Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

VANESSA TAMICHE NAVARRO,

Petitioner,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-3213-KKM-NHA

PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity

as Attorney General, et al.,

Respondents.

___________________________________

ORDER

Petitioner and noncitizen Vanessa Tamiche Navarro was scheduled to

appear for an Order of Supervision (OSUP) check-in appointment at the U.S.

Immigration and Customs (ICE) Enforcement Tampa Field Office on Friday,

November 21, 2025, at 7:00 a.m. See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 5–11. Tamiche

Navarro’s retained counsel communicated to members of the ICE Tampa Field

Office that she had a conflict and could not attend her client’s appointment,

but ICE declined to reschedule. Id. ¶¶ 13–18. The day before her appointment,

Tamiche Navarro moved this Court for a Temporary Restraining Order

“restraining Respondents from requiring Petitioner to appear” without counsel

and requiring ICE to reschedule the OSUP appointment. Mot. for TRO (Doc.

2-1) at 1, 8.

Tamiche Navarro’s scheduled appointment time passed before the

motion was assigned to me, and so I directed her to explain whether her

request for emergency relief was moot. (Doc. 5). In response, Tamiche Navarro

filed a second motion, this time requesting a TRO “restraining Respondent

from finding Petitioner noncompliant with ICE OSUP Standards for refusing

to appear at the November 21, 2025 OSUP appointment without counsel,”

requiring ICE to reschedule the appointment, and “[o]rder[ing] that

Petitioner’s OSUP status remain unchanged pending the rescheduled

appointment.” 2d. Mot. for TRO (Doc. 6) at 8. For the following reasons, I deny

the motion.

To obtain a TRO, a movant must demonstrate “(1) a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered

if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm

the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that the entry of the relief

would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d

1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation modified). The third and

fourth factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party,” but in all

cases the “the first two factors . . . are the most critical.” Nken v. Holder, 556

U.S. 418, 434 (2009). A TRO is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be

granted unless the movant clearly establishe[s] the burden of persuasion as to

each of the four prerequisites.” Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v.

Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified)

(citing McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998)).

On the first factor, “a petitioner must demonstrate a substantial

likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the causes of action he has asserted.”

Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1134 (11th Cir. 2005).

This means that “injunctive relief must relate in some fashion to the relief

requested in the complaint,” id., and cannot “deal[] with a matter lying wholly

outside the issues in the suit,” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th

Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1127 (11th

Cir. 1990) (“Litigants are not entitled to greater temporary remedies pending

litigation than they would be entitled to as the ultimate prevailing party.”).

Here, Tamiche Navarro’s complaint requests injunctive relief enjoining

Respondents from requiring her to attend the scheduled appointment, ordering

Respondents to reschedule the appointment, and directing Respondents to

“[m]aintain [her] current OSUP supervision status pending the rescheduled

appointment.” Compl. at 6 (Prayer for Relief). The complaint does not

contemplate Tamiche Navarro failing to appear, nor does it seek relief related

to alleged consequences from doing so. But her second motion now asks to bar

ICE from deeming her “noncompliant” for failing to appear. 2d. Mot. for TRO

at 3. Because the complaint does not squarely request that relief, I cannot

award Tamiche Navarro a “greater temporary remed[y] . . . than [she] would

be entitled to as the ultimate prevailing party.” Gomez, 899 F.2d at 1127.

In any event, Tamiche Navarro fails to convince that she has a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits or that she faces an impending,

irreparable harm. Because she cannot satisfy the “most critical” factors

necessary for preliminary relief, I do not address the final “merge[d]” factors.

First, Tamiche Navarro does not address this Court’s jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g),1 which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to

hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision

or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders.” Section 1252(g) is a “discretion-protecting

provision” designed to prevent the “deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence

prolongation of removal proceedings.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999). “When ‘asking if a claim is barred by

§ 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.’ ” Camarena v.

1 She also does not discuss 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes review of “any

other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland

Security the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” The Attorney General has discretion

to revoke an OSUP. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) (“The Executive Associate

Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke release

and return to Service custody an alien previously approved for release under the

procedures in this section.”); but see Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154

(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[W]hile courts cannot question the discretion that is exercised [to

revoke an OSUP], they can address the process used to exercise that discretion.”).

Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d

1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2020)). In the present context, courts differentiate

“between the decision to revoke an OSUP and a failure to follow procedures”

in doing so. See, e.g., Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at

*5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025); see also Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR,

2025 WL 1895479, at *3–5 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025) (holding that § 1252(g) did

not strip the Court of jurisdiction to evaluate whether the government

complied with OSUP revocation procedures).

Here, Tamiche Navarro seeks prospective relief barring ICE from finding

her noncompliant with the OSUP and from adjusting her OSUP status. She

also seeks an order obligating ICE to reschedule her check-in appointment. In

my view, this three-headed request “runs headlong into § 1252(g).” Camarena,

988 F.3d at 1273. Although it appears speculative whether ICE intends to alter

or revoke Tamiche Navarro’s OSUP based on her failure to appear, whether to

do so amounts to a “decision . . . by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g);

see Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *4 (finding “that § 1252(g) deprives [the

Court] of subject-matter jurisdiction over Respondents’ decision to revoke the

OSUP”); see also Espinoza-Sorto v. Agudelo, No. 1:25-CV-23201-GAYLES,

2025 WL 3012786, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2025) (“ICE’s decision to revoke

Petitioner’s OSUP, a necessary step to execute his removal order, . . . clearly

fall[s] under the purview of § 1252(g).”); see also Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d

1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (finding that “[s]ecuring an alien while

awaiting a removal determination constitutes an action taken to commence

proceedings”). This Court likely lacks jurisdiction to grant the specific relief

requested here.

Second, and to the extent that Tamiche Navarro’s request avoids

§ 1252(g) as a “substantive review of the underlying legal bases for [the

government’s] discretionary decisions and actions,” Madu v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,

470 F.3d 1362, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006), her claim is doubtful on the merits.

Tamiche Navarro argues that ICE violated due process and her rights to

counsel under 8 U.S.C. § 1362 and 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) by refusing to reschedule

her OSUP check-in appointment. See 2d. Mot. for TRO at 5–6. Section 1362

provides aliens the “privilege of being represented (at no expense to the

Government)” by counsel “[i]n any removal proceedings before an immigration

judge.” And DHS regulations likewise provide aliens “the right to be

represented by an attorney” “[w]henever an examination is provided for” in

Title 8, Chapter I of the Code of Federal Regulations.2 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b).

2 Tamiche Navarro claims that “DHS regulations specify that counsel may appear at

any interview unless expressly excluded” and that “OSUP check-ins are not excluded

Indeed, although aliens are entitled to due process of law in deportation

hearings under the Fifth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit has long held that

“ ‘an alien must show substantial prejudice’ to prevail ‘on a due process

challenge to a deportation proceeding.’ ” Priva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 34 F.4th 946,

954 (11th Cir. 2022).

But assuming that Tamiche Navarro’s OSUP check-in qualifies as either

a “removal proceeding[]” or “examination” under the above standards,3 she

inadequately alleges either a constructive denial of her rights or resulting

“substantial prejudice.” Instead, ICE’s refusal to reschedule is analogous to the

denial of a continuance. Even in the criminal context, though, “a denial of a

continuance request will not always amount to a Sixth Amendment violation

of a paying defendant’s choice of counsel.” United States v. Coleman, 256 F.

App’x 263, 265 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see Freza v. Att’y Gen. United

States, 49 F.4th 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2022) (reviewing for abuse of discretion “[t]he

question of whether the denial of a continuance constitutes a violation of [an

alien’s] due process and statutory right to counsel” under 8 U.S.C. § 1362); cf.

under the regulation.” 2d. Mot. for TRO at 5; see also Ex. B (Doc. 6) at 20 (arguing

that an alien “may be accompanied by counsel ‘in any interview’ before DHS unless

specifically exempted”). 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) does not use the specific “interview”

language Tamiche Navarro attributes to it, nor does it speak to (non) exemptions.

3 Although I need not decide this question to determine that Tamiche Navarro is not

entitled to emergency relief, I observe that she provides no authority extending either

provision to the OSUP check-in appointment context.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (recognizing that a

court may limit a defendant’s right to counsel of his choice for many reasons

including “the demands of its calendar,” or “fairness”).

On the facts presented here, ICE’s decision appears to be a reasonable

effort to manage its supervisory responsibilities. In July 2025, based on

Tamiche Navarro’s “pending Application to Register Permanent Residence or

Adjust Status (Form I-485),” ICE scheduled her appointment for November. 2d

Mot. for TRO ¶¶ 12, 14; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a)(1) (OSUP may “require[] that

the alien report to a specified officer periodically and provide relevant

information under oath as directed”). Counsel, based in South Florida, did not

ask ICE to reschedule until November 10, less than two weeks before the in-

person appointment in Tampa. 2d Mot. for TRO ¶ 17. ICE declined because

they “see a lot of aliens every day and are not in the position to constantly move

appointment dates.” Ex. B. (Doc. 6) at 20. Even so, Tamiche Navarro could still

consult with her attorney beforehand and appear with another representative.

ICE expressly gave her the latter option. See Ex. A. (Doc. 6) at 12 (“Please note

that ICE’s inability to reschedule the appointment . . . does not negate your

client’s right to legal representation”); see also Ex. B. (Doc. 6) at 20 (“You are

more than welcome to send another attorney or representative in her place”).

ICE’s decision not to reschedule at the last minute did not constitute an abuse

of discretion or prejudicial violation of Tamiche Navarro’s rights.

Finally—and fatally to the TRO request—Tamiche Navarro does not

show “that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted.”

Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225. Although she can seek injunctive relief to prevent

future injury, Tamiche Navarro must still “establish standing by

demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant’s allegedly

wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and that the threatened injury

is certainly impending.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (citation modified); see also Elend v.

Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The binding precedent in this

circuit is clear that for an injury to suffice for prospective relief, it must be

imminent.”). Thus, “possible future injury” will not suffice for standing.

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).

Tamiche Navarro alleges, at most, a speculative risk of “possible future

injury.” Her complaint and operative motion discuss the risk of appearing at

her check-in without counsel, but those risks are moot and cannot support

standing. See 2d. Mot. for TRO at 6–7. Looking forward, Tamiche Navarro

claims that because she did not appear, she “faces being held outside of ICE

OSUP Compliance unless this Court intervenes and restrains Respondents

from holding Ms. Tamiche Navarro noncompliant.” Id. at 3. Tamiche Navarro

fails to explain what specific harms attach to OSUP noncompliance. And she

does not allege that ICE will penalize her for noncompliance, let alone that it

will do so imminently. Nor did ICE promise as much. In declining counsel’s

demand to reschedule, ICE Officer Angel Gonzalez wrote that Tamiche

Navarro’s failure to attend “could result in significant consequences.” Ex. A

(Doc. 6) at 12–13. That language accords with the fact that the Attorney

General’s decision to revoke an OSUP is discretionary, not mandatory. See 8

C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2). And even then, “the alien will be notified of the reasons for

revocation of his or her release” and “will be afforded an initial informal

interview promptly . . . to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the

reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” Id. § 241.4(l)(1). Ultimately,

absent verified allegations or evidence that Tamiche Navarro faces “certainly

impending” harm, emergency relief is not warranted, and Tamiche Navarro’s

complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing.

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Tamiche Navarro’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice. She may file an amended complaint no later than

December 9, 2025.

2. Tamiche Navarro’s Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

3. Tamiche Navarro’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

(Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.

4. Tamiche Navarro is directed to serve the Complaint and a copy of

this Order on Respondents by December 2, 2025.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 25, 2025.

pate Kinki Mizelle

United States District Judge

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