Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------

AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

25-CV-5311(EK)(MMH)

-against-

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS BOARD et al.,

Defendants,

-and-

AMAZON LABOR UNION NO. 1

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS,

Defendant-Intervenor.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

In September 2025, New York amended its State

Employment Relations Act. See S. 8034-A, 2025-2026 Legis.

Session (N.Y. 2025) (enacted). The amendment extended the state

law’s coverage to entities like the plaintiff — Amazon.com

Services LLC — whose labor relations had previously been subject

only to federal oversight. Amazon filed suit, arguing that the

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., preempts

the state’s newly conferred oversight powers.

Amazon now seeks to enjoin any enforcement of the

amendment. For the following reasons, the motion for a

preliminary injunction is granted.

I. Background

The Court draws the following facts from the complaint

and the parties’ declarations and exhibits. See Real Est. Bd.

of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 786 F. Supp. 3d 788, 815

(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“In deciding a motion for preliminary

injunction, a court may consider the entire record . . . .”).1

All facts discussed herein are undisputed unless otherwise

noted. See Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755

(2d Cir. 1998) (party seeking preliminary injunction “is not

entitled to have the court accept its untested representations

as true if they are disputed”).

A. The NLRA and SERA

The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is “a

comprehensive code passed by Congress to regulate labor

relations in activities affecting interstate and foreign

commerce.” Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 238

(1967). Specifically, the NLRA guarantees employees the right

to self-organize, collectively bargain, engage in concerted

activities, and refrain from all such activities. 29 U.S.C.

1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

§ 157. The NLRA also prohibits both employers and labor

organizations from engaging in unfair labor practices. Id.

§ 158. The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has

exclusive jurisdiction to administer the NLRA. See Wis. Dep’t

of Indus., Lab. & Hum. Rels. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291

(1986) (NLRA enforcement is “a role Congress reserved

exclusively for the [NLRB].”).

Historically, the New York State Employment Relations

Act (“SERA”) provided similar protections to laborers who were

not covered by the NLRA — such as, agricultural workers and non-

employee contractors. Compl. ¶ 26, ECF No. 1. And the State

Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) served as a state

analogue to the NLRB. Id. ¶ 27. But SERA “expressly excluded

from [the] PERB’s jurisdiction employees covered by the NLRA.”

Id. ¶ 26; N.Y. Lab. Law § 715 (McKinney 1968) (“The provisions

of this article shall not apply to: (1) employees . . .

protected by the provisions of the [NLRA] . . . .”).

B. The SERA Amendment

On September 5, 2025, New York enacted the SERA

Amendment, which eliminated SERA’s exception for “employees

. . . protected by the provisions of the [NLRA].” Compl. ¶ 28;

S. 8034-A (N.Y. 2025), ECF No. 1-1.2 Instead, SERA now

2 Page numbers in citations to record documents other than briefs refer

to ECF pagination.

presumptively applies to NLRA-covered employees. The only

exception it allows is for cases in which the NLRB “successfully

asserts jurisdiction over any employer, employees, trades, or

industries pursuant to an order by the federal district court.”

Id. Upon signing the bill into law, Governor Hochul explained

that — in her view — “the Trump administration has failed to

prioritize a strong [NLRB]”; PERB Chair Connick (a defendant

here) added that the “PERB stands ready to fill the void.” Id.

¶ 28 n.2 (citing Press Release, Office of the Governor (Sep. 6,

2025).3

As a result of the SERA Amendment, parallel provisions

of SERA and the NLRA now apply to many of the same employees.

See id. ¶ 32 (comparing SERA and NLRA definitions of “an unfair

labor practice”). Amazon also contends, though the state

disputes, that SERA and the NLRA “diverge[] in critical

respects,” meaning certain employers are subject to conflicting

requirements. Compare id. ¶¶ 37-42 (describing differences in

the two statutes), with Defs.’ PI Opp’n 20-22, ECF No. 30

(citing PERB case law interpreting SERA “consistently with the

NLRA”).

3 Available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-

legislation-strengthen-and-expand-worker-and-labor-protections (last accessed

November 25, 2025).

C. The JFK8 Charge

On September 15, the Amazon Labor Union No. 1

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“ALU”) filed a charge

with the PERB alleging unfair labor practices at Amazon’s JFK8

fulfillment center on Staten Island (the “JFK8 Charge”). ECF

No. 1-2. Specifically, the ALU alleges that its vice president,

Brima Sylla, was pretextually disciplined for “low productivity”

and ultimately fired, all in retaliation for his union

activities. Id. at 8-9. The PERB served the JFK8 Charge on

Amazon on September 17 and issued a notice of conference for

October 13. La Rocca Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 14-2; Notice of

Conference, ECF No. 1-3. At the time the ALU filed the JFK8

Charge, substantially similar charges were already pending

before the NLRB. Compl. ¶¶ 48-49.

D. The Instant Action

Following receipt of the JFK8 Charge, Amazon filed

this action. The company alleges that the SERA Amendment is

(1) facially unconstitutional because it is preempted by the

NLRA as determined in the Supreme Court’s decisions in San Diego

Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) and Lodge

76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S.

132 (1976); (2) unconstitutional as applied to Amazon under

Garmon; and (3) facially unconstitutional because it violates

the Due Process Clause’s fair-notice requirement. Compl. ¶¶ 55-

82.

On September 23, Amazon filed a motion for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) and eventual preliminary injunction,

which would enjoin Defendants from enforcing SERA against

employers or employees covered by the NLRA.4 ECF No. 14. The

Honorable Orelia E. Merchant, acting as the Miscellaneous Duty

Judge, denied Amazon’s motion for a TRO the same day.5 ECF No.

17. However, in a parallel action pending in Albany, New York,

the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby granted an administrative stay of

any matters brought before the PERB that may implicate the

NLRB’s jurisdiction, pending resolution of a motion for a

preliminary injunction in that case. Order, NLRB v. State of

New York, No. 25-CV-1283 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2025), Dkt. No. 16.

The ALU then moved to intervene, ECF No. 26, and the

Court granted that motion. See Order Granting ALU’s Motion to

Intervene, Docket Order dated Oct. 22, 2025.

II. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a

4 Amazon’s proposed order, ECF No. 14, also requests that the Court

“declar[e]” the SERA Amendment unconstitutional. But Amazon has since made

clear that it is not seeking “a preliminary declaratory judgment.” Amazon’s

Suppl. Letter-Br. 6, ECF No. 47.

5 Judge Merchant concluded that Amazon had not met the “stringent”

requirements for an ex parte TRO. ECF No. 17, at 2.

likelihood of irreparable harm absent relief; (3) that the

balance of equities supports an injunction; and (4) that the

public interest favors an injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). When the government is a

party to a lawsuit, the final two factors merge. New York v.

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2020).

A. Amazon Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of its

Preemption Claim

The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law is

the “supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution

or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.

Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “This means that when federal and state

law conflict, federal law prevails and state law is preempted.”

Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453, 471

(2018). Here, Amazon has established that the SERA Amendment is

likely preempted by the NLRA, as determined in Garmon and its

progeny.

In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an

activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the

States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive

competence of the [NLRB].” 359 U.S. at 245. This rule

“prevents States not only from setting forth standards of

conduct inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the

NLRA, but also from providing their own regulatory or judicial

remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited by the

Act.” Gould, 475 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).

In Garmon, Justice Frankfurter justified the broad

preemption in this arena:

When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the

activities which a State purports to regulate are

protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,

or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due

regard for the federal enactment requires that state

jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to

regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of

federal regulation involves too great a danger of

conflict between power asserted by Congress and

requirements imposed by state law.

Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.

Here, no party disputes that SERA, as amended, covers

activity that is also subject to Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.

Instead, the state argues that “historically unique

circumstances justify exceptions to Garmon preemption here.”

Defs.’ PI Opp’n 11. It points to two circumstances in

particular: the current lack of a quorum at the NLRB and the

perceived threat to the board members’ for-cause removal

protection.

The obvious problem is that the Supreme Court’s clear

pronouncements include no “unique circumstances” exception. And

lower courts “cannot and will not invent an exception to Supreme

Court doctrine.” U.S. ex rel. Best v. Barbarotta, No. 12-CV-

6218, 2013 WL 308972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2013).6 Moreover,

even if we could, the “circumstances” the state points to here

have not (yet) come to fruition.

First, the reasoning of Garmon itself precludes

reliance on the NLRB’s loss of a quorum. That case highlighted

the need for exclusive federal procedures as well as the

exclusive application of federal substantive law. The Court

invoked Congress’s creation of “a centralized administrative

agency” — the NLRB — “armed with its own procedures,” 359 U.S.

at 242; see also id. at 242-43 (“Congress evidently considered

that centralized administration of specially designed procedures

was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive

rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to

result from a variety of local procedures . . . .”).

The quorum requirement is precisely one such

procedure. And when Congress mandated a quorum, it obviously

envisioned the possibility that the NLRB might lack one from

time to time, thus inhibiting action.7 In this instance,

6 Two Justices have expressed some interest in curtailing Garmon’s

reach. See Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. Union No. 174,

598 U.S. 771, 785 (2023) (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in the judgment).

Still, district courts are bound to follow Garmon “[u]ntil and unless the

Supreme Court itself overrules or limits” it. Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d

123, 125 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002).

7 At a more general level, Garmon makes clear that even the NLRB’s

explicit refusal to act — with or without a quorum — is not a basis for the

state to exercise power. In Garmon itself, the NLRB “had declined to

exercise its jurisdiction,” and yet the state courts of California were still

precluded from acting. 359 U.S. at 238. This observation may be complicated

moreover, the state has provided no basis to conclude that the

lack of a quorum will endure indefinitely. See, e.g., Daniel

Wiessner, US Senate Panel Approves Two Trump NLRB Nominees,

Tables a Third,” Reuters (Oct. 9, 2025).8

Second, while the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025), may indicate that for-

cause removal protections’ days are numbered, the Supreme Court

has repeatedly cautioned that lower courts should respect its

“prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Mallory v.

Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 136 (2023).9

The state and the ALU make two further arguments that

merit only passing discussion. First, the state contends that

Amazon should be judicially estopped from relying on Garmon

because Amazon previously won an administrative stay of certain

NLRB proceedings in the Fifth Circuit on a finding that the

agency’s exercise of jurisdiction was likely unconstitutional.

— slightly — by a later amendment to the NLRA: in 1959, Congress amended the

statute to permit states to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes when the

NLRB “by rule of decision or by published rules” declines jurisdiction

because “the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently

substantial.” 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1959). There has been no such

declination here, notwithstanding the State’s argument to the contrary.

Defs.’ Suppl. Letter-Br. 2-3. In point of fact, the NLRB has affirmatively

sought to protect its jurisdiction from the PERB. See generally NLRB v.

State of New York, No. 25-CV-1283 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2025) (challenging the

SERA Amendment).

8 Available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-senate-panel-

approves-two-trump-nlrb-nominees-tables-third-2025-10-09 (last accessed Nov.

25, 2025).

9 The Fifth Circuit’s issuance of a preliminary injunction finding that

removal protections for NLRB members and ALJs are likely unconstitutional,

see Defs.’ PI Opp’n 15, is even less predictive, and certainly has not “ended

the uniform administration of the NLRA.” Id.

See Defs.’ PI Opp’n 17-19. But judicial estoppel only applies

when, among other things, there exists “a true inconsistency

between the statements in the two proceedings.” Simon v.

Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997). In the

prior action, Amazon argued that NLRB members are

unconstitutionally insulated from removal. See Ex. E – W.D.

Tex. / 5th Cir. Filings and Orders 30, ECF No. 30-6. Here,

Amazon argues that the SERA Amendment is preempted by the NLRA.

The two positions are not in direct contradiction.

Second, the ALU asserts that “permitting Garmon

preemption when the [NLRB] cannot meaningfully regulate runs

afoul of modern-day 10th Amendment doctrine under Murphy v.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.” Proposed Br. of Proposed

Intervenor ALU in Opp’n to Prelim. Inj. 2 (“ALU PI Opp’n”), ECF

No. 31-1. Murphy is inapposite. The law at issue in that case

could not be understood “as anything other than a direct command

to the States,” meaning it was not a valid form of preemption.

584 U.S. at 479-80. No such command exists here.

Because the Court finds that Amazon is likely to

succeed on its claim that the SERA Amendment is preempted under

Garmon, we need not reach Amazon’s Machinists and void-for-

vagueness arguments. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort

Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)

(“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that this

Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the

necessity of deciding them.”).10

B. Amazon Is Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm

“A showing of irreparable harm is the single most

important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary

injunction.” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559

F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009). Irreparable harm is “a continuing

harm which cannot be adequately redressed by final relief on the

merits and for which money damages cannot provide adequate

compensation.” Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d

Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “The standard for preliminary

injunctive relief requires a threat of irreparable harm, not

that irreparable harm already have occurred,” see Mullins v.

City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) — although such

threat must be “actual and imminent,” not “remote” or

“speculative.” Wabtec, 559 F.3d at 118.

Amazon has established that it is likely to suffer

irreparable harm absent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants’

enforcement of the SERA Amendment. “In the Second Circuit, it

is well-settled that an alleged constitutional violation

constitutes irreparable harm.” Gallagher v. N.Y. State Bd. of

10 The Court also need not “separately address [Amazon’s] as-applied

claim[]” because the parties seem to agree, at least implicitly, that it is

“better read as [a] facial objection[.]” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2014); see Defs.’ PI Opp’n (declining to specifically

address Amazon’s as-applied challenge).

Elections, 477 F. Supp. 3d 19, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting

cases). And it is undisputed that Amazon is subject to the

allegedly unconstitutional law at issue here, even if

enforcement is currently stayed. Moreover, were proceedings

related to the JFK8 claims to advance in parallel before the

PERB and the NLRB, Amazon could be exposed to “the specter of

inconsistent rulings.” Pl.’s PI Br. 8, ECF No. 14-1. “Courts

in the Second Circuit have routinely found,” albeit in slightly

different contexts, that “the risk of inconsistent judgments

. . . constitutes irreparable harm.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Q

Pharmacy RX, Inc., No. 23-CV-9085, 2024 WL 3823491, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024) (collecting cases).

The state responds that “in the earlier-filed NLRB v.

State of New York et al., No. 25 Civ. 01283 (N.D.N.Y.), [the]

PERB . . . agreed to hold in abeyance any matters . . . that may

implicate the NLRB’s jurisdiction until a decision is

rendered . . . on the NLRB’s preliminary injunction motion.”

Defs.’ PI Opp’n 24. Because this administrative stay

“effectively grants Amazon’s requested relief until at least

December 2025,” id., the state argues that Amazon is not facing

imminent harm. In other words, the state effectively claims

that Amazon’s motion is moot.

But a temporary stay pending decision on a motion for

a preliminary injunction is not interchangeable with the relief

sought here, i.e., a preliminary injunction. Cf. People v.

Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal

of request for injunction where a state court had already

granted plaintiffs “all of the injunctive relief requested in

the present case” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the state’s

attempt to avoid a preliminary injunction based on a stay it

voluntarily stipulated to also calls to mind the principle that

“voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not make

a case moot.” E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Invista B.V., 473

F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2006). As Amazon notes, “courts routinely

reject such attempts to toggle enforcement on and off.” Pl.’s

Reply Br. 10, ECF No. 37 (citing Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Duffy,

784 F. Supp. 3d 624, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). Accordingly, Amazon

has sufficiently established a likelihood of irreparable harm.

C. The Balance of the Equities Weighs in Amazon’s Favor

When the government is a party, the balance-of-

equities and public-interest factors merge. New York, 969 F.3d

at 58-59. Defendants assert two interests that weigh against

granting a preliminary injunction: (1) it “would deprive New

Yorkers of any forum to assert their collective bargaining

rights during the pendency of this entire lawsuit”; and

(2) Defendants have sought discovery about the “extent of [the

NLRB’s] functioning.” Defs.’ PI Opp’n 24-25.11 But these

asserted interests merely rehash the state’s merits arguments,

which the Court rejected above. See Section II.A, supra.

Furthermore, while “the [s]tate has an interest in

administering its laws without interference by federal equitable

power, that interest is diminished when the laws at issue likely

impinge a federal constitutional right. . . . [And] the public

interest is well served by the correction of this constitutional

harm.” A.H. by & through Hester v. French, 985 F.3d 165, 184

(2d Cir. 2021). The balance of the equities therefore favors

relief.

D. No Bond Is Required

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may

issue a preliminary injunction “only if the movant gives

security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the

costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been

wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

While Rule 65(c)’s bond requirement appears mandatory on its

face, the Second Circuit has held that district courts have

“wide discretion to set the amount of a bond, and even to

dispense with the bond requirement,” such as “where there has

11 Defendants also argue that “Amazon’s inequitable litigation conduct

establishing judicial estoppel . . . tips the balance of the equities against

Amazon.” Defs.’ PI Opp’n 25. But the Court rejected Defendants’ judicial

estoppel argument in Section II.A, supra.

been no proof of likelihood of harm.” Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v.

Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 136 (2d Cir. 1997).

Here, the state does not allege that Defendants — the

only parties who would be enjoined or restrained — would suffer

financial harm from a wrongful injunction.12 Indeed, the state

has not requested that Amazon post bond. Accordingly, no bond

will be imposed at this time. See Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Prod.

Studio, Inc., 88 F.4th 125, 143 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[W]here the

party opposing an injunction does not request security, the

district court does not err in failing to order it.”).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Amazon’s request for

preliminary injunctive relief is granted. Defendants are hereby

enjoined from enforcing the SERA Amendment.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: November 26, 2025

Brooklyn, New Yor

k

12 While Defendant-Intervenor ALU argues that it would be collaterally

harmed by an injunction, ALU’s PI Opp’n 25, it does not contend that it would

be subject to the injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (referring to harm

to “any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained” (emphasis

added)).