BROOKS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TONITA BROOKS : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

CHESTER VALLEY GOLF CLUB, ET :

AL. : NO. 25-761

MEMORANDUM

Padova, J. November 17, 2025

Plaintiff Tonita Brooks brings this race and sex discrimination action against her former

employer, Chester Valley Golf Club (the “Club”), and the Club’s general manager, Jordan

Pozniak. She asserts claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),

47 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendants have moved to dismiss the First

Amended Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the

reasons that follow, we grant the Motion, but also afford Plaintiff leave to amend her claims.

I. BACKGROUND

The First Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. The Club is an event venue and

golf club in Malvern, Pennsylvania. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) It is open to the public for a variety of

events, including golf outings and weddings. (Id. ¶ 6.) On May 25, 2021, the Club hired Plaintiff

as an accounting support assistant. (Id. ¶ 17.) Within two weeks, Plaintiff learned that the

Controller and Assistant Controller were leaving their positions with the Club. (Id. ¶ 18.) As a

result, Plaintiff was promoted to Assistant Controller. (Id. ¶ 19.) In that role, Plaintiff was the

“only black American woman” in management at the Club. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff’s supervisor was

Controller Kathleen McGarry. (Id. ¶ 20.)

In February of 2023, Defendant Jordan Pozniak was hired to be the Club’s new General

Manager. (Id. ¶ 21.) On February 25, 2023, Pozniak ordered that Plaintiff’s job title on the Club’s

website directory be changed from Assistant Controller to Bookkeeper. (Id. ¶ 23.) He then began

giving Plaintiff additional job duties without increasing her pay. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) As one example,

in May of 2023, Pozniak tasked Plaintiff with training the Membership and Marketing Director

about accounts receivable. (Id. ¶ 27.)

At some point prior to mid-November of 2023, Plaintiff and McGarry questioned the

Club’s Food and Beverage Manager, Ashley Heath, about a $35,000 expenditure that Heath had

not included in the October billing. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) On November 17, 2023, Pozniak called

Plaintiff and McGarry into his office and berated Plaintiff for questioning that expenditure, telling

Plaintiff that he had approved it. (Id. ¶ 28, 30.) Heath, however, “was constantly making mistakes

in billing [the Club’s] guests.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Consequently, “Plaintiff was on a near daily basis

comping or crediting guest checks because of [Heath’s and her department’s] errors.” (Id. ¶ 34.)

“Plaintiff was always cordial, responsive, and professional in her email correspondence with . . .

Heath.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Heath, in contrast, “would frequently withhold information necessary for

Plaintiff to complete her job duties.” (Id. ¶ 36.)

At some point in time, Heath complained to Pozniak about Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 33.) On

February 11, 2024, Pozniak sent an email to the accounting department, stating that Plaintiff had

been “rude and disrespectful” when working with other Club departments and that it was therefore

necessary to outline behavior changes for both Plaintiff and McGarry. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)

Shortly thereafter, on February 22, 2024, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor gave Plaintiff an

excellent performance evaluation. (Id. ¶ 37.) Nevertheless, at Pozniak’s direction, Plaintiff was

given only a $1,000.00 pay raise, which amounted to a cost-of-living increase of less than 1%. (Id.

¶ 38.) At the same time, “all other salaried staff . . . received an average increase of 3% or more

for similar performance evaluations.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Ultimately, Pozniak’s “negative comments” and

“hostile actions” towards Plaintiff were so “intense,” “humiliat[ing],” and “intolerable” that

“Plaintiff was forced into a constructive discharge in May 2024.” (Id. ¶¶ 44, 46, 48, 50.)

The Amended Complaint initially contained nine Counts, but Plaintiff withdrew five of the

Counts in response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.1 The four remaining Counts are Counts I,

II, IV, and V. Count I asserts a claim against both Defendants for racial discrimination pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count II asserts a § 1981 claim against both Defendants for hostile work

environment based on race. Count IV asserts a Title VII claim against the Club for disparate

treatment based on sex and race. Count V asserts a Title VII claim against the Club for hostile

work environment based on sex and race. Defendants have moved to dismiss all four Counts.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we “consider only the

complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as

undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”

Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d

223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)). We “accept as true all plausible factual allegations made in the complaint

and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No.

VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007); Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 323 (3d Cir. 2014)). However, we “need

1 Specifically, Plaintiff withdrew Count III (retaliation under § 1981), Count VI (retaliation

under Title VII), Count VII (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count VIII (declaratory

relief), and Count IX (injunctive relief). (Pl.’s Mem. in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss (Pl.’s

Mem.”) at 2.)

not ‘accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Host Int’l, Inc. v.

Marketplace PHL, LLC, 32 F.4th 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986)) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff’s pleading obligation is to set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim,”

which “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (second alteration in original) (first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2); then quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must allege

“‘sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,’ thus enabling ‘the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.’” Warren

Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In the end, we

will grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint

are not sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Geness v. Admin. Off. of

Pa. Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Counts I and IV – Race and Sex Discrimination

Counts I and IV of the Amended Complaint assert claims for disparate treatment race

discrimination in violation of § 1981 and Title VII, as well as disparate treatment sex

discrimination under Title VII.2 We largely analyze discrimination “[c]laims brought under Title

2 Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

VII [and] § 1981 . . . coextensively,” Anderson v. Boeing Co., 694 F. App’x 84, 86 n.4 (3d Cir.

2017) (citations omitted), because the substantive elements of the two claims are “generally

identical,” Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009). To allege a cognizable

claim of disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that “1) s/he is

a member of a protected class, 2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to attain or retain,

3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action, and 4) the action occurred under circumstances

that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging

Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir.

2008)). Similarly, to allege a cognizable claim of race discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff

must allege (1) that she is a member of a racial minority, (2) intentional discrimination on the basis

of race, and (3) discrimination concerning at least one of the activities in the statute, “which

includes the right to make and enforce contracts.” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797

(3d Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).

The intent elements of the two claims, which are our focus here, are similarly articulated

but require different levels of proof. While the intent element of a Title VII claim can be satisfied

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have

the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and

property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like

punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every

kind and to no other.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “Although § 1981 does not itself use the word ‘race,’ the [Supreme] Court

has construed the section to forbid all ‘racial’ discrimination in the making [and enforcement] of

. . . contracts.” St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987) (citing Runyon v.

McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976)); Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir.

2001) (“Section 1981 . . . prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of

contracts . . . .”). Section 1981 applies to employment contracts. See Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581

F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

with plausible allegations that racial or sexual animus was a motivating factor for the

discriminatory conduct, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff asserting a § 1981 claim must

plausibly allege that “but for [her] race, [s]he would not have been discriminated against,”

Williams v. Tech Mahindra (Americas) Inc., 70 F.4th 646, 651 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Comcast

Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020)). Ultimately, the

requirement to plead the requisite intent for either claim may be satisfied with allegations of

“enough facts to ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [that]

necessary element.’” Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213).

Defendants argue that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for race or sex

discrimination pursuant to Title VII or § 1981 because it does not a plausibly allege that racial or

sexual animus was a motivating factor behind, much less the but-for cause of, any alleged adverse

employment action. The Amended Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff was subjected to

adverse employment actions based on race and sex in violation of § 1981 and Title VII insofar as

(1) her title was changed from assistant controller to bookkeeper on the Club’s directory; (2) she

was given an increased workload with no increase in compensation; and (3) she was awarded only

a $1,000 raise in spite of an excellent performance evaluation. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25-27, 38;

see Pl.’s Mem at 5-6.)

In arguing that the Amended Complaint adequately alleges that discrimination was the but-

for cause of, and a motivating factor for, these actions, Plaintiff argues only that the Amended

Complaint plausibly alleges sufficient comparator evidence, i.e., evidence that individuals

similarly situated to a plaintiff, but not of her protected race and sex, were treated more favorably

under similar circumstances. (See Pl.’s Mem. at 6-7 (arguing that “no other individuals similarly

situated but not of Plaintiff’s protected class of race [and sex] were treated similarly to the way

Plaintiff was treated”)); Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., 403 F. App’x 699, 702 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010)

(stating that an inference of causation can be supported with allegations of comparator evidence

(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002)); Greene v. Virgin Islands

Water & Power Auth., 557 F. App’x 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining what is meant by

“comparator evidence” (citing Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003))).

There are, however, only two allegations in the Amended Complaint that appear to concern the

differential treatment of other potentially similarly-situated employees with respect to salary,

workload, and/or title. Specifically, Paragraph 39 alleges that “all other salaried staff had received

an average increase of 3% or more for similar performance evaluations,” and Paragraph 40 alleges

that Plaintiff “was the only black American woman employed in management at the [C]lub during

the time of these occurrences and the only one treated in such a discriminatory manner.” (1st Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 39-40.)

Neither of these allegations support a reasonable inference that the alleged adverse

employment actions (title change, increased workload, and minimal salary increase) were

motivated by racial or sexual animus. Indeed, Paragraph 39’s failure to allege the race and sex of

the “other salaried staff” to whom it refers makes it impossible to draw a reasonable inference that

there were non-black and male salaried staff who were treated more favorably than Plaintiff.

Moreover, because an “average” is necessarily the product of amounts both higher and lower than

the average, the allegation that the staff “received an average increase of 3% or more for similar

performance evaluations” does not even allow for a reasonable inference that all staff with similar

performance evaluations received larger raises than Plaintiff’s, such that they were treated more

favorably. (Id. ¶ 39.) Meanwhile, Paragraph 40’s allegation that Plaintiff “was the only black

American woman . . . in management” and was the only one “treated in such a discriminatory

manner” is simply too vague and general to allow for a reasonable inference that white men in

management did not have their titles changed, have their workloads increased without a

corresponding pay raise, or get small salary increases in spite of good performance reviews. There

are also no allegations that permit us to infer that any white men in management were similarly

situated to Plaintiff in any respect other than being members of management. See Houston v.

Easton Area Sch. Dist., 355 F. App’x 651, 654 (3d Cir. 2009) (“To make a comparison of the

plaintiff’s treatment to that of an employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class . . . , the plaintiff

must show that [s]he and the employee are similarly situated in all relevant respects.” (citation

omitted)); id. (explaining that “in the context of personnel actions,” the relevant factors to consider

in determining whether the comparator is similarly situated are commonly whether “the two

employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in

similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their

conduct or the employer’s treatment of them” (quotation omitted)).

For these reasons, even reading the allegations of the Amended Complaint in a light most

favorable to Plaintiff, we conclude that the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that

racial or sexual animus was a motivating factor behind, much less the but-for cause of, the alleged

adverse employment actions on which Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims rests. See Gross v.

R.T. Reynolds, Inc., 487 F. App’x 711, 716 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that a complaint failed to allege

a plausible claim of race discrimination under § 1981 where it alleged “an abundance of

wrongdoing” but no “facts supporting the conclusion that those acts were motivated by

discrimination the basis of race”); Bailey v. Millenium Grp. of Del., No. 21-1752, 2022 WL

3754617, at *2 (3d Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim where plaintiff “offered

nothing more than his own speculation that [the alleged adverse action] was motivated by racial

discrimination and pleaded no facts to support any inference that it was” (citations omitted)). It

simply contains too few factual allegations to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence of [that] necessary element.” Martinez, 986 F.3d at 266 (quoting Fowler, 578 F.3d

at 213).

Accordingly, we dismiss the race and sex discrimination claims in Counts I and IV of the

Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

B. Counts II and V – Hostile Work Environment

Count II of the Amended Complaint asserts a hostile work environment claim based on

race against Defendants pursuant to § 1981, and Count V asserts a hostile work environment claim

based on both race and gender against the Club pursuant to Title VII. Hostile work environment

claims under the § 1981 and Title VII are “analyzed in the same manner.” Miller v. Thomas

Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 908 F. Supp. 2d 639, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2012), aff’d, 565 F. App’x 88 (3d Cir.

2014). In order to plead such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that “1) [she] suffered intentional

discrimination because of . . . her [protected status], 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive,

3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally

affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior

liability [where the employer is alleged to be responsible].” Castleberry v STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259,

263 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167). Defendants argue that the Amended

Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that there was race and/or sex discrimination that meets the

severe or pervasive requirement.

The Supreme Court has explained that the “‘severe or pervasive’” standard “is an objective

standard, based on ‘an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.’”

Tourtollette v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 846 (3d Cir 2016) (quoting Harris v. Forklift

Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Because “severe or pervasive” is in the disjunctive, the standard

can be satisfied with allegations of harassment that was either severe or pervasive. Castleberry,

863 F.3d at 264. Thus, “some harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an environment

even if not pervasive,” whereas “other, less objectionable, conduct will contaminate the workplace

only if it is pervasive.” Id. (quoting Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)).

“Isolated incidents and offhanded comments . . . are [ordinarily] not sufficient to sustain a hostile

work environment claim,” Stucke v. City of Phila., 685 F. App’x 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2017) (first

alteration in original) (quotation omitted), although an extremely serious incident, such as a racial

epithet accompanied by a threat of termination, can suffice, Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264-66.

Ultimately, “[w]hether an environment is hostile requires looking at the totality of the

circumstances, including: ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264 (quoting Harris,

510 U.S. at 23). “These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that

Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775, 788 (1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).

Plaintiff asserts that the Amended Complaint alleges racial and/or sexual discrimination

that was severe or pervasive because it alleges that (1) her title was changed from “Assistant

Controller” to “Bookkeeper,” (2) her workload was increased with no corresponding increase in

compensation; (3) she was required to train another employee regarding accounts receivable; (4)

she was “berated” for raising an accounting discrepancy with the food and beverage manager, and

(5) Ponziak called her “rude and disrespectful” in an email to the accounting department. (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25-26, 27, 30, 31-32; Pl.’s Mem. at 8.) She maintains that these incidents

demonstrate “a pattern of singling out and scapegoating” her. (Pl.’s Mem. at 9.)

However, as explained above, there are no allegations in the Amended Complaint that

support an inference that the changes to her title or workload, or her lackluster pay raise, were

motivated by animus based on either race or sex. The same is true for the single occasion when

Plaintiff was “berated” for a work-related matter, because there is nothing about that incident that

raises a reasonable inference that the work criticism, even if undeserved, was motivated by animus

as to Plaintiff’s protected status. Thus, none of those allegations support an inference of a hostile

work environment based on either race or sex.

The last incident on which Plaintiff relies to support her allegation of a hostile work

environment, and the only allegation in the Amended Complaint that even arguably reflects any

discriminatory animus, is Poznick’s statement in the February 11, 2024 email that Plaintiff was

“rude and disrespectful.” (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff acknowledges that this criticism did

not explicitly mention race or sex, but she maintains that it invokes a racial stereotype of an “angry

black woman” and thus, supports inferences of racial and sexual animus and a correspondingly-

discriminatory hostile work environment. (See Pl.’s Mem at 10.) “District courts in this circuit

have recognized the ‘perniciousness’ of the ‘angry Black woman’ trope and have held the

invocation of this stereotype may serve as evidence of discriminatory animus, even where the

invocation is not explicit.” Johnson v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 23-3430, 2024 WL

1773358, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2024) (quoting Curry v. Devereux Found., 541 F. Supp. 3d 555,

561 (E.D. Pa. 2021), and citing Blount v. TD Bank, N.A., Civ. A. No. 20-18805, 2023 WL

4621881, at *13 (D.N.J. July 19, 2023)).

Here, the allegation in the Amended Complaint is that Ponziak stated that Plaintiff was

“rude and disrespectful” when dealing with other Club departments and then used that accusation

to justify proposed behavior changes for both Plaintiff and her supervisor, who unlike Plaintiff, is

not alleged to be black. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Even accepting for purposes of the pending

Motion that the “rude and disrespectful” comment in this context evokes an “Angry black woman”

trope, the allegation of the single, isolated racial comment can only be characterized as a mere

offensive utterance. It was neither physically threatening nor objectively humiliating and certainly

was not so severe as to sustain a hostile work environment claim on its own. Accordingly, we

conclude that the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege discrimination that is either

severe or pervasive. We thus dismiss the hostile work environment claims pursuant to § 1981 and

Title VII on that basis.3

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in full. However, “in civil

rights cases, [we] must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when

dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”

Fletcher–Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see

3 Plaintiff asserts in her Memorandum that she has also pled a claim for constructive

discharge, arguing that the discrimination and hostile work environment that she endured was so

intolerable that any reasonable person subject to them would resign. As an initial matter, although

the Amended Complaint periodically mentions constructive discharge, it is not apparent that it

actually includes a constructive discharge claim. Indeed, when Plaintiff argues constructive

discharge is her Memorandum, she does not identify any particular Count of the First Amended

Complaint as containing such a claim, and no cause of action actually references constructive

discharge. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that such a claim was intended, the law is clear

that “[t]o prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or

pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile working environment.”

Spencer v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 317 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Thus,

where, as here, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim of either discrimination or hostile

work environment, she has also failed to allege a cognizable claim of constructive discharge.

also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). We are not convinced that Plaintiff’s

claims are futile and do not perceive any inequity is permitting amendment. We therefore dismiss

the Amended Complaint without prejudice and afford Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend her

complaint to state cognizable claims. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova, J.

______________________

John R. Padova, J.