Bowman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JENNIFER BOWMAN, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-00256

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

)

v. )

)

METROHEALTH SYSTEM, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendant. )

Before the Court is Defendant MetroHealth System’s (“MetroHealth”) Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff Jennifer Bowman’s (“Bowman”) Complaint in its entirety. (Doc. 16.) Bowman

opposed (Doc. 20), and MetroHealth replied (Doc. 21). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

MetroHealth is a healthcare provider operating in the greater Cleveland area and employs

600 doctors, 1,700 nurses, and almost 9,000 other workers. (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 11.)1 Bowman is a

medical practice assistant. (Id. at 4, ¶ 17.) Bowman alleges MetroHealth failed to pay her, and

other employees similarly situated, for all hours worked because of MetroHealth’s “time editing”

or “rounding” practices and policies in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA”), 29

U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (Id. at 6, ¶ 24.) Specifically, she alleges MetroHealth rounded and edited

clock-in and clock-out times which resulted in Plaintiff and others performing their “principal

activities of their jobs” without compensation. (Id. at 6, ¶ 26.)

1 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document

and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.

The time editing and rounding allegations relate in part to MetroHealth’s clock-in and

clock-out procedures documented in a “System Policy.” (Doc. 16-1 (hereinafter “Timekeeping

Policy”).)2 Per the Timekeeping Policy, non-exempt hourly employees must swipe their ID

badge at the beginning and end of their shifts. (Id. at 107.) As it relates to clocking-in, the

Timekeeping Policy states:

1.2. Initial Clock-In:

1.2.1. For the initial clock-in at the start of an employee’s shift, the system

permits an employee to swipe their badge, or clock in using a computer, no

earlier than six (6) minutes prior to the start of their shift. Those six minutes

are rounded forward, and the employee is paid beginning at the scheduled

start time. Attempting to swipe (or clock) in any earlier results in the swipe

being rejected.

1.2.2. Likewise, for the initial swipe-in only, the system permits an

employee to swipe in up to six (6) minutes after the start time, and the swipe

rounds back to the start time for payroll purposes.

(Id. at 108.) As it relates to clocking out, the Timekeeping Policy states:

1.3. Subsequent Time Swipes:

1.3.1. For all other swipes, including swiping (or clocking) out, rounding

occurs both forward and backward, based on a three (3)-minute midpoint.

1.3.1.1. Where an employee swipes out 1-3 minutes early, the swipe is

considered for payroll purposes as occurring at the end of the shift. Where

an employee swipes out 4-6 minutes early, there is a .10 reduction of time

recorded and an employees’ pay is reduced accordingly.

2 In her Complaint, Bowman never specifies the practices or policies relating to her time

rounding allegations. Nor does she attach the Timekeeping Policy. In its Motion to Dismiss,

MetroHealth attached the Timekeeping Policy. (Doc. 16-1.) On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court

typically only considers the complaint, and any exhibits attached thereto. However, a court may

also consider “exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to

in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic

Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th

Cir. 2001)). The Timekeeping Policy is routinely referenced throughout the Complaint and is

central to the claims relating to the FLSA allegations. Therefore, the Timekeeping Policy can be

considered.

1.3.1.2. Likewise, swiping out 1-3 minutes late results in the swipe rounding

back to the scheduled end of shift. Swiping out 4-6 minutes past the

scheduled end of shift results in additional time recorded and additional pay

of .10 of an hour.

(Id.) Hourly employees are not permitted to work any hours outside of those designated on their

scheduled workday, which includes any exception to the clock-in and clock-out procedures

described above. (Id. at 108.)

According to the Complaint, the Timekeeping Policy is “rigged” in MetroHealth’s favor

and was designed to willfully pay less time than worked. (Doc. 1 at 7, ¶ 29.) As a result of the

Timekeeping Policy, among other policies and practices, MetroHealth failed to pay employees

for the full time they worked and shortchanged eligibility for overtime pay. (Id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 33-

34.)

B. Procedural History

On February 10, 2025, Bowman commenced this action. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint

asserted five claims: (1) a violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Count One); (2) violations

of the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, R.C. §§ 4111.03, 4111.10 (Count Two); (3) a

violation of R.C. § 4113.15 for failing to pay a semimonthly wage on time (Count Three); (4) a

violation of R.C. § 2307.60 for damages for criminal acts (Count Four); and (5) unjust

enrichment under Ohio law (Count Five). (Id. at 20-27, ¶¶ 74-116.)

Bowman brings all claims as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Id.) Bowman proposes to form two classes, one relating to the alleged FLSA

violations (the “FLSA Collective”) and one relating to the alleged Ohio state law violations (the

“State Law Class”). As it relates to the FLSA Collective, Bowman proposes the following group

of individuals should receive notice:

All current and former non-exempt (including but not limited to commission-based,

production-based, hourly, and salaried) employees of Defendant during the period

of three years preceding the commencement of this action to the date of judgement

in this action who worked overtime hours during one or more workweeks and who,

during any one overtime workweek, were not paid for all minutes or hours recorded

in Defendant’s timekeeping system due to any time editing and/or time rounding.

(Id. at 15, ¶ 54.) And as it relates to the State Law Class, Bowman proposes the following group

of individuals should receive notice:

All current and former non-exempt (including but not limited to commission-based,

production-based, hourly, and salaried) employees of Defendant during the period

of six years preceding the commencement of this action to the date of judgement in

this action who worked overtime hours during one or more workweeks and who,

during any one overtime workweek, were not paid for all minutes or hours recorded

in Defendant’s timekeeping system due to any time editing and/or time rounding.

(Id. at 18, ¶ 67.)

On April 18, 2025, MetroHealth moved to dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. 16.) Bowman

opposed, and MetroHealth replied. (Docs. 20, 21.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the

complaint meets this standard. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, the

complaint must make out a plausible legal claim, meaning the complaint’s factual allegations

must be sufficient for a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plausibility

does not require any specific probability of success, but it does demand “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

When courts evaluate whether a complaint states a plausible claim, they must accept all

factual allegations as true. Cates v. Crystal Clear Techs., LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2016)). Courts must also

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and they must generally construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Courts do not accept legal conclusions

or other conclusory allegations as true, D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2010)), and courts need not

make unwarranted factual inferences, Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006).

B. FLSA Claim (Count One)

The FLSA “requires employers to compensate employees at one and one-half times their

‘regular rate’ if they work over 40 hours per week.” Acosta v. Min & Kim, Inc., 919 F.3d 361,

363 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). The FLSA also “imposes recordkeeping

requirements on employers,” meaning employers must record “overtime-eligible employees’

daily and weekly hours, hourly rate of pay, daily or weekly straight-time earnings, and overtime

pay, and total wages per pay period.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 211(c)). In this case, Bowman

alleges MetroHealth violated the FLSA’s overtime and recordkeeping mandates because of an

illegal rounding practice where MetroHealth rounded clock in and clock out times. (Doc. 1 at 6,

¶ 26.) MetroHealth asserts two challenges to Bowman’s FLSA claim: (1) the Complaint lacks

any allegations of the compensable work Bowman (and others similarly situated) performed; and

(2) the time rounding policy, including the Timekeeping Policy, is lawful. (Doc. 16 at 93-97.)

Each is addressed in turn.

1. Compensable Work

“[T]he FLSA established a minimum wage and overtime compensation for each hour

worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek.” Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S.

27, 31, 135 S.Ct. 513, 190 L.Ed.2d 410 (2024). To state an overtime claim under the FLSA, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) an employer-employee relationship; (2) the employer or its employees

engaged in interstate commerce; (3) the employee worked more than forty hours in a workweek;

and (4) overtime was not paid. Dep’t of Labor v. Am. Healthcare Servs., LLC, 762 F.Supp.3d

666, 679 (S.D. Ohio 2025) (collecting cases). Thus, as relevant here, a plaintiff must allege she

worked more than forty hours in a workweek.

“But the FLSA did not define ‘work’ or ‘workweek[.]’” Busk, 574 U.S. at 31. The

Supreme Court took up that task in a series of decisions that produced an expansive definition of

“work.” Id. It “defined ‘work’ as ‘physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)

controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of

the employer and his business.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No.

123, 321 U.S. 590, 598, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944)). “Workweek” was defined to

“includ[e] all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s

premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery

Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690-91, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946)). These definitions proved too

broad and produced a “flood of litigation.” Id.

In response, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act which specifically exempted

FLSA liability (i.e., made non-compensable) two work-related activities: (1) walking, riding, or

traveling to or from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which

such employee is employed to perform and (2) activities which are preliminary to or

postliminary to said principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to the time on any

particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any

particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. Id. at 32; 29 U.S.C. §

251(a); see also In re Amazon.com, Inc., Fulfillment Ctr., 852 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2017)

(recounting history of Portal-to-Portal Act).

The Portal-to-Poral Act did not change the Supreme Court’s earlier definitions of “work”

or “workweek” “[o]ther than its express exceptions for travel to and from the location of the

employee’s ‘principal activity,’ and for activities that are preliminary or postliminary to that

principal activity.” IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 28, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005).

Rather, “the Portal-to-Portal Act narrowed the coverage of the [FLSA].” In re Amazon.com, 852

F.3d at 607. The “statute had no effect on the computation of hours that are worked ‘within’ the

workday.” Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 28. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor

confirm this interpretation of the statute. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a) (“the Portal Act does not

affect the computation of hours worked within the ‘workday’ proper, roughly described as the

period ‘from whistle to whistle,’ and its provisions have nothing to do with the compensability

under the Fair Labor Standards Act of any activities engaged in by an employee during that

period”).

The Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions to FLSA liability posed new questions for courts,

including the interpretation of “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said

principal activity or activities.” Busk, 574 U.S. at 31. “‘[P]rincipal activity’ refers to the activity

‘an employee is employed to perform.’” In re Amazon.com, 852 F.3d at 609 (quoting Busk, 574

U.S. at 31). The Supreme Court has “interpreted the term ‘principal activity or activities’ to

embrace all activities which are an ‘integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.’”

Id. at 33 (cleaned up) (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29-30). “An activity is [] integral and

indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform if it is an

intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to

perform his principal activities.” Busk, 574 U.S. at 31; see also 29 CFR § 790.8(b) (2013) (“The

term ‘principal activities’ includes all activities which are an integral part of a principal

activity”); § 790.8(c) (“Among the activities included as an integral part of a principal activity

are those closely related activities which are indispensable to its performance”). Using this test,

courts have found various work-related activities non-compensable under the FLSA as either a

preliminary or postliminary activity. See Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29-30 (considering whether time

spent waiting to put on protective gear was compensable time); Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247,

252-53, 76 S.Ct. 330, 100 L.Ed. 267 (1956) (considering whether time spent showering and

changing clothes was compensable time); Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260, 262, 76

S.Ct. 337, 100 L.Ed. 282 (1956) (considering whether time spent sharpening knives was

compensable time).

In cases where a plaintiff alleges an employer did not compensate employees for all

compensable time performed immediately before or after their shifts in violation of the FLSA,

the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts describing their principal work activities. See Forrester

v. Am. Sec. & Prot. Serv. LLC, No. 21-5870, 2022 WL 1514905, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 12959

(6th Cir. May 13, 2022) (“to state a claim for relief, the complaint must allege facts that show

[work performed before or after a shift] is compensable.”). “After all, the FLSA doesn’t require

employers to pay for every minute employees are at work.” Id. at *3. If a plaintiff fails to

sufficiently allege their principal work activities, it cannot be determined if the alleged

compensable time is exempted from the FLSA under the Portal-to-Portal Act. Id. at *5.

In Forrester, plaintiff’s employer, American Security, required employees to arrive 10 to

15 minutes prior to the start of their scheduled shift and sometimes required employees to remain

10 to 15 minutes after their shift ended. Id. at *2. An employee sued arguing American Security

did not compensate for this time, described as “pass down” time, despite employees performing

“several shift-change duties.” Id. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Sixth

Circuit affirmed. Id.

To proceed on an FLSA claim, the “complaint must contain facts that show [the plaintiff]

is entitled to compensation for the pass-down time.” Id. at *3. Specifically, “to state a claim for

relief, the complaint must allege facts that show pass-down time is compensable.” Id. Relying

on Busk, the Sixth Circuit explained that Congress exempted employers from FLSA liability for

work-related activities that were “preliminary to or postliminary to” “principal activity or

activities” which “occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such

employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases,

such principal activity or activities.” Id. (citing Busk, 574 U.S. at 32-33). Thus, under the

Portal-to-Portal Act, time is non-compensable if the activities are “preliminary” or

“postliminary” to the “principal activity or activities” which the employee is employed to

perform. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)). Considering the Portal-to-Portal Act and Busk, the

Sixth Circuit explained a plaintiff must allege what their “principal activities” are and must

allege a description of what work was performed during the time a plaintiff alleges they were not

properly compensated. Id. at *4-5. If a plaintiff does not present such allegations, a plausible

FLSA claim has not been stated. Id. at *6.

This is the primary argument MetroHealth makes here. (Doc. 16 at 93.) To

MetroHealth, the FLSA provides for a private right of action against an employer by an

employee when an employee has not been paid for compensable time. (Id.) Because a plaintiff

is only entitled to payment for compensable time, a plaintiff must allege in the complaint the

nature of the work performed. (Id.) In support, MetroHealth primarily relies on Forrester.

Here, to MetroHealth, the Complaint lacks sufficient allegations relating to what compensable

work Bowman, and the other employees she brings her claims on behalf, performed. (Doc. 16 at

94.) MetroHealth cites portions of the Complaint which alleges Bowman and other employees

“clocked in and performed the principal activities of their jobs” for which they were not

compensated. (Doc. 1 at 6, ¶ 26.) And the Complaint alleges Bowman and other employees

“regularly complete[d] tasks” which “constitute[d] part of their principal activities and/or are

integral and indispensable to their principal activities before their shift starting time (and after

shift ending times).” (Id. at 7, ¶ 27.) To MetroHealth, because the Complaint lacks allegations

relating to the specific work Bowman and other employees performed, she has not alleged that

work was compensable. (Id.)

Bowman argues her FLSA claim is distinguishable from the claim in Forrester, which

did not consider a time rounding claim. (Doc. 20 at 183.) She argues her illegal time rounding

claim is distinct from the “off-the-clock activities” claim the Forrester court considered. (Id.)

According to Bowman, she is not seeking compensation for “off-the-clock” work activities

performed prior to or after her shift, but instead, compensation for time spent after she clocked in

which was illegally rounded to her detriment. (Id. at 183-84.) In essence, Bowman argues her

claim is not subject to the Portal-to-Portal Act because she seeks compensation for work

performed during her shift. (Id.)

The Portal-to-Portal Act made “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said

principal activity or activities” non-compensable if the activities “occur either prior to the time

on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any

particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.” Thus, the Portal-to-

Portal Act applies to work related activities which occur prior to or after a workday. As the

Supreme Court explained, the Portal-to-Portal Act “had no effect on the computation of hours

that are worked ‘within’ the workday.” Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29. Regulations promulgated by the

Department of Labor explain:

Under the provisions of section 4, one of the conditions that must be present before

“preliminary” or “postliminary” activities are excluded from hours worked is that

they ‘occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which the employee

commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he

ceases’ the principal activity or activities which he is employed to perform.

Accordingly, to the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after the

employee commences to perform the first principal activity on a particular workday

and before he ceases the performance of the last principal activity on a particular

workday, the provisions of that section have no application. Periods of time

between the commencement of the employee’s first principal activity and the

completion of his last principal activity on any workday must be included in the

computation of hours worked to the same extent as would be required if the Portal

Act had not been enacted.

29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a) (emphasis added).

Here, Bowman alleges she clocked in for work and immediately began performing her

principal job duties—the job duties she was specifically hired to perform. (Doc. 1 at 6, ¶ 26.)

She alleges clock in times and clock out times were inappropriately rounded, resulting in the

performance of principal job duties for which she was not fully compensated. (Id.) Critically,

she does not allege MetroHealth required her to come to work early to perform pre-shift

activities, nor does she allege MetroHealth required her to stay after her shift for post-shift

activities. Bowman’s allegations do not allege “preliminary” or “postliminary” work activities.

Thus, she does not seek compensation for off-the-clock activities that may be, or may not be,

compensable under the FLSA.3

3 MetroHealth seizes on language in the Complaint where Bowman alleges she and others

completed tasks which “constitute part of their principal activities and/or are integral and

indispensable to their principal activities before their shift starting times (and after shift ending

times).” (Doc. 21 at 204) (emphasis in original). To MetroHealth, this language clearly asserts a

In this way, Forrester is distinguishable. 2022 WL 1514905, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS

12959, *3 (considering claim employer “didn’t pay her or other employees for pass-down time”).

In Forrester, plaintiffs sought compensation for time spent either preparing for their shift or

finishing their shift for which they are not on the clock and are not compensated. The question

was whether the activities an employee is required to perform prior to or after their shift is

compensable time under the FLSA. That question turns on whether the activities are

“preliminary” or “postliminary” to an employee’s “principal activity or activities.” Id. at *3-4.

If they are, it is not compensable time. But this case does not present the same question the

Forrester court considered. See also Howard v. Post Foods, LLC, No. 19-cv-570, 2022 WL

4233221, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166029, *37 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2022) (following Forrester

and dismissing FLSA claim where plaintiff failed to allege “pre-shift and post-shift activities,”

there, putting on mandatory COVID-19 protective gear which allegedly increased pre- and post-

shift time spent at work).

Bowman’s claim does not seek compensation for potentially incidental activities she

performed immediately before or after her shifts. Instead, Bowman alleges she clocked in to

perform her regular principal job duties and that time was inappropriately rounded. She does not

allege, like the plaintiff in Forrester, that MetroHealth required her to come early to her shift or

stay late after her shift ended without compensating her. MetroHealth does not require

employees to get to work 10 to 15 minutes early, nor does it require employees to stay 10 to 15

minutes late, to perform some sort of function relating to their jobs. When an employee clocks

claim that falls under the Portal-to-Portal Act, thus requiring the Court to determine if the work

was compensable (i.e., preliminary or postliminary to Bowman’s principal activities). But read

in context, the allegation merely states Bowman and others performed work while clocked in

prior to their “shift starting times.” This is consistent with Bowman’s time rounding claim—she

clocked in prior to her “shift starting time” but was not compensated due to the rounding policy.

in at MetroHealth, say 4 minutes early, that time is rounded forward such that the employee is

not compensated for that time.

The question raised by the Complaint is whether an employee should be paid for those 4

minutes, or if MetroHealth’s rounding is proper. The question is not whether that time is

“preliminary” work because, as alleged, Bowman immediately begins her principal job duties

upon clocking in. The test under Busk for considering whether this time is preliminary or

postliminary, that is whether the employer could have eliminated the activities altogether without

impairing the employees’ ability to complete their work, does not fit these allegations. Even if it

did, that test would be satisfied here: MetroHealth could not have eliminated the activities

Bowman alleges she should have been compensated for because she immediately began her

regular job duties upon clocking in. See Dozier v. All. Glob. Sol., LLC, No. 24-cv-348, 2024 WL

4445714, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183647, *12-13 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2024) (in time rounding

case, distinguishing Forrester by explaining complaint implies work was compensable because

rounded hours were still recorded upon clocking in, inferring the rounded hours were normal

work time removed from time sheets).

MetroHealth urges that—even if Forrester is distinguishable on the facts and legal

theory—it still requires a plaintiff to plead compensable work activities, that is, the nature of the

work performed. (Doc. 21 at 204.) Bowman has done so for purposes of satisfying Rule 8. She

immediately began performing her work duties, which she was hired to perform, upon clocking

in. (Doc. 1 at 6, ¶ 26.)

2. Time Rounding Policy

Regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor guide employers’ compliance with

the FLSA. As relevant here, “federal courts have long applied the Department’s rounding rules

to FLSA claims.” Lott v. Recker Consulting, LLC, No. 23-cv-489, 2025 WL 2550009, 2025 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 172452, *55 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2025) (citing Corbin v. Time Warner Ent.-

Advance/Newhouse P’ship, 821 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016)). Under the DOL regulations,

time rounding is “not illegal per se.” Rapp v. Forest City Techs., Inc., No. 20-cv-2059, 2021 WL

2982005, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131540, *12 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2021). A time rounding

policy does not violate the FLSA if the time rounded is “to the nearest 5 minutes, or to the

nearest one-tenth or quarter of an hour,” and it “is used in such a manner that it will not result,

over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have

actually worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b); see also Kurpan v. CNC Precision Machine, Inc., No.

23-cv-70, 2024 WL 3992299, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155149, *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2024)

(“Time rounding is a lawful practice where it does not result, over a period of time, in failure to

compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.”) (citation

omitted). Courts analyzing time rounding violations must determine if the policy is neutral on its

face, and if no, whether the policy is neutral as applied. Lott, 2025 WL 2550009, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 172452, *56-57; see also Houston v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 76 F.4th 1145, 1150 (8th Cir.

2023) (rounding policies must be “neutral, both facially and as applied”) (quoting Aguilar v.

Mgmt. & Training Corp., 948 F.3d 1270, 1288 (10th Cir. 2020)).

“If an employer’s rounding practice does not permit both upward and downward

rounding, then the system is not [facially] neutral.” Corbin, 821 F.3d at 1077. A policy is not

neutral as applied if an employer’s rounding practice systematically favors an employer in a

manner that results, over a period of time, in the failure to compensate employees for time

worked. Lott, 2025 WL 2550009, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172452, *58-59; Houston, 76 F.4th at

1150. “[N]eutral time clock rounding practices—rounding both up and down in a way that

averages out over time—are legal,” but “rounding practices that ultimately benefit the employer

and result in the underpayment of wages are always illegal.” Rapp, 2021 WL 2982005, 2021

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131540, *13 (collecting cases). Thus, “[c]ourts around the country have

recognized overtime violations where an employer rounded down time without evidence that the

rounding practice averaged out to fully compensate employees for the time worked.” Id.

(collecting cases).

MetroHealth argues its timekeeping procedures, including the Timekeeping Policy, are

entirely lawful. (Id. at 95-97.) MetroHealth stylizes its clock in procedure as a “grace period”

and its clock out procedure as a neutral and lawful time rounding policy. (Id.) In contrast,

Bowman argues the Complaint alleges the Timekeeping Policy, among other policies and

practices at MetroHealth, is not neutral and does not average out to fully compensate employees

for their time. (Doc. 20 at 177-78.) Bowman argues the Complaint sets forth that the

Timekeeping Policy itself, and its application in practice, undercompensates employees. (Id.)

At the motion to dismiss stage, Bowman’s Complaint states a plausible claim that

MetroHealth’s timekeeping policy violates the FLSA. The Complaint alleges MetroHealth’s

policy, over time, does not adequately compensate employees because of the operation of the

Timekeeping Policy, among other MetroHealth policies and practices. (Doc. 1 at 7-9, ¶¶ 29-33.)

C. State Law Claims (Counts Two through Five)

1. Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (R.C. §§ 4111.03, 4111.10)

(Count Two)

On May 19, 2025, the parties jointly stipulated to the dismissal of the Rule 23 class

allegations in Count Two of the Complaint. (Doc. 19.) In it, they recognized another court in

this District held claims under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act cannot be brought as

a Rule 23 class action, and instead, must be brought as an opt-in collective. See Garner v.

Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 23-cv-2258 (N.D. Ohio filed Nov. 21, 2023) (Boyko, J.).

Accordingly, the parties jointly stipulated to the dismissal of the Rule 23 allegations in Count

Two barring any further judicial action from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme

Court of Ohio on this issue. Bowman will continue to pursue Count Two as an opt-in collective

action only. (Id.)

Notwithstanding the joint stipulation, MetroHealth argues the OMFWSA claim should be

dismissed for the same reasons the FLSA claim should be dismissed. (Doc. 16 at 97.) Both

parties agree federal courts analyze FLSA and OMFWSA claims under the same standards.

(Doc. 16 at 97; Doc. 20 at 180); see Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501

(6th Cir. 2007) (“the [OMFWSA] expressly incorporates the standards and principles found in

the FLSA”); Gilbo v. Agment LLC, No. 19-cv-00767, 2020 WL 759548, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

26031, *17 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2020) (“Ohio law incorporates the FLSA’s definitions,

standards, and principles for its minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions.”).

Because the FLSA claim survives MetroHealth’s Motion to Dismiss, so too does the OMFWSA

claim.

2. Semimonthly Payment of Wages (R.C. § 4113.15(A)) (Count Three)

Section 4113.15 of the Ohio Prompt Pay Act (“OPPA”), provides:

(A) Every employer doing business in this state shall, on or before the first day of

each month, pay all its employees the wages earned by them during the first half of

the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and shall, on or before

the fifteenth day of each month, pay such employees the wages earned by them

during the last half of the preceding calendar month. [. . .]

(B) Where wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the regularly scheduled

payday or . . . and no contest court order or dispute of any wage claim including the

assertion of a counterclaim exists accounting for nonpayment, the employer, in

addition, as liquidated damages, is liable to the employee in an amount equal to six

per cent of the amount of the claim still unpaid and not in contest or disputed or

two hundred dollars, whichever is greater.

The OPPA thus “requires employers in Ohio to pay their employees the preceding month’s

wages by the first day and fifteenth day of the month.” Bobnar v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 758

F.Supp.3d 690, 745 (N.D. Ohio 2024); Brown v. Fukuvi USA Inc., No. 29294, 2022 WL

1514910, 2022 Ohio App. LEXIS 1493, *98 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 2022) (“Ohio’s PPA

requires employers to pay wages within certain times after they are earned”). If an employer

violates the OPPA, § 4113.15(B) allows an employee to collect liquidated damages. O’Brien v.

Ed Donnelly Enter., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing liquidated damages

available under the OPPA), abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577

U.S. 153, 136 S.Ct. 663, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016). However, pursuant to § 4113.15(B), “a

dispute accounting for nonpayment precludes the award of liquidated damages to a wage

claimant.” Id. at 577 (citation omitted); Bobnar, 758 F.Supp.3d at 745 (“the OPPA does not

allow an employee to recover liquidated damages if the allegedly unpaid wages are in dispute”);

Baum v. Intertek Testing Servs., No. 13-cv-1347, 2013 WL 6492372, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

173039, *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2013) (holding § 4113.15 is “only applicable to employment

situations where the wage amount is undisputed”); Brown, 2022 WL 1514910, 2022 Ohio App.

LEXIS 1493, *102 (“An employer’s dispute of entitlement prevents recovery of liquidated

damages”); Haines & Co., Inc. v. Stewart, No. 2000CA138, 2001 WL 166465, 2001 Ohio App.

LEXIS 597, *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2001) (holding that the “case constituted a contest over a

wage claim” which means “the Prompt Pay Act [] does not apply to this case”).

MetroHealth argues Bowman cannot maintain her OPPA claim because there is a

“contest” or “dispute” over the wages allegedly owed. (Doc. 16 at 100.) To MetroHealth, §

4113.15(B) precludes an OPPA claim where there is a “contest” or “dispute of any wage claim.”

(Id.) Because the Complaint pleads a dispute regarding the wages owed to Bowman,

MetroHealth argues the claim should be dismissed. (Id. at 101.)

Bowman interprets the statutory scheme differently. To Bowman, her claim arises under

§ 4113.15(A), not § 4113.15(B). (Doc. 20 at 184.) Bowman argues she can bring her claim

solely under § 4113.15(A) which does not contain an exemption for wages that are in “dispute.”

(Id. at 185.) That is, Bowman argues § 4113.15(A) and § 4113.15(B) are disjunctive and create

separate claims. (Id.) Thus, she argues her claim under § 4113.15(A) is not subject to the

exclusions in § 4113.15(B). (Id. at 185-86.) She explicitly waives any claim to damages under §

4113.15(B). (Id.) Bowman recognizes case law generally prohibits her from any liquidated

damages claim under § 4113.15(B) but asserts her claim escapes dismissal because it is brought

under § 4113.15(A). (Id.)

Another court in this district recently addressed Bowman’s argument. See Garner v.

Cleveland Clinic Found., 735 F.Supp.3d 867, 880-81 (N.D. Ohio 2024). In Garner, the court

rejected a plaintiff’s argument that their claim could survive dismissal because it was brought

solely under § 4113.15(A) and did not seek liquidated damages under § 4113.15(B). The Garner

court reviewed federal and Ohio case law regarding § 4113.15 and concluded “Section

4113.15(A) defines the time frame in which an employer must pay its employees their wages

earned and Section 4113.15(B) describes the liquidated penalty for not paying wages in the time

proscribed by the statute.” Id. at 880 (quoting In re Lowe’s Companies, Inc. Fair Lab. Standards

Act & Wage & Hour Litig., 517 F.Supp.3d 484, 514 (W.D.N.C. 2021)). That is, § 4113.15(A)

requires prompt payment, and § 4113.15(B) provides the penalty for the failure to do so. Id.

(“The Court finds that OPPA does not present separate causes of action in Paragraph A versus

Paragraph B”). This view is consistent with prior case law which has consistently dismissed

OPPA claims where a dispute existed as to whether wages were due. See, e.g., O’Brien, 575

F.3d at 577 (affirming dismissal of OPPA claim and explaining circumstances where a plaintiff

may have a valid claim absent a dispute); Garner, 735 F.Supp.3d at 881 (collecting cases where

courts have held OPPA does not apply if there is a “dispute”); Lower v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,

494 F.Supp.2d 770, 775 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding plaintiff cannot maintain OPPA claim

because “§ 4113.15 expressly applies only to wages that are not in dispute”). None of the above-

cited case law has found a valid claim under § 4113.15(A) despite § 4113.15(B)’s prohibition.

Bowman reasons that, because courts have held a violation of the FLSA or the

OMFWSA automatically creates a cause of action under § 4113.15(A), a plaintiff can bring a §

4113.15(A) notwithstanding § 4113.15(B). (Doc. 20 at 185-86.) Bowman cites a series of cases

that have allowed § 4113.15(A) claims relating to FLSA and OMFWSA violations. (Id.) True,

these cases have allowed the OPPA claim to rise and fall with the FLSA and OMFWSA claims.

However, none of these cases discuss the precise issue MetroHealth raises. The Garner court

similarly recognized this issue but found it ultimately unpersuasive in light of the other case law

presented. Garner, 735 F.Supp.3d at 880. The court’s reasoning in Garner is persuasive. And,

like the plaintiff in Garner, Bowman cannot proceed with an OPPA claim where there is a

contest or dispute. Count Three is dismissed.

3. Civil Action for Criminal Acts (R.C. § 2307.60) (Count Four)

R.C. § 2307.60 provides for the recovery of damages, including “exemplary and

punitive,” for “[a]nyone injured in person or property by a criminal act.” R.C. § 2307.60(A)(1);

Jacobson v. Kaforey, 75 N.E.3d 203, 206 (Ohio 2016) (R.C. § 2307.60 “creates a statutory cause

of action for damages resulting from any criminal act”). As stated above, the FLSA “requires

employers to compensate employees at one and one-half times their ‘regular rate’ if they work

over 40 hours per week.” Acosta, 919 F.3d at 363 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). Section 215 of

the FLSA makes it “unlawful for any person” to violate § 207. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2). In turn, §

216 imposes criminal liability on “[a]ny person who willfully violates any of the provisions of

section 215[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (emphasis added).

“Willfulness” under the FLSA requires “that the employer either knew or showed

reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.”

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988);

Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 842 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).

“[A]lthough conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally, ‘the plaintiff still must

plead facts about the defendant’s mental state, which, accepted as true, make the state-of-mind

allegation plausible on its face.’” Katoula v. Detroit Entm’t LLC, 557 F. App’x 496, 498 (6th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Republic Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247 (6th Cir.

2012)). As pleaded, Count Four seeks to recover damages under R.C. § 2307.60 because

MetroHealth allegedly willfully violated the FLSA, thereby engaging in a criminal act.

MetroHealth challenges “willfulness.”4 (Doc. 16 at 102.) It describes the allegations of

alleged willfulness as “generic statements” that MetroHealth is a sophisticated organization that

should be aware of wage and hour laws. (Id.) MetroHealth relies on Scheck v. Maxim

Healthcare Servs. in support of its Motion. 333 F.Supp.3d 751 (N.D. Ohio 2018). There, the

court dismissed a § 2307.60 claim because the complaint lacked “state of mind” allegations. Id.

at 758. The complaint merely alleged the defendant was aware of its obligations under the

FLSA, that the defendant did not act in good faith in formulating its pay practices, and that the

defendant willfully did not pay employees overtime. Id. These allegations, standing alone, the

4 As with its other arguments, MetroHealth also argues Count Four should be dismissed because

Plaintiff fails to plead a FLSA claim. Because the Complaint sufficiently alleges a FLSA claim,

this argument does not necessitate dismissal of Count Four.

court held, were nothing more than legal conclusions insufficient to allege willfulness. Id.

MetroHealth argues the same is true of Bowman’s Complaint.

The Complaint alleges more than the complaint presented in Scheck. MetroHealth

maintained records regarding clock in and clock out times but still enacted a rounding policy in

willful violation of the FLSA. (Doc. 1 at 14, ¶ 50.) MetroHealth created this policy to

systematically underpay employees for purposes of saving money. (Id.) The Complaint also

pleads, consistent with the FLSA and Ohio law, MetroHealth maintains posters relating to

overtime pay yet created a pay policy that deprives employees of pay for actual hours worked.

(Id. at 13, ¶ 47.) Because MetroHealth is a large, sophisticated employer, it can be inferred

MetroHealth knew its policies violate the FLSA. (Id. at 12, ¶ 45.) Combined, these allegations

are sufficient to state a claim for willfulness. See Miller v. AT&T Corp., No. 13-cv-1422, 2013

WL 5566698, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146037, *6-7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2013) (denying motion to

dismiss willful violation of FLSA claim because complaint included factual support for willful

allegations, there, improper record keeping); Walsh v. Americare Healthcare Servs., No. 21-cv-

5076, 2023 WL 2544509, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44991, *14 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2023)

(reserving ruling on willfulness until summary judgment because “[d]efendant’s arguments are

better suited to the determination of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding

willfulness”). MetroHealth’s sole challenge to Count Four is without merit.

4. Unjust Enrichment (Count Five)

To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a complaint must plausibly allege “(1) a benefit

conferred by a plaintiff upon a defendant; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3)

retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to do so

without payment.” Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 465 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ohio 1984). Unjust

enrichment allegations mirroring FLSA and OMFWSA allegations are not generally dismissed

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Clark v. Pizza Baker, Inc., No. 18-cv-157, 2020 WL 5760445,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178297, *12-13 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2020) (finding the FLSA does not

preempt unjust enrichment claim at motion to dismiss stage, and allowing unjust enrichment

claim to proceed along with FLSA, OMFWSA, and OPPA claims); Monahan v. Smyth Auto.,

Inc., No. 10-cv-48, 2011 WL 379129, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9877, *24-25 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2,

2011) (finding the FLSA and OMFWSA does not preempt unjust enrichment claim at motion to

dismiss stage). Instead, “[a]t the very least, plaintiffs are permitted to plead claims in the

alternative, and a court may not dismiss claims as preempted until the parties have had a chance

to develop the facts during discovery to assess whether facts different from those comprising the

[federal] claim support the state common law state claims.” Clark, 2020 WL 5760445, 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178297, *13.

The Complaint alleges MetroHealth has been unjustly enriched through its illegal time

rounding policy because it has benefited from the labor of its employees without compensation.

(Id. at 27, ¶ 113.) MetroHealth was unjustly enriched “both as to straight time and overtime.”

(Id. at 9, ¶ 35.) Bowman seeks the “full amount of regular wages that remain unpaid.” (Id. at 27,

¶ 116.)

MetroHealth focuses on a purported inconsistency in the Complaint allegations.

Bowman first pleads her unjust enrichment claim as one relating to straight time and overtime.

(Doc. 1 at 9, ¶ 35.) But she later pleads her unjust enrichment claim as relating only to overtime.

(Id. at 26, ¶ 110.) Seizing on this inconsistency, MetroHealth argues the OMFWSA preempts

any overtime claim. Bowman acknowledges the preemption doctrine but clarifies that her unjust

enrichment claim only relates to straight time, not overtime, and is therefore distinct from the

FLSA and OMFWSA overtime claims. (/d. at 169-70.) MetroHealth nonetheless seeks

dismissal of the claim for straight time. (Doc. 21 at 209-10.) It argues even Bowman’s straight

time unjust enrichment claim is governed by the OMFWSA and OPPA and is therefore

preempted. (/d. at 209.)

The Complaint has plausibly stated a claim for unjust enrichment. There are sufficient

factual allegations and, drawing all reasonable inferences in Bowman’s favor, the claim can

proceed. Indeed, MetroHealth did not present the Court with any legal authority that the claim

presented must be dismissed. As the movant, it is MetroHealth's burden to demonstrate

dismissal is merited as a matter of law. It has not done so.

I. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant MetroHealth System’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count Three of Plaintiff Jennifer Bowman’s

Complaint is DISMISSED. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to all other claims presented

in the Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 24, 2025 ¢

4 24 Mh BRENNAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE