Stillwell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

PENELOPE STILLWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-01608-WFJ-AEP

STEVEN H. MEZER, in his individual

and official capacity;

LILLIANA M. FARINAS-SABOGAL, in

her individual and official capacity;

MICHAEL J. BRUDNY, in his individual

and official capacity;

BECKER & POLIAKOFF, P.A.;

TIRSO M. CARREJA JR., in his individual

and official capacity;

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a Verizon

Wireless; and

PINELLAS COUNTY CLERK OF

COURT, in his official capacity,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Steven H. Mezer, Michael J. Brudny, Lilliana

M. Farinas-Sabogal, and Becker & Poliakoff, P.A.1; Tirso M. Carreja, Jr. and Cellco

Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless2 (collectively, “Verizon”); and the Pinellas

1 Defendants Steven H. Mezer, Michael J. Brudny, and Lilliana M. Farinas-Sabogal are attorneys for Defendant Becker

& Poliakoff, P.A., and represented Landmark Towers at Sand Key Condominium Association Inc. in the underlying

state court litigation over the cell tower. Dkt. 13 at 4.

2 Defendant Tirso M. Carreja, Jr., an attorney with Shutts & Bowen LLP, represented Defendant Verizon in the

underlying state court litigation over the cell tower. Dkt. 3 ¶ 14.

County Clerk of Court’s3 (the “Pinellas Clerk”) Motions to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint. Dkts. 13, 16, 17. Plaintiff Penelope Stillwell, proceeding pro se, has

responded in opposition, Dkts. 21, 26, 27, and only Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. and its

attorneys have replied. Dkt. 22. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants

the motions to dismiss without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from the alleged “unauthorized construction of a

commercial telecommunication cell tower facility on Plaintiff’s fee simple common

property,” and the subsequent “racketeering conspiracy among attorneys, telecom

corporate actors, and local public officials.” Dkt. 3 ¶ 1.

Plaintiff Stillwell is a condominium owner in Pinellas County, Florida, who

has opposed the placement of a commercial cell tower on her residential property.

Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. Plaintiff claims that, on some unspecified date, Defendant Steven H.

Mezer, an attorney for Defendant Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., participated in a scheme

for the construction of a Verizon cell tower on Plaintiff’s condominium property

“based on a fraudulent amendment to the condominium declaration.” Id. ¶ 6.

Defendant Mezer then facilitated an “illegal sale” of the Verizon cell tower lease to

a “foreign country’s sovereign wealth fund for $630,000.” Id. ¶ 8. In an effort to

3 More specifically, Plaintiff is suing Ken Burke, Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller for Pinellas County,

Florida, in his official capacity. See Dkt. 17 at 1.

mask the actual purchaser of the cell tower lease, Defendant Mezer allegedly “used

a false Massachusetts LLC.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant

Mezer’s use of “a straw purchaser in the Verizon Wireless lease sale” was designed

to circumvent the “FCC’s strict regulation and scrutiny of foreign control of the US

telecom sector to protect critical infrastructure and national security.” Id. ¶ 11.

As part of the scheme, a suspended condominium board member, Lee

Donnelly, working under the direction of Defendant-attorney Michael Brudny,

signed and filed a fraudulent amendment to the condominium declaration, which

permitted construction of the cell tower. Id. ¶ 19. Lee Donnelly then signed an

agreement authorizing Verizon to install the cell tower. Id. ¶ 20. Defendant Verizon

allegedly bribed Lee Donnelly by paying him $5,000 to sign the agreement. Id. ¶ 21.

Following the execution of the lease with Verizon, the condominium association

entered into a “secretive agreement” on October 19, 2023, to sell the lease to the

strawman Massachusetts entity (allegedly owned by a foreign sovereign wealth

fund) for $630,000. Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 24. The sale of the lease was later rescinded. Id. ¶

25.

Plaintiff filed suit at some unspecified point in the Sixth Judicial Circuit of

Florida—Penelope Stillwell v. Arlene Mussel White, et al., case number 22-001990-

CI. Id. ¶¶ 17, 26, 27. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that she filed a motion for summary

judgment at some unknown point, which Defendant Judge George M. Jirotka “never

ruled on” and “denied Plaintiff access to schedule hearings and enforcing a system

that requires a Florida Bar ID.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 27. Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendant

Pinellas County Clerk of Court maintains the [judicial automated workflow system

(“JAWS”)] hearing scheduling system that requires a Florida Bar ID to access

hearing time, thereby excluding pro se litigants from equitable participation in court

proceedings.” Id. ¶ 18.

On June 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit in federal court, Dkt. 1, and subsequently

amended her complaint three days later. Dkt. 3. The two-count Amended Complaint

alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violations of the First and Fourteenth against

Judge Jirotka and the Pinellas Clerk and a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (“RICO”) claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d) against all the other

Defendants. Id. In September 2025, all Defendants (except for Judge Jirotka) filed

the instant motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Dkts. 13, 16, 17.

LEGAL STANDARD

As an initial matter, pro se litigants’ filings are liberally construed.

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). This liberal

reading, however, does not exempt pro se plaintiffs from the pleading standards

outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules of the Middle

District of Florida. Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371

(11th Cir. 2005); Caton v. Louis, No. 2:07-CV-32-FtM-99SPC, 2007 WL 9718731,

at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007). Moreover, a district court may not serve as a pro se

plaintiff’s “de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading. . . .” See

GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), the Court must accept all the complaint’s allegations as true, construing

them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282,

1284 (11th Cir. 2008). The pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To

survive dismissal, the complaint’s allegations must plausibly suggest that the

[plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.”

James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.

2008) (citation modified) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56

(2007)). The Court does not need to accept as true any bare legal conclusions offered

in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to

dismiss. As pled, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim and a civil RICO claim. The Court begins with the Section 1983

claim against the Pinellas Clerk and then turns to the civil RICO claim against the

other Defendants.

I. Count I- Section 1983 Claim

The Amended Complaint brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Pinellas

Clerk for excluding Plaintiff “from access to court via the JAWS system due to her

pro se status” in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Pinellas

Clerk contends that “[o]ther than the conclusory statement that her rights were

violated, the Amended Complaint does not offer any additional facts as to which

actions by the Clerk deprived Plaintiff of these rights or how such actions would

constitute a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.” Dkt. 17 at 3. The Court agrees.

In general, “to state a claim under § 1983,” a plaintiff must allege (1) “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” and

(2) that the alleged violation “was committed by a person acting under the color of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails on the first element. Beginning

with the alleged First Amendment violation, Plaintiff has not provided a single

factual allegation in the Amended Complaint that explains how denying access to

JAWS violated her First Amendment right to (presumably) freedom of speech. Dkt.

3 ¶ 28. Assuming that Plaintiff is bringing a freedom of speech claim, there are zero

allegations to put Defendants on notice of what kind of First Amendment claim is

being brought, such as a First Amendment Restriction claim or a First Amendment

Retaliation claim. See e.g., Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic

Ass’n, Inc., 942 F.3d 1215, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019); Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313,

1320 (11th Cir. 2019). As such, even when liberally construing the Amended

Complaint, the Court cannot determine how the singular factual allegation that

Plaintiff was “excluded from access to court via the JAWS system” constitutes a

First Amendment violation under Section 1983. Dkt. 3 ¶ 28. As pled, Plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim is due to be dismissed.

As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff again fails to plead any

factual allegations about what kind of Equal Protection Clause claim she is bringing

and how the Pinellas Clerk’s actions violated such a right. The Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaims that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. Essentially, this is “a direction that all persons similarly situated should be

treated alike.” Martinez v. Warden, 848 F. App’x 864, 867 (11th Cir.

2021) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).

To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff “must allege that the

plaintiff is a member of an identifiable group, was subjected to differential treatment

from others similarly situated, and the difference in treatment was based on his or

her membership in that group.” Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1296 (N.D.

Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.

Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege a class-of-

one equal-protection claim and allege that he “has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir.

2006) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).

Here, Plaintiff neither alleges that she was treated differently based on

membership in a group nor alleges disparate treatment based on characteristics

unique to her. There are also no facts that sufficiently allege the “similarly situated”

requirement. As pled, her equal-protection claim is subject to dismissal.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim does not fare any better.

Again, there are no allegations about the type of due process claim being brought—

i.e., substantive due process or procedural due process. See e.g., McKinney v. Pate,

20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994). Nor are there any facts suggesting that the

Pinellas Clerk’s actions violated Plaintiff’s due process rights (under either type of

claim). Therefore, the Pinellas Clerk’s motion to dismiss Count I is granted without

prejudice.

II. Count II- Civil RICO Claim

Turning to the civil RICO claim against Defendant Verizon and the

Defendant-attorneys, the Court finds the Amended Complaint has failed to

adequately plead a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d).

RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any

enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful

debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In addition to creating criminal liability, RICO creates a

civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a

violation of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). A plaintiff must allege the following six

elements to bring a RICO claim: “that the defendants (1) operated or managed (2)

an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that included at least

two predicate acts of racketeering, which (5) caused (6) injury to the business or

property of the plaintiff.” Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir.

2020). A RICO claim can be dismissed if it fails to plausibly allege any one of these

six elements. Id.

As to the second element, RICO defines an “enterprise” as “any individual,

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group

of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

“An ‘association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a

common purpose.’” Cisneros, 972 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Boyle v. United States, 556

U.S. 938, 948 (2009)). A plaintiff must allege more than an “abstract common

purpose, such as a generally shared interest in making money.” Id. “[W]here the

participants’ ultimate purpose is to make money for themselves, a RICO plaintiff

must plausibly allege that the participants shared the purpose of enriching

themselves through a particular criminal course of conduct.” Id. “The ‘pattern of

racketeering activity’ element requires that a civil RICO plaintiff establish ‘at least

two acts of racketeering activity.’” Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings

(Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 948 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)).

Additionally, civil RICO claims “are essentially a certain breed of fraud

claims, [which] must be pled with an increased level of specificity” under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b). Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 482

F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that “[i]n

alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake”). To satisfy rule 9(b), a RICO claim must allege: “(1)

the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time and

place of and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in

which the statements misled the [p]laintiffs; and (4) what the [d]efendants gained by

the alleged fraud.” Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co., 482 F.3d at 1316–17.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead several elements of her RICO claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Verizon, Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. (and its attorneys), and Tirso

M. Carreja, Jr., were all in an association-in-fact enterprise to “unlawfully enrich

themselves through exploitation of the condominium’s common property.” Dkt. 3 ¶

31. But the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege more than an abstract

common purpose. The conclusory allegation that all the Defendants shared a

common purpose to unlawfully enrich themselves and fraudulently “conceal[ed] []

material facts from courts and condominium owners” is devoid of any factual

support. Id. Besides naming the various Defendants and concluding that they shared

a common purpose, the Amended Complaint does not offer any facts to plausibly

support the inference that these attorneys, law firm, and telecommunications

company were somehow participants in a scheme to defraud Plaintiff. Therefore,

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the existence of an enterprise, as required by the

federal RICO Act.

Nor has Plaintiff met Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for the pattern

of racketeering activity. Plaintiff claims Defendants committed “mail and wire fraud,

obstruction of justice, tampering with official records, and money laundering”

without any specificity. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff failed to allege “precise statements,

documents, or misrepresentations made” or how the precise misrepresentations

misled her. See Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co., 482 F.3d at 1317. Instead, Plaintiff

has only provided vague and conclusory allegations that Defendants worked together

to assist an unknown “foreign sovereign wealth fund” for their own monetary

benefit. Dkt. 3 ¶¶ 24, 31.

Further, none of the sparse allegations concerning unlawful signatures by a

suspended board member and a secretive agreement satisfy the Rule 9(b) standard,

id. ¶¶ 19–27, as they do not allege the time and place of the predicate acts. See Brooks

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1381 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citiation modified) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ RICO claims fell short of the

heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard when the claims were “devoid of specific

allegations with respect to the separate [d]efendants” but “simply ‘lumped together’

all of the [d]efendants in their allegations of fraud”); see Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna

Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs do not point to a single

specific misrepresentation by Defendants. . . .”). Even liberally construing the

Amended Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to plead her civil RICO claim

against each Defendant and dismisses Count II without prejudice.4

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit is clear that this Court must give a pro se plaintiff, like

Ms. Stillwell, “at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court

dismisses the action with prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d

1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff has already amended her complaint once. See

4 In Steven H. Mezer, Michael J. Brudny, Lilliana M. Farinas-Sabogal, and Becker & Poliakoff, P.A.’s motion to

dismiss, Defendants bring up arguments concerning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention. Dkt. 13 at

2. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a civil RICO claim against Defendants in Count II, the Court

declines to consider the application of these doctrines at this time. However, if Plaintiff amends her complaint within

the allotted time, Defendants are free to re-raise these arguments on any subsequent motion to dismiss. And Plaintiff

should review these doctrines, as federal courts generally do not sit in review over, or correct, state court judgments.

See Efron v. Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2024).

Dkts. 1, 3. All Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice, arguing Plaintiff will be

unable to state a claim under Section 1983 and RICO. Dkt. 13 at 2; Dkt. 16 at 2; Dkt.

17 at 4. While the Court may agree at the end of the day, Plaintiff may make one last

attempt at stating a claim under Section 1983 and RICO. However, the Court warns

that any subsequent complaint that fails to state a claim will be dismissed with

prejudice. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir.

2019); Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291. And Plaintiff is cautioned to review Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11. Further, Plaintiff is well-advised to seek legal counsel,

including perhaps one of the legal aid services that might provide free advice.5

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkts. 13, 16, 17, are GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 3, is DISMISSED without

prejudice. Plaintiff will have one more opportunity to amend her

complaint to adequately state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

RICO. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must do

so within TWENTY-ONE (21) days of the date of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 19, 2025.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5 See e.g., Bay Area Volunteer Legal Services—(800) 625-2257; Legal Aid of Manasota—(941) 366-0038.

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record

Plaintiff, pro se