Valdez

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 SAMUEL SAMSON GUZMAN,, Case No. 1:21-cv-00621-KES-HBK (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S DUE PROCESS

13 v. CLAIM

14 R. VALDEZ, M. JIMENEZ, V. CUEVAS, (Doc. No. 21)

SAMANTHA KUTNEY and BERTHA

15 LOPEZ, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO CORRECT

CAPTION

16 Defendants.

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

17

18 Plaintiff Samuel Samson Guzman is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

19 pauperis on his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.

20 No. 17). On September 22, 2025 the district judge adopted in part and declined in part the

21 Findings and Recommendations issued by the undersigned. (Doc. No. 21). In its June 3, 2024

22 Findings and Recommendations, the undersigned had found that the TAC failed to state a

23 cognizable claim under the First, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments and recommended that

24 Plaintiff’s TAC be dismissed without further leave to amend. (Doc. No. 19). The district judge

25 adopted the F&R as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim only, finding Plaintiff had sufficiently

26 plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment against defendants R. Valdez and M.

27 Jimenez, as well as a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 21). The

28 district court then referred this case back to the undersigned for further findings regarding the

1 extent to which plaintiff has plead his due process claim as to each defendant. (Id. at 8, ¶ 4).

2 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds the TAC alleges a due process

3 claim against only defendant Cuevas and recommends the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s TAC

4 and his due process claim against defendants Kutney and Lopez.

5 SCREENING REQUIREMENT

6 A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation

7 Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief

8 against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any

9 defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and

10 dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon

11 which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

12 such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

13 At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true,

14 construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v.

15 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.

16 2003). The Court’s review is limited to the complaint, exhibits attached, materials incorporated

17 into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Petrie v.

18 Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). A court

19 does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted

20 deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical

21 to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See

22 Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).

23 The Federal rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and

24 plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

25 Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient

26 factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the

27 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,

28 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not

1 sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard.

2 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not

3 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

4 statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required

5 to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.

6 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

7 If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant

8 is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v.

9 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d

10 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how

11 to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial

12 decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131

13 n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad

14 faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

15 amendments previously allowed . . ..” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892

16 (9th Cir. 2010).

17 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING

18 The undersigned limits the facts alleged in the TAC to those that are relevant for purposes

19 of determining Plaintiff’s due process claim against each named defendant. The TAC identifies

20 the following CDCR staff as Defendants: (1) ISU Officer R. Valdez; (2) ISU Sergeant M.

21 Jimenez; (3) Acting Lieutenant V. Cuevas; (4) Librarian Samantha Kutney; and (5) Librarian

22 Bertha Lopez. (Doc. No. at 2-3).1 Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their individual capacities.

23 (Doc. 20 at 3-4). The following facts are presumed to be true at this stage of the screening

24 process.

25 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleged First Amendment retaliation claim and Eight

26 Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against defendants Valdez and Jimenez. In

27

1 Scott Frauenheim, retired Warden is named on the docket as a defendant but is not named in the body of

28 the TAC.

1 support, the TAC alleged that on April 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance challenging

2 his eligibility for a Security Threat Group (“STG”) Validation Termination Review after being

3 denied a requested review. (Id. at 3). The grievance was granted. (Id.). On July 13, 2020, prior

4 to Plaintiff’s STG Termination Review hearing, Defendants Valdez and Jimenez searched

5 Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.). Plaintiff’s “cell was tossed up and a copy of an Angel & Butterfly was

6 confiscated.” (Id.). On July 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance “based on the arbitrary

7 nature of the [July 13, 2020] cell search.” (Id.). Three days later, on July 23, 2020, Plaintiff was

8 issued an RVR for STG behavior by Defendants Valdez and Jimenez. (Id.). Based on “[t]he

9 suspicious timing” of the RVR, the district court concluded that Plaintiff had asserted a First

10 Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Valdez and Jimenez but found no Eighth

11 Amendment claim. (Doc. No. 21 at 3-4).

12 Plaintiff’s second claim in his TAC asserted a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

13 at page 4 of the TAC. Briefly, Plaintiff states he received an RVR for STG behavior based on “a

14 newly certified STG symbol that was never posted on the facility in violation of the U.S.

15 Constitution Amendment XIV.” (Id. at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff complains that the law library

16 was closed during COVID, and the “newly certified symbol of a butterfly” was never

17 disseminated to the general population by librarians S. Kutney and Lopez. Despite him not

18 having knowledge of its prohibited status, Defendant Cuevas found him guilty of the RVR at his

19 hearing. (Id.).

20 As relief, Plaintiff seeks nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages, as well as “relief

21 from the RVR guilty finding” including expungement of the charge. (Id. at 5).

22 Due Process

23 Relevant to Plaintiff’s due process claim, the district court held:

24

“It is clearly established, both by common sense and by precedent, that due process

25 requires that fair notice of what conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed.”

Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford,

26 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). “This principle applies within the prison setting.” See, e.g.,

Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, “before a prisoner can be charged

27 with violating prison rules, the prisoner must have notice of those rules.” Radi v.

McCormick, 978 F.2d 715 (Table), at *1 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that, to satisfy due

28

1 process, a prisoner must be informed that the conduct he engaged in could subject him to

disciplinary charges and punishment, but ultimately upholding the district court’s

2

conclusion that there was sufficient factual evidence in the record to find that the prisoner

had notice of the rule he violated); see also Schenck v. Edwards, 133 F.3d 929 (Table), at

3

*1 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that, in a case brought by a prisoner, “[a]n individual’s due

4 process rights may be violated if he is sanctioned for conduct that he had insufficient

notice was proscribed”) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972));

5 Anderson v. Crosby, No. 5:04CV164SPMMD, 2005 WL 3357220, at *4 (N.D. Fl. Mar.

25, 2005) (citing Reeves v. Peetcox, 19 F.3d 1061 (5th Cir. 1994)) (though generally

6

people are presumed to know the law, “in the unique setting of a prison, inmates are not

7 necessarily presumed to know the regulations.”). Moreover, section 3378.1(f)(3)(A) of

title 15 of the California Code of Regulations requires that if an STG related symbol is

8 certified, “dissemination of the newly certified sign or symbol will be made to . . . the

incarcerated population.” § 3378.1(f)(3)(A).

9

10 Guzman v. Valdez, No. 1:21-CV-00621-KES-HBK (PC), 2025 WL 2691265, at *4 (E.D. Cal.

11 Sept. 22, 2025). Consequently, after viewing the TAC in the light most favorably to Plaintiff and

12 considering Plaintiff’s objections, the district court found Plaintiff adequately alleged that his due

13 process rights were violated as he allegedly did not receive fair notice of the prohibited conduct

14 prior to being sanctioned for such conduct and referred this matter back to the undersigned to

15 evaluate the due process claim as to each of the three named defendants. (Id.).

16 The undersigned now evaluates Plaintiff’s due process claim as alleged against defendants

17 Kutney, Lopez and Cuevas.

18 Defendants Kutney and Lopez

19 According to the TAC, defendants Kutney and Lopez, the facility librarians, never

20 disseminated information to the general population stating the butterfly was certified as an STG

21 symbol. (Doc. No. 17 at 4). Liberally construed, Plaintiff has failed to establish that defendants

22 Kutney and Lopez violated his due process rights. While Plaintiff states that these two

23 defendants, who were librarians, failed to disseminate the newly STG symbol to the general

24 population, Plaintiff does not allege either defendant sanctioned him without fair notice of what

25 conduct was prohibited. See Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, there

26 are no allegations that either defendant Kutney or Lopez were responsible for disseminating this

27 information to the general population. Other than noting their positions as librarians and the fact

28 that the library was closed during COVID, there are no facts alleged in the TAC from which the

1 court can infer that either defendant Kutney or Lopez violated Plaintiff’s due process rights, or

2 violated a CDCR procedure that vested them with the responsibility to disseminate newly

3 certified symbols to the general population.2 Consequently, based upon the foregoing, the

4 undersigned finds the TAC fails to state due process claim against defendants Kutney and Lopez.

5 Defendant Cuevas

6 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Cuevas issued him an RVR for STG behavior because

7 Plaintiff was in possession of an STG symbol. (Doc. No. 17 at 4). Plaintiff states that he did not

8 have notice that the symbol was a newly certified STG symbol. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

9 defendant Cuevas had knowledge that Plaintiff was unaware of this symbol’s status and still

10 found Plaintiff guilty of STG activity. (Id.) Liberally construed Plaintiff has alleged that

11 defendant Cuevas knew Plaintiff lacked fair notice of the STG symbol but nonetheless sanctioned

12 Plaintiff for being in possession of the symbol. (Id.). Thus, the Court finds the above allegations

13 in the TAC adequately allege a due process claim against defendant Cuevas.

14 For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that the TAC states a cognizable

15 due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against defendant Cuevas but fails to state a

16 due process claim against defendants Kutney and Lopez.

17 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

18 The Clerk of Court shall correct the caption to reflect the termination of Scott Frauenheim,

19 retired Warden, as a defendant.

20 It is further RECOMMENDED:

21 Plaintiff be permitted to proceed on his due process claim against defendant Cuevas only

22 and Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint be dismissed against defendants Kutney and Lopez.

23 NOTICE TO PARTIES

24 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

25 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

26

2 Notably in his objections (Doc. No. 20), Plaintiff refers the court for the first time to Cal. Code Regs. tit.

27 15, § 3378.1 which requires “dissemination of the newly certified sign or symbol” to be made “to DAI

Wardens, OCS Agents, the incarcerated population.” The regulation however does not identify who is

28 responsible for such dissemination.

1 | after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written

2 | objections with the Court. Jd.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned,

3 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen

4 | (15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party

5 | wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its

6 | CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with

7 | specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by

8 || the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. §

9 | 636(b)U)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the

10 | waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

' | Dated: _ October 9, 2025 Wile. Th fareh Zack

12 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28