Hernandez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ARSENIO ARIAS HENRIQUEZ : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-2221

HERNANDEZ, :

: (Judge Neary)

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

MICHAEL T. ROSE, KRISTI NOEM, :

and PAMELA BONDI, :

:

Respondents :

MEMORANDUM

Individuals facing immigration proceedings typically receive bond hearings.

The purpose of these hearings is to determine whether these individuals are either

a flight risk or a danger to the community. If they are not, an immigration judge

may order them released on bond pending the disposition of their immigration

proceedings.

Petitioner Arsenio Arias Henriquez Hernandez has been in this country for

over two decades. He was recently detained by respondents Michael T. Rose, Kristi

Noem, and Pamela Bondi (collectively, the “Government”), who appear to be

denying him a bond hearing before an immigration judge on account of a

governmental policy which invokes a law inapplicable to Hernandez. Hernandez has

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and requests a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”) enjoining the Government from detaining him and ordering his

immediate release.

Hernandez has unlawfully been denied a bond hearing, so the court will issue

a TRO requiring the Government to provide him one. But the court will deny

Hernandez’s motion insofar as it seeks his immediate release.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in September

2004 from Mexico without inspection. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 2). Hernandez has been

detained by the Government since November 20, 2025. (Id. ¶ 4). The Government

has denied or will deny Hernandez a bond hearing pursuant to a policy contending

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision renders Hernandez

ineligible for release on bond. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 4).

On November 21, 2025, Hernandez filed a petition (Doc. 1) for a writ of

habeas corpus raising statutory and constitutional claims challenging his ongoing

detention without a bond hearing. On the same day, Hernandez moved for a TRO

enjoining the Government from detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and

ordering his immediate release.

II. Legal Standard

Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy granted in limited

circumstances.” Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2017). The standard for

obtaining a temporary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is

the same as the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Cerro Fabricated

Prods. LLC v. Solanick, 300 F. Supp. 3d 632, 647 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2018). “A

preliminary injunction must be issued with notice to the adverse party. . . . A TRO,

in contrast, may be issued without notice where it is clearly shown that immediate

and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse

party can be heard in opposition.” Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 956 F.3d

156, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

To obtain a TRO, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) he is likely to succeed on

the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the

balance of equities favors an injunction, and (4) an injunction is in the public

interest.” Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin, 133 F.4th 213,

218 (3d Cir. 2025). “The first two factors are ‘gateway factors’: A plaintiff must

satisfy them both to be eligible for preliminary relief.” Id. (citing Reilly v. City of

Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017)). The standard to show irreparable

harm is demanding and requires the plaintiff to demonstrate such harm is more

likely than not to occur absent injunctive relief. Id. (citing Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179).

Where, as here, a party seeks a TRO against the government, “the latter two factors

merge.” Schrader v. Dist. Att’y of York Cnty., 74 F.4th 120, 126 (3d Cir. 2023).

III. Discussion

Hernandez argues the Government’s policy of mandatory detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) misapprehends federal law and violates his procedural due

process rights. (Docs. 1, 2, 3). He maintains 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to those

individuals detained while unlawfully entering the United States, whereas 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226—which provides for release on bond—should apply to him as he was

detained while already present in the country. Hernandez contends the failure to

provide him a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due

process.

His constitutional challenge likely succeeds on the merits. See U.S. CONST.

AMEND. V; see also Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well

established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the

context of removal proceedings.”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).

Whether Hernandez’s ongoing detention violates his procedural due process rights

requires an assessment of:

(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk

of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the

Government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that

the additional or substitute procedures would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).

These factors all favor Hernandez. First, his private interest is “the interest

in being free from physical detention,” which is “the most elemental of liberty

interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,

detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that

[the Due Process] Clause protects.”). The restriction of liberty is particularly acute

here where, absent a bond hearing, he would be detained for months or even years

while his case proceeds. See Guasco v. McShane, No. 25-CV-1650, 2025 WL

3270201, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2025) (“The wheels of justice turn slowly.”).

Accordingly, the first Mathews factor strongly favors Hernandez.

So too does the second Mathews factor. There is a certainty—not merely a

risk—that the failure to grant Hernandez a bond hearing would unlawfully deprive

him of the opportunity to make the case for his release and incarcerate him

indefinitely. Therefore, this factor also weighs in his favor.

Finally, the Government’s interests do not weigh in its favor. Its two

paramount interests are that an individual facing immigration proceedings does not

abscond from justice and does not endanger the community. An immigration judge’s

bond order—either granting Hernandez bond because he does not present such

risks or denying him bond because he does—would account for both those concerns.

Furthermore, should the immigration judge grant Hernandez bond, the

Government could seek an emergency stay of the bond order pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §

1003.19(i)(1) if it can “demonstrate that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its

appeal to the [Board of Immigration Appeals] and that it would suffer irreparable

harm in the interim.” Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

Therefore, the final Mathews factor cuts in Hernandez’s favor as well.

Taken together, it appears Hernandez’s continued detention without a bond

hearing is unlawful. This position is shared by a growing number of courts across

the country. See, e.g., Gomez, v. Unknown Party, No. 25-CV-03255, 2025 WL

3269055 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2025); Roman v. Olson, No. 25-CV-169, 2025 WL

3268403 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 24, 2025) Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-CV-6338, 2025

WL 3171639 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025). Thus, Hernandez has demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits.

Hernandez will also suffer irreparable injury due to his continued detention

without a bond hearing if his TRO is denied. See Arias Gudino v. Lowe, 785 F.

Supp. 3d 27, 46 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (“In the immigration context, unlawful detention is

a sufficient irreparable injury.”); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir.

2017) (concluding “Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of irreparable harm by

virtue of the fact that they are likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an

indeterminate period of time.”).

Finally, both the balance of the equities and the public interest favor

granting a TRO here. The government suffers no undue burden from Hernandez

receiving a bond hearing to which he is entitled under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and there is

a strong public interest in preventing the unnecessary and unlawful detention of

persons who otherwise should be set free. See Arias Gudino, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 48

(concluding “it is in the public’s interest that individuals subject to immigration

proceedings be afforded sound process and not be subjected to unlawful detention.”);

Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995-96 (affirming the district court’s reasoning that “any

additional administrative costs to the government are far outweighed by the

considerable harm to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the absence of [an]

injunction . . . [which] will likely prevent the unnecessary detention of non-

citizens”).

IV. Conclusion

Hernandez is entitled to a bond hearing. Accordingly, the court will grant

Hernandez’s motion (Doc. 2) for a TRO in part and deny it in part. The Government

must provide Hernandez with a bond hearing as set forth in an accompanying

order.

/S/ KELI M. NEARY

Keli M. Neary

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: November 25, 2025