The opinion
[Cite as In re C.H., 2025-Ohio-5351.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE C.H., JR. :
: No. 115187
A Minor Child :
:
[Appeal by C.H., Father] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 26, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. AD22906112
Appearances:
Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Kelly Wojtila, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.:
Appellant-father C.H. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s decision
terminating his parental rights and awarding permanent custody of his child, C.H.,
Jr. (d.o.b. 1/15/2019) (“C.H.” or “the child”) to the Cuyahoga County Division of
Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
This case arises from a June 17, 2022 complaint for neglect,
dependency, and temporary custody filed by the agency.1 The complaint alleged that
both Mother and Father had substance-abuse issues, that they lack stable housing
to provide for the child’s basic needs, and that “the child was previously adjudicated
neglected and dependent due, in part, to Mother and Father’s substance abuse, and
the child was previously committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS prior to
being reunited with Mother and Father in May 2020.” The complaint also alleged
that Father has another child who was previously adjudicated neglected and
dependent partly because of Father’s substance abuse.
On June 21, 2022, the court granted temporary custody of the child
to the agency, the child was adjudicated to be dependent, and a case plan was
developed toward reunification.
A semiannual review (“SAR”) filed July 25, 2022, noted that Father
was incarcerated and had not engaged in visitation services. The SAR also noted
that the agency had ongoing concerns regarding Father’s drug use, that Father was
currently using drugs, and that Father had pending drug-related charges.
On August 1, 2022, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”)
for the child.
On September 14, 2022, the agency filed an amended complaint.
1 The record reflects that the initial complaint was dismissed for failure to reach a
resolution within the required statutory timeframe.
A December 29, 2022 SAR noted that on December 6, 2022, Father
was sentenced to five years in prison. Subsequently, the record reflects that Father
engaged in and largely completed case-plan services while incarcerated.
On April 12, 2023, the agency filed a motion for first extension of
temporary custody and request for specific findings. On May 1, 2023, the magistrate
granted the agency’s motion for a first extension of temporary custody. In a
corresponding journal entry, the court found that the agency “has made reasonable
efforts and continues to make reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to
safely return home through the provision of supportive services” and further that
the agency “has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan for the
child.” On May 17, 2023, the court adopted the May 1, 2023 magistrate’s decision.
On August 22, 2023, the agency filed a motion for a second extension
of temporary custody and request for specific findings. The magistrate granted the
agency’s motion on September 20, 2023, and made reasonable-efforts findings. On
October 6, 2023, the court adopted the magistrate’s decision.
On February 26, 2024, the agency filed a motion to modify temporary
custody to permanent custody.
On April 17, 2025, the court held a trial on the agency’s motion for
permanent custody.
CCDCFS caseworker Leonid Tselentchook (“Tselentchook”) testified
that he became involved with the case in July 2024, and that in this case, C.H. had
been in agency custody since April 2022. He testified that the child had previously
been in agency custody in a separate case, but Mother and Father had regained
custody of C.H. in that case.
Tselentchook testified that he supervised visits with C.H. and Father
at Father’s correctional facility, and he described Father and C.H.’s interactions as
“very good.” (Tr. 36.) He also testified that while incarcerated, Father completed his
case-plan services, related to parenting and substance abuse.
Father testified that he had been incarcerated since April 2022 related
to his convictions for drug possession and drug trafficking. He testified that his
earliest anticipated release date was late November 2025, at which point he would
be able to serve the last six months of his sentence in transitional control or a halfway
house. Father also testified that he has been sober since April 2022. Father testified
as to the programs he had completed while incarcerated, as well as to the services
that would potentially be available to assist him with his reentry transition. Father’s
counsel introduced a letter confirming that his employment at the time of trial would
continue upon his release.
The child’s GAL testified that C.H. had behavioral problems in his
foster placement and at school. She testified that while she recognized that the court
might be limited by statutory guidelines regarding extending temporary custody,
she did not believe it was in C.H.’s best interests to terminate Mother and Father’s
parental rights.
On April 22, 2025, Father filed a bench brief to supplement his
arguments from the April 17 hearing. On April 25, 2025, Mother filed a response in
support of Father’s bench brief. On April 28, 2025, the agency filed a bench brief to
supplement its arguments from the April 17, 2025 hearing.
On May 9, 2025, the court granted the agency’s motion for permanent
custody. In a corresponding journal entry, the court made the following findings, in
relevant part:
Pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(B)(1):
(d) The child has been in temporary custody of a public children
services agency or private child placing agency for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period.
With respect to the best interest of the child, the Court has considered
the following factors under O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(1):
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, and foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child.
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in temporary custody of a public children services agency or
private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of
disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-
month period.
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether that
type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent
custody.
(e) Whether any factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply
in relation to the parents and the child.
With respect to the best interest of the child, the Court finds that
pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), that all of the following apply:
(a) The Court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or
more of the factors in division (E) of this section exist and the child
cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable
time or should not be placed within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent.
(b) The child has been in the agency’s custody for two years or longer
and no longer qualifies for temporary custody pursuant to division (D)
of section 2151.415 of the Ohio Revised Code.
(c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned permanent
living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5) of Section 2151.353 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
(d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or interested person
has filed, or has been identified in, a motion for legal Custody.
As all of these sections apply, permanent custody is in the best interest
of the child, and this Court as required by this statute, shall commit the
child to the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
The court went on to find:
Pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(E): The Court finds that the child cannot
be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time of
should not be placed with either parent.
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. Applies to
Mother.
(2) The chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental
retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent
that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate
permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated,
within one year. Mother has chemical dependency.
(16) Any other factor the Court finds relevant: Father is currently
incarcerated and has been since 2022. Father and Mother remain
married to each other. Father has remained sober and is maintaining
a job since February 6, 2025 while incarcerated and maintained as
strong bond as possible with child. However, father shall continue to
be incarcerated or in related step down facility or halfway house
through rest of 2025.
On June 2, 2025, Father and Mother filed separate notices of appeal.2
Father raises a single assignment of error for our review:
The trial court abused its discretion by granting permanent custody of
Appellant’s [child] to CCDCFS against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
II. Law and Analysis
A parent has a fundamental interest in the care and custody of their
child. In re L.W., 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). However, parental rights are
not absolute: “‘The natural rights of a parent are always subject to the ultimate
welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’”
In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunnigham, 59 Ohio
St.2d 100, 106 (1979). When deciding to terminate an individual’s parental rights
to their children, the goal “‘is to make a more stable life for the dependent children
and to facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.’” In re U.B., 2025-
Ohio-1265, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), quoting In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.). The
main focus of any child-custody decision must be what is in the best interests of the
child. See Venable v. Venable, 3 Ohio App.3d 421, 423 (8th Dist. 1981).
R.C. 2151.414 sets out specific findings a juvenile court must make
before granting an agency’s motion for permanent custody of a child. To grant
2 This appeal is a companion case to Mother’s appeal, In re C.H., Jr., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 115194.
permanent custody, the juvenile court is required to engage in a two-prong
approach. The juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that (1) one
or more of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) exist, and (2) a grant
of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (2).
Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that measure or
degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not
to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal
cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or
conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825,
¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954). “‘We will not reverse a
juvenile court’s termination of parental rights and award of permanent custody to
an agency unless the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.’”
In re U.B. at ¶ 23, quoting In re L.A., 2024-Ohio-5103, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that
the proper appellate standards of review to apply in cases involving a
juvenile court’s decision under R.C. 2151.414 to award permanent
custody of a child and to terminate parental rights are the sufficiency-
of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, as
appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are
presented by the parties.
In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18. Here, Father presents a single assignment of error
alleging that the award of permanent custody was error because it was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
In reviewing a juvenile court’s decision regarding permanent custody
on manifest-weight-of-the-evidence grounds,
the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179,] ¶ 20. “In weight the evidence, the court of
appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the trier
of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to
the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial
judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing
the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “‘If the
evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing
court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the
verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate
Review, Section 604, at 191-192 (1978).
In re Z.C. at ¶ 14.
A. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) Findings
In the instant case, the trial court made a finding pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d), that the child had been in agency custody “for twelve or more
months in a consecutive twenty-two month period.” Father does not dispute this
finding.
B. R.C. 2151.414(D) — Best Interests of the Child
Once the juvenile court found that one of the enumerated R.C.
2151.414(B)(1) factors applied, the court moved on to the second prong of the two-
prong test and conducted an analysis of the child’s best interests. The juvenile court
had to find by clear and convincing evidence that it was in C.H.’s best interests to
grant permanent custody to the agency. In re L.W., 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 36 (8th
Dist.); R.C. 2151.414(D). The focus of a best interest determination is the child, not
the parent. In re R.G., 2016-Ohio-7897, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing In re N.B., 2015-
Ohio-314, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.); In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315 (8th Dist. 1994).
Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), if all of the following apply, then
[p]ermanent custody is in the best interest of the child, and the court
shall commit the child to the permanent custody of a public children
services agency or private child placing agency:
(a) The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or
more of the factors in division (E) of this section exist and the child
cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with either parent.
(b) The child has been in the agency’s custody for two years or longer,
and no longer qualifies for temporary custody pursuant to division (D)
of section 2151.415 of the Ohio Revised Code.
(c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned permanent
living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5) of Section 2151.353 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
(d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other interested
person has filed, or has been identified in, a motion for legal custody.
(Emphasis added.)
The juvenile court in this case found that all of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)
factors applied and that it was therefore statutorily required to commit C.H. to the
agency’s permanent custody.
With respect to the factors in division (E), the court found that three
of the factors applied, though only one — R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) — applied to Father.
Specifically, the court found that the (E)(1) factor, regarding the parent’s continuous
and repeated failure to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be
placed outside of the home, applies to Mother. The court also found that the (E)(2)
factor, regarding chronic chemical dependency, applies to Mother. With respect to
Father, the court found that (E)(16), referring to “any other factor the Court finds
relevant[,]” applied to Father, and noted that Father was currently incarcerated and
had been since 2022. The court further found that Father and Mother remain
married to each other, and while Father has remained sober and is maintaining a
job and as strong a bond as possible with the child, Father would continue to be
incarcerated or in a related stepdown facility or halfway house through 2025.
According to Father, the juvenile court erred in using (E)(16), the
“catchall” provision, to deprive Father of his parental rights. While Father
acknowledges that the court was only required to find that one of the (E) factors
applied, he argues that it was improper for the court to do so here using the catchall
provision. He further argues that this is especially true when the statutory factor
that contemplates an incarcerated parent, (E)(12), did not apply to Father.3 Father
does not cite any controlling case law supporting his assertion, and we decline to
adopt his reasoning here.
3 The R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) factor states: “The parent is incarcerated at the time of
the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child
and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing
of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing.”
The statute clearly empowers juvenile courts to “consider any other
factors the court deems relevant.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(16). Further, we note that, in
this case, the juvenile court not only cited R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) with respect to
Father, but also explained its finding thereunder with specificity. Additionally, the
juvenile court found that Mother and Father remained married and Father’s own
testimony indicated that he intended to live with Mother again upon his release.
While this intention is not inherently problematic, this intention, in the context of
ample evidence in the record that Mother is still abusing methamphetamines and
has herself failed to remedy the conditions causing the child’s removal, is
noteworthy.
Moreover, while we acknowledge the progress that Father has made
on his case-plan goals while incarcerated, we also note that “‘the successful
completion of case-plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent
custody to a social services agency.’” In re T.B., 2025-Ohio-2075, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.),
quoting In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). This is because a case plan is
“‘a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.’” Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has noted
that “[i]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing
court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and
judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” In re Z.C., 2023-
Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80, fn. 3. While
Father has undoubtedly made significant progress, this does not change the juvenile
court’s statutory obligations.
Because we find that factor (16) under R.C. 2151.414(E) was met with
respect to Father, we also find that the evidence in the record supports the juvenile
court’s finding that the child cannot or should not be returned to the parents.
Likewise, we find that the juvenile court’s determinations under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)
are supported by the record. Because all of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)
apply, permanent custody is in the best interests of the child and the juvenile court
was required to grant permanent custody to the agency. In re P.J., 2021-Ohio-1821,
¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Further, because we find that the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) best-interests
factors are supported by the record, there is no need to address the R.C.
2151.414(D)(1) best-interests factors. In re Z.L., 2025-Ohio-4851, ¶ 60, citing In re
A.S., 2021-Ohio-3829, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.)
The juvenile court considered the relevant statutory factors in
granting permanent custody, and its findings were supported by competent,
credible evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the grant of permanent custody
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Father’s sole assignment of error
is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, JUDGE*
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)