The opinion
Filed 11/21/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
GURDEEP DEOL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. A172274
CALIFORNIA VETERINARY
MEDICAL BOARD, (Riverside County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. CVPS2402058)
After an administrative hearing, the California Veterinary Medical
Board (Board) revoked Gurdeep Deol’s veterinary license based on findings of
negligence, incompetence, and unprofessional conduct. He petitioned the
trial court for a writ of administrative mandate to compel the Board to set
aside its decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The court granted the petition
as to the unprofessional conduct charge but denied it as to the other two
charges. Both parties appealed. We reverse the judgment with respect to the
unprofessional conduct charge, concluding Business and Professions Code
section 4883, subdivision (g) (section 4883(g)) concerns more than just
substance abuse. (Undesignated statutory references are to this code.)
We otherwise affirm. 1
1 The California Supreme Court transferred this matter from the
Fourth Appellate District to this court on January 15, 2025.
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BACKGROUND
In April 2018, Zoe — an eight-year-old cocker spaniel — arrived to
Deol’s veterinary practice for a routine wellness exam, which included blood
work and administration of the DA2PP and Bordetella vaccines. Deol
administered the vaccines despite learning that Zoe had a fever of 103.4
degrees Fahrenheit; he did not inform her owners — who were present —
about the fever or that administering vaccines to a febrile dog could cause
serious disease and death. Zoe’s health rapidly deteriorated over the next
few days. Her owners returned after she became unresponsive and began
urinating blood. Deol did more blood work, which revealed that vital blood
markers had dropped to life-threatening levels. He did not tell Zoe’s owners
about the seriousness of her condition or recommend blood transfusions. She
died within 24 hours.
In May 2018, Zoe’s owners filed a complaint with the Board. In
September 2019, Dr. Beth Parvin reviewed the complaint. She determined
Deol departed from the standard of care by failing to communicate Zoe’s
condition to her owners and by failing to refer her to a veterinarian who could
care for her, and Parvin further determined that his failure demonstrated
insufficient knowledge. Although she found the administration of the
vaccines did not depart from the standard of care, she did not know that Zoe
had a fever.
In November 2022, the Board initiated disciplinary proceedings,
accusing Deol of negligence, incompetence, and unprofessional conduct. It
alleged that administering vaccines to Zoe while she was febrile — and his
treatment of her when she returned — constituted negligence. It also alleged
his failure to appreciate the severity and urgency of her condition and
appropriately treat it constituted incompetence, and his failure to inform
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Zoe’s owners of her prognosis constituted unprofessional conduct. Moreover,
it noted it had previously disciplined him for the death of another animal,
which also resulted from his failure to identify, treat, and appreciate the
seriousness of a life-threatening condition and to communicate that condition
to the animal’s owners. Deol filed a notice of defense.
An administrative hearing took place in November 2023. One expert —
Dr. James Howard — testified. He based his opinions on his 40 years of
veterinary experience, his education, and data derived from textbooks,
publications, and scientific articles that existed at the time of the incident.
He defined the standard of care as “what a similar practitioner in a similar
position” would do “when faced with a similar case.” He also noted he had
personally been under similar circumstances on numerous occasions. The
administrative law judge also admitted Parvin’s report into evidence.
Howard opined that Deol violated the standard of care. He opined it is
“well outside . . . the . . . standard of practice to administer vaccines to a
febrile animal” and explained why. He also opined “it was below the
standard of care to have not offered” a blood transfusion as a treatment after
Zoe’s blood markers dropped so low, “that the average practicing general
practitioner would have made the call to recommend transfusion therapy to
stabilize this patient,” and that the failure to do so constituted negligence and
incompetence. Finally, he opined that failing to provide a transfusion
violated a basic rule of veterinary medicine — designed to stabilize patients
whose blood markers fell to life-threatening levels regardless of the cause —
and “the average veterinarian” would have followed it.
In December 2023, the administrative law judge found clear and
convincing evidence of negligence, incompetence, and unprofessional conduct,
and her proposed decision determined Deol’s license should be revoked. In
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January 2024, the Board adopted the proposed decision, and it subsequently
denied Deol’s petition for reconsideration.
In March 2024, Deol filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate
in the trial court. He argued the Board imposed discipline without cause,
that essential elements of the violations were not supported by clear and
convincing proof, and the discipline imposed constituted an abuse of
discretion. For the first time, he argued that only evidence of substance
abuse could support the unprofessional conduct charge.
The trial court denied the petition with respect to the negligence and
incompetence charges, but it granted the writ as to the unprofessional
conduct charge. In doing so, the court concluded it could consider Deol’s new
statutory interpretation argument. It also concluded that section 4883(g) —
the provision concerning unprofessional conduct — only refers to substance
abuse so Deol’s failure to communicate could not be a basis for discipline
under that subdivision. But the court concluded that clear and convincing
evidence otherwise supported the administrative law judge’s findings of
negligence and incompetence.
DISCUSSION
We address the Board’s and Deol’s appeals in turn and begin with the
Board’s appeal.
I.
At the outset, the Board contends Deol forfeited his argument that
section 4883(g) only encompasses substance abuse by failing to raise it in the
administrative hearing and instead raising it for the first time in his writ
petition. We disagree.
Ordinarily, “a litigant must raise all issues before an administrative
agency in order to raise them on writ review.” (Richman v. Santa Monica
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Rent Control Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) But there are instances
when a reviewing court will exercise its discretion to consider an issue not
previously raised, “including when the issue relates to a question of law
only.” (Air Machine Com SRL v. Superior Court (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 414,
421, fn. 7.) Because the interpretation of section 4883(g) involves a question
of law — and the facts are not in dispute — the trial court validly exercised
its discretion to consider the issue, and we do so as well. (Air Machine, at
p. 421, fn. 7.)
The Board next argues that section 4883(g) applies to more than just
substance abuse. On this point, we agree.
“When construing a statute, we determine the Legislature’s intent and
effectuate the law’s purpose by examining the statutory language, giving the
words their plain and ordinary meaning.” (De Martini v. Superior Court
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1269, 1275 (De Martini).) “If the statutory text is
unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” (Ibid.) “But if the language
‘supports more than one reasonable construction,’ ‘we may look to extrinsic
aids,’ such as the legislative history.” (Ibid.) We “independently review legal
issues, such as those involving statutory interpretation.” (Id. at p. 1274.)
Section 4883 provides that the “board may deny, revoke, or suspend a
license or registration or assess a fine . . . for any of the following[.]” One
basis for discipline is “[u]nprofessional conduct, that includes, but is not
limited to, the following: [¶] (1) Conviction of a charge of violating any federal
statutes or rules or any statute or rule of this state regulating dangerous
drugs or controlled substances. . . . [¶] (2)(A) The use of, or prescribing for or
administering to oneself, any controlled substance. [¶] (B) The use of any of
the dangerous drugs specified in Section 4022, or of alcoholic beverages to the
extent, or in any manner as to be dangerous or injurious to a person licensed
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or registered under this chapter, or to any other person or to the public, or to
the extent that the use impairs the ability of the person so licensed or
registered to conduct with safety the practice authorized by the license or
registration. [¶] (C) The conviction of more than one misdemeanor or any
felony involving the use, consumption, or self-administration of any of the
substances referred to in this section or any combination thereof . . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] (3) A violation of any federal statute, rule, or regulation or any of
the statutes, rules, or regulations of this state regulating dangerous drugs or
controlled substances.” (§ 4883(g).)
Generally, unprofessional conduct is understood to refer to “conduct
which breaches the rules or ethical code of a profession, or conduct which is
unbecoming a member in good standing of a profession.” (Shea v. Board of
Medical Examiners (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 564, 575, fn. omitted.) Although
section 4883(g) includes several examples of substance abuse as illustrations
of unprofessional conduct, other language suggests an intent to sweep more
broadly. The statute provides “[u]nprofessional conduct . . . includes, but is
not limited to,” and then it provides the examples of substance abuse.
(§ 4883(g), italics added.) The phrase “ ‘ “including, but not limited to” ’ ” is
generally a phrase of enlargement. (Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025)
18 Cal.5th 33, 43.)
In arguing to the contrary, Deol relies on the interpretive canon of
ejusdem generis, “meaning ‘ “ ‘ “of the same kind.” ’ ” ’ ” (Brown v. City of
Inglewood, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 43.) The canon applies when “ ‘ “ ‘specific
words follow general words in a statute,’ ” ’ ” and it “instructs that ‘ “ ‘the
general term or category is “restricted to those things that are similar to
those which are enumerated specifically.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.; Medtronic USA, Inc. v.
California Dept. of Tax & Fee Admin. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 817, 824
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[doctrine not an “ ‘ “immutable” ’ ” rule but is a “ ‘ “guideline[] subject to
exceptions” ’ ”].) Deol argues section 4883(g)’s listing of substance abuse
examples — in contrast to statutes regulating unprofessional conduct in
other professions — demonstrates that the Legislature intended to restrict
the meaning of unprofessional conduct to substance abuse. Assuming there
are multiple plausible interpretations, we turn to extrinsic aids to discern the
Legislature’s intent. 2 (De Martini, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1275.)
Our review of the legislative history supports the Board’s
interpretation. (De Martini, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1277.) Section 4883
was added to the Business and Professions Code in 1978 by Senate Bill
No. 1795. The bill “represent[ed] a dramatic strengthening and expansion of
the tools available to the Board to carry out its legislative mandate,” and the
“grounds for [discipline] [were] redrafted so as to be clearer, more responsive
to the modern day practice of veterinary medicine, in order to allow the Board
to more effectively regulate the practice.” (Dept. Consumer Affairs, Enrolled
Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1795 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 20, 1978, p. 4.)
Among the changes, the bill included “new disciplinary violations” for
“unprofessional conduct,” and “disciplinary action for ‘unprofessional conduct’
would be more closely related to issues involved in the practice of veterinary
medicine and specifically the care and treatment of animals than the
language which it replaces. One instance of unprofessional conduct will be
misuse of drugs.” (Dept. Consumer Affairs, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1795
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) July 6, 1978, pp. 1, 3, italics added.) We can find
nothing in the legislative history — and Deol fails to address the legislative
2 We grant the Board’s unopposed request to take judicial notice filed
February 21, 2025. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (b), (c), 459.)
7
history in his briefing — indicating the Legislature intended that only
substance abuse would constitute unprofessional conduct. 3
Given the protective purpose of section 4883, its legislative history, and
use of the phrase “includes, but is not limited to,” we conclude section 4883(g)
empowers the Board to impose discipline for more than just substance abuse.
(§ 4800.1 [protecting public is paramount purpose]; Pineda v. Williams-
Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 532 [protective statutes liberally
construed in favor of their purpose]; Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners,
supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575.)
II.
In his appeal, Deol first argues that Howard’s testimony did not
establish a recognized standard of care because he did not provide evidence of
“the manner in which practicing veterinarians actually do or do not handle
comparable cases.” (Capitalizations omitted.) We disagree.
“To establish a veterinarian malpractice claim, a plaintiff is required to
present expert testimony establishing the appropriate standard of care in the
relevant community.” (Quigley v. McClellan (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1276,
1283 (Quigley).) “ ‘Standard of care “ ‘is a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and
3 The Board notes that it has historically interpreted section 4883(g) to
include conduct beyond substance abuse. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 2032.35
[unprofessional conduct includes “[a]ltering or modifying the medical record
of any animal, with fraudulent intent, or creating any false medical record,
with fraudulent intent”], 2038(d)(2) [a veterinarian who authorizes a
chiropractor to perform musculoskeletal manipulation upon an animal in
violation of a regulation has engaged in unprofessional conduct].) While we
need not rely on these regulations, we acknowledge “courts show deference to
an administrative body’s reasonable construction of relevant statutory
provisions within its field of expertise.” (Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 710, 717.)
8
can only be proved by their testimony.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “This is because ‘ “[t]he
standard of care in a [veterinarian] malpractice case requires th[e]
[veterinarian] exercise in diagnosis and treatment that reasonable degree of
skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of
the [veterinary] profession under similar circumstances.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “In order
to establish what that degree of skill, knowledge and care is, there must be
expert testimony explaining how the average veterinarian of ordinary skill
and knowledge from the relevant community would have treated the case
under similar circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1285.)
Howard’s testimony established the standard of care. (Quigley, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1283, 1285.) He defined the standard of care as “what
a similar practitioner in a similar position” would do “when faced with a
similar case.” He based his opinion on his 40 years of veterinary experience,
his education, and further data derived from textbooks, publications, and
scientific articles that existed at the time of the incident. (Evid. Code, § 801
[an expert may properly base testimony on their own “special knowledge,
skill, experience, training, and education”].) He also noted that he had
personally been under similar circumstances on numerous occasions. (Ibid.)
Moreover, Howard compared Deol to an average veterinarian, not to —
as Deol contends — himself or the ideal veterinarian. (Compare with
Quigley, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1284–1286; Spann v. Irwin Memorial
Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 655.) For example, Howard opined
it is “well outside . . . the . . . standard of practice to administer vaccines to a
febrile animal.” He also opined “it was below the standard of care to have not
offered” a “blood transfusion” as a “treatment,” “that the average practicing
general practitioner would have made the call to recommend transfusion
therapy to stabilize this patient,” and that the failure to do so violated a basic
9
rule of veterinary medicine that “the average veterinarian” would have
followed. Indeed, Deol admits that to “deviate from a professional standard
of care, the defendant/respondent must have done something that the
average veterinarian of ordinary knowledge and skill would never do in that
situation, or . . . failed to do something that every qualified member of the
profession would typically do.” That is exactly what Howard’s testimony
established.
Next, Deol argues that Howard’s testimony did not constitute clear and
convincing evidence that Deol was negligent, and the trial court erred in
denying his petition as to the negligence charge. 4 We disagree.
Howard’s testimony constituted clear and convincing evidence of Deol’s
negligence. To begin, Deol contends there were conflicting expert reports as
to whether administering vaccines to a febrile dog fell below the standard of
care. He misrepresents the record. Parvin — who was unaware of Zoe’s
fever — did not consider whether administering vaccines to a febrile dog fell
below the standard of care. Her report therefore had no evidentiary value on
that issue. (Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 146, 155.) Next, Deol again contends that Howard relied
entirely on “professional preferences, imposing an aspirational community
standard rather than . . . an existing one.” That also misrepresents the
record. As explained above, Howard’s testimony established a “standard of
practice” for the “average practicing general practitioner” based on his
4 While the parties agree we review the trial court’s findings for
substantial evidence, Deol contends we must find substantial evidence to
satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof. The Board disagrees. We
need not resolve the issue because, under any standard, sufficient evidence
supports the findings.
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extensive knowledge. (Evid. Code, § 801; Quigley, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1283, 1285.)
Lastly, Deol contends Howard’s testimony did not constitute clear and
convincing evidence of incompetence because — in Deol’s view — the finding
was based on one incident that Howard never described as incompetent and
on Deol’s failure to communicate rather than his knowledge base. He thus
argues the trial court erred by denying his petition with respect to the
incompetence charge. We disagree.
The incompetence finding is supported by case law and clear and
convincing evidence. (Kearl v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1986)
189 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1055–1056.) A “ ‘single act of misconduct under certain
circumstances may be sufficient to reveal a general lack of ability to perform
the licensed duties, thereby supporting a finding of incompetency . . . .’ ”
(Ibid., italics omitted.) Here, like in Kearl, “there were several acts or
decisions” in this one incident “which were improper.” (Id. at p. 1056.) As to
the evidence, Deol misrepresents the record. Contrary to his assertions,
Howard testified that failing to recommend a blood transfusion was
incompetent, and the administrative law judge based her incompetence
finding on his failure to see the need for a blood transfusion. Moreover,
Parvin also determined Deol lacked knowledge concerning the need for blood
transfusions, and the Board noted this was the second time an animal died
because he failed to identify, treat, and appreciate the seriousness of a life-
threatening condition.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is reversed as to the Board’s unprofessional
conduct charge but otherwise affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court with instructions to deny Deol’s petition for writ of administrative
mandate in full. The Board shall recover its costs on appeal.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A172274; Deol v. California Veterinary Medical Board
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Superior Court of Riverside County, Hon. Kira L. Klatchko
George M. Wallace, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Assistant Attorney General,
Marichelle S. Tahimic and Lauro A Paredes, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Defendant and Appellant.
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