Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

MONIQUE DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-30011-KAR

)

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, WILLIAM )

MAHONEY, and GLADYS OYOLA, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON ALL COUNTS

(Dkt. No. 81)

ROBERTSON, U.S.M.J.

I. Introduction

Self-represented plaintiff Monique Davis (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against her former

employer, the City of Springfield (“the City”), and two of the City’s employees, William

Mahoney (“Mr. Mahoney”) and Gladys Oyola-Lopez (“Ms. Oyola”) 1 (collectively,

“Defendants”), for allegedly discriminating against her based on race, subjecting her to a hostile

work place, and retaliating against her for engaging in protected activity. The amended

complaint (“Am. Compl.”) does not identify the statutory bases for these claims. The record,

however, establishes that Plaintiff filed administratively with the Massachusetts Commission

Against Discrimination and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court

assumes, for this reason, that Plaintiff intends to assert claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B,

§§ 4(1) and 4(1B) (“Chapter 151B”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),

1 The court follows Spanish naming conventions and refers to Ms. Oyola-Lopez as Ms. Oyola in

this decision. See, e.g., United States v. Martínez-Benítez, 914 F.3d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 2019).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ summary judgment

motion is granted as to each of these claims.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “An issue is ‘genuine’ when a rational factfinder could resolve it either direction.” Mu v.

Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.), rev. denied, 885 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing

Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano–Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)). “A fact is ‘material’

when its (non)existence could change a case’s outcome. Id. (citing Borges, 605 F.3d at 5).

A party seeking summary judgment is responsible for identifying those portions of the record

“which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant can meet this burden either by “offering

evidence to disprove an element of the plaintiff’s case or by demonstrating an ‘absence of

evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.’” Rakes v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 47,

52 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). If the moving party meets its burden,

“[t]he non-moving party bears the burden of placing at least one material fact into

dispute.” Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at

325). The record is viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, and reasonable inferences are

drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor. See Garcia-Garcia v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878 F.3d

411, 417 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Cirs., Inc., 777 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.

2015)).

Defendants submitted a statement of undisputed facts in support of their summary

judgment motion with references to supporting materials filed therewith (Dkt. No. 83). See LR,

D. Mass. 56.1. Plaintiff did not file a statement of material facts as to which she contended that

there is a genuine issue to be tried supported by references to affidavits, depositions and other

supporting documents. See id. Instead, she filed a memorandum in which she purports to

explain or contest Defendants’ factual assertions supported by various documents filed therewith

(whose admissibility for purposes of summary judgment has not been challenged by Defendants)

(Dkt. No. 86). Local Rule 56.1 provides, in pertinent part, that “[m]aterial facts of record set

forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party shall be deemed for purposes of

the motion to be admitted by the opposing parties unless controverted by the statement required

to be served by opposing parties.” Id. Defendants invoke this provision, arguing that the court

should deem their factual assertions admitted for summary judgment purposes (Dkt. No. 86 at 1).

The court declines to do so on a blanket basis.

In part because the disputes between the parties principally concern the legal significance

of events rather than whether certain events occurred, “[t]his court finds that it is appropriate to

consider [Plaintiff’s factual assertions] to the extent [those factual assertions] are undisputed or

are supported by citations to evidence that can be identified in the record. … To the extent

[P]laintiff’s [factual assertions] are not supported by adequate citations to the record or merely

reflect [P]laintiff’s legal arguments, this court has not credited them as undisputed facts.” Tian v.

Aspen Tech., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 345, 350-51 (D. Mass. 2014); see also Givens v. Mass. Inst. of

Tech., Civil Action No. 24-10355-BEM, 2025 WL 2645380, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2025)

(“[T]he Court will disregard [Plaintiff’s] attempts to dispute facts where there is no citation to the

record to demonstrate that such a dispute actually exists, or where the purported evidence does

not actually create a genuine dispute of fact.”). The following facts are undisputed except where

otherwise noted.

III. Factual Background

Beginning on or around May 26, 2015, through November 2020, Plaintiff, who identifies

as Black, was employed by the Springfield Police Department, where, she asserts, she was a

valued employee (Dkt. No. 83-8 at 1, 14; Dkt. No. 85-13 at 2). Plaintiff left the City’s police

department in or around November 2020 when she was hired by Tasheena Davis, then the City’s

Clerk, as a Senior Office Assistant working primarily in public records (Dkt. No. 83-2 at 4; Dkt.

No. 85-8 at 4; Dkt. No. 85-13 at 2). At some point after Plaintiff moved to the Clerk’s Office,

Andrea Stone, the public records coordinator, retired. In May 2021, in anticipation of Ms.

Stone’s retirement, Tasheena Davis recommended Plaintiff to Ms. Oyola as Ms. Stone’s

replacement (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 9, 14, 15). On June 23, 2021, a few days before Ms. Stone retired,

she sent an email to internal clients informing them that Plaintiff would fill in as public records

coordinator until Ms. Stone’s replacement was hired (Dkt. No. 85-8 at 3; Dkt. No. 85-12 at 3-4).

In the meantime, on or around June 1, 2021, after Tasheena Davis moved to the City’s

law department, Ms. Oyola was appointed as acting City Clerk. She was sworn in as City Clerk

on June 17, 2021 (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 6). On Ms. Stone’s retirement, Ms. Oyola posted the public

records coordinator position. Plaintiff applied and was interviewed. On or around July 28, 2021,

Plaintiff was notified that Ms. Oyola had hired Marvina Shubrick for the public records

coordinator position. It is undisputed that, like Plaintiff, Ms. Shubrick is Black (Dkt. No. 83-1 at

13; Dkt. No. 83-10 at 3; Dkt. No. 85-5 at 5). On July 30, 2021, after learning she had not been

selected for the position, Plaintiff sent an email to City employees in other departments who

needed the services of the public records coordinator, instructing them to direct their inquiries to

the new hire (Dkt. No. 83-20 at 1; Dkt. No. 85-8 at 3). Ms. Shubrick had not been trained for her

new position when Plaintiff sent this email, which she did without consulting Ms. Oyola (Dkt.

No. 85-8 at 3, 6).

In an August 17, 2021 email Plaintiff sent to Edward Pikula, City Solicitor, Caitlyn

Julius, Assistant Director of Human Resources, and Mr. Mahoney, who was Director of Human

Resources and Labor Relations, she provided an account of incidents that had led her to seek a

meeting she had with Mr. Pikula in the morning on August 17, 2021 (Dkt. No. 83-10 at 2-3).

Plaintiff expressed concerns about Ms. Oyola’s management of the public records department

and neglect of its employees. She stated that, on July 2, 2021, Ms. Oyola brought doughnuts in

for the office and didn’t include her; that Ms. Oyola ordered T-shirts for employees in the Clerk’s

Office and didn’t include her; and that she learned that Ms. Oyola had provided applicants for the

public records coordinator position other than herself access to a study guide concerning the

public records function. Plaintiff informed Ms. Julius and Messrs. Pikula and Mahoney that, on

July 19, 2021, she had sought guidance via email from the City’s Chief Diversity and Inclusion

Officer (Dkt. No. 83-10 at 2). In this August 17, 2021 email, Plaintiff acknowledged that, after

she learned that Ms. Oyola had not selected her for the public records coordinator position, she

emailed the police department and emergency communications, informing them that she would

no longer be doing the work of the public records coordinator, and that Ms. Oyola had sent her

an email after this unilateral announcement, informing her that Ms. Oyola intended to schedule a

meeting with HR and the City’s legal department to discuss roles and interdepartmental

cooperation regarding public records. Plaintiff reported that the meeting was not held, so she

pursued a meeting on her own with Mr. Pikula and Ms. Julius (Dkt. No. 83-10 at 3).

On the same day that she met with Mr. Pikula, Plaintiff sent an email to Ms. Oyola and

Camille Nelson stating that the day had been overwhelming and due to the stress of the work

environment, she was taking the rest of the day off as vacation time (Dkt. No. 85-9 at 2). Ms.

Oyola responded that she had marked Plaintiff as sick for the remainder of the day, and that she

and Plaintiff would meet with Human Resources upon Plaintiff’s return (Dkt. No. 85-9 at 3).

On August 20, 2021, Plaintiff sent an email to Messrs. Pikula and Mahoney with the

subject line, Work Place Concerns Continued. She complained that since her August 17, 2021

meeting with Mr. Pikula, she had learned that Ms. Oyola had offered assistance to staff members

in becoming notaries public without including her; that Krista Efantis, a colleague employed in

the City Clerk’s office with whom she had been friendly, had declined to sit with her to avoid the

drama; that Ms. Stone, the retired Public Records Coordinator, had been asked to come back and

train her successor; and that Ms. Oyola had not communicated with her in the two months that

Ms. Oyola had been serving as City Clerk (Dkt. No. 85-15).

On or around August 26, 2021, after Ms. Oyola had notified Plaintiff that Plaintiff was

supposed to request advance notice from her supervisor before using vacation (in response to

another unilateral announcement by Plaintiff that she was taking vacation time that day), Plaintiff

attended a meeting with Mr. Mahoney, Ms. Oyola, and Ms. Julius. According to Mr. Mahoney

during this meeting, he provided Plaintiff with a new job description that the City had adopted

for her position that did not involve a change in grade or pay; told Plaintiff that in the absence of

the City’s Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, he would assign a lawyer to investigate her

complaints (he did); and informed her that if she had questions about her job responsibilities, she

should discuss those with Ms. Oyola, who was her supervisor (Dkt. No. 85-13 at 5). Attorney

Mary Kelleher’s report of her investigation was dated September 3, 2021 (Dkt. No. 85-8 (made

part of the record by Plaintiff, excluding exhibits)). Mr. Mahoney reviewed the investigative

report and, on September 24, 2021, informed Plaintiff that he had concluded that there were no

violations of City policies (Dkt. No. 85-11 at 9-10).

Among other issues, Ms. Kelleher’s report noted Plaintiff’s complaint that Ms. Oyola did

not approve a merit bonus for her that was paid to non-union employees who had performed

certain public-facing work during the COVID-19 pandemic (Dkt. No. 85-8 at 5; 85-2 at 2-3). It

is undisputed that Plaintiff received a $3,000.00 COVID Merit Award in 2021. Ms. Stone, the

retired public records coordinator, received an award of the same amount (Dkt. No. 83-6 at 1-2;

Dkt. No. 83-2 at 6). Ms. Oyola testified at her deposition that, because she did not supervise

Plaintiff during the period covered by the human resources questionnaire sent to managers for

purposes of determining employee eligibility for the awards, she did not make a submission for

an award for Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 7). According to the City and Mr. Mahoney, because

Plaintiff worked for the Springfield Police Department for part of the relevant period and the

City Clerk’s Office for the other part of the relevant period for which these merit bonuses were

awarded, ascertaining her entitlement was complicated by the need to gather information from

several sources (Dkt. No. 83-6).

It is undisputed that, after the public records coordinator position was posted, Ms. Oyola

sent a link to a public website that described the public records function to Ms. Efantis, who was

one of the applicants (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 8; Dkt. No. 83-2 at 15; Dkt. No. 85-7 at 4). Ms. Oyola

did so in response to Ms. Efantis’s request for information about the public records function.

Ms. Oyola did not send the link to any other applicant (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 9-10). It is also

undisputed that Plaintiff was already a notary public when Ms. Oyola offered staff members

assistance in becoming notaries public (Dkt. No. 85-5 at 3). According to Defendants, other

members of Ms. Oyola’s staff who were already notaries were not offered support to begin the

process of becoming notaries (Dkt. No. 85-5 at 8).

While neither party has laid out a clear timeline of Plaintiff’s presence and absence from

the workplace from September 2021 through January 2022, on November 2, 2021, she was

approved for continuous FMLA leave from September 21 through October 20, 2021, and for

intermittent FMLA leave from October 21 through November 19, 2021 (Dkt. No. 85-15 at 8).

On December 27, 2021, she was notified that she would exhaust her FMLA leave effective

January 17, 2022 (Dkt. No. 85-15 at 9). On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff resigned her position

with the City, citing an “unbearable and rather uncomfortable” work environment and stating that

she would have to find other employment “because the City Clerk choose to essentially pick on

her” (Dkt. No. 83-9).2

IV. Discussion

Title VII and Chapter 151B prohibit an employer from discriminating against an

employee based on a protected characteristic, including race. “Under both Title VII and Chapter

151B, a plaintiff can bring claims for disparate treatment or hostile environment ….” O’Horo,

M.D. v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 131 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2025). While there are some differences

2 Defendants’ statement of material facts leaves the chronology of Plaintiff’s employment with

the City Clerk’s Office unclear in a number of respects and, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff did

not meet her obligation to set out a concise statement of material facts of record as to which she

contends there is a genuine issue to be tried. LR., D. Mass. 56.1. The relevant and applicable

provisions in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) and (e) and LR., D. Mass. 56.1 are “aimed an enabling a

district court to adjudicate a summary judgment motion without endless rummaging through a

plethoric record.” Puerto Rico Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázqúez, 603 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir.

2010). Nonetheless, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(3) authorizes the court to rely on material in the record

that neither party has cited in a statement of facts, as the court has done in this case. The parties’

submissions, and, in particular, Plaintiff’s submissions, have greatly complicated the task of

discerning material facts – undisputed or disputed – in this case.

between the statutes and the analyses, there are cases in which it is appropriate to address the

Title VII and the Chapter 151B claims together. See id. This is such a case.3

A. Discrimination: Disparate Treatment

a. Failure to Promote

“Direct evidence [of discrimination] ‘consists of statements by a decisionmaker that

directly reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the contested employment decision.’”

Givens, 2025 WL 2645380, at *5 n.13 (quoting Zampierollo-Rheinfeldt v. Ingersoll-Rand de P.R.,

Inc., 999 F.3d 37, 51 (1st Cir. 2021) (citations omitted)). Where Plaintiff has not pointed to any

statements by Ms. Oyola, the decision maker, that directly reflect the alleged animus and bear

squarely on the contested employment decision, “the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework applies.” Id. at *5 (citing McDonnall Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04

(1973); Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); Knight v. Avon Prods.,

Inc., 780 N.E.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Mass. 2003)).

In setting out her prima facie case, Plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a

protected class, (2) she was performing satisfactorily so as to meet the employer’s

legitimate job-performance expectations, (3) she suffered some adverse

employment action at the hands of her employer, and (4) she was treated less

favorably than someone outside her protected class.

Ashley v. Paramount Hotel Grp., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (D.R.I. 2006) (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Smith v. Stratus Comput., Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Gannon

v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 167, 168 (D.R.I. 1991)). The establishment of a prima

facie case creates, in effect, a presumption that an employer has discriminated. See St. Mary’s

3 One difference between Title VII and Chapter 151B is that “there is no individual liability

under Title VII,” Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009), such that, as a

matter of law, neither Ms. Oyola nor Mr. Mahoney can be individually liable to Plaintiff under

Title VII.

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). Thus, the First Circuit recently set forth the

fourth element of the prima facie case as requiring a plaintiff to show that “the adverse

employment action transpired under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”

Pipoli v. Dept. of Human Servs., Off. of Veterans Servs., 123 F.4th 565, 571 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing

Rinsky v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 918 F.3d 8, 29 (1st Cir. 2019)).

Plaintiff easily satisfies the first and third elements of the required prima facie case on her

failure to promote claim: she is a member of a protected class under Title VII and Chapter 151B,

and, when she was denied a promotion to the public records coordinator position, she suffered an

adverse employment action. See Vil v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Civil Action No. 11-

10780-GAO, 2012 WL 3202852, at *12 (D. Mass. Aug. 2, 2012) (stating that the plaintiff

satisfied the third element of a prima facie case by alleging that he was denied a promotion based

on his race and in retaliation for protected activity). Construing the record in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, she has satisfied the second element insofar as there is no evidence she was

not performing to the City’s reasonable expectations when she was denied the promotion she

sought. The deficiency in her prima facie case lies with the fourth element: because Ms.

Shubrick, the individual who was selected over Plaintiff for the public records coordinator

position is, like Plaintiff, Black, Ms. Shubrick’s selection does not give rise to an inference of

discrimination. See Givens, 2025 WL 2645380, at *9 (holding that, where the plaintiff had not

presented competent evidence of discriminatory animus, her claim of racial discrimination

failed).

Plaintiff’s submission related to Ms. Shubrick’s selection for the public records

coordinator position appears aimed at showing that it was a result of favoritism, and that Ms.

Shubrick is neither qualified for, nor good at, the job (e.g., Dkt. Nos. 85-8 at 15-22, 23-27; 85-9).

That Ms. Oyola may have chosen someone she had worked with who lacked experience in the

public records function “doesn’t cut it. After all, ‘the anti-discrimination laws do not insure

against’ an employer’s ‘inaccuracy or flawed business judgment’; rather, ‘they are designed to

protect against, and to prevent, actions spurred by some discriminatory animus.’” Brandt v.

Fitzpatrick, 957 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Kouvchinov v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 537

F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2008)). “[W]hen faced with employment decisions that lack a clear

discriminatory motive, ‘[c]ourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits

– or even the rationality – of employers’ nondiscriminatory business decisions.’” Rodríguez-

Cardi v. MMM Holdings, Inc., 936 F.3d 40, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Mesnick v. Gen. Elec.

Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff has pointed to no direct evidence of

discrimination by Ms. Oyola, the decisionmaker, nor has she pointed to evidence giving rise to a

presumption or inference that Ms. Shubrick was selected over her because of racial animus. For

these reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII and Chapter

151B failure to promote claims.

b. COVID Merit Bonus

Plaintiff’s claim concerning the COVID-19 bonus suffers from the same defect. She

argues that a factfinder could infer discrimination because Ms. Oyola did not submit her name

for a bonus on the ground that she was not Plaintiff’s supervisor during the relevant time, but did

submit Ms. Stone’s name for the bonus even though Ms. Oyola was not Ms. Stone’s supervisor

during the relevant time. Additionally, she notes that the bonus paid to her was less than the

amount for which Mr. Mahoney initially nominated her (Dkt. No. 85 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 85-2 at 6).

Based on Ms. Oyola’s deposition testimony, it is undisputed that she did not take steps to ensure

that Plaintiff received a COVID-19 bonus. Ms. Oyola initially testified that she did not believe

she had submitted Ms. Stone’s name for a COVID-19 bonus because Ms. Stone worked as public

records coordinator and Ms. Oyola did not supervise her in that capacity, then changed her

testimony to reflect that she could not remember whether she had done so (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 7-8).

For purposes of Defendants’ motion, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

the court assumes that Ms. Oyola submitted Ms. Stone’s name for a COVID-19 bonus, thereby

treating Ms. Stone, someone who was similarly situated to Plaintiff in relevant respects,

differently than she treated Plaintiff. Further, the court assumes without deciding that a delay in

the payment of a bonus might rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s

claim of disparate treatment with respect to the COVID bonus fails at the same step of the prima

facie inquiry as does her failure to promote claim: she has not shown that she was treated

differently because of a protected characteristic. Defendants represent – without contradiction by

Plaintiff – that Ms. Stone also is Black (Dkt. No. 83 at 2, ¶ 9). Thus, while Plaintiff may have

shown that she was treated differently than a similarly situated individual, she has not shown that

she was treated differently because of race. See Givens, 2025 WL 2645380, at *9; Ashley, 451 F.

Supp. at 330.

Plaintiff has also failed to raise an inference of disparate treatment based on race with

respect to the amount of her COVID-19 bonus. According to a document Plaintiff submitted, the

factors to be considered in determining the amount of an employee’s bonus included the extent

an employee worked from their regularly assigned work station as opposed to working remotely;

the extent to which their work had risked exposure to COVID-19; and work the employee had

engaged in directly related to mitigating the effects of the pandemic on Springfield residents,

such as, for example, organizing COVID-19 clinics or administering vaccines (Dkt. No. 85-2 at

2-3). The policy specifically provides that an employee performing her regular duties providing

services to the public was not performing COVID-19 related work. Mr. Mahoney, whom

Plaintiff has accused of discriminating against her, proposed a bonus of $4,500. According to a

document Plaintiff submitted, Thomas Ashe, the Mayor’s chief of staff, responded to Mr.

Mahoney that he would need some additional clarification from department heads before

approving a COVID-19 merit bonus of $4,500 for Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 85-2 at 6). Plaintiff has not

shown that she worked in a position that required her to interact with members of the public on a

frequent and regular basis at the height of the pandemic, nor does the record show that she

engaged directly in work that mitigated the effects of the pandemic on Springfield residents.

Thus, the record establishes a legitimate business reason for the amount of Plaintiff’s bonus. For

her part, Plaintiff has not identified a similarly situated employee, i.e., someone who had job

responsibilities similar to her responsibilities, who was outside the protected class and was

treated more favorably than she was treated in terms of the bonus amount. See, e.g., Diaz v. City

of Somerville, 59 F.4th 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,

686 N.E.2d 1303, 1309-10 (Mass. 1997) (noting that a plaintiff can show an employer’s stated

reason for an adverse action is not the real reason for the action by demonstrating that similarly

situated employees were treated differently)). On this record, Plaintiff’s complaint about the

amount of her bonus falls far short of raising an inference of different treatment based on a

protected characteristic.

“An adverse employment action is one that materially changes the conditions of a

plaintiff’s employment.” Desai v. Univ. of Mass. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 605 F. Supp. 3d 255, 267 (D.

Mass. 2022). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to base a disparate treatment claim on the fact that Ms.

Oyola emailed Ms. Efantis a link to a public website describing the public records function

before interviews for the position, Plaintiff has not identified an event that would qualify as an

adverse employment action under Title VII or Chapter 151B. See O’Horo, 131 F.4th at 18

(stating that even if the plaintiff identified an instance of disparate treatment, where there was no

harm that left him worse off, he had not identified an adverse employment action). Plaintiff has

not explained how providing Ms. Efantis with a link to a public website materially changed the

conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, and the court is unable to discern any material change to

Plaintiff’s employment, including any material disadvantage to her in her application for the

public records coordinator position given her experience with the public records function.

Further, even if the website referral was an adverse employment action, Ms. Oyola provided a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for this routine and modest courtesy to a current employee

– Ms. Efantis asked Ms. Oyola about the responsibilities of the position and Ms. Oyola

responded by providing the website link – and Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence to show

that this explanation was untrue, or that it was a pretext for discrimination (or retaliation).

Accordingly, this event cannot serve as a basis for any claim under Title VII or Chapter 151B.

See id. at 14-17.

In summary, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal and state

law disparate treatment claims.

B. Discrimination: Hostile Work Environment

“To establish a hostile work environment, [Plaintiff] is required to ‘show that [her] work

environment was so pervaded by racial harassment as to alter the terms and conditions of [her]

employment.’” Garmon v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 844 F.3d 307, 317 (1st Cir. 2016)

(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1998)). To make out a prima facie

showing, Plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) that [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) that [she] was subjected to

unwelcome [racial] harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon [race];

(4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the

conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that

[racially] objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive ,

such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in

fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has

been established.

Id. at 317 (third, fourth, and sixth alterations in original) (quoting Douglas v. J.C. Penney

Co., 474 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2007)). This standard applies to Plaintiff’s state law

Chapter 151B claim as well as her federal Title VII claim. See Ponte v. Steelcase, Inc.,

741 F.3d 310, 319 n.9 (1st Cir. 2014); Kathuria v. Dental Dreams LLC, Civil Action No.

17-30077-MGM, 2020 WL 3719507, at *6 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2020).

Factors a court considers when determining whether alleged harassing conduct

meets the severe and pervasive standard include “’the severity of the conduct, its

frequency, whether it is physically threatening or not, and whether it interfered with the

victim’s work performance.’” Ponte, 741 F.3d at 320 (quoting Gerald v. Univ. of P.R.,

707 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2013)). To be actionable, “the harassment must pass a certain

threshold of severity. Offhand comments and a tense or uncomfortable working

relationship with one’s supervisor are, without more, insufficient to support a hostile

work environment claim.” Flood v. Bank of Am. Corp., 780 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2015).

An employer is not required to provide a workplace “free from the usual ebb and flow of

power relations and inter-office politics.” Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 54

(1st Cir. 2000) (discussing constructive discharge standard).

The court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has shown that she was subjected to a

pervasively hostile work environment. The court does not doubt that Plaintiff perceived

her work environment to be hostile and uncomfortable. Her perception, however, is not

sufficient on its own to give rise to a trial-worthy hostile work environment claim. While

Plaintiff has not clearly articulated the precise basis of her hostile work environment

claim, it appears that she complains that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

because Ms. Oyola generally ignored her, and that Ms. Oyola failed to invite her to

participate when Ms. Oyola brought in doughnuts for staff and bought t-shirts for union

staff members. She additionally complains of Ms. Oyola’s alleged disparate treatment in

failing to send her the link to the public website describing the public records function,

delay in scheduling her interview for the public records coordinator position and

approving her merit bonus, and directing an Assistant City Clerk to refer Plaintiff to Ms.

Oyola for a work-related matter rather than simply going to the Assistant City Clerk for

assistance (Dkt. No. 85-10 at 6). Plaintiff has alleged, from her perspective, a tense and

uncomfortable working relationship with Ms. Oyola and dissatisfaction with

administrative procedures and decisions by a new supervisor. Plaintiff has not alleged

conduct by Ms. Oyola that was physically threatening or that Ms. Oyola directed any

humiliating or offensive comments at Plaintiff. So far as appears from the record, Ms.

Oyola did not criticize Plaintiff’s job performance in one-on-one conversations or in front

of other employees. Changes in office procedures by a new supervisor, not shown to be

directed at any particular employee, are not the stuff of which hostile environment claims

are made.

The court finds the case of Colón-Fontánez v. Mun. of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 44

(1st Cir. 2011) instructive. In Colón-Fontánez, the plaintiff claimed that her supervisor

would refuse to meet with her, permitted other employees to come and go from her office

but avoided the plaintiff, refused to greet her, required her to wait before their meetings,

yelled at her in front of other employees, and refused to take action when the plaintiff

complained about how she was treated by other employees. See id. The First Circuit

held that, “[w]hile these facts certainly indicate[d] an uncomfortable and tense working

relationship between [the supervisor] and [the plaintiff], they [were] not sufficiently

severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.” Id. Viewing the record in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, her allegations of mistreatment pale in comparison to

the allegations advanced by the plaintiff in Colón-Fontánez. Those allegations were held

to be an insufficient basis for a hostile work environment claim. See also O’Horo, 131

F.4th at 21-22 (holding that the plaintiff’s evidence did not establish a workplace

situation so rife with discriminatory animus that it amounted to a hostile work

environment; citing Colón-Fontánez); Hall v. FMR Corp., 667 F. Supp. 2d 185, 201 (D.

Mass. 2009) (“To an objective observer familiar with the daily workplace interactions

that occur between supervisors and their employees, as well as the clashes of personality

that are the predictable byproducts of the human condition, [the plaintiff’s] complaints

would appear for the most part unremarkable or even trivial.”). As to Mr. Mahoney,

Plaintiff alleges only that he failed to address her complaints about Ms. Oyola (Dkt. No.

85 at 9-10). Viewing the evidence objectively, no reasonable factfinder could conclude

that Plaintiff was the victim of a hostile work environment because of Ms. Oyola’s

actions or inaction or Mr. Mahoney’s alleged inaction.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s complaints rose to the level of a hostile work

environment, which they do not, Plaintiff “has not demonstrated that [s]he was subjected

to any of the complained of actions because of [her] race.” Garmon, 844 F.3d at 318.

The record establishes that Ms. Oyola hired a member of Plaintiff’s protected class for

the position that Plaintiff sought and is devoid of any comment or action directed at

Plaintiff by Ms. Oyola that evidenced discriminatory animus. See O’Horo, 131 F.4th at

20 (holding that plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim failed when it rested, for the

most part, on comments or incidents unrelated to the protected characteristic); Hall, 667

F. Supp. 2d at 202. The court acknowledges that “’[e]vidence of harassment of third

parties can help prove a legally cognizable claim of a hostile environment.” Pike v. Budd,

133 F.4th 74, 88 n.8 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Hernandez-Loring v. Universidad

Metropolitana, 233 F.3d 49, 55 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff alleges that other Black

employees have accused Ms. Oyola of discrimination based on race. These allegations as

advanced by Plaintiff are devoid of any detail and do not describe activity by Ms. Oyola

that would give rise to a hostile work environment based on race. Moreover, such

evidence is relevant only when offered to help prove a cognizable claim of a hostile

environment. See id. at 88-89; Hernandez-Loring, 233 F.3d at 55. Here, Plaintiff has not

advanced a cognizable hostile environment claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s Title VII and Chapter 151B hostile work environment claims.

C. Retaliation

Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants retaliated against her by changing her job

title and duties after she engaged in protected activity (Dkt. No. 85 at 13). Title VII and

Chapter 151B make it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for

engaging in conduct protected by federal and state antidiscrimination laws. See

Nakanwagi v. Exec. Off. of Trial Ct., 786 F. Supp. 3d 313, 323 (D. Mass. 2025). The

elements of a claim of retaliation are that the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; the

employer took an adverse employment action; and the protected conduct and the adverse

action were causally related. Id. (citing Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 99 F.4th 105,

115 (1st Cir. 2024)). “’[T]o successfully establish a claim of unlawful retaliation there

must be, “at a minimum, … competent evidence that the alleged retaliators knew of the

plaintiff’s protected activity and that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse

employment actions alleged.”’” Id. at 324 (alterations in original) (quoting Alvarado v.

Donahue, 687 F.3d 453, 459 (1st Cir. 2012)). “’An adverse employment action “typically

involves discrete changes in the terms of employment, such as hiring, firing, failing to

promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing

significant change in benefits.”’” Garmon, 844 F.3d at 314 (quoting Cham v. Station

Operators, Inc., 685 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2012)). “A materially adverse change in the

terms and conditions of employment ‘must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience

or an alteration of job responsibilities.’” Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 35

(1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002)).

Title VII and Chapter 151B protect an employee against retaliation for making an

internal complaint to management or a human resources or diversity officer. See Fantini

v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)). Here, Plaintiff claims that her job responsibilities

were changed after she made a complaint to Talia Gee, the City’s Diversity and Inclusion

Officer (Dkt. No. 85 at 12). According to Plaintiff, Ms. Gee, who was on maternity leave

at the time, recommended that Plaintiff speak with Ms. Oyola (Dkt. No. 85-8 at 3; Dkt.

No. 85-13 at 5). There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff or Ms. Gee disclosed

Plaintiff’s July 19, 2021, communication to Ms. Gee at any time before Plaintiff referred

to it in the August 17, 2021, e-mail she sent to Mr. Pikula, Ms. Julius, and Mr. Mahoney

after meeting with Mr. Pikula earlier that day, in which she stated that she “began to

realize that the behaviors exhibited by the newly appointed City Clerk were unethical and

deliberate in making [her] feel ostracized from the rest of the office” and reached out to

Ms. Gee for guidance for this reason (Dkt. No. 83-10 at 2).

As an initial matter, while there is no doubt that an internal complaint to an

employer’s diversity officer could in theory satisfy the protected activity element of a

retaliation claim, Plaintiff did not include her communication to Ms. Gee in her

voluminous submission in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. “The

term ‘protected activity’ refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited

discrimination.” Cruz v. Coach Stores Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-4; Wimmer v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125, 134-35 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999)). In a contemporaneous email, Plaintiff characterized

Ms. Oyola’s conduct as unethical rather than discriminatory. The court is not persuaded

that Plaintiff has established that her complaint to Ms. Gee constituted protected conduct

because she has not shown that she complained about an employment practice forbidden

under Title VII or Chapter 151B in her communication to Ms. Gee. See Fantini, 557 F.3d

at 32 (the plaintiff, who complained that a male colleague had violated a conflict-of-

interest law, did not comply with the first requirement for bringing a retaliation claim

because she did not make a complaint about an unlawful practice under Title VII).

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff complained about discrimination when she

communicated with Ms. Gee, she has not shown that Ms. Oyola or Mr. Mahoney knew or

had reason to know that Plaintiff had complained about alleged discrimination before her

job description was revised. According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s job description was

revised on July 27, 2021, and became effective on August 26, 2021, when Mr. Mahoney

gave the revised job description to Plaintiff during a meeting (Dkt. No. 85-13 at 4-5).

There is nothing in the record contradicting Mr. Mahoney’s statement about the timing of

the revisions to Plaintiff’s job description, which meshes with Ms. Julius’s statement to

Ms. Kelleher that the reason for revising Plaintiff’s job description was to meet Ms.

Oyola’s need for administrative assistance in view of the scope and nature of her

responsibilities and her perception that Plaintiff was fully occupied with public records

(Dkt. No. 85-8 at 6). To the extent there is evidence in the record concerning Ms. Oyola’s

knowledge of Plaintiff’s July 19, 2021, complaint to Ms. Gee, that evidence is Ms.

Oyola’s statement to Ms. Kelleher, also reflected in Ms. Kelleher’s investigative report.

Ms. Oyola told Ms. Kelleher that she was not aware of any of Plaintiff’s complaints prior

to the August 26, 2021, meeting between Plaintiff, Ms. Julius, Mr. Mahoney, and Ms.

Oyola (Dkt. No. 85-8 at 6). If Plaintiff seeks to rely on an August 17, 2021, email to Ms.

Oyola to show Ms. Oyola’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s allegations, that email only

represented that Plaintiff was feeling stress in the workplace (Dkt. No. 85-9 at 2). This

communication is not a complaint about conduct prohibited by state or federal

antidiscrimination laws. The same is true of Plaintiff’s August 23, 2021, email

complaining about the “stressful environment … at work” (Dkt. No. 85-9 at 4). As to

Mr. Mahoney, Plaintiff has not claimed she copied Mr. Mahoney on her communication

to Ms. Gee. At his deposition, Mr. Mahoney did not remember whether he was advised

of Plaintiff’s communication to Ms. Gee on or around July 19, 2021 (Dkt. No. 83-3 at 5).

In any event, there is no evidence in that Mr. Mahoney played a role in deciding that

Plaintiff’s job description should be revised.

Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to show that either Ms. Oyola or Mr.

Mahoney was advised before August 17, 2021, that Plaintiff had complained to Ms. Gee

on July 19, 2021 (Dkt. No. 83-10 at 2). Further, the record does not include evidence that

Plaintiff had complained about alleged discrimination before her job description was

revised on July 27, 2021 (Dkt. No. 85-13 at 4-5). Thus, Plaintiff has “failed to establish a

causal connection between … protected conduct and the adverse employment action

because she failed to show that [Ms. Oyola or Mr. Mahoney] knew about the” July 19,

2021, communication to Ms. Gee. Pina v. Children’s Place, 740 F.3d 785, 801 (1st Cir.

2014) (citing Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 139 (1st Cir. 2013); Pomales v.

Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2006)), or that she had complained

about conduct that violated the provisions of Title VII and Chapter 151B. See Fantini,

557 F.3d at 32.

Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation fails for the further reason that she has shown

nothing more than an alteration of her job description to bring it into conformity with the

work she was performing. Plaintiff agreed at her deposition that her job was in public

records (Dkt. No. 83-2 at 5). She herself described that function as more than a full-time

job (Dkt. No. 85-12 at 5). Her job description was revised in July 2021 to reflect that she

was working in public records so that the new City Clerk could hire an assistant to

perform administrative responsibilities unrelated to the public records function (Dkt. No.

85-8 at 60. Plaintiff has not shown there was any change in her grade, compensation, or

the duties she actually performed as a result of the revised job description. Thus, the

revised job description was not a materially adverse change in the conditions of

Plaintiff’s employment. See Morales-Vallellanes, 605 F.3d at 35.

Finally, Plaintiff appears to contend that her decision to resign from her

employment with the City was a retaliatory adverse job action (Dkt. No. 83-9; Dkt. No.

85 at 13). “[T]he First Circuit has recognized that a discharge is a paradigmatic example

of an adverse employment action, and that ‘[a] “discharge” under [Title VII] may be

constructive as well as a direct firing.’” Thirkield v. Neary & Hunter OB/GYN, LLC, 76

F. Supp. 3d 339, 351 (D. Mass. 2015) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting

Hernandez-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1998);

citing Bergeron v. Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2009)). Thus, under the right

circumstances, a constructive discharge “’can suffice as an adverse employment action

for purposes of a retaliation claim.’” Id. (quoting Henricks v. White Cty., No. 4:10 CV

42, 2012 WL 5948199, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 28, 2012)). Plaintiff, however, cannot

establish a constructive discharge “without first establishing that her work environment

was hostile ….” Bodman v. Me., Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 787 F. Supp. 2d 89,

108 (D. Me. 2011) (citing Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004); Landrau-

Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 613 (1st Cir. 2000); Hernandez-

Torres, 158 F.3d at 48); see also Hall, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (“To prove constructive

discharge, a plaintiff must offer evidence of harassment at least as severe (if not more)

than that required for a hostile work environment claim.”). Because Plaintiff has not

shown that her work environment was hostile, any retaliation claim based on an alleged

constructive discharge, and any claim of constructive discharge, fail as a matter of law.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants are entitled to judgment on so much of

Plaintiff’s complaint as asserts claims of retaliation or constructive discharge under Title

VII and Chapter 151B.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on All

Counts (Dkt. No. 81) is GRANTED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to close this case on

the court’s docket.

It is so ordered.

Dated: November 26, 2025 Katherine A. Robertson

KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE