The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-1884T
Filed: November 25, 2025
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DARNELL R. CARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
ORDER
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action for a tax refund on November 3, 2025.
The complaint was docketed on November 5, 2025. The plaintiff also sought leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. On November 6, 2025, the motion to for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
was granted, but the plaintiff was also ordered to show cause by December 8, 2025, why the
complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because on its face the complaint
failed to allege the prerequisites to a claim for a tax refund. On November 24, 2025, the clerk
received from the plaintiff a motion to stay the response date pending resolution of a motion for
a writ of prohibition filed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on November 19, 2025.
In re Carter, No. 2026-110 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).
Before considering the merits of a plaintiff’s claims, a court must first determine that it
has jurisdiction to hear the case. Jurisdiction is a threshold matter that a court must resolve
before it addresses the merits of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-
95 (1998). A federal court has a responsibility to ensure that it has jurisdiction over any claims
asserted. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 916 F.3d 987, 992-93 (Fed. Cir.
2019). A court may dismiss a complaint on its own initiative if “the pleadings sufficiently
evince a basis” for the court to take that action. Anaheim Gardens v. United States, 444 F.3d
1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006). At this stage of the case, all the plaintiff’s nonfrivolous factual
allegations are assumed to be true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Trusted
Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and his complaint is given a more liberal construction
than it would be given if prepared by a lawyer. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972). Notwithstanding this liberal construction, a pro se plaintiff still bears the burden to
demonstrate that the complaint satisfies the jurisdictional limits on the Court of Federal Claims.
See Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). This burden
must be met by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of subject -matter
jurisdiction. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is established by the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), which provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
The Tucker Act itself does not “create[ ] a substantive right enforceable against the
Government by a claim for money damages.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003). Instead, the Tucker Act limits this court’s jurisdiction to causes of
action based on separate money-mandating statutes and regulations. Metz v. United States,
466 F.3d 991, 995-98 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Section 1346(a)(1) of 28 U.S.C. confers on the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction,
concurrent with the district courts, “[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery
of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected
without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected. . . .”
Jurisdiction to consider claims for tax refunds is limited by 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), which
provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected … until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary,
according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary
established in pursuance thereof.
To sue to recover a tax refund, a “taxpayer must comply with the tax refund scheme
established in the [Internal Revenue] Code.” United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co.,
553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008). For a court to have jurisdiction over a tax refund claim, the Code requires
that a claimant first “duly file” an administrative claim with the IRS for a refund. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7422(a); see United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602 (1990). The requirement that an
administrative claim be filed goes to jurisdiction; the adequacy of an administrative filing to
support a claim goes to whether a claim is meritorious. Dixon v. United States, 67 F.4th 1156,
1161 1008, 1011-12 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th 1008, 1011-12
(Fed. Cir. 2022)).
The applicable regulations require specify that for a claim to be “duly filed,” it “[m[ust
set forth in detail each ground upon which a . . . refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise
the [IRS] of the exact basis thereof. The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a
written declaration that it is made under penalties of perjury. A claim which does not comply
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with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund . . . .” 26 C.F.R.
§ 301.6402-2(b)(1); see Hall v. United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 371, 377 (Fed. Cl. 2020).
Compliance with this provision requires a party seeking a refund to provide the IRS with all
necessary documents, such as W-s and 1099 forms, necessary to allow the IRS to resolve the
claim. See Waltner v. United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The requirement for
specificity and documentation prevents frivolous claims. Id.
The order to show cause merely requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that jurisdiction
exists over his claim before the defendant is obligated to respond. The plaintiff’s reliance on the
Twombley/Iqbal standards is misplaced. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Under those cases, a complaint must only present a
plausible claim on the merits to avoid dismissal, but those cases do not address potential
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
A stay is not necessary. The plaintiff shall file a response to the order to show cause by
December 8, 2025. If he fails to do so, his complaint will be dismissed, and he may appeal
directly to the Court of Appeals from that final judgment and receive an adjudication on his
pending motion before the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, the motion for a stay pending resolution of the petition in the Court of
Appeals for a writ of prohibition is DENIED. The response to the order to show cause remains
due by December 8, 2025.
It is so ORDERED.
s/ Richard A. Hertling
Richard A. Hertling
Judge
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