TAMAGNY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

COURTNEY TAMAGNY, JEANNE

Civil Action No. 25-732 (SDW) (CF)

TAMAGNY,

Plaintiffs,

WHEREAS OPINION

v.

November 24, 2025

DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY, et al.,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Defendant John Scott Tamagny’s

Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 30 (“Motion”)) Plaintiffs Courtney and Jeanne Tamagny’s First Amended

Complaint1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff Courtney Tamagny (“Courtney”) is one of three children to parents

Plaintiff Jeanne Tamagny (“Plaintiff Jeanne”) and Defendant John Scott Tamagny (“Defendant

John”).2 (D.E. 54 (“SAC”) at 3 ¶ 1.) Courtney alleges that from the time she was four to fifteen

years old, her father sexually abused and assaulted her as well as her older and younger sisters,

1 Since the filing of Defendant John Scott Tamagny’s Motion, Plaintiffs amended their pleadings once

again. (D.E. 47 (filing a Second Amended Complaint).) The differences between the First Amended

Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint do not impact the arguments made in Defendant’s Motion.

Thus, this Court considers the Second Amended Complaint as operative pleading in this opinion.

2 Given that several parties share a last name, this Court refers to these individuals by their first names to

clearly distinguish them.

Sarah and M.T. (SAC at 6–7, 11.) Courtney also alleges she was sexually abused at the hands of

the family’s neighbor, Defendant Keith Slevin, with her father’s approval and participation. (Id.

at 7, 9); and

WHEREAS on January 28, 2025, Courtney initiated the instant lawsuit against Defendants

the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (“DCPP”), the New Jersey Department of Child

and Families (“NJDCF”), Christine Norbut Beyer, Joanna Holota, John Scott Tamagny, Keith

Slevin, the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (“BCPO”), and the State of New Jersey. (D.E. 1.)

On March 19, 2025, Courtney filed a First Amended Complaint joining Jeanne as a plaintiff. (D.E.

23.) After obtaining leave from this Court, Plaintiffs amended the complaint once more, joining

BCPO Investigator Matthew Zablocki as an additional State Defendant.3 (D.E. 54.) The Second

Amended Complaint, the operative pleading at this juncture, contains twelve causes of action. (See

generally D.E. 54); and

WHEREAS both Courtney and Jeanne assert the following causes of action: violations of

the Fourteenth Amendment right to parent and to familial association pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981

and § 1983 against State Defendants (Count I); conspiracy to engage in the former in violation of

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 against all Defendants (Count II); due process and equal protection

violations pursuant to § 1981 and § 1983 against State Defendants (Count III); and conspiracy to

engage in Count III’s violations contra § 1985 and § 1986 solely against the State Defendants

(Count IV). (D.E. 54 at 18–26);

WHEREAS solely Courtney brings the remaining causes of action in the Second Amended

Complaint against Defendants John and Keith Slevin. The remaining causes of action are: assault

and battery (Count V); incestuous abuse in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(a) (Count VI);

3 The other State Defendants in this matter are: DCPP; NJDCF; Christine Norbut Beyer, Commissioner of

the NJDCF; Joanna Holota, DCPP Investigator; the BCPO; and the State of New Jersey.

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts VII and VIII, respectively); a due

process violation through breach of the parental duty under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count

IX); false imprisonment (Count X); invasion of privacy (Count XI); and illegal transportation of

minors under 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (Count XII). (D.E. 54 at 31–37); and

WHEREAS Defendant John moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint in

its totality. John argues the Second Amended Complaint lacks the factual content necessary to

withstand a motion to dismiss and is conclusory as to the potentially criminal conduct alleged.

(D.E. 30-1 at 13–14, 17–18.) John also argues that the Second Amended Complaint fails to

plausibly plead a conspiracy claim where it lacks allegations establishing a relationship between

Defendants, discriminatory animus, and a conspiratorial agreement. (Id. at 14–17.) However,

Defendant John’s Motion lacks any argumentation regarding the remaining claims brought against

him by Courtney in Counts V through XII; and

WHEREAS under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78

(2009). The pleading should “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); and

WHEREAS when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff,” and determine

“whether [the] plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). The analysis involves a two-step approach.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the Court parses between

the factual and legal elements of a claim, treating “all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true,” but disregarding any legal conclusions. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

Second, the Court considers “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that

the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679). When a plaintiff pleads factual content that enables the court to draw “the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” a claim has facial plausibility.

Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678);

and

WHEREAS as a preliminary matter, this Court notes that Defendant John’s Motion

impermissibly asks this Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint wholesale without

accounting for the fact that Counts I, III, and IV are asserted solely against the State Defendants.

Defendant John also attaches exhibits to his Motion that this Court declines to consider. See

Belichick, 605 F.3d at 230 (“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the

complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” (emphasis

added)); and

WHEREAS Defendant John also challenges Plaintiffs’ use of Doctor Steven Gold and

Doctor Randell Alexander’s opinions contained in their respective reports, excerpts of which are

quoted in the Second Amended Complaint. While courts “may consider ‘matters extraneous to

the pleadings’ if they are ‘integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ without converting

the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment,” Defendant John’s failure to tie the

arguments presented to particular counts in the Second Amended Complaint in light of the 12(b)(6)

standard render the challenges unsuccessful. Calabria Ristorante, Inc. v. Ruggiero Seafood, Inc.,

706 F. Supp. 3d 489, 507 (D.N.J. 2023) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114

F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)); and

WHEREAS in reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, this Court finds that although

some claims could be pleaded with more particularity, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts that

enable this Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendant John may be liable for the

misconduct alleged. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786. Courtney not only details the types of sexual

abuse she endured but also gives specific events she allegedly endured at the hands of Defendants

John and Slevin. (See, e.g., D.E. 54 at 6 (describing first incident of abuse), 9–10 (detailing

incident in the woods in Rockland County, New York)); and

WHEREAS however, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to

plausibly state a claim of conspiracy to violate their civil rights under § 1985 and § 1986 in Count

II against all Defendants, including Defendant John. A plaintiff allegedly injured by a conspiracy

formed “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons

of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,” may

bring suit pursuant to Section 1985(3). 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3),

the plaintiff must allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived

of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners

v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983).

WHEREAS the plaintiff must also allege “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action” to successfully state a claim.

Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403

U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). In doing so, “a plaintiff must allege both that the conspiracy was motivated

by discriminatory animus against an identifiable class and that the discrimination against the

identifiable class was invidious.” Id. Here, Count II fails to allege “that the conspiracy was

motivated by discriminatory animus” and to specify what identifiable class, separate and apart

from “the fact that [the class’s] members are victims of the defendants’ tortious conduct,” Plaintiffs

are a part of. Such failures lead this Court to conclude that Count II fails to state a plausible claim

for relief; therefore

Defendant John Scott Tamagny’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in large

part. Count II is DISMISSED; Counts V through XII remain. Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30)

days to amend their complaint. An appropriate order follows.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

Cari Fais, U.S.M.J.