Patterson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

JUCIRLEY ALVES DE ANDRADE CIVIL DOCKET NO. 6:25-cv-01695

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

BRYAN PATTERSON, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.

WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (the “Petition”)

filed by the Petitioner, Jucirley Alves de Andrade (hereinafter, “Petitioner”). [Doc. 1].

A MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER was filed by Petitioner on the same

day. [Doc. 2]. Respondents Bryan Patterson, Todd Lyons, and Pamela Bondi

(collectively, “Respondents”) filed a Response on November 12, 2025, [Doc. 7], to

which Petitioner filed a Reply on November 19, 2025, [Doc. 8]. For the following

reasons, the Petition is DENIED and DISMISSED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a Brazilian native who illegally entered the United States at an

unknown location in Arizona on or about May 10, 2021, without being inspected by

an immigration officer. [Doc. 1, ¶ 22]; see also [Doc. 7, p. 8]. He was not admitted or

paroled following entry.

The Petitioner does not provide any explanation for his whereabouts between

May 10, 2021, and the present, aside from confirming that he entered from Mexico

and was taken into custody on September 12, 2025, in Massachusetts. At the time of

his arrest, Petitioner was without a valid passport or any documentation authorizing

his presence in the United States. [Doc. 7, pp. 8-9]. He was charged with violations

of § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). [Doc. 7-1].

Petitioner was subsequently placed in removal proceedings under INA Section

240, with a hearing scheduled for October 16, 2025. However, the hearing was

continued to allow Petitioner time to retain counsel, and his next master calendar

hearing was set for November 12, 2025. As of now, Petitioner remains in removal

proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). [Doc. 7, p. 9].

Petitioner, Mr. Alves de Andrade, argues that his current detention by ICE is

unlawful because the government is improperly classifying him as an “applicant for

admission” detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), a statute that does not allow for release

on bond. He contends that because he was arrested inside the United States—after

having lived, worked and established a home here for several years—his detention is

governed instead by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for the possibility of release on

bond pending removal proceedings. See generally [Doc. 1].

Petitioner asserts that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Immigration

Court are refusing to provide him with the required bond hearing based on the Board

of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) new decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado (2025),

which classifies individuals like him as § 1225(b) detainees. He argues that this

policy contradicts longstanding statutory practice, has been rejected by multiple

federal courts, and unlawfully deprives him of his statutory right to a bond hearing.

[Id.]

Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondents’ denial of a bond hearing

violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He emphasizes his strong

liberty interests, the severe hardship caused to his family, and the high risk of

erroneous detention when no individualized custody assessment is provided. He

asserts that due process requires a bond hearing at which the government would bear

the burden of continued detention. [Id.]

At bottom, Petitioner seeks an order compelling DOJ to provide him an

individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a), at which ICE would be required to

justify his detention by clear and convincing evidence. [Id.] Respondents counter

that Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is consistent with the

plain statutory language and does not deprive Petitioner of due process. See generally

[Doc. 7].

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

A. Writ of Habeas Corpus

“[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every

individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525

(2004) (citing U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). Under § 2241, the writ is extended inter

alia to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2241 as

granting district courts with jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus challenges to the

legality of the detention of aliens. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). Here,

Petitioner alleges that he is being held in violation of the statutory scheme set forth

in portions of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. See [Doc. 1, ¶¶ 32, 33].

Thus, this Court possesses habeas jurisdiction because Petitioner claims he is being

detained “in violation of the … laws … of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

B. The INA’s Jurisdiction-Stripping Provisions

Clearly having general habeas jurisdiction over aliens, the Court next turns to

Respondents’ contention that this Court nonetheless lacks jurisdiction over the

claims asserted in the Petition because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g) operate to

strip this Court of jurisdiction. [Doc. 7, pp. 29–32]. Petitioner disagrees with the

Respondents’ claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(9) and argues that neither provision applies to claims challenging detention

without bond. See generally [Doc. 8]. However, because the Court determines that

the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief under the facts presented, the Court

declines to determine the applicability of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the

INA cited by the Respondents.

II. Classification Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226

As stated above, Petitioner’s primary argument challenges the applicability of

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to his case. Instead, he contends that his removal proceedings

should be categorized as occurring pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, under which a

detainee may be eligible for a bond hearing. See generally [Doc. 1]. Relying on broad

language included in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), Petitioner asserts

that § 1225 only applies to aliens who are “seeking entry,” such as aliens who are

crossing or have just recently crossed the border, or aliens who petition for admission

at a port of entry. [Doc. 1, ¶ 15]. Petitioner further contends that § 1226 applies to

aliens who enter without inspection and have resided in the country’s interior for an

extended period. [Id., ¶¶ 16, 17]. Conversely, Respondents maintain that under a

plain reading of the relevant statutes, § 1225 is a narrower statute applying to all

aliens who are “applicants for admission,” while § 1226 is a broader statute

potentially applicable to any alien. [Doc. 7, pp. 10–14]. With this background—and

given the relative complexity of the subject matter—the Court will engage in a

thorough analysis of the plain language and statutory schemes of the relevant

provisions of §§ 1225 and 1226 to address Petitioner’s claims.

When engaging in statutory interpretation, “[w]e begin, as always, with the

text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 391 (2017). And “[i]f the statutory

language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.” King v. Burwell, 576

U.S. 473, 486 (2015).

A. Section 1225: A Provision Applicable to all “Applicants for

Admission”

Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of aliens seeking

admission into the United States. Among other things, it provides detailed

procedures for handling “applicants for admission,” such as an expedited removal

process and the processing of asylum claims. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)–(B).

Important here, § 1225 also has specific detention requirements for “an alien who is

an applicant for admission.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, to determine the

legality of Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2), the Court must first determine

whether Petitioner is properly classified under the statute as an “applicant for

admission.”

1. Section 1225(a): Defining “Applicants for Admission”

Section 1225(a) defines applicants for admission: “[a]n alien present in the

United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States … shall

be deemed … an applicant for admission.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). The

“or” in the statute is disjunctive, and thus indicates that there are two types of aliens

who are treated as “applicants for admission:” (1) those who have not been admitted,

and (2) those who arrive in the United States.

An alien who is a statutorily defined “applicant for admission” may be either

inadmissible or not inadmissible. Applicants for admission are not per se

inadmissible if they arrive at a port of entry and present themselves for inspection.

See id. § 1225(a)(1). Conversely, an alien may be an “applicant for admission” who is

also inadmissible by: (1) being present in the United States without having been

admitted or paroled; or (2) arriving at a time or place not designated by the Attorney

General. See id.; see also id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An “applicant for admission” may also

be inadmissible if they do not possess “a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry

permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document” “at the

time of application for admission.” Id. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I); see also id. § 1225(a)(1).

Thus, under the plain text of § 1225(a)(1), any alien physically present in the

United States who has not been admitted is an “applicant for admission,” regardless

of how long they have been in the country or whether they ever intended to apply or

enter properly.

2. Section 1225(b): Detention of Applicants for Admission

Although the length of an alien’s presence in the United States is not

determinative of whether they are an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a)(1), it

does affect the course of an applicant’s removal proceedings. More specifically,

applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1)

and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.

Section 1225(b)(1) “applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due

to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” and “certain other aliens

designated by the Attorney General.” Id. An alien is a “certain other alien” for

§ 1225(b)(1) purposes if they have “not been admitted or paroled into the United

States and … [have] not affirmatively shown …” that they have “been physically

present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to

the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).

Section 1225(b)(2) “is broader” and applies to all “other aliens” who are not

included under § 1225(b)(1) but are nevertheless defined as “applicant[s] for

admission” under § 1225(a). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In

other words, § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants

for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here).”

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), (B)).

Aliens who are subject to removal under § 1225(b)(1) are to be “removed from

the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either

an intention to apply for asylum … or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). These removal proceedings are considered “expedited removal”

proceedings because the alien is to be removed “without further hearing or review.”

Id. However, aliens subject to removal under § 1225(b)(2) are not subject to expedited

removal but, rather, removal proceedings in the ordinary course pursuant to § 1229a.

But, important here, the statute mandates that they nonetheless “shall be detained”

for the pendency of their removal proceedings. See id. § 1225(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Thus, an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is subject to mandatory

detention regardless of whether they are being processed for removal under the

expedited procedure set forth in § 1225(b)(1) or under the “standard” § 1229a removal

proceedings called for in 1225(b)(2). Both mandate detention throughout the

pendency of the removal proceedings.1 Id. § 1225(b)(1)–(2). Put differently, both

sections require mandatory detention until the conclusion of the inspection process—

whether it is through expedited removal or the conclusion of § 1229a removal

proceedings.

B. Section 1226: A Catchall Provision for All Aliens

“Even once inside the United States, aliens do not have an absolute right to be

here.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. “[A]liens who were inadmissible at the time of

entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since admission” are

subject to possible removal under § 1226. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(2)).

1 Under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), the alien “shall be detained pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found to have no such fear, until

removed.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (emphasis added). And under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “the alien

shall be detained for a proceeding under [§] 1229a.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

Thus, both § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate the detention of applicants for admission.

Section 1226 therefore operates as a catchall provision that “generally governs the

process of arresting and detaining … aliens pending their removal.” Id.

The statutory text of § 1226 bears out that purpose. “On a warrant … by the

Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on

whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see

also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Under federal regulations, aliens detained under

§ 1226(a) may be afforded bond hearings at the outset of their detention.2 8 C.F.R.

§§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. Thus, § 1226(a)

operates as a catchall provision for all aliens, including those who enter lawfully but

later become inadmissible.

C. Petitioner is Subject to § 1225(b) Detention as an “Applicant for

Admission,” and the Application of § 1225(b) to Petitioner Does

Not Render § 1226(a) Superfluous

Here, considering the information presented to the Court, Petitioner has been

properly classified as an “applicant for admission.” Again, an “applicant for

admission” is broadly defined by statute as “[a]n alien present in the United States

who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Petitioner does not argue that he

has been admitted, and Petitioner’s “Notice to Appear” charges him with removability

under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). See generally [Doc. 1]; [Doc. 7-1]; [Doc. 8-1]. Because Petitioner

2 “Section 1226(c) … carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released

under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis in original). This Section prohibits

the release of aliens who have committed certain criminal acts or acts of terror. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c). There are exceptions to § 1226(c)’s prohibition on releasing certain criminal aliens,

such as for witness protection purposes, that are not relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(4).

However, Respondents do not aver that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c).

entered the United States at an unknown location in Arizona, without being

inspected by an immigration officer, he is therefore also appropriately categorized as

an inadmissible alien under § 1182.3 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), (a)(7)(A)(i)(I);

[Doc. 7]. The Court therefore concludes that § 1225(b)(2)’s plain language and the

“all applicants for admission” language of Jennings permits DHS to detain Petitioner

under § 1225(b)(2). See Jennings, 283 U.S. at 287 (“[Section 1225(b)(2)] serves as a

catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by §

1225(b)(1).…”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (defining an “applicant for admission”

as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.…”).

Nor does this interpretation render § 1226(a) superfluous. Of course, it is clear

from the plain text of the INA that there is substantial potential overlap between §

1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2). This notwithstanding, there are categories of aliens to

whom § 1226(a) is applicable, but not § 1225(b)(2). One example is the Petitioner in

Jennings, Alejandro Rodriguez. Rodriguez was a Mexican citizen who had been a

lawful permanent resident since 1987. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Rodriguez was

convicted of a drug offense in 2004, and the Government detained him under § 1226

and sought his removal. Id. at 289–90. Rodriguez was not an inadmissible alien nor

an “applicant for admission;” rather, he was an admitted alien. Thus, Rodriguez’s

3 As noted above, under § 1182 an alien is inadmissible if they are “present in the

United States without being admitted or paroled, or [] arrive[] in the United States at any

time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

An “applicant for admission” may also be inadmissible if they do not possess “a valid

unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid

entry document” “at the time of application for admission.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

case discussed in Jennings is a paradigmatic example of an admitted alien who is not

an “applicant for admission” but who subsequently became subject to removal under

§ 1226(a).

Decisions from other district courts throughout the United States, including

ones in this district, have rejected Respondents’ argument and found that aliens like

Petitioner are subject to detention under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b).4 Although not

binding upon this Court, this Court will briefly discuss why this Court’s analysis

differs from that of other courts.

First, many of these cases rest upon the premise that §§ 1225 and 1226 are

mutually exclusive relying on broad language in Jennings. But in Jennings, the

Supreme Court did not state that § 1225(b) applies only to aliens seeking entry into

the United States; instead, the Jennings Court stated that Ҥ 1225(b) applies

primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” 583 U.S. at 297 (emphasis

added); see also Vargas Lopez, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 n.5 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025).

Thus, the Jennings Court did not restrict the application of § 1225(b) only to aliens

who are seeking entry into the United States or aliens who are near the border.

Under the plain statutory language of § 1225(a)(1) that defines “applicants for

4 See e.g., Ventura Martinez v. Trump, 3-25-cv-01445 (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2025); Kostak

v. Trump, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Lopez Santos v. Noem, 2025 WL

2642278 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Sept.

22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Lopez-Campos v.

Raycroft, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL

2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2025); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct.

1, 2025); Garcia Jimenez v. Kramer, 2025 WL 2374223 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025); Arrazola-

Guzman v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); but see, e.g., Vargas Lopez

v. Trump, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 3025); Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); Pena v. Hyde, 2025 WL 2108913, (D. Mass. July 28, 2025); Matter

of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

admission,” § 1225(b) also applies to those who are “present in the United States who

ha[ve] not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). This is precisely Petitioner’s status.

Second, although other district courts correctly found that some petitioners

were subject to § 1229a standard removal proceedings instead of § 1225(b)(1)

expedited removal proceedings, these courts conflated the type of removal proceeding

that was initiated by DHS with that detainee’s eligibility for a bond hearing. As

discussed above, aliens who are subject to removal under both §§ 1225(b)(1) and

1229a are subject to mandatory detention; the only distinction is the process

employed thereafter in removal proceedings. Therefore, the Court finds these other

cases unpersuasive and concludes that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(2), without eligibility for a bond hearing.

Furthermore, many of these district court cases were decided before – or soon

after – the BIA issued its opinion in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA

2025). In Hurtado, the BIA correctly noted that “applicants for admission … are those

aliens who are seeking admission and who an immigration officer has determined are

‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Id. at 218 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A)). Thus, “[t]his category is a ‘catchall provision that applies to all

applicants for admission not covered by’” § 1225(b)(1). Id. (quoting Jennings, 583 at

287). Consequently, “the INA explicitly requires that this … ‘catchall’ category of

applicants for admission be mandatorily detained for the duration of their

immigration proceedings.” Id. at 218–19.

The BIA decision also correctly observed that § 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a), “does not purport to overrule the mandatory detention requirements for

arriving aliens and applicants for admission explicitly set forth in [§] 235(b)(1) and

(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2).” Id. at 219. And, as this Court noted above,

“while an inadmissible alien who establishes that he or she has been present in the

United States for over 2 years is not subject to the expedited removal process, the

alien nevertheless ‘shall be detained for a proceeding under [§ 1229a].’” Id. at 219–

20 (citing INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).

And while, of course, the BIA’s precedential decisions are not binding upon this

Court, the Court does acknowledge that the BIA is a court that possesses subject

matter expertise on immigration matters. Thus, when considering the BIA’s

thorough analysis of the plain statutory text and legislative history of the INA, this

Court finds Hurtado persuasive. See id. at 222–25 (discussing the legislative history

of the INA).

Finally, though not necessary to reach its conclusion, this Court notes that its

analysis comports with the legislative history of the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C,

§ 302(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-579, which added § 1225(a)(1) in 1996. Before

IIRIRA, there was “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully

enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the

border unlawfully.” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020). Congress

remedied this through the addition of § 1225(a)(1), which “ensure[d] that all

immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their physical

presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the

INA – in the position of an ‘applicant for admission.’” Id. The plain statutory text

comporting with the legislative history supports this Court’s conclusion.5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds on the showing made that Petitioner

is lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) and is therefore not entitled to a bond hearing.

And because Petitioner has been lawfully detained and currently in removal

proceedings, his detention does not violate due process under the Supreme Court

precedent. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal

proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”); Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018) (“Congress has authorized immigration officials

to detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration

proceedings.”).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioner’s MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER [Doc. 2] and PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [Doc. 1] are

DENIED and DISMISSED.

5 For this Court to conclude that an alien who has unlawfully entered the United States

and managed to remain in the country for a sufficient period of time is entitled to a bond

hearing, while those who seek lawful entry and submit themselves for inspection are not, not

only conflicts with the unambiguous language of the governing statutes, but would also

seemingly undermine the intent of Congress in enacting the IIRIRA. This Court thus

“refuse[s] to interpret the INA in a way that would in effect repeal [Congress’s] statutory fix.”

United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2024).

THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 215* day of November 2025.

Chad ¢

DAVID C. JOSEPH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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