Tokas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

VAIBHAV SINGH TOKAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-01740-SEP

)

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION )

SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff’s application to proceed in district court

without prepayment of fees and costs. Doc. [2]. Based on Plaintiff’s financial information, the

Court grants the application and waives the filing fee. On initial review, the Court dismisses

Plaintiff’s complaint for writ of mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief, and denies all

pending motions as moot. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim

for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal

conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.

Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept

as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints must

“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d

1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be

“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this complaint for writ of mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, seeking a Court order directing the United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services (USCIS) to conduct an expedited review of his immigration petition.

Plaintiff filed a Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) self-petition with USCIS on November

20, 2024, alleging he suffers domestic abuse, discrimination, and homelessness. Doc. [8] at 2.

USCIS issued a prima facie determination on January 2, 2025, confirming Plaintiff’s basic

eligibility, but has not adjudicated the immigration petition. Plaintiff submitted 11

“humanitarian expedite requests” between November 2024 and October 2025, but none has been

acted upon by USCIS. Doc. [8] at 2; see also Doc. [12-7]. Plaintiff states that he is homeless

and has been living out of his vehicle, a 2022 Audi Q5, since December 2024.1 Id. Because of

his PTSD, mental health concerns, and the impending cold weather, he alleges the delay in

adjudicating his petition places him at “serious risk of medical deterioration or death.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asks this Court to order USCIS to act on his petition, which is something it may

do only in extraordinary cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the

United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to plaintiff.”); In re SDDS, Inc., 97

F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The issuance of a writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy to be

1 Plaintiff lists his vehicle in his bankruptcy petition filed August 21, 2025. See In re Tokas, No. 25-

43214 (E.D. Mo. Bankr. filed Aug. 21, 2025).

invoked only in extraordinary situations.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Mandamus may issue only when the Plaintiff can establish (1) “a clear and indisputable right to

the relief sought,” (2) that “the defendant has a nondiscretionary duty to honor that right,” and

(3) that he “has no other adequate remedy.” Jd. at 1034; see also Castillo v. Ridge, 445 F.3d

1057, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying writ of mandamus where INS not under a

nondiscretionary duty to grant waiver sought by plaintiff).

Petitioner has shown neither that he has a clear and indisputable right to expedited

humanitarian review of his immigration petition nor that USCIS has a nondiscretionary duty to

honor that right. USCIS’s policy manual, cited by Plaintiff, states “USCIS may expedite

adjudication of an application, petition, request, appeal, or motion at its discretion.” USCIS

Policy Manual, Ch. 5, Part A (emphasis added); www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-a-

chapter-5 (last visited Nov. 26, 2025). “As expediting an application, petition, request, appeal,

or motion generally means that USCIS would adjudicate the requestor’s benefit ahead of others

who filed earlier, USCIS carefully weighs the urgency and merit of each expedite request.” /d.

The policy manual describes several criteria that 1t may consider in determining whether to grant

expedited requests, including “[e]mergencies or urgent humanitarian situations,” which it

describes as “a pressing or critical circumstance related to human welfare.” /d.

Because Plaintiff has not established a clear and indisputable right to expedited

adjudication of his immigration petition, nor that USCIS has a nondiscretionary duty to honor

such a request, the Court cannot grant the drastic remedy of mandamus relief. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs application to proceed in district court

without prepaying fees and costs, Doc. [2], is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus,

declaratory, and injunctive relief is DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions, Docs. [8], [11], and [13],

are DENIED without prejudice as moot.

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 26th day of November, 2025.

SARAH E. PITLYK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE