Daniel Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia, James Dougherty, Michael Duffy, Dominic Mangoni, Paul McKelvie, Paul Raley, and Thomas Perks

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL GWYNN, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

No. 25-553-KSM

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,

JAMES DOUGHERTY,

MICHAEL DUFFY,

DOMINIC MANGONI,

PAUL MCKELVIE,

PAUL RALEY, and

THOMAS PERKS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. November 26, 2025

Plaintiff Daniel Gwynn was granted habeas corpus relief nearly thirty years after his

wrongful incarceration for the murder of Marsha Smith. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s

office (DAO) dropped all charges, and Gwynn, exonerated, was released from custody in 2024.

Gwynn now brings a civil suit against members of the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD)

and the City of Philadelphia. Defendants City of Philadelphia and Detectives James Dougherty

and Dominic Mangoni move to dismiss Gwynn’s claims against Detectives Dougherty and

Mangoni, which allege violations of Gwynn’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-

incrimination, and Gwynn’s Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia, which alleges

wrongful prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. (Doc. No. 17.) Gwynn filed a brief in

opposition. (Doc. No. 20.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ partial motion to

dismiss is denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Accepting all of Gwynn’s allegations as true, the relevant facts are as follows. Marsha

Smith, a squatter, tragically died in a fire at an abandoned apartment building on November 20,

1994. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 24.) No witnesses saw the person who allegedly started the fire. (Id. at

¶ 64.) But when detectives interviewed three witnesses who lived in the same abandoned

building with Smith, two of the witnesses stated that they fought with a man named “Rick” the

day before the fire. (Id. at ¶ 44, 49.) Although each witness gave a significantly different

physical description of “Rick” (id. at ¶ 41), the detectives claimed that all three witnesses

identified Gwynn’s photo as “Rick.” And the detectives fabricated a story that the witnesses

recognized Gwynn from a filler picture for a photo array shown to these witnesses in a previous

murder investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 46–59.) The detectives represented to the prosecutor and the

court that this photo array was not saved, so their story could not be verified. (Id. at ¶¶ 66–67.)

Years later, as part of Gwynn’s federal habeas corpus proceedings, the court ordered discovery

which revealed the photo array did not include Gwynn’s picture, leaving it unanswered why

these detectives showed the witnesses Gwynn’s photo. (Id. at ¶ 46.) Gwynn has never been

called or known by the name “Rick.” (Id. at ¶ 63.)

Following his identification by these witnesses, Gwynn was arrested in connection with

the fire that killed Smith. (Id. at ¶ 83.) The day of his arrest, Defendants Dougherty and

Mangoni coerced Gwynn into giving a false statement. (Id. at ¶ 83.) Seventeen hours passed

between his arrest and the end of his interrogation. (Id. at ¶ 94.) During this time, Gwynn was

handcuffed, deprived of access to an attorney, slept a total of fifteen minutes, and was under the

influence of crack cocaine. (Id. at ¶¶ 95–96.) Defendants Dougherty and Mangoni knew Gwynn

was in a drug-induced state when they interrogated him. (Id. at ¶ 109.) Yet, they fabricated a

false confession and forced Gwynn to sign it.1 (Id. at ¶ 97.) The statement only contained

details about the crime known to the police, had internal inconsistencies, and contained

misunderstandings about basic facts of the crime scene. (Id. at ¶ 105.)

At trial, the prosecution based its case largely on the testimony of the three witnesses who

identified Gwynn as the man named “Rick” and on Gwynn’s coerced confession. (Id. at ¶¶ 110–

15.) The jury convicted Gwynn of first-degree murder, arson, and five counts of aggravated

assault, sentencing him to death in November 1995. (Id. at ¶ 116.)

Years later, post-conviction discovery revealed that the detectives ignored and deprived

Gwynn of evidence that offered a credible alternative theory of guilt. (Id. at ¶ 31.) This

alternative theory related to the murder of Glenn Taylor, who was killed in the same abandoned

house as Smith just fifteen months earlier. (Id. at ¶¶ 117–20.) Witnesses to this murder named

the attackers as Maurice Johnson, a/k/a “Reese,” and Gary Lupton a/k/a “Rick.” (Id. at ¶ 128–

31.) Johnson and Lupton threatened to kill the squatters if they gave the police information

about Taylor’s murder. (Id. at ¶ 134.) Despite this threat some of the squatters provided

information to the police which then led to the arrests of Johnson and Lupton. Following

Johnson and Lupton’s arrests, there were three arson attempts on the squatters’ building, the

same building where Smith had lived. (Id. at ¶ 143.) Significantly, two of those squatters—who

later identified Gwynn as “Rick”—testified at Lupton’s trial for the murder of Taylor. (Id. at ¶

141.) It was just three days after these two squatters testified at Lupton’s trial, that the

abandoned building where the two squatters lived with Smith was burned down. (Id. at ¶ 142.)

Moreover, a separate apartment building of another witness who testified against Taylor and

1 The confession stated that Gwynn argued with the squatters in the building the day before the fire and

came back the next day to apologize, but, while there, he dropped gas cans on the hallway and

accidentally dropped a match that he was using to light his crack pipe. (Doc. No 14 ¶¶ 84–87.)

Lupton was also set on fire. (Id. at ¶ 155.) This second fire occurred after Gwynn’s arrest and

while he was in custody. (Id. at ¶ 157.)

Post-conviction discovery also revealed a letter to the police from a witness reporting that

Lupton (a/k/a “Rick”) solicited him to kill witnesses located in the building where Smith died.

(Id. at ¶ 160.) And, post-conviction discovery showed that the police knew of the connection

between the Taylor murder investigation and the arsons because the investigating detectives

overlapped and documentation related to Taylor’s murder was found in the Smith murder file.

(Id. at ¶¶ 163–69.) But none of this exculpatory evidence was disclosed to Gwynn. (Id. at ¶ 162.)

According to Gwynn, the misconduct that occurred in the investigation of his case was

the product of a City policy, practice, and custom of unconstitutional misconduct including:

• Engaging in unlawful interrogation of suspects; illegal witness detentions

and interrogations; fabrication of witness and suspect statements; and

failing to record and disclose exculpatory evidence;

• Failing to appropriately discipline or take corrective action against police

officers who engaged in illegal or unconstitutional conduct;

• Failing to properly train and supervise officers on the constitutional

limitations on their investigative, detention, and arrest powers;

• Ignoring, with deliberate indifference, systemic patterns of police

misconduct and abuse of civilians’ rights during police investigations and

prosecutions of criminal suspects and defendants, including unlawful police

interrogations, illegal arrests, unlawful coercion of witnesses, providing

unlawful fraudulent financial rewards for statements favorable to their

theory of the case, falsification and fabrication of evidence, and suppression

of exculpatory and impeachment evidence; and

• Failing to properly sanction or discipline PPD officers, who are aware of

and conceal or aid and abet violations of constitutional rights of individuals

by other PPD officers, thereby causing and encouraging PPD officers,

including Defendants in this case, to violate the rights of citizens such as

Mr. Gwynn.

(Id. at ¶ 217.)

Gwynn alleges the City and its policymakers knew about these practices, and in support

of that allegation, references 1977 and 1978 Philadelphia Inquirer Pulitzer Prize-winning

reports, governmental investigations, complaints, and internal PPD investigations. (Id. at ¶ 183.)

Gwynn also names sixteen other cases with similar misconduct to show how pervasive these

practices were before, during, and after his murder investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 186–201.) Further,

Gwynn alleges the PPD was deliberately indifferent during this time because the PPD lacked

internal guidelines and rules relating to the constitutional rights of suspects and witnesses during

questioning and interrogation prior to January 1, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 203–07.) After policies were

instated in 2014, the PPD’s clearance rate dropped, which, Gwynn claims, shows that “the PPD

Homicide Unit relied on the ability to violate the constitutional rights of suspects and witnesses

to investigate and clear cases.” (Id. at ¶ 213.) The PPD still lacks policies for disclosing

evidence to the DAO. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A plaintiff’s complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In reviewing a motion to

dismiss, a court “draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Wilson v. USI Ins.

Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2023). However, we are not “compelled to accept

unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks

omitted). The “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is

sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the

U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “Conclusory assertions of fact and legal

conclusions are not entitled to the same presumption.” Id.

A plaintiff’s claim for relief under Section 1983 “must allege a person acting under color

of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2013). “Rather than

conferring any substantive rights, section 1983 ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred.’ ” Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Gwynn’s Fifth Amendment claim in Count Three and his

municipal liability claim in Count Five. The Court discusses each in turn.

A. Fifth Amendment Claim.

In Count Three, Gwynn sues Defendants Dougherty and Mangoni under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. (Doc. No. 14 at

¶¶ 234–38.) Specifically, Gwynn alleges that Detectives Dougherty and Mangoni fabricated a

false confession and forced Gwynn to sign it while he was in a drug-induced state, overbearing

Gwynn’s will through sleep deprivation and aggressive interrogation. (Id. at ¶¶ 83–116.)

The Fifth Amendment, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,

provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. To protect this right, the Supreme Court has provided

safeguards such as Miranda warnings and the “right to counsel” during custodial interrogations.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Nevertheless, “questioning a plaintiff in custody

without providing Miranda warnings is not a basis for a § 1983 claim as long as the plaintiff’s

statements are not used against her at trial.” Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 557–58 (3d Cir.

2003). This is because “violations of the prophylactic Miranda procedures do not amount to

violations of the Constitution itself.” Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994).

Instead, to establish a Fifth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show compulsion and use.

Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2012).

Here, Defendants Dougherty and Mangoni argue Gwynn’s Fifth Amendment claim is not

cognizable because Miranda violations cannot provide the basis for a § 1983 claim. (Doc. No. 17

at 6.) But here, Gwynn’s Fifth Amendment claim is based not on a Miranda violation, but on the

use of his coerced confession at trial. (Doc. No. 20 at 22–23.) The Court finds that Gwynn

pleads facts, which taken as true, show compulsion and use. First, Gwynn alleges Defendants

Dougherty and Mangoni coerced him into signing a false statement. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 235.) As

alleged, Defendants Dougherty and Mangoni achieved this compulsion through seventeen hours

of aggressive interrogation while Gwynn was sleep deprived, handcuffed, and under the

influence of crack-cocaine. (Id. at ¶¶ 83–109.) See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 306 (3d

Cir. 2014) (holding the appellant’s evidence of a seventeen-hour interrogation, unaccompanied

by friends or counsel could show coercion). Second, Gwynn claims his compelled statement was

introduced at trial, after which the jury convicted Gwynn of first-degree murder, arson, and five

counts of aggravated assault. (Id. at ¶ 115–16.) Thus, Gwynn has alleged a cognizable Fifth

Amendment claim, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Three is denied.

B. Monell Liability

In Count Five, Gwynn sues the City of Philadelphia, by and through its final

policymakers, under § 1983 for unconstitutional practices that led to Gwynn’s arrest, charging,

prosecution, and nearly thirty years of wrongful incarceration. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶¶ 244–48.)

Municipalities cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of their employees under

a theory of vicarious liability based on respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a municipality may only be held liable when an official policy,

practice, or custom proximately caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. Fletcher v.

O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793 (3d Cir. 1989).2 Courts recognize two ways a plaintiff may

satisfy this standard: “[a] plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the

municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the

municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105

(3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798–99 (3d Cir. 2019)

(internal citations omitted). Under either theory, the complaint must give notice as to the

improper conduct beyond simply alleging that the municipality’s policy violated certain

constitutional rights. See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding a

complaint that alleged the city had a policy of ignoring First Amendment rights was insufficient).

Additionally, a plaintiff must establish proximate causation between the policy or inadequacy

and the plaintiff’s injury by demonstrating a “plausible nexus” or “affirmative link” between the

two. Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). “As long as the causal link is not

too tenuous, the question whether the municipal policy or custom proximately caused the

constitutional infringement should be left to the jury.” Id. at 851.

Gwynn brings claims under both theories of municipal liability. He alleges the City had a

“policy, practice, or custom” of the use of “coercive techniques in interviews and interrogations

2 The Third Circuit has not decided whether a municipality can be held liable only when its employees

violate rights that were clearly established at the time. District courts have taken different approaches.

Compare Ogrod v. City of Philadelphia, 598 F. Supp. 3d 253, 276 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (holding the city was

not subject to municipal liability for rights that were not clearly established at the time of its employees’

actions), with Crosland v. City of Philadelphia, 676 F. Supp. 3d 364, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (holding the

plaintiff need not show his rights were clearly established to state a claim for municipal liability because

the clearly established law analysis relates to qualified immunity, not municipal liability). Defendants’

motion does not raise this issue, so the Court will not examine it further.

to obtain confessions; the fabrication of inculpatory evidence; the fabrication of incriminating

statements from witnesses, suspects, and arrestees by coercion, suggestion, and feeding details

about the crime; and the withholding of exculpatory and impeachment evidence.” (Doc. No. 14

at ¶ 245.) Gwynn also alleges his injuries were caused by the City’s failure to “make any

meaningful investigation into charges,” its failure “to take appropriate remedial and/or

disciplinary actions,” and its failure to sufficiently train. (Id. at ¶¶ 216, 246–47.) The Court

examines each theory in turn.

1. Policy or Custom

“Policy is made when a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish

municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.”

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). The plaintiff must show the decisionmaker has

“policymaking responsibility” because “[u]nder § 1983, only the conduct of those officials

whose decisions constrain the discretion of subordinates constitutes the acts of the municipality.”

Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850. Since Gwynn does not identify a decisionmaker with policymaking

responsibility, he does not state a Monell claim under the policy theory.

A plaintiff alleges custom “by showing that a given course of conduct, although not

specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to

constitute law.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480. “Custom may be established by proof of

knowledge and acquiescence.” Fletcher, 867 F.2d at 793–94. But, “a plaintiff need not

specifically identify a responsible policymaker if the plaintiff has demonstrated a custom that is

so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, such that the custom can be ascribed to

municipal policymakers.” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 229 F. Supp. 3d 322, 336 (E.D. Pa.

2017) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Here, Defendants argue that Count Five must be dismissed because Gwynn fails to

identify a policy or custom with sufficient particularity, he cannot establish causation, and the

allegations of misconduct in various lawsuits and civil complaints cannot show a practice or

custom that leads to municipal liability. The Court disagrees.

First, Defendants rely on the Third Circuit’s opinion in McTernan v. City of York, to

argue Gwynn has not identified a policy or custom with sufficient particularity. (Doc. No. 17 at

9.) In McTernan, the court held that the complaint gave no notice as to the defendant’s improper

conduct because the plaintiff simply alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated. 564

F.3d at 658. Here, by contrast, Gwynn’s complaint puts Defendants on notice as to their

misconduct by specifically pointing to tactics used to coerce confessions, fabricate inculpatory

evidence, suppress exculpatory and impeaching evidence, and manipulate statements from

witnesses. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 180.) Gwynn’s complaint identifies this custom with particularity

using Gwynn’s own experience and the experiences discussed in sixteen other cases. (Doc.

No. 14 at ¶¶ 186–201.)

Next, Defendants claim that Gwynn fails to establish a sufficient link between the alleged

pattern and the injury. (Doc. No. 17 at 12.) But Gwynn specifically alleges a causal relationship

between the new procedures enacted in 2014 and the fall of the PPD’s clearance rate, showing

that “the PPD Homicide Unit relied on the ability to violate the constitutional rights of suspects

and witnesses to investigate and clear cases.” (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 213.) At this stage, Gwynn’s

allegations establish a causal link that is not so “tenuous” as to warrant dismissal. Bielevicz, 915

F.2d at 851.

Last, Defendants argue that similar cases without findings of liability are mere allegations

of misconduct, and these lawsuits and civil complaints cannot show practice or custom that

would lead to municipal liability. (Doc. No. 17 at 15.) Defendants do not cite to any controlling

authority to support this argument. And they fail to recognize “courts in this circuit—including

the court of appeals—have accepted similar numbers of incidents as evidence of a pattern.”

Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-4196, 2019 WL 4039575, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27,

2019) (emphasis added); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 969–70, 973 (3d Cir.

1996) (finding that five written civilian complaints of similar misconduct were sufficient to show

a pattern) (emphasis added). And, while Defendants argue that civil complaints are “mere

allegations,” at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must take allegations in the complaint as

true. Thus, Gwynn has stated a claim for Monell liability under the custom theory.

Gwynn’s allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to establish custom. Gwynn’s

allegations describe in detail a course of conduct that is widespread and long-standing. Gwynn

articulates techniques used to obtain confessions; to fabricate inculpatory evidence; to withhold

exculpatory and impeaching evidence by not disclosing the entire investigative file to the DAO;

and to fabricate incriminating statements from witnesses, suspects, and arrestees by feeding

details know by the police. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 180.) Gwynn alleges these practices were

pervasive and known by the City, referencing reports by the Philadelphia Inquirer, governmental

investigations, complaints, internal investigations, and sixteen similar cases. (Id. at ¶¶ 183–201.)

2. Failure or Inadequacy

A plaintiff may also hold a municipality liable for the failure to train, failure to supervise,

or failure to discipline its officers. Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105. Under this theory, the plaintiff

must show that the failure or inadequacy constituted deliberate indifference. Id. at 105–06.

“This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will

confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of

employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339,

357 (3d Cir. 1999)). A “plaintiff need not establish that the municipal policymaker had actual

knowledge of a pattern of constitutional misconduct. Constructive knowledge or a showing that

the municipal policymaker ‘should have known’ about the pattern of constitutional misconduct is

sufficient.” Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-4196, 2019 WL 4039575, at *14 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 27, 2019) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997))). “The

proper causation inquiry in a failure to train, supervise, or discipline case focuses on ‘whether the

injury could have been avoided had the employee been trained [or supervised or disciplined]

under a program that was not deficient in the identified respects.’ ” Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575,

at *23 (quoting Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Harris

v. Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989))).

Gwynn’s complaint alleges deliberate indifference as to the need to supervise, discipline,

and train PPD officers. First, Gwynn references similar cases throughout the early 1990s to

show municipal policymakers knew the PPD homicide detectives would confront difficult

murder investigations where they would need to interrogate witnesses and suspects and come

into possession of exculpatory and impeachment evidence that would need to be disclosed to the

prosecution. Second, there was a history of mishandling murder investigations and

interrogations, as alleged by reference to the Philadelphia Inquirer reporting in the late 1970s.

Last, wrong choices by the PPD during murder investigations implicate constitutional rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Gwynn pleads with particularity the

inadequacies of the disciplinary, supervision, and training systems, alleging they were arbitrary,

delayed, inconsistent, incomplete, and lacked early warning systems. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶¶ 216–

17.) See Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 290 F.Supp.3d 371 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding the

plaintiff stated a Monell claim by recounting “nine similar incidents of police misconduct in

Philadelphia from 1988 to 1994” caused by the City’s failure to train and discipline detectives).

And, Gwynn has alleged causation for his failure or inadequacy theory of Monell

liability. Gwynn identifies the “specific policies” that “would have prevented the plaintiff’s

alleged injuries,” using his reference to the new procedures enacted in 2014, such as prohibitions

on use of force, threats, coercion, and interrogation before the issuance of Miranda warnings.

See Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575, at *23 (finding the plaintiff sufficiently identified policies that

would have prevented his injuries, such as training officers to include exculpatory information in

probable cause affidavits and prohibiting the use of force during interrogations). Further, Gwynn

alleges that if he had had the exculpatory information that was withheld, it would have

“powerfully refuted the prosecution’s case against him.” (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 31.)

Defendants argue that Gwynn’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline claim fails

because Gwynn does not specify which City policymakers acted with deliberate indifference.

(Doc. No. 17 at 10.) But, “[p]ractices so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law

are ascribable to municipal decisionmakers.” Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850. Accordingly, a

plaintiff’s evidence need not specifically identify the responsible decisionmaker. Id. Here,

Gwynn “has alleged a Monell time-period of 48 years” (Doc. No. 17 at 8), detailing sixteen

similar instances and referencing documentation of similar misconduct by the Philadelphia

Inquirer, governmental investigations, complaints, and internal PPD investigations. (Doc. No. 14

at ¶ 183). These allegations, which suggest decades of alleged failures to train, supervise, and

discipline, are sufficient to show a practice so well settled as to have the force of law. See

Wright, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 336–37 (holding the plaintiff’s complaint, which named at least eight

separate instances involving the same conduct, allowed the court to infer the unconstitutional

practices of the Philadelphia Police Department were so widespread they could be ascribed to

municipal policymakers). Thus, Gwynn has sufficiently shown the widespread, continued

failures can be ascribed to municipal policymakers.

* * *

In sum, Gwynn has sufficiently stated a Monell claim against the City based on a custom

and a failure to train, supervise, or defend. Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss is also

denied as to Count Five.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss is denied.

Defendants’ alternative request to narrow the claim both in content and in time-period is also

denied.3

3 Because this Court has found that Gwynn’s complaint was sufficiently particular to put Defendants on

notice of his theories of municipal liability, the request to narrow the claim is denied. Further, Defendants

do not specify which content or time-periods they believe should be excluded.