WILSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHNSTOWN DIVISION

KEVIN WILSON, )

) Civil Action No.:

) 3:24-CV-00183-CBB

Plaintiff,

)

Christopher B. Brown

)

vs. United States Magistrate Judge

)

)

C.O. GALLAHER, PAUL ENGLISH,

)

RONALD MOONEY, DR. LAUREL R.

)

HARRY,

)

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

ON MOTION TO DISMISS ECF No. 29

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

This civil rights action was initiated by pro se Plaintiff Kevin Wilson

(“Wilson”) who is currently an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution at

Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”). Wilson alleges Defendants2, who are Corrections

Officials at SCI-Houtzdale, violated his civil rights when they allegedly retaliated

1 All parties have consented to full jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

2 Defendants include Gallaher, a security officer at SCI-Houtzdale (“Officer Gallaher”), Ronald

Mooney, the intelligence captain at SCI-Houtzdale (“Cpt. Mooney”), Paul English, a security

lieutenant at SCI-Houtzdale (“Lt. English”), and Dr. Laurel R. Harry, the secretary of the DOC (“Sec.

Harry”) (collectively “Corrections Defendants”).

against him for filing a separate civil rights lawsuit related to different DOC

corrections officials. See ECF No. 15.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.

Presently pending before the Court is Corrections Defendants’ partial motion to

dismiss Wilson’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). ECF No. 29. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. ECF

Nos. 30, 36.

For the reasons that follow, Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part.

II. Background

Wilson claims two inmates physically assaulted him in February 2018 while

he was in custody at SCI-Dallas. ECF No. 15 at ¶ 11. Thereafter, he filed a civil

rights action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania against two corrections officers on Eighth Amendment claims related

to the failure to protect him during the assault and a subsequent denial of medical

care. Id. at ¶ 12; Wilson v. Mahally, 3:18-cv-1637-RDM (M.D.Pa. 2018). The case

was scheduled for a jury trial to begin on December 11, 2023. Wilson v. Mahally,

3:18-cv-1637-RDM (M.D.Pa.) (ECF Nos. 113, 114, 123).

While the parties were conducting discovery in that action, Wilson was given

a copy of the investigation report of the assault but misplaced it and requested a

copy of the report from a DOC administrator. Id. at ¶¶13-18. The DOC

administrator sent Wilson’s request to Lt. English on or about November 16, 2023.

Id. at ¶ 18. Wilson alleges within a day of receiving this request, Lt. English and

Cpt. Mooney fabricated a report that Wilson possessed contraband. Id. at ¶ 19. He

further alleges that Lt. English directed Officer Gallaher and another unnamed

officer to search Wilson’s cell and destroy his trial exhibits and legal paperwork in

an apparent effort to intimidate Wilson from proceeding with his pending civil

rights trial. Id.

Consistent with Lt. English’s directives, Officer Gallaher and another

unnamed officer conducted cell searches the next day on Wilson’s prison block and

searched Wilson’s cell. Id. at ¶¶ 20-31. During the search, Officer Gallaher asked

Wilson why he was suing the two officers and why Wilson wrote to the DOC

administrator requesting investigation reports. Id. at ¶ 31. Wilson responded to

Officer Gallaher that his “lawsuit was none of his busine[ss].” Id. Officer Gallaher

then became upset and responded “okay . . . you can’t go to trial without your legal

papers.” Id. He also told Wilson that he was going to “max out [his] sentence if [he

went] through with the trial,” as he sorted through Wilson’s trial exhibits, read

them, and asked questions about where he obtained them. Id. at ¶¶ 36-38. Officer

Gallaher then ripped up Wilson’s legal work and trial exhibits and flushed them

down the toilet. Id. at ¶ 40. After destroying them, Officer Gallaher smacked

Wilson’s television from the stand, which was damaged, but still works. Id. at ¶¶

42-43. After the search ended, Wilson requested a plunger to unclog his toilet from

Officer Gallaher flushing his legal documents and later filed a grievance concerning

this incident. Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.

Wilson unsuccessfully attempted to obtain new copies of his trial exhibits,

and claims his grievance was rejected without investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 53-61. He

also alleges that Cpt. Mooney erased camera footage of the cell search. Id. at ¶ 74.

As a consequence of his trial exhibits and other legal work product being destroyed,

Wilson claims he did not have the tools he needed to present his viable claims at

trial and caused him to lose. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72.

According to Wilson, the conduct by Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt.

English was part of a pattern of retaliatory searches which occurred due to Sec.

Harry’s policy to allow security office staff members to investigate their own

misconduct, give the security office staff members discretion to erase incriminating

video footage and discretion whether to interview inmates. Id. at ¶ 75. The policy

also results in the security office not being disciplined for retaliatory searches. Id.

In the end, Wilson claims this all caused him to become suicidal and resulted in his

being on suicide watch. Id. at ¶¶ 66-70

Based on this, Wilson asserts the following claims:

(1) A First Amendment retaliation and related conspiracy claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt. English

(Count I);

(2) A First Amendment access to courts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt. English (Count II);

(3) A “state law tort claim” for destroying Wilson’s personal property against

Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt. English which the Court will

construe as a claim for conversion under Pennsylvania law, ECF No. 15 at

¶ 80 (Count III);

(4) A “municipal liability” claim for maintaining a policy of “biased

investigations” against Sec. Harry, id. at ¶ 84 (Count IV);

(5) A “cruel and unusual punishment” claim for destroying his personal

property which the Court will construe as asserted against Officer

Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt. English, id. at ¶ 85 (Count V);

(6) A Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim for treating Wilson

“differently from other inmates who were similarly situated” under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants, id. at ¶ 86 (Count VI).

Corrections Defendants move to dismiss four of Wilson’s six claims: (1) the

First Amendment access to courts claim (Count II); (2) the “municipal liability”

claim (Count IV); (3) the “cruel and unusual punishment” claim (Count V); and (4)

the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim (Count VI). ECF No. 29.

Corrections Defendants do not move to dismiss Wilson’s claims for First

Amendment retaliation (Count I) or his state law conversion claim (Count III). Id.

III. Standard of Review – Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The applicable inquiry under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled. A

complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief;” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and can be dismissed for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A

defendant bears the burden of showing a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim.

See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000), holding

modified by Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003).

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges

entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the

pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.’” Phillips

v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556). The court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and

unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d

173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), nor a plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.”

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court’s role

is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support

of their claims – not if they will ultimately prevail. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974) (overruled on other grounds).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the allegations in the

complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record and any

document “integral to or explicitly relied upon in [framing] the complaint.” Schmidt

v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). If a court considers other

matters outside of this list, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary

judgment after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to present all material

discovery relevant to a summary judgment motion before the Court’s decision. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Finally, because Wilson is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can reasonably

read Gregory’s complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it will

do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories,

poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading

requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982). Despite this leniency,

“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a

claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing

Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).

IV. Discussion

a. Municipal Liability and “Cruel and Unusual Punishment”

Claims (Counts IV and V)

Although out of order, the Court will first address Counts IV and V as Wilson

does not oppose their dismissal.

In the Amended Complaint, Wilson asserts a § 1983 municipal liability claim

against Sec. Harry for maintaining a policy of “biased investigations” (Count IV)

and a “cruel and unusual punishment” claim against Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney

and Lt. English for destroying his personal property (Count V). ECF No. 15 at ¶¶

84-85. Corrections Defendants move to dismiss these claims on the grounds that the

DOC is not a municipality subject to § 1983 liability under the Monell v. Dep't of

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) standard, and because there is

no recognized Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim for a

deprivation of property. See ECF No. 30 at 3-5. Corrections Defendants further

maintain that to the extent Wilson attempts to assert a Fourteenth Amendment

due process claim for the destruction of his property, he had an adequate post-

deprivation remedy for the loss. Id. at 5-6.

As Wilson does not “object to” or “oppose” dismissal of his “municipal

liability” claim or his “property claim,” ECF No. 36 at 1, Counts IV and V are

dismissed as unopposed with prejudice. The Court will now turn to Corrections

Defendants remaining arguments.

b. Equal Protection (Count VI)

Wilson asserts an equal protection “class of one” claim against the

Corrections Defendants for treating him “differently from other inmates[] who were

similarly situated” and did so “intentionally and without rational basis.” ECF No.

15 at ¶ 86.

Corrections Defendants argue Wilson’s equal protection claim should be

dismissed “because he has not included any allegations of unlawful differential

treatment.” ECF No. 30 at 7.

In his response, Wilson explains he was treated differently from other

inmates who were randomly searched the same night he was because he submitted

a “request slip and lawsuit.” ECF No. 36 at 1. In other words, Wilson alleges he

was treated differently from other prisoners whose cells were searched that same

day because, unlike those prisoners who had no pending litigation against DOC

officials, his personal property was intentionally destroyed and there was no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a state

may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV. When a plaintiff asserts a “class of one” equal protection

challenge “alleging that the litigant [himself], and not a particular group, was the

subject of discriminatory treatment under a particular law, we have required the

litigant to allege that [he] has been intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” PG

Pub. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 114 (3d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

A “pure or generic retaliation [] claim simply does not implicate the Equal

Protection Clause.” Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 298 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2006)

(cleaned up). When a plaintiff alleges defendants enforce the law selectively against

them in retaliation for exercising constitutional rights, the proper cause of action is

under the First Amendment for retaliation, and not for an equal protection class of

one theory under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also Wardlaw v. City of

Philadelphia, No. CIV. 09-3981, 2011 WL 1044936, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011)

(dismissing equal protection claim based on allegation of retaliation); Stubbs v.

Nutter, No. CIV.A10-3200, 2010 WL 3421015, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (same);

O'Fee v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 09-2724, 2009 WL 3172759, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

Oct. 2, 2009) (same). Wilson’s assertion that Corrections Defendants treated him

differently from other inmates by destroying his legal materials in retaliation for

pursuing his civil rights through a lawsuit is essentially a recasting of his

retaliation claim as one for equal protection.

Accordingly, Corrections Defendants motion to dismiss Wilson’s equal

protection claim is granted and this claim is dismissed with prejudice as

amendment would be futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.

c. Access to Courts (Count II)

Wilson claims Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt. English violated his

right of access to the courts when they destroyed his trial exhibits and other legal

materials and this caused him to lose his civil rights trial because he could not ask

the defendants and witnesses questions he prepared, could not present his original

opening and closing statements, and was not given access to his trial exhibits until

the day of the trial. ECF No. 15 at ¶¶ 77-79.

Corrections Defendants argue Wilson’s access to courts claim should be

dismissed because he has not alleged the “actual injury” or “prejudice” elements

required to state such a claim. ECF No. 30 at 8-12. Corrections Defendants argue

Wilson was provided with copies of his exhibits at trial after he informed the trial

judge and counsel of their destruction, but he did not make “any mention of the

purported loss of his opening and closing statements or his list of questions for

examination of witnesses” to the trial judge. Id. at 11. Corrections Defendants

maintain Wilson had the opportunity to pursue his claims through trial and has not

explained how he was prejudiced by the unavailability of his legal materials. Id. at

12.

Prisoners maintain a constitutional right of access to the courts under the

First Amendment. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). When a prisoner

alleges corrections officials have “inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal

claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’ – that they lost a

chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they

have no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other

than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205–06

(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). To state

such a claim, the prisoner’s complaint “must describe the underlying arguable claim

well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must describe the ‘lost

remedy.’” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205–06 (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416–17).

“The right to meaningfully access the courts includes a right to the tools

needed in order to challenge the conditions of confinement.” Rivera v. Monko, 37

F.4th 909, 918 (3d Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (finding a prisoner’s inability to access

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence during a jury

trial plausibly stated an access-to-courts claim). This right of access does not stop

once a complaint challenging conditions of confinement has been filed, and “a

prisoner has a valid access-to-courts claim when he alleges that the denial of access

to legal materials—before and/or during trial—caused a potentially meritorious

claim to fail.” Id. at 915; 922. “Indeed, it would be perverse if the right to access

courts faded away after a prisoner successfully got into court by filing a complaint

or petition. Once in court, a prisoner's need to access legal materials is just as

great—if not greater—than when a prisoner initially filed a complaint.” Id. at 922–

23. Thus, just because Wilson was able to file his complaint challenging his

conditions of confinement does not automatically establish, as Corrections

Defendants suggest, that Wilson had meaningful access to the courts. See Rivera, 37

F.4th at 915 (“it is ludicrous to hold that the right of access stops once the complaint

has been filed.”). Similarly, Corrections Defendants have cited no legal authority

for the proposition that Wilson’s failure to raise the issue of his destroyed legal

notes and other work product with the trial court forecloses his access to courts

claim as a matter of law.

Accordingly, Wilson has adequately stated an access to courts claim. He

alleges the legal materials he prepared, which included his trial exhibits, questions

for examining witnesses and his opening and closing statements, were intentionally

destroyed less than a month before trial and he was unable to receive a copy of the

trial exhibits until the day the trial started. ECF No. 36 at 2. He claims the

intentional destruction of his legal materials inhibited his ability to prepare for and

prosecute his civil rights claims and caused him to lose at trial. Id. At this stage, it

can reasonably be inferred that Wilson was prejudiced from the destruction of his

legal materials because he was not able to effectively present testimony or elicit

testimony from witnesses and access to those materials would have changed the

outcome of his trial. See e.g., Rivera, 37 F.4th at 915 (“We know of very few lawyers

who could litigate [a conditions of confinement] action without being able to refer to

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. A pro se

prisoner is much less likely to be able to do so.”).

Accordingly, Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in this

respect.

d. Personal Involvement and Supervisor Liability of Sec. Harry

Lastly, Corrections Defendants argue Wilson has failed to adequately allege

the personal involvement of Sec. Harry or any predicate supervisory liability

against him and therefore the claims against him must be dismissed. Because the

only claims Wilson asserts against Sec. Harry have been voluntarily dismissed

(municipal liability claim at Count IV), or have failed to state a claim and dismissed

with prejudice (equal protection claim at Count VI), this argument will not be

addressed and Sec. Harry is dismissed from this action.

V. Conclusion

Based on the above, Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in

part and denied in part. Corrections Defendants’ motion is granted with respect to

Wilson’s municipal liability claim (Count IV), “cruel and unusual punishment”

claim (Count V), and equal protection claim (Count VI) which are dismissed with

prejudice. No claims remain against Sec. Harry, therefore he is dismissed from this

action. Corrections Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects. The

following claims remain against Officer Gallaher, Cpt. Mooney and Lt. English only:

(1) A First Amendment retaliation and related conspiracy claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I);

(2) A First Amendment access to courts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count

II); and

(3) A conversion claim under Pennsylvania law for destroying Wilson’s

personal property (Count III).

An appropriate Order follows.

DATED this 25th day of November, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: KEVIN WILSON

KU3715

SCI HOUTZDALE

P.O. Box 1000

209 Institution Drive

Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000

Counsel of record via CM/ECF electronic filing