Cooper

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRUCE X. COOPER, No. 4:24-CV-00487

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

SCOTT PRINCE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOVEMBER 26, 2025

Plaintiff Bruce X. Cooper is a serial pro se litigant who was previously

confined at the State Correctional Institution in Dallas, Pennsylvania (SCI Dallas).

He filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action, alleging that two medical

providers at SCI Dallas were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

The Court dismissed his initial complaint for failure to state an Eighth Amendment

claim of medical deliberate indifference but granted leave to amend. Cooper then

filed an amended complaint. Presently pending is Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The

Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Cooper’s amended complaint

with prejudice.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. BACKGROUND

Cooper is currently incarcerated at SCI Benner Township,2 but the events

that underlie the instant civil action allegedly occurred while he was imprisoned at

SCI Dallas. Cooper initially filed his lawsuit in December 2023 in the Court of

Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.3 Defendants—Dr. Scott Prince

and Mark Abel, PA-C—promptly removed the case to this Court in March 2024

after they were served.4

Defendants then moved to dismiss Cooper’s complaint,5 arguing that he had

failed to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs. The Court granted that motion, finding that Cooper had

failed to allege personal involvement by PA Abel and had failed to plausibly plead

deliberate indifference by either PA Abel or Dr. Prince.6 The Court dismissed

Cooper’s complaint without prejudice and Cooper filed an amended complaint,7

which is the operative pleading in this action.

Cooper’s Section 1983 lawsuit primarily concerns the medical care he

received at SCI Dallas from May to June 2023 by Dr. Prince and PA Abel.8

Cooper first alleges that on March 2, 2023, during a sick-call visit, he informed

2 See Doc. 10 ¶ 3.

3 See generally Doc. 1-2.

4 See generally Doc. 1.

5 Doc. 9.

6 See Doc. 16 at 6-10 & n.43.

7 Doc. 18.

8 See generally id.

unspecified “medical staff” that he was experiencing shortness of breath at rest and

with walking.9 According to the medical records attached to his amended

complaint, CRNP Loretta DeBoer examined Cooper and reviewed his medical

records, noting that a PET scan was scheduled for later that month as well an

outside cardiothoracic surgery consult due to a “malignant neoplasm of the lung.”10

CRNP DeBoer informed Cooper that his breathing issues could be related to his

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) “and/or his lung tumor.”11

Cooper was seen again by CRNP DeBoer on May 10, 2023, after

complaining of shortness of breath.12 He asserted that he was using his Albuterol

inhaler “2 puffs,” which was prescribed twice daily, in the evening only, and stated

that he “did not know that [he] could use it more than that.”13 CRNP DeBoer

provided Cooper with “education on [the] proper use of [the] Albuterol inhaler and

Alvesco inhaler,” and issued him a shower pass to shower on the same Block level

as he was housed.14

On May 18, 2023, during another sick-call visit, Cooper again complained

of breathing problems and shortness of breath.15 It appears that this is the first

instance—as relevant to the instant lawsuit—where he interacted with and was

9 Id. ¶ 6.

10 See Doc. 18-1 at 1, 6, 7.

11 Id. at 1; Doc. 18 ¶ 6.

12 Doc. 18-1 at 26-27.

13 Id. at 26.

14 Id.

15 Doc. 18 ¶ 7, Doc. 18-1 at 2.

treated by PA Abel.16 PA Abel examined Cooper, measured his vitals and oxygen

saturation (which was found to be 97%), noted that he was on three inhalers and

had a history of COPD, and prescribed a “steroid dose pack” based on Cooper’s

complaints.17 Later in his amended complaint, Cooper asserts that on May 18 he

also complained of “hard dark stool” and PA Abel prescribed “fiber-lax,” a stool

softener.18

Cooper was seen again on sick call by CRNP DeBoer on May 31, 2023.19

He attached a “notice of liability” to his sick-call request, indicating that his

breathing issues had “not gotten better,” nor had he been seen by a specialist “of

which Dr. Prince and sick call staf[f] are not.”20 CRNP DeBoer advised Cooper

that he was scheduled to see Dr. Miceli (an oncologist) via telemedicine on June 5,

and that he had already been seen by outside specialist Dr. Lee (a cardiothoracic

surgeon) on March 23, 2023, and April 3, 2023.21 Cooper was further informed

that he had undergone a PET scan on March 16, 2023, as well as a biopsy on April

25, 2023, and that Dr. Miceli would review the biopsy results and determine any

need for follow-up visits with specialists.22 Additionally, Cooper was advised that

16 See Doc. 18-1 at 2.

17 Id. at 2-3.

18 See Doc. 18 ¶ 17; Doc. 18-1 at 11.

19 Doc. 18 ¶ 11; Doc. 18-1 at 15.

20 Doc. 18-1 at 15.

21 Id. at 6-8, 15.

22 Id. at 15.

SCI Dallas “medical staff have ordered studies and consults as directed by [these]

specialists.”23

On June 4, 2023, Cooper was seen for shortness of breath and leg weakness

during physical exertion.24 He was initially examined by RN Jacqueline Chackan,

who notified Dr. Prince and subsequently received an order to have Cooper

evaluated by PA Abel.25 RN Chackan directed Cooper to remain in the infirmary

until he could be evaluated by PA Abel.26

Later the same day, Cooper was seen by PA Abel.27 Cooper’s vital signs

were normal and an ECG revealed a normal sinus rhythm.28 PA Abel noted that

Cooper’s lungs were clear, his abdomen was “soft and nontender,” he had no

edema or cyanosis in his extremities, and he had no “focal neurological deficits.”29

Although Cooper alleges that Dr. Prince ordered him to be admitted to the

infirmary for a 23-hour period for observation,30 Cooper’s medical records reflect

that it was actually PA Abel who admitted him for 23-hour monitoring based on

the diagnosis of shortness of breath.31 During this 23-hour admission to the

23 Id.

24 Doc. 18 ¶ 12; Doc. 18-1 at 16-17.

25 Doc. 18-1 at 17.

26 Id.

27 Doc. 18 ¶ 12; Doc. 18-1 at 18-19.

28 Doc. 18-1 at 19.

29 Id.

30 Doc. 18 ¶ 12.

31 Doc. 18-1 at 18. This discrepancy is immaterial for the instant motion to dismiss.

infirmary, Cooper was monitored by nursing staff throughout the day and into the

following day.32

The next day, June 5, Cooper was seen in the infirmary by Dr. Prince.33 Dr.

Prince noted Cooper’s complaint of shortness of breath (or “dyspnea”), observing

that it increased with exertion and weather changes.34 He further noted that Cooper

had “only been using Alvesco once daily,” as well as Albuterol three to four times

daily.35 Dr. Prince “reinforced” the use of Alvesco two times a day, and noted that

he was considering changing Cooper to “one of the new triple therapy agents like

Trelegy.”36 Dr. Prince declined to refer Cooper to a pulmonologist at that time,

noting that he was scheduled to see Dr. Miceli later that afternoon to review biopsy

results.37

Later that day, Cooper told nursing staff that he was “fine” and “want[ed] to

go back to the block.”38 Dr. Prince discharged Cooper from the infirmary,39 and

Cooper ambulated to the block “without assistance or difficulty” and with no

complaints of pain.40

32 Id. at 20-22.

33 Doc. 18 ¶ 13; Doc. 18-1 at 23-25.

34 Doc. 18-1 at 23.

35 Id.

36 Id. at 24.

37 Id.

38 Id. at 25.

39 Doc. 18 ¶ 13; Doc. 18-1 at 25.

40 Doc. 18-1 at 25.

On June 10, 2023, Cooper returned to the medical department, once again

experiencing shortness of breath that worsened with walking and exertion.41 He

informed medical provider Rita Missigman that he had “been dealing with

worsening COPD symptoms that have been gradually getting worse since

[M]ay.”42 Missigman placed him on oxygen and promptly notified Dr. Prince,

who was the on-call physician at that time.43

Approximately two hours later, Dr. Prince examined Cooper and noted that

he was having worsening shortness of breath and was experiencing tachycardia.44

Dr. Prince activated “911” and ordered Cooper’s transfer via ambulance to the

emergency department at Geisinger Hospital.45 Dr. Prince administered 60mg of

Prednisone and kept Cooper on oxygen until emergency personnel arrived.46

Cooper alleges that, while hospitalized at Geisinger Hospital, he was

diagnosed with “severe anemia” with a hemoglobin count of “2.6” on admission.47

He claims that he received six to seven units of plasma as part of his treatment

there.48 He was discharged on June 14, 2023.49

41 Doc. 18 ¶ 14 (Cooper’s amended complaint appears to contain a typo, providing the date of

this treatment as “May 10, 2023” instead of June 10, 2023); Doc. 18-1 at 27, 28.

42 Doc. 18-1 at 28.

43 Id. at 28-29.

44 Id. at 30.

45 Doc. 18 ¶ 14; Doc. 18-1 at 31-34.

46 Doc. 18-1 at 31-32.

47 Doc. 18 ¶ 15.

48 Id.

49 Id.

Cooper sues Dr. Prince and PA Abel, alleging that they were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.50

He seeks compensatory damages as well as court fees.51 Defendants move to

dismiss Cooper’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).52 That motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”53 The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.54 In

addition to the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also

consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as

undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if

the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents.55

50 Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.

51 Id. ¶ 37.

52 See generally Doc. 28.

53 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

54 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

55 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.56 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”57 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.58 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”59

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”60

Because Cooper proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”61 This is

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Cooper, is incarcerated.62

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Cooper’s Eighth Amendment

medical indifference claims, arguing that his allegations do not rise to the level of a

56 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

57 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

58 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

59 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

60 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

61 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

62 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

constitutional infringement. The Court agrees that Cooper’s allegations—at

most—implicate professional negligence rather than an Eighth Amendment

violation and therefore will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

A. Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference Claim

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”63 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he had

a serious medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that

need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.”64 A serious

medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment

or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.”65

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

63 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

64 Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

65 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

injury.66 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”67 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.68

Cooper adequately states a serious medical need with respect to his acute

anemia and the complications he experienced. He does not, however, plausibly

allege that either Dr. Prince or PA Abel acted with deliberate indifference to that

need.

Cooper’s briefing on the instant motion to dismiss and his actual pleadings

tell completely different stories. In his briefing, Cooper argues that he was ignored

by Defendants for “nearly three months” even though he repeatedly “represented to

both [D]efendants” his medical concerns via “written letters” and during “sick-call

sessions.”69 These assertions are directly contradicted by Cooper’s verified

amended complaint and the attached medical records.

According to Cooper’s pleadings, PA Abel treated Cooper on just two

occasions during the time relevant to this lawsuit. On both days (May 18 and June

4), Cooper expressed concerns about shortness of breath, and on May 18, he also

mentioned that he had “dark hard stools.” During both visits, PA Abel examined

66 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

67 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

68 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

69 Doc. 30 at 1, 6.

Cooper and provided him with medical care and prescription medication to address

Cooper’s symptoms. According to the medical records, he also ordered Cooper to

be kept under 23-hour observation in the infirmary following the June 4 exam.

Dr. Prince treated Cooper for the first time on June 5, 2023. During this

exam, he noted that Cooper had only been using Alvesco once daily, as well as

Albuterol three to four times daily. Dr. Prince reinforced the use of Alvesco two

times a day and noted that he was considering changing Cooper to a new “triple

therapy” treatment for his COPD. Dr. Prince declined to refer Cooper to a

pulmonologist at that time, noting that he was scheduled to see a different

specialist later that same afternoon. He next saw Cooper five days later. During

that June 10 examination, he determined that Cooper’s worsening symptoms

required outside medical attention and transferred him via ambulance to Geisinger

Hospital’s emergency department.

Thus, PA Abel’s at-issue treatment of Cooper spanned approximately two

and a half weeks, and Dr. Prince’s treatment spanned just five days—not three

months, as Cooper repeatedly argues in his briefing. During this brief period of

time, each provider saw Cooper on only two occasions. Moreover, as part of those

examinations, PA Abel and Dr. Prince considered Cooper’s symptoms and medical

history and provided the care and prescription medications they determined to be

medically appropriate.

Cooper’s attempt to impute to Defendants his other treatment by (or

communication to) CRNP DeBoer, RN Chackan, or any other SCI Dallas medical

provider70 is improper in Section 1983 litigation. That is because there is no

respondeat superior liability under Section 1983; rather, “a plaintiff must aver

facts to show the defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”71

Thus, Dr. Prince and PA Abel are only responsible for their personal conduct in

treating Cooper; they are not vicariously liable for the actions of other SCI Dallas

medical providers.

When considering Dr. Prince’s and PA Abel’s brief treatment as alleged by

Cooper, nothing in the amended complaint implicates deliberate indifference by

either Defendant. At no time was Cooper denied care known to be medically

necessary, delayed provision of medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denied

prescribed medical treatment, or denied a reasonable request for treatment.

Rather, Cooper’s amended complaint and attached medical records plainly

demonstrate that—during the time in question—Cooper was receiving extensive

medical care while incarcerated at SCI Dallas, including immediate medical

attention following sick calls, treatment by numerous SCI Dallas medical providers

70 See, e.g., Doc. 18 ¶ 27 (alleging, in conclusory fashion, that Dr. Prince is a “doctor and director

of medical” who “oversees and makes the final decisions regarding treatment and care for

prisoners,” and that all subordinates inform Dr. Prince of “serious medical problems of

prisoners”); Doc. 30 at 1, 2, 4, 6.

71 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

(e.g., nurses, nurse practitioners, a physician assistant, and an in-house doctor),

treatment by two outside specialist physicians (an oncologist and a cardiothoracic

surgeon) for lung cancer, outside testing for his multiple medical problems, and

eventually emergency transfer to an outside hospital. Cooper’s claim that the care

he received was the equivalent of “no” treatment72 is eviscerated by his own

amended complaint and attached medical records.

While it is clear that Cooper believes that Dr. Prince and PA Abel failed to

properly treat his symptoms (i.e., by treating him for COPD and lung cancer rather

than testing and treating him for acute anemia), such an allegation only implicates

professional negligence, not a constitutional violation.73 Indeed, treating a patient

experiencing shortness of breath who has a known history of COPD and lung

cancer for those precise respiratory illnesses does not appear to be an unreasonable

course of action. Cooper’s claim that Defendants’ chosen course of treatment was

somehow inappropriate or deficient is a quintessential example of a disagreement

with a medical provider’s professional judgment or treatment plan, which simply

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.74

72 Doc. 18 ¶ 22.

73 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 96, 106 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).

74 See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (explaining that “mere disagreement as to the proper medical

treatment” does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation”); see also Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because ‘mere disagreement as to the

proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,’ when

Cooper also repeatedly argues that because Dr. Prince and PA Abel knew he

had a history of anemia, their chosen course of treatment exhibited deliberate

indifference to that serious medical need.75 Once again, however, such an

argument merely implicates medical malpractice. That is, Cooper is contending

that because Defendants had previously treated Cooper for anemia in 2021 and

2022 or observed it in his medical history, they should have known that Cooper’s

symptoms were anemia-related. This type of allegation is a classic assertion of

negligence.

Cooper has not alleged, nor can he allege, that either Dr. Prince or PA Abel

was aware that Cooper was suffering from acute anemia in late May and early June

2023 and simply refused to treat that condition. Indeed, by Cooper’s own

admission, he did not discover that his symptoms (shortness of breath and fatigue

upon exertion) were caused by anemia until he was admitted to Geisinger Hospital

and staff performed testing and determined that his hemoglobin was 2.6.76

Thus, his claim that Dr. Prince and PA Abel “deliberately disregarded the

condition” i.e., anemia,77 is a gross mischaracterization of the Eighth Amendment

medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence

that it violates professional standards of care.” (internal citation omitted)); Brown v. Borough

of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”).

75 See Doc. 18 ¶¶ 8-10, 30; Doc. 30 at 4.

76 See Doc. 18 ¶ 15.

77 See id. ¶¶ 30-31, 34; Doc. 30 at 4, 8-9.

deliberate indifference standard for medical care. Under Cooper’s errant

reasoning, Dr. Prince and PA Abel would have been “deliberately indifferent” to

Cooper’s serious medical needs if they had failed to treat Cooper for any one of his

many serious, previously diagnosed medical conditions and it turned out that such

prior condition was the root cause of his respiratory problems in May and June.

That previous medical history includes, but is not limited to, chronic embolism,

deep vein thrombosis, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, peripheral vascular disease,

pulmonary embolism, COPD, coronary artery disease, hematuria, dyspepsia, hiatal

hernia, edema, and lung cancer.78 That is simply not the standard by which prison

medical providers are measured in Eighth Amendment medical indifference

claims.

Cooper’s amended complaint, therefore, is woefully deficient as to plausibly

alleging that either Dr. Prince or PA Abel was culpable of “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain” in their brief treatment of him. His allegations—at

most—implicate a claim of professional negligence, not an Eighth Amendment

violation. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Cooper’s amended complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

78 See Doc. 18-1 at 8, 30.

B. Leave to Amend

Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile.”79 Further leave to amend will be denied because

Cooper has failed to cure the fatal deficiencies with his pleadings even after

“amendments previously allowed.”80 Both Cooper’s complaint and amended

complaint reflect that he is unable to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment

medical indifference claim against either Defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cooper’s amended

complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

79 Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

80 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”).