Villega

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Rebekah D. Villega,

Plaintiff,

No. 24 CV 3137

v.

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins

Chicago Public Media,

Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In April 2023, Rebekah Villega began working at Chicago Public Media

(“CPM”) as a Senior Benefits and Compliance Manager. After CPM placed her on a

performance improvement plan (“PIP”), she requested accommodations for post-

traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. Soon after that, CPM terminated Villega’s

employment.

Villega filed this lawsuit against CPM under the Americans with Disabilities

Act for disability discrimination and unlawful retaliation. [Dkt. 1.]1 Before the court

is CPM’s motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. 21.]2 Because Villega has presented

no evidence permitting a jury to find in her favor, the court grants the motion.

I. Local Rule 56.1 and Summary Judgment Proceedings

The court draws on the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements to summarize the

facts, which are undisputed except where otherwise noted. [Dkts. 31, 35.] “On

summary judgment, the court limits its analysis of the facts to the evidence that is

presented in the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements.” Kirsch v. Brightstar Corp., 78

F. Supp. 3d 676, 697 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Local Rule 56.1 requires the moving party to file

a statement of material facts with citations to specific supporting evidence in the

record. L.R. 56.1(a)(2); see also L.R. 56.1(d). The opposing party must then respond to

each fact by either admitting it or disputing it with its own supporting evidence. L.R.

56.1(b)(2); see also L.R. 56.1(e). The non-moving party may also file additional facts

supporting its position, L.R. 56.1(b)(3), subject to the same rules that governed the

moving party’s statement of facts. This means that it must cite “specific evidentiary

material, including the specific page number, that supports it.” L.R. 56.1(2).

1 Villega has withdrawn her claim for failure to accommodate. [Dkt. 25 at 3 n.1.]

2 Citations to docket filings generally refer to the electronic pagination provided by

CM/ECF, which may not be consistent with page numbers in the underlying documents.

Villega’s submissions only sometimes comply with these requirements. At

times, she fails to cite to evidence when disputing CPM’s facts. [Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 35, 51,

53–55.] Other times, she disputes an asserted fact “without concisely explaining how

the cited material controverts the asserted fact.” L.R. 56.1(e)(3). [Id., ¶¶ 14, 15.] Still

other times, she quarrels with plainly immaterial aspects of an asserted fact. [Id.,

¶¶ 17, 18.]

Some of Villega’s statements of additional facts are padded with multiple facts

in violation of L.R. 56.1(d)(1) (“statement of material facts … must consist of concise

numbered paragraphs.”) [Dkt. 31, ¶¶ 5, 14.] Other paragraphs lack relevance. [Dkt.

31, ¶¶ 6, 7, 9.] Though the court has discretion to require strict compliance with Local

Rule 56.1, see Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Found., 71 F.4th 601, 611 n.13

(7th Cir. 2023), it exercises its discretion not to do so here. While some of Villega’s

paragraphs are less concise and direct than contemplated by Local Rule 56.1(d), the

court was able to adequately discern what facts were being admitted and denied, and

it elects to resolve the motion on the merits rather than a technical violation of the

rules.

* * *

The court would be remiss if it did not note one troubling aspect of summary

judgment proceedings. Ruling on the motion required the court to sift through

portions of some depositions to determine whether facts were genuinely disputed or

material. In doing so, it observed a shocking lack of civility by counsel of record.

Lawyers on both sides exhibited unprofessional, unnecessarily quarrelsome and

discourteous behavior, both on the record and off. In just one example, counsel

repeatedly interrupted one another and the witness, arguing about trivial matters

and threatening several times to call the court to referee their disputes. [Dkt. 31-4 at

10–11, 12–13, 17–18.]

“Transcripts of depositions are often very ugly documents.” DF Activities Corp.

v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1988). This case was no exception. The court

expects civility in litigation, see Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926,

946 (7th Cir. 1997), for attorneys who “behave unprofessionally during depositions

make litigation harder on lawyers, parties, and courts.” Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown

Rowe & Maw LLP, 452 B.R. 676, 686 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 785 (7th Cir.

2013).

II. Background

The court recounts the facts in the light most favorable to Villega as the non-

moving party. See Frazier-Hill v. Chi. Transit Auth., 75 F.4th 797, 801 (7th Cir. 2023).

Villega began working for CPM in 2023 as a Senior Benefits and Compliance

Manager. [Dkt. 35, ¶ 5.] Her duties included overseeing CPM’s open enrollment

process and working with the finance and accounting team to execute payroll. [Id.,

¶¶ 3–4.]

Villega has PTSD and anxiety, which limit her ability to regulate her emotions,

communicate, think clearly and concentrate. [Dkt. 35, ¶ 8.] Villega maintains, and

CPM disputes, that during orientation, Villega disclosed to Human Resources

Representatives Stephanie Bassill and Amy Wielunski that she has PTSD. [Dkt. 31,

¶ 10.] It is undisputed that between April and August 2023, Villega did not request

any disability accommodations. [Dkt. 35, ¶ 9.]

Debra Chamra was Villega’s direct supervisor. [Dkt. 35, ¶ 6.] In August 2023,

Chamra raised concerns about Villega’s preparation for the open enrollment process

with CPM’s Chief People Person, Lori Malatesta. [Id., ¶¶ 14–18, 59.] According to

CPM, Villega had failed to perform several key job responsibilities related to matters

such as open enrollment, benefits presentations, and the like. [Id., ¶¶ 14–15.] CPM

says that on two occasions Villega failed to attend “critical” meetings; she failed to

sufficiently test certain open enrollment profiles; and she failed to send out benefit

information session invites to CPM employees without being prompted. [Id., ¶ 16.]

Villega generally disputes this, explaining that her overall work performance met

expectations and that any missteps were overstated or insignificant. According to

Villega, she did not fail to attend the critical meetings—she attended one meeting

and was late to the other but appropriately followed up; she did send out benefit

information session invites without being prompted; and she did complete “some

testing [] for open enrollment.” [Id., ¶¶ 14–16; Dkt. 27-1, at 3–4.]

On September 1, 2023, Villega met with Chamra to discuss performance. [Dkt.

35, ¶ 21.] A week later on September 7, Chamra placed Villega on a thirty-day PIP.

[Id., ¶ 28.] The PIP explained that “Villega needed to demonstrate improvement in

several areas, including leading the open enrollment process, maintaining and

staying in front of [responsibilities that] included compliance reporting, new hire on

boarding, HRIS, and state tax set-up.” [Id., ¶¶ 29–30.] Villega felt “able to perform

the tasks listed in the PIP and did not require additional time or some form of

accommodation in order to perform those tasks.” [Id., ¶ 33.]

It is undisputed that as of the time Villega was placed on the PIP, neither

Chamra nor Malatesta knew that Villega had a disability. [Dkt. 31, ¶ 18.]

One week into the PIP, on September 13, Villega submitted an accommodation

request with a letter from her psychiatric clinician, which explained that Villega

“struggles with significant symptoms of PTSD and anxiety” and recommended “extra

time if needed for projects and due dates and written requests that are specific and

indicate expectations.” [Dkt. 35, ¶ 35–38.] During her deposition, Malatesta

acknowledged that this documentation alerted her to Villega’s disability for the first

time. [Dkt. 31, ¶ 18.] A few days later, Kate Verrant, CPM’s Assistant General

Counsel, emailed Villega to acknowledge receipt of the request and to schedule a

meeting about appropriate accommodations. [Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 39–40.] At the same time,

Villega drafted an addendum to the PIP that did not mention PTSD or any other

disability, nor any accommodation request, [Id. ¶ 38.], though the record is unclear

as to who received this addendum. [See Dkt. 21-8 at 31–32.]

A key meeting took place on September 18, when Villega had her first (and

only) virtual check-in meeting with Chamra and Bassill as required by the PIP. [Dkt.

35, ¶ 41.] The parties disagree on exactly what was said, but according to Villega,

Chamra started the meeting by asking questions about the status of the items in the

PIP, and Villega was not given an opportunity to respond or speak. [Id., ¶ 43.] Villega

recalls that Chamra’s “voice became louder and she was noticeably aggravated,”

something that triggered Villega’s PTSD and later a panic attack. [Id., ¶¶ 43–44.]

CPM, for its part, maintains that Villega did not want to discuss the PIP or her

progress with action items, and instead focused on Chamra’s failure to communicate.

[Id.] All agree that Villega became upset, started crying, and abruptly disconnected

the meeting without explanation. [Id.; Dkt. 31, ¶ 19.]

The next day, Verrant and Villega met to discuss potential accommodations for

Villega. [Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 45–51, 60.] Later that same day, Malatesta, Chamra, and

Chamra’s supervisor met to discuss Villega’s employment. [Id., ¶¶ 53–54.] It is

undisputed that this meeting is when Chamra first learned of Villega’s disability and

her accommodation request. [Dkt. 31, ¶ 18.]3 After consulting with one another,

Chamra made the decision to terminate Villega, which was communicated to Villega

in writing on September 20. [Dkt. 35, ¶ 55; Dkt. 31, ¶ 21.] The letter explicitly

referenced the September 18 check-in meeting, explaining that Villega “refused to

discuss” her progress with tasks and that the check-in culminated in Villega

“abruptly leaving the meeting without explanation.” [Dkt. 21-11 at 1.] According to

the letter, “the employment relationship has frayed to the point where [Villega was]

no longer willing to engage in constructive conversation with [her] supervisor,” and

CPM “did not believe it would be constructive to complete the remainder of the [PIP].”

[Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 56–57; Dkt. 21-11 at 1.] This lawsuit followed.

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent

3 During her deposition, Villega testified that she shared her PTSD diagnosis during

her initial orientation and that “HR should have told [Chamra]” that first week. [Dkt. 21-4

at 25.] But this is pure speculation, and speculation cannot create a genuine issue of fact to

defeat summary judgment. Flowers v. Kia Motors Fin., 105 F.4th 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2024).

Bank, 27 F.4th 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 2022). The court construes the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving her the benefit of all reasonable

inferences. Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 (7th Cir. 2022).

Defeating summary judgment requires evidence, not mere speculation. See Weaver v.

Champion Petfoods USA Inc., 3 F.4th 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2021).

IV. Analysis

A. Disability Discrimination

Count I alleges disability discrimination, specifically that CPM unlawfully

terminated Villega’s employment in violation of the ADA, which prohibits employers

from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard

to … [the] discharge of employees … job training, and other terms, conditions, and

privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). [Dkt. 1.]

For a disability discrimination claim to succeed under the burden-shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Villega must

show that “(1) [she] is disabled; (2) [she] is otherwise qualified to perform the essential

functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action was caused by her disability.”

Kurtzhals v. Cnty. of Dunn, 969 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2020). The evidence must

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Villega’s disability was the but-

for cause of her termination. Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 440 (7th Cir. 2022);

Kurtzhals, 969 F.3d at 728.

There is no dispute that Villega is disabled and that her termination is an

adverse employment action. [See Dkt. 21-1 at 9.] CPM argues that Villega cannot

establish the second and fourth elements of her claim because she was terminated for

not meeting CPM’s legitimate expectations, not because of her disability. [Dkt. 21-1

at 9.] Villega, on the other hand, maintains that CPM’s legitimate expectations were

only pretext for discrimination.

“Where legitimate expectations and pretext overlap,” as is the case here, the

court “can be more efficient by addressing both together rather than first determining

whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination and then turning to pretext.”

Brooks, 39 F.4th at 435. Doing so is more in keeping with the holistic approach

established in Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).

Ultimately, “the only question that matters [is] when looking at the evidence as a

whole, whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that

the plaintiff’s [disability] caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.”

Brooks, 39 F.4th at 433 (quoting Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). Under Ortiz, the court looks

at the evidence in the aggregate to determine whether it allows an inference of

prohibited discrimination. Vichio v. US Foods, Inc., 88 F.4th 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2023).

CPM offers non-discriminatory reasons for Villega’s termination, including her

failure to comply with the PIP, and her refusal to discuss her performance progress,

which manifested in her decision to abruptly leave the September 18 check-in

meeting without explanation. [Dkt. 21-1 at 9.] This means that Villega’s

discrimination claim fails unless a reasonable jury could find that CPM’s reasons

were pretextual. Pretext is defined as a “dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an

oddity or an error.” Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2024);

Brooks, 39 F.4th 424, 435 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Pretext means more than a mistake on the

part of the employer; pretext means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some

action.”) Proving pretext requires a plaintiff to “identify such weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s asserted reasons

that a reasonable person could find it unworthy of credence.” Murphy v. Caterpillar

Inc., 140 F.4th 900, 914 (7th Cir. 2025) (internal citation omitted). In considering

whether an employer’s professed reasons were pretextual, the court does “not

evaluate whether the employer’s proffered justification was accurate or even whether

it was unfair.” Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020).

Instead, the “sole focus is on whether the employer’s stated reason can be

characterized as a falsehood rather than an honestly held belief.” Id.; See v. Ill.

Gaming Bd., 29 F.4th 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2022) (if an employer “honestly believed its

reasons for taking the challenged actions, even if those reasons were incorrect, then

the reasons were not pretextual.”)

Villega first points to deviation from standard practices, arguing that she was

prematurely “taken off of the PIP before she had even gotten halfway through it” and

terminated—even though she was timely completing many of the PIP’s goals and

there was good reason to believe she would complete the remaining goals successfully.

[Dkt. 25 at 14.] In support of her deviation argument, she points to Malatesta’s

deposition testimony, who explained that one goal of a PIP is for an employee to

continue employment, and that terminating an employee before the PIP’s due date

doesn’t happen often. [Dkt. 21-7 at 5 (Malatesta’s Dep. Tr. 14:3–14:11) (“Q.: That

doesn’t happen very often, though, correct? Normally you would allow them to finish

out the performance plan before making a decision as to whether they remain

employed, is that correct? [ … ] A.: Yes.”).]

An “employer’s divergence from its standard [employment] practices can

establish, or at least be evidence of, pretext and defeat summary judgment.” Barnes-

Staples v. Carnahan, 88 F.4th 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2023). For a policy deviation to be

probative of discrimination, though, courts typically look for some evidence linking

the policy departure to a discriminatory motive, such as proof that “an employer has

applied its policies differently between protected-class and non-protected-class

members.” Id. (collecting cases on selective policy enforcement); see also Cunningham

v. Austin, 125 F.4th 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2025) (deviation from policy not probative of

discrimination without evidence linking deviation to plaintiff’s protected status).

Here, even assuming that Malatesta’s testimony could establish deviation from a

standard practice of allowing employees to complete a PIP before deciding whether

to terminate, there is no evidence that any deviation here was motivated by Villega’s

disability. For instance, she submits no evidence suggesting that similarly situated

employees on a PIP who were not disabled were permitted to complete a PIP in its

entirety when Villega was not. Nor does she cite any evidence suggesting that CPM

generally treated non-protected-class members on PIPs more favorably than Villega

was treated. Barnes-Staples, 88 F.4th at 717. Of course, additional evidence could

strengthen the causal connection, but Villega has not come forward with any.

Next up is suspicious timing. [Dkt. 25 at 14–15.] According to Villega, the

timing of her termination is suspicious because the same day that Chamra learned of

Villega’s PTSD and request for accommodation—September 19—is the same day that

Chamra made the decision to fire Villega. This timing, Villega says, is even more

suspicious considering that Villega was terminated before being allowed to complete

the PIP even though she was on track to successfully complete it.

“Occasionally … an adverse action comes so close on the heels of a protected

act that an inference of causation is sensible.” Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC,

636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Clark County School District v. Breeden,

532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (“very close” temporal proximity can suffice); Casna v. Loves

Park, 574 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir. 2009). Suspicious timing alone, however, rarely

establishes causation, Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898

(7th Cir. 2015), “particularly when there are reasonable non-suspicious explanations

for the timing of the adverse employment action.” McCann vs. Badger Mining Corp.,

965 F.3d 578, 592 (7th Cir. 2020). Context is an important consideration in evaluating

whether suspicious timing warrants an inference of causality, and significant

intervening events can weigh against finding that timing was suspicious. See Davis

v. Time Warner Cable, 651 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2011); Coggins v. Medline Indus.,

Inc. 749 F.Supp.3d 960, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (in the two week period between when an

employer learned of employee’s disability and her termination, employee refused to

comply with a vaccination requirement, meaning that without additional

corroborating evidence, timing alone was not enough to survive summary judgment).

Here, it is true that the decision to terminate Villega occurred on the very day

that Chamra learned of Villega’s disability and request for an accommodation. And

it is also true that Villega was terminated before the natural expiration of the PIP.

But CPM points to interceding events, most notably Villega abruptly ending the

September 18 check-in meeting, to argue that an inference of suspicious timing can’t

be drawn. It notes that Chamra documented Villega’s performance and

communication concerns before Chamra was aware of Villega’s disability. It’s also

undisputed that Chamra was unaware of Villega’s disability or her request for an

accommodation when she placed Villega on the PIP, or as of the September 18 check-

in meeting. [Dkt. 31, ¶ 18; Dkt. 21-4, at 25–26.] At best, then, the close timing

constitutes a small amount of pretext—not enough to sustain Villega’s claim on its

own, but something to add to the pile. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766.

Finally, Villega argues that she has demonstrated pretext because nearly

every allegation by Chamra relating to Villega’s poor performance is genuinely

disputed. [Dkt. 25 at 15.] But nothing about Villega’s evidence calls into question the

sincerity of CPM’s decision to place her on a PIP and ultimately terminate her. “To

show pretext, a plaintiff must do more than simply allege that an employer’s stated

reasons are inaccurate; [she] must still have some circumstances to support an

inference that there was an improper motivation proscribed by law.” Tyburski v. City

of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2020); Monroe, 871 F.3d at 505 (“[T]he question

is not whether the employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether

the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the discharge.”)

Perhaps CPM was wrong in its assessment of Villega’s performance issues,

“but even then, error is not enough to show pretext.” Vassileva, 118 F.4th at 874.

Courts are not “super-personnel departments who sit in judgment of management

decisions.” Brooks, 39 F.4th at 436. The only question is whether CPM “honestly

believed it had a non-discriminatory reason for termination” Id. Villega’s evidence in

this regard, at best, shows that CPM made a mistake when it concluded her

performance was sufficiently unsatisfactory to terminate her, but that cannot show

but-for causation.

Even when viewed with the benefit of all inferences drawn in Villega’s favor,

and even considering all of her arguments together under Ortiz—suspicious timing

and deviation from standard practices—no reasonable juror could conclude that the

reasons offered for Villega’s termination are a mask for illegal discrimination, that

is, a sham to cover up discriminatory motives. Vassileva, 118 F.4th. at 874; Monroe

v. Ind. Dep’t of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2017).

B. Retaliation

To prevail on a claim of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1)

statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Bruno v. Wells-

Armstrong, 93 F.4th 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 2024). For Villega to have engaged in

protected activity under the ADA, she “must have asserted [her] rights under the

ADA by either seeking an accommodation or raising a claim of discrimination due to

[his] disability.” Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 856 n.6 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814—15 (7th Cir. 2015)).

Villega’s retaliation claim fails for the same reasons just discussed: she cannot

show a causal connection between her request for an accommodation and her

termination. She advances no new or different arguments in support of her retaliation

claim than those discussed above, so no reasonable jury could find that Chamra based

the termination decision on Villega’s request for an accommodation.

IV. Conclusion

The court grants Chicago Public Media’s motion for summary judgment.

Enter: 24-cv-3137 2S

Date: November 21, 2025

Lindsay C. Jenkins

United States District Court Judge