Osdoby

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

11/25 /2025

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT

MERRYL OSDOBY, individually and on

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

behalf of all others similarly situated,

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

22-CV-04199 (NG) (JMW)

-against-

HANDI-FOIL CORP.,

Defendant.

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A P P E A R A N C E S:

Robert L. Kraselnik

Law Offices of Robert L. Kraselnik, PLLC

261 Westchester Avenue

Tuckahoe, NY 10707

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Michael A. Glick

Kirkland & Ellis LLP

1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

Attorneys for Defendant

WICKS, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Merryl Osdoby (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of others similarly

situated commenced this case as a putative class1 action against Defendant Handi-Foil Corp.

(“Defendant” and collectively the “Parties”) alleging claims under New York General Business

Law (“GBL”) §§ 349-50, seeking monetary relief for the alleged misleading/deceptive business

1 Plaintiff’s proposed class consists of: “[a]ll persons who purchased the Products in New York State

during the applicable limitations period primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and not for

resale.” (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 34.)

practices and false advertising based upon Defendant’s mislabeling of its aluminum foil products

as made in the USA. (See generally, ECF No. 23.) The Court “So-Ordered” the Parties’

Confidentiality Stipulation back on January 23, 2023. (ECF No. 25.) Now before the Court, by

way of referral from the Hon. Nina Gershon, is the Parties’ joint application to file under seal or

in redacted form, documents filed in connection with Defendant’s summary judgment motion

and Plaintiff’s class certification motion (ECF No. 61).2 (See Electronic Order dated

11/24/2025.) For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Seal (ECF No. 61) is DENIED.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The public right of access is deeply embedded in our Country’s history. Indeed, that

concept existed well before the right appeared in our Constitution. “Judicial documents are

subject at common law to a potent and fundamental presumptive right of public access that

predates even the U.S. Constitution. That right includes ‘a general right to inspect and copy’

such judicial documents.” Mirlis v. Greer, 952 F.3d 51, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal citations

omitted).

It is by now axiomatic that there is a presumption of public access to judicial documents

and records. See Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139

(2d Cir. 2016); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The

common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nation's

history.”); Suffolk Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp. v. United States Small Bus. Admin., No. 24-CV-

07058 (SJB) (JMW), 2025 WL 1384157, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025) (same). Whether right

of access to court proceedings and records is overcome, “depends on the nature of the

2 While the Parties’ sealing application states “certain documents” in connection with their motions for

summary judgment and class certification, they list the entirety of their motion papers, accompanying

declarations and exhibits.

proceeding, not on the personal characteristics of the litigant.” Hartford Courant Co., LLC v.

Carroll, 986 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2021). It matters not that the parties among themselves agree

to have documents sealed. Rather, the public's interest and right to judicial access is as much at

stake. See Lask v. Fallon, No. 24-CV-04751 (JMW), 2025 WL 1920366, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11,

2025).

This right of access, however, is not absolute as a party may move to seal judicial

records. Yet motions to seal must be “‘carefully and skeptically reviewed to ensure that there

really is an extraordinary circumstance or compelling need’ to seal the documents from public

inspection.” Bernsten v. O'Reilly, 307 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Video

Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994)); see Lugosch, 435 F.3d

at 119. Indeed, “[t]he burden of demonstrating that a document submitted to a court should be

sealed rests on the party seeking such action.” DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d

818, 826 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 258 F.R.D. 236, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

(internal citations omitted) (“The party opposing disclosure of a judicial document must make a

particular and specific demonstration of fact showing that disclosure would result in an injury

sufficiently serious to warrant protection . . . broad allegations of harm unsubstantiated by

specific examples or articulated reasoning fail to satisfy the test.”).

The Second Circuit in Lugosch adopted a three-part analysis to help guide the district

courts when determining whether documents filed in a case can and should be placed under seal.

See Suffolk Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp., 2025 WL 1384157, at *2; see Lugosch, 435 F.3d at

119–20; see also King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., No. 04-CV-5540 (DGT), 2010 WL

3924689, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010). First, the court “must determine whether documents

are judicial documents that are relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in

the judicial process.” Saadeh v. Kagan, No. 20-CV-1945 (PAE) (SN), 2021 WL 965334, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Second, the Court must

weigh the presumption of access attached to the documents in question. See id. (citing Lugosch,

435 F.3d. at 119–120). And third, the Court must use its discretion to determine “whether there

are any countervailing concerns that would weigh against full public access to the documents.”

See id. (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d. at 120); see also Zou v. Han, No. 23-CV-02370 (JMA) (JMW),

2024 WL 1704704, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.,

435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978) (The question of whether documents are sealed is ultimately left to the

sound discretion of the district court, which should “be exercised in light of the relevant facts and

circumstances of the particular case.”)). “Higher values that may justify redactions include ‘the

privacy interests of innocent third parties as well as those of defendants that may be harmed by

disclosure,’ as well as ‘[f]inancial records ..., family affairs, illnesses, [and] embarrassing

conduct with no public ramifications.’” United States v. Greenwood, 145 F.4th 248, 256 (2d Cir.

2025) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

The facts presented here are considered in light of each of the Lugosch factors addressed

below.

I. Whether the Documents are “Judicial Documents”

“A judicial document is not simply a document filed with the court, but one that is

‘relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.’”

Cantinieri v. Versick Analytics, Inc., No. 21-cv-6911 (NJC) (JMW), 2024 WL 759317, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024) (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 115) (citation omitted).

As our precedent makes clear, a court “perform[s] the judicial function” not only

when it rules on motions currently before it, but also when properly exercising its

inherent “supervisory powers.” A document is thus “relevant to the performance of

the judicial function” if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district

court's ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, without

regard to which way the court ultimately rules or whether the document ultimately

in fact influences the court's decision. Accordingly, if in applying these standards,

a court determines that documents filed by a party are not relevant to the

performance of a judicial function, no presumption of public access attaches.

Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).

As such, judicial documents that are tantamount to performance of Article III functions

likely carry a strong presumption of access whereas documents that are insignificant in helping a

court reach an adjudicative decision demonstrate a low presumption of access. See Amodeo, 71

F.3d at 1049–50.

Generally, summary judgment motions have been deemed a judicial document. See e.g.,

Alcon Vision, LLC v. Lens.com, No. 18-CV-407, 2020 WL 3791865, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 7,

2020) (“strong presumption of access that attaches to documents filed in connection with a

dispositive motion”); Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 142 (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d

Cir. 1982) (“we have determined that a report submitted to a court in connection with a

summary-judgment motion is entitled to a strong presumption of access”)); Ram Krishana, Inc.

v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., No. 22-CV-03803 (JLR), 2024 WL 1657763, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,

2024) (quoting Stafford v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 78 F.4th 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2023) (“the

[summary judgment] documents that Plaintiff seeks to seal unquestionably are ‘judicial

document[s] ... to which the presumption of public access attaches’”)); see also Brown, 929 F.3d

at 50 (requiring “compelling” reasons to seal documents filed “in connection with dispositive

motions such as motions for dismissal or summary judgment”); Cantinieri, 2024 WL 759317, at

*3 (quoting Bernsten, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 166–67) (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126) (“[j]ust as

with documents submitted in connection with a Motion for Summary Judgment, … ‘are judicial

documents to which a presumption of immediate public access attaches under both the common

law and the First Amendment.’”).

Likewise, motion papers and the documents thereto relating to class certification are

considered judicial documents. See McKoy v. Trump Corp., No. 18-CV-9936 (LGS), 2024 WL

449979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2024) (“[E]xhibits related to motions for class certification are

judicial documents because they are relevant to the judicial function.”); Tropical Sails Corp. v.

Yext, Inc., No. 14-CV-7582 (JFK), 2016 WL 1451548, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016) (“The

exhibits supporting a motion for, or opposition to, class certification would certainly be relevant

to the judicial function and useful to the judicial process … Accordingly, the 15 exhibits filed in

support of a motion for class certification are judicial documents.”)

Here, the Parties seek that (i) memoranda, declarations, exhibits and 56.1 statements for

the summary judgment motion (ECF Nos. 62-71), and (ii) the class certification motion papers

with any accompanying exhibits be sealed or redacted (ECF Nos. 75-80, 82-84). (ECF No. 61 at

1-2.) Given the above, these documents are unquestionably judicial documents. Nor do the

Parties dispute that the documents within the application are judicial documents but rather focus

on the remaining portions of Lugosch test. (See ECF No. 61.) As such, the Court next considers

whether there is a presumption of access associated with the documents and whether there are

any countervailing concerns. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119.

II. Presumption of Access Associated with the Documents

Judicial documents are presumptively subject to public inspection. Amodeo, 71 F.3d at

1047. “The presumption of public access exists along a continuum.” Olson v. Major League

Baseball, 29 F.4th 59, 89 (2d Cir. 2022). “The strongest presumption attaches where the

documents ‘determin[e] litigants’ substantive rights,’… and is weaker where the ‘documents play

only a negligible role in the performance of Article III duties[.]’” Id. (citing Amodeo, 71 F.3d at

1049-50). Indeed, where documents “directly affect an adjudication,” or are used to determine

the substantive rights of the parties, the presumption of access is “at its zenith” and can only be

overcome by extreme circumstances. 42West LLC v. Gould, No. 21-CV-1581 (OTW), 2024 WL

4263235, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2024). With that, the presumption to public access here is

strong. See Olson, 29 F.4th at 90 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Brown, 929 F.3d at 50) (“Thus, a strong

presumption attaches to materials filed in connection with dispositive motions, such as a motion

to dismiss or a summary judgment motion.”); see also Savage v. Sutherland Glob. Servs., Inc.,

No. 19-CV-06840 (EAW), 2025 WL 1224346, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2025) (collecting cases)

(“Documents submitted in connection with a motion for class certification are judicial records to

which a strong presumption of access applies.”)

Accordingly, the presumption of access to the documents requested to be sealed are “at

its zenith” and the Court must now analyze whether any countervailing concerns overcome such

a high presumption of accessibility to justify the requested documents being filed under seal. See

Greater Miami Baseball Club Ltd. P'Ship. v. Selig, 955 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Only

where countervailing considerations of privacy are sufficient to overcome the presumption may

the [parties] be denied access to such documents.”)

III. Countervailing Concerns to Overcome the Presumption

To overcome the presumption of public access, the party seeking to seal bears the burden

of showing that countervailing, “substantial interests” outweigh the presumption. See Under

Seal v. Under Seal, 273 F. Supp. 3d 460, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). Substantial interests generally

include “a third party’s personal privacy interests, the public’s safety, or preservation of attorney-

client privilege.” Id. at 647. When analyzing whether countervailing concerns, like privacy

interests, outweigh the presumption of access, courts should consider the degree to which the

subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public, the nature and degree of

injury that may result from disclosure, and the reliability of such information. See Suffolk Reg'l

Off Track Betting Corp., 2025 WL 1384157, at *3 (citing Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050-51). When

these factors “outweigh the value to the public of accessing the document at issue, then that

document should be sealed.” Forbes IP (HK) Limited v. Media Business Generators, S.A. de

C.V., No. 23-CV-11168 (JGLC), 2024 WL 1743109, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2024) (citation

omitted). Importantly, as the presumption of public access is high in connection to dispositive

motions, the Second Circuit has directed the district courts to conduct a “particularized review”

when determining if the “public access outweighs any countervailing privacy interests.” Brown,

929 F.3d at 49-51.

Here, the general countervailing concerns such as privacy interests, public safety or

preservation of attorney-client privilege are not addressed with any degree of particularity apart

from the request to redact Plaintiff’s email address. Rather, the Parties offer that if the

information is disclosed publicly, “Handi-Foil would experience financial harm and competitive

disadvantage,” and “Plaintiff believes [certain import information] may bear on sensitive

competitive sourcing information.” (ECF No. 61 at 3.)

It is well established that considerations of privacy or a business’s proprietary

information, such as trade secrets or confidential research can override the public

right of access to judicial documents. However, the Second Circuit has cautioned

that [i]n most cases, a judge must carefully and skeptically review sealing requests

to [e]nsure that there really is an extraordinary circumstance or compelling need.

Lavin v. Virgin Galactic Holdings, Inc., No. 21-CV-3070 (ARR) (TAM), 2025 WL 1031060, at

*2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2025) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

While there are many decisions that grant sealing motions in part (and some entirely)3 to

protect financial information and sensitive business information, the Parties here have failed to

3 See e.g., Nervora Fashion, Inc. v. Advance Mag. Publishers Inc., No. 24-CV-4805 (RA), 2025 WL

406669, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2025) (“Accordingly, the Court finds that sealing of Respondent's

financial information is justified and grants Respondent's motion to redact its financial information”);

make a particularized showing of compelling reasons why any documents should be redacted

and/or filed under seal. See Martin v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-01833 (MRK) (WIG), 2010 WL

1644514, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2010) (denying seal motion) (“The critical issue in this case is

whether Plaintiff has made a particularized showing through clear and compelling reasons why

specific portions of his Memorandum should be redacted and filed under seal.”); Utica Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-00196 (BKS)(ATB), 2017 WL 9400673, at *5

(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (denying seal motion) (“Further, the parties have not identified, with

particularity, why these documents should be sealed or the harms likely from disclosure.”);

Alexander v. Azar, 396 F. Supp. 3d 242, 253 (D. Conn. 2019) (“Plaintiffs’ do not attempt to

make a ‘particularized showing’ as to the need to seal the Mercy Hospital deposition or exhibits,

and Mercy Hospital did not accept the invitation to attempt to make such a showing on its own

behalf.”); see also Savage, 2025 WL 1224346, at *2 (“Surprisingly, even though the prior

motion to seal was denied for failure to provide sufficient support for the request, Sutherland's

motion continues to fail to meet the basic requirements for sealing these documents.”) The

perfunctory recitation of the standard along with generalized statements are not enough to shiled

records from public view. String citing cases and outlining the general propositions simply does

not satisfy the heavy burden. Without justification or compelling reasons linking the list of

documents to be filed under seal – which appear to be majority of both motions (summary

judgment and class certification) – the Court concludes that the documents should not be sealed.

Nock v. Spring Energy RRH, LLC, No. 23-CV-1042 (JHR) (RWL), 2025 WL 487307, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

13, 2025) (collecting cases) (“the Court finds that that information is either private and personal

information subject to redaction pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or business-related

information that is sufficiently sensitive and tangential to the motion so as to outweigh the presumption to

public access”); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Sunny Merch. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 3d 485, 510–11

(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (granting redactions and sealing of specific business information and personal financial

information).

See McDay v. Eckert, No. 20-CV-233 (JLS)(JJM), 2025 WL 2115475, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 29,

2025) (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121) (“[D]ocuments used by parties moving for, or opposing,

summary judgment should not remain under seal absent the most compelling reasons.”)

And, although the Parties cite to their Confidentiality Stipulation and Order (ECF No. 25)

for what the parties deemed may be designated as confidential, “[a] designation of a document as

confidential under a protective order, by itself, is not sufficient to permanently seal a document.”

Renois v. WVMF Funding, LLC, No. 20-CV-9281 (LTS) (VF), 2025 WL 863714, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 19, 2025) (collecting cases). More is needed, but more is absent here.

Accordingly, since the parties have not overcome the presumption of public access, and

the Motion to Seal is denied. See Rapaport v. Barstool Sports, Inc., No. 18-CV-8783 (NRB),

2020 WL 1082608, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020) (“plaintiffs have failed to rebut the strong

presumption of public access accorded….”)

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the parties’ Joint Motion to Seal (ECF No. 61) is DENIED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

November 25, 2025

S O O R D E R E D:

James M. Wicks

/s/

JAMES M. WICKS

United States Magistrate Judge