Petitioner under reasonable conditions of supervision;
2 an order enjoining Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the Southern District of
3 California during the pendency of these proceedings and while Petitioner remains in
4 Respondents’ custody; and any other relief which this Court deems “just and proper.” (Id.,
5 Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 2–3, 6).
6 II. LEGAL STANDARD
7 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their
8 respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A petitioner prevails in his petition for writ
9 of habeas corpus if he shows that his custody violates the Constitution or laws of the United
10 States. Id. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
11 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
12 III. DISCUSSION
13 A. Jurisdiction
14 Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction per 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and
15 (g). (Return 5–8). The Court has previously considered and rejected this argument. See
16 Vasquez Garcia v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2549431, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
17 3, 2025); Medina-Ortiz v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02819-DMS-MMP, ECF No. 7, at 3–4 (S.D.
18 Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). Based on the reasoning of those cases, the Court again rejects this
19 argument.2
20 B. Merits—Detention Statutes
21 Petitioner argues that his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is unlawful and
22 that he instead falls under § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework (under which the
23 IJ granted Petitioner release on a $7,500 bond). (Pet. ¶¶ 2, 31). Respondents maintain that
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27 2 Petitioner argues that prudential exhaustion would be futile in light of the BIA’s decision, Yajure
Hurtado. (See Pet. ¶¶ 13–15). Because Respondents do not oppose this assertion, the Court need not, and
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1 Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2). (Return 1). The Court agrees with
2 Petitioner.
3 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “an alien who is an applicant for admission, if
4 the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
5 and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, . . . shall be detained for a proceeding under [§
6 1229a].” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An “applicant for admission” is an
7 “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
8 States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .).” Id. § 1225(a)(1). Respondents
9 do not contend that Petitioner affirmatively applied for admission. Rather, Respondents
10 argue that an applicant for admission is automatically understood to be “seeking
11 admission” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A). (See Return 12–13). However,
12 Respondents’ understanding of “seeking admission” would “seemingly render that phrase
13 mere surplusage, such that the language could be deleted while retaining the same statutory
14 meaning.” Castellanos Lopez v. Warden, 25-cv-2527-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 3005346, at
15 *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). Thus, “seeking admission requires an affirmative act such as
16 entering the United States or applying for status, and it does not apply to individuals who,
17 like [Petitioner], have been residing in the United States and did not apply for admission
18 or a change of status.” Esquivel-Ipina v. Larose, No. 25-CV-2672 JLS (BLM), 2025 WL
19 2998361, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025); Vasquez Garcia, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6.
20 Further, Respondents’ interpretation would render the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.
21 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), superfluous. Section 1226(c) carves out exceptions to § 1226(a),
22 requiring certain people be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Specifically, § 1226(c)(1)(E)
23 (enacted by the Laken Riley Act) requires mandatory detention for people who are
24 inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) and charged with certain crimes not
25 relevant here. Id. § 1226(c)(1)(E). As a practical matter, if § 1225(b)(2) already
26 encompassed all inadmissible noncitizens, there would be no need to pass an amendment
27 that required detention for those who are inadmissible under the same statutes and are being
28 charged with specific crimes. Vasquez Garcia, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6. “A plain reading
1 || of this exception implies that the default discretionary bond procedures in Section 1226(a)
2 || apply to a noncitizen who . . . is present without being admitted or paroled but has not been
3 ||implicated in any crimes as set forth in Section 1226(c).” Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.
4 || Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
5 The Court’s holding maintains a “general distinction” between §§ 1225(b) and
6 || 1226(a) as explained by the Supreme Court: § 1225(b) applies to “aliens seeking admission
7 ||into the country” and § 1226 applies to “aliens already in the country.” Castellanos Lopez,
8 WL 3005346, at *3 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294-95 (2018)).
9 || Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner is being unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2).°
10 IV. CONCLUSION
11 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Petition. This Court hereby
12 |} ORDERS Respondents to release Petitioner from custody within 48 hours of this Order’s
13 ||filing, pursuant to the bond order issued by the IJ on July 18, 2025.4 The parties are
14 |} ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within 72 hours of this Order’s filing, confirming
15 || Petitioner’s release. Further, the Court ORDERS that Respondents are enjoined from re-
16 || detaining Petitioner during the pendency of his removal proceedings without prior leave of
17 Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 ||Dated: November 26, 2025
50 2 ins Yn. L4\
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
21 United States District Judge
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26 In light of this determination, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s arguments concerning the
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
28 4 Because Respondents can no longer detain Petitioner, Petitioner’s request that he shall not be transferred
outside of the Southern District of California is DENIED as moot.