“A state computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer is familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable.”
How later courts described this case
- “A state computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer is familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable.”
- “Once the officer smelled the marijuana, he had probable cause to search the vehicle.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 25-10678 Document: 90-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-10678 November 24, 2025
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Marcus L. Willis,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Diaz De Leon, Officer; Jeff Williams, Chief; City of
Bedford,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CV-778
______________________________
Before Stewart, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Plaintiff Marcus L. Willis was driving in Bedford, Texas when
Defendant Officer Diaz De Leon pulled him over. De Leon informed Willis
that he stopped him for driving without valid insurance. 1 De Leon then stated
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
1
An officer can “enter [a vehicle’s] license plate number into an ‘in-vehicle
computer’ database designed to return vehicle information such as insurance status.”
United States v. Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 2017). Driving without valid
Case: 25-10678 Document: 90-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/24/2025
No. 25-10678
he smelled marijuana and proceeded to search Willis’ vehicle. De Leon did
not find contraband, but he cited Willis for driving without insurance. Willis
filed a complaint with Defendant Police Chief Jeff Williams, reporting the
search and alleging unlawful racial profiling. Williams did not take Willis’
complaint seriously, mocked Willis, and did not investigate the incident.
Willis sued the City of Bedford, De Leon, and Williams (collectively,
“Appellees”). These included claims—under § 1983—for: (1) unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) racial
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, (3) a claim for failure to train and supervise against Williams,
and (4) a claim for failure to train and supervise against the City of Bedford.
He also asserted an intentional discrimination claim under Texas law.
Willis filed two amended complaints, and Appellees moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge
recommended granting the motion, and the district court adopted the
recommendation in full after reviewing Willis’ objections.
DISCUSSION
Willis challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims and also
asserts new arguments.
I. Willis raises three new arguments for the first time on appeal.
First, Willis argues that Appellees’ brief should have been stricken as
untimely under our Rule 31.1 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b).
Willis contends that Appellees did not show “excusable neglect” when they
failed to meet their deadline.
_____________________
insurance is a violation of Texas’ Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Tex. Transp.
Code Ann. §§ 601-.051, -.071, -.191 (West 1995).
2
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No. 25-10678
The record shows that Appellees did not file their brief according to
Rule 26. However, Appellees filed a motion to submit their brief out of time
and explained that they mistakenly assumed their deadline to file had been
paused until Willis filed a sufficient brief and record excerpts. Extensions of
time are permitted “for good cause,” and this court granted Appellees’
motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(b).
Second, Willis argues that he was “denied equal access to judicial
review due to Clerk misconduct and procedural manipulation.” Willis states
the Clerk’s office mislabeled his filings, made other filing irregularities, and
refused to correct its errors.
It is not clear which filing Willis is referring to, since his filings do not
appear to be mislabeled. In any case, plaintiffs may not raise new claims for
the first time on appeal. Petty v. Kelly, 73 F. App’x 79 (5th Cir. 2003);
Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). If Willis
has a claim he would like to assert, it needs to be properly presented to a
district court in the first instance.
Third, Willis claims that the court’s procedural conduct has “created
a constitutional infirmity undermining Appellant’s due process rights.”
As noted, this court does not review new claims presented for the first
time on appeal. If Willis has a novel due process claim to assert, he must allow
a district court to consider it in the first instance.
II. Willis also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 and
Texas law claims.
Willis questions whether the district court erred by granting dismissal
and claims he should have been allowed discovery. Willis asks the court to
vacate the judgment and remand on his Monell claim, as municipalities can
be liable for misconduct based on policy or practice and not just individual
3
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No. 25-10678
conduct. Collectively, he asserts his allegations were sufficient to survive the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss. E.g., Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2023). We start
with Willis’ § 1983 claim against De Leon for a Fourth Amendment violation
for unreasonable search and seizure. Willis’ second amended complaint
alleged that he “was stopped for allegedly driving without valid insurance,”
and De Leon “then accused Plaintiff of possessing marijuana and proceeded
to search Plaintiff’s vehicle without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”
The district court found that De Leon had qualified immunity, and we
agree. In resolving a qualified immunity claim, courts must “decide whether
the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional
right,” and determine whether the “right at issue was clearly established.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citations omitted).
Willis failed to sufficiently allege facts that amount to a constitutional
violation. He was stopped due to a Texas state law violation, so the stop was
justified at its inception. See United States v. Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675,
680 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A state computer database indication of insurance
status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer is familiar with the
database and the system itself is reliable.”). From there, De Leon developed
probable cause to search Willis’ car. United States v. Henke, 775 F.2d 641, 645
(5th Cir. 1985) (“Once the officer smelled the marijuana, he had probable
cause to search the vehicle.”). The stop and search did not violate Willis’
constitutional rights.
Willis also asserted a racial discrimination claim in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. He alleged that “De Leon’s actions were racially
motivated, violating [his] rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
4
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No. 25-10678
Fourteenth Amendment.” This amounts to a conclusory claim of racial
discrimination. See McKnight v. Eason, 227 F. App’x 356, 356 (5th Cir. 2007).
He has therefore failed to assert a cognizable equal protection claim. See id.
Regarding Willis’ Monell claims, “municipal liability under section
1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a
violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
custom.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). As
discussed, Willis was unable to allege a violation of his constitutional rights.
Without a constitutional violation, Willis’ Monell claims fail, and they were
properly dismissed.
Willis also brought a claim against Appellees for intentional
discrimination under Texas law, stating that “[t]he Texas Tort Claims Act
(TTCA) does not bar claims based on civil rights violations.” While the
TTCA “creates a limited waiver of sovereign immunity,” it “does not apply
to claims arising out of an intentional tort.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571
F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2009). This claim was properly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
5