Opinion

Tompkins

Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed: Nov 20, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 37.1%

taking judicial notice of the BOP’s publicly accessible Inmate Locator records

How later courts described this case

taking judicial notice of the BOP’s publicly accessible Inmate Locator records
requiring a court to compare “the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s response” and accepting the plaintiff’s version where there is a conflict
“The word ‘jurisdiction,’ of course, is capable of different interpretations. We use it in the sense that it is used in the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and not in the sense of subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court.”
“Section 2241 petitions may be brought only in the district court for the district in which the inmate is incarcerated.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GEORGE TOMPKINS, )

Reg. No. 36417-479, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-CV-215-WKW

) [WO]

WARDEN WASHINGTON, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner George Tompkins, an inmate incarcerated at the Federal Prison

Camp in Montgomery, Alabama (“FPC Montgomery”) and proceeding pro se, filed

this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. # 1.) He

argues that his earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), see Pub.

L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, have been unjustly withheld due to the Federal

Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) reliance on a regulation he argues unlawfully exceeds the

BOP’s statutory authority. (Docs. # 1, 14.) In his petition, he seeks the application

of these credits to secure an immediate transfer to prerelease custody. (Doc. # 1

at 7.) In response, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition should be

dismissed because under 18 U.S.C. § 3625, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

to review the BOP’s decision concerning the calculation of Petitioner’s FSA earned

time credits. (Doc. # 11 at 12–15.) Alternatively, Respondent contends that if

subject matter jurisdiction exists, Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies before seeking habeas relief necessitates the dismissal of the petition.

(Doc. # 11 at 3.) Thereafter, Petitioner was directed to file a reply and was given an

opportunity to submit any supporting affidavits, declarations, or documents. (Doc.

# 12.) In his reply brief, Petitioner clarifies that he is pursuing judicial review of the

regulations upon which the BOP relied to withhold his FSA earned time credits and

that he is not challenging the BOP’s decision to withhold those credits in his case.

(See Doc. # 1 at 3–7, as clarified in Doc. # 14 at 4–5.) However, he argues that, if

exhaustion is a requirement, it should not apply in his case, claiming unavailability

and futility as exceptions to exhaustion. (See Doc. # 1 at 2; Doc. # 14 at 1.)

For the reasons to follow, Respondent’s response (Doc. # 11) is construed as

containing: (1) a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction; and (2) a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. The first motion will be denied, while the second motion

will be granted without prejudice. No evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve

these motions. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts [hereinafter, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases].1

1 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases apply to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b),

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (providing that the § 2254 Rules apply to habeas corpus petitions

filed under provisions other than § 2254).

II. BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District

of Texas sentenced Petitioner to 120 months’ imprisonment and three years’

supervised release based on multiple convictions, including for conspiracy to

defraud the United States and pay healthcare kickbacks and conspiracy to commit

healthcare fraud. See United States v. Tompkins, No. 4:18-CR-40 (S.D. Tex. June

30, 2020), ECF No. 207. His release date, according to the BOP, is August 1, 2028.

See Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last

visited Nov. 19, 2025).2

In 2018, Congress passed the FSA to broaden prisoners’ access to non-

custodial placements. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified at

18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3624, 3631–35). The FSA’s provisions work together to

motivate eligible inmates to participate in recidivism-reduction programs by

awarding them earned time credits. §§ 3621(h), 3624(g), 3632. Participants may

earn 10 days, or in some instances 15 days, of credit for every 30 days of successful

program participation. Each earned time credit equals one day. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3621, 3624, 3631–35. Under the FSA, earned time credits are applied to

2 This court takes judicial notice of the public records maintained on the BOP’s website. See Fed.

R. Evid. 201(c); see also Naveleski v. Int’l Paper Co., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1300 n.25 (N.D. Fla.

2017) (“[I]t is not uncommon for courts to take judicial notice of factual information found on

official governmental agency websites.”); United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of the BOP’s publicly accessible Inmate Locator records).

accelerate an inmate’s transfer either to prerelease custody, which includes

residential reentry centers and home confinement, or to supervised release if such a

term has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g).

In his petition, which is dated February 22, 2025, Petitioner alleges that he is

eligible to earn FSA time credits. He contends that he has earned the maximum

number of FSA time credits—365—that can be applied to reduce his sentence. (Doc.

# 1 at 3); § 3624(g)(3). However, he argues that additional FSA time credits have

been improperly withheld, affecting his time in prerelease custody. (Doc. # 1 at 4–

6.) He elaborates on this issue as follows.

On September 5, 2024, the BOP introduced a tool to estimate an inmate’s FSA

conditional placement date. (Doc. # 1 at 4.) The FSA conditional placement date is

the date on which a prisoner potentially is eligible for prerelease custody based on

projected FSA earned time credits. See Crowe v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2025 WL

1635392, at *4 (D.D.C. June 9, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-5296 (D.C. Cir. Aug.

18, 2025). According to Petitioner, the tool initially projected his FSA conditional

placement date as December 20, 2025. (Doc. # 1 at 4, ¶ 21; see also Doc. # 1-1 at 2

(BOP’s FSA Time Credit Assessment, dated Sep. 5, 2024).) However, he argues

that this date does not account for any Second Chance Act (SCA) credits,3 indicating

3 Congress enacted the Second Chance Act (SCA) to “assist offenders reentering the community

from incarceration to establish a self-sustaining and law-abiding life by providing sufficient

transitional services.” Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 3(a)(5), 122 Stat. 657 (2008). The SCA helps

that with these credits applied, he would have been eligible for prerelease custody

on December 20, 2024. (Doc. # 1 at 4.) He contends that in October 2024, the BOP

improperly changed the projection inputs, affecting the imprisonment of “thousands

of inmates,” including his. (Doc. # 1 at 5, ¶ 25.) Specifically, Petitioner received an

FSA Time Credit Assessment dated December 30, 2024, which reduced his

projected FSA conditional placement days from 955 days to 640 days, thus

extending his conditional placement date from December 20, 2025, to October 31,

2026. (Doc. # 1 at 5, ¶ 25; see also Doc. # 1-2 at 2 (BOP’s FSA Time Credit

Assessment, dated Dec. 30, 2024); Doc. # 1-1 at 2.) In his petition, he argues that

the BOP calculated this new date by projecting only his FSA time credits up to the

conditional placement date. Under this new calculation, the BOP improperly “does

not apply all the FSA credits earned while the inmate is at a halfway house or on

home confinement.” (Doc. # 1 at 5, ¶ 26.) In his petition, Petitioner requests an

order directing “Respondent to immediately send [him] to prerelease custody (either

home confinement or halfway house).” (Doc. # 1 at 7.)

However, in his reply brief, Petitioner clarifies that he “is not asking this Court

to review the individualized administrative decision to withhold FSA credits from

offenders reintegrate by expanding access to prerelease custody for up to 12 months “to the extent

practicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). Under the SCA, prerelease custody includes placement in

home confinement for the shorter of 6 months or 10% of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.

§ 3624(c)(2). The SCA predates the FSA and was the only mechanism for prerelease custody for

BOP prisoners until the FSA passed.

him.” (Doc. # 14 at 4.) Rather, he is seeking judicial review of the allegedly

“unlawful BOP regulation[s],” 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.42 and 523.44, which he says the

BOP improperly is using to withhold his FSA earned time credits, in violation of

statutory authority. (Doc. # 14 at 4–5.)

As to these clarified contentions, Petitioner does not mention any attempt to

exhaust the BOP’s administrative-remedy program and seemingly concedes this

failure by stating, “Petitioner prays that this Court accept this Emergency Petition

without requiring Petitioner to futily [sic] attempt to exhaust his administrative

remedies . . . .” (Doc. # 1 at 7.) However, federal prisoners, like Petitioner, are

subject to the BOP’s administrative-remedy program, codified at 28 C.F.R. § 542.10

et seq. (Doc. # 11-1 at 3, ¶ 6 (Decl. of A. McCall Young).) This program comprises

a four-step process that a prisoner must follow to exhaust his administrative

remedies. (Doc. # 11-1 at 3, ¶ 6); see also Shivers v. United States, 1 F.4th 924, 935

(11th Cir. 2021). First, the prisoner must submit an institutional-level “informal

resolution” request (typically a BP-8 form). See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). Second, the

prisoner must file a BP-9 form within 20 days following the alleged incident that

serves as the basis for the request, unless the inmate demonstrates a valid reason for

delay. See § 542.14(a). Third, if unsatisfied with the warden’s response, an inmate

may submit an appeal using a BP-10 form to the appropriate regional director within

20 days of the date the warden signed the response. See § 542.15(a). Fourth, an

inmate who is unsatisfied with the regional director’s response may submit an appeal

to the general counsel using the appropriate BP-11 form within 30 days of the date

the regional director signed the response. See id.

The regulations also provide response times at each level of the

administrative-remedy program. See § 542.18. At the institutional level (BP-8 and

BP-9), 20 calendar days from the date of filing are allotted to respond to an inmate’s

request.4 At the BP-10 level, the regional director has 30 calendar days to respond.

At the BP-11 level, the BOP’s general counsel has 40 calendar days to respond. Id.

An inmate exhausts administrative remedies only after properly and timely seeking

review at all four levels.

With this factual background, the parties’ arguments are now examined.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Construed Motions to Dismiss

Respondent’s response challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and

alternatively, the petition’s prematurity for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Under the authority of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,

these challenges are construed as Rule 12 motions to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b). Although the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases do not address motions to

4 The “date of filing” is “the date [a request or appeal] is logged into the Administrative Remedies

Index as received.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.18.

dismiss, they permit the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when

there is no conflict with the habeas statutes or rules. Rule 12, Rules Governing §

2254 Cases. In this instance, applying Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure does not present any conflict.

B. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Section 2241(a) grants jurisdiction to district courts to provide habeas relief

to an inmate who is confined within the court’s district at the time his petition is

filed. Respondent has not contested this court’s statutory jurisdiction as conferred

by § 2241(a). See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 n.7 (2004) (“The word

‘jurisdiction,’ of course, is capable of different interpretations. We use it in the sense

that it is used in the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and not in the sense of

subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court.”); see also Fernandez v. United

States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Section 2241 petitions may be

brought only in the district court for the district in which the inmate is

incarcerated.”). Rather, Respondent argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3625 eliminates this

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims challenging the BOP’s

individualized decisions regarding his FSA earned time credits. (See Doc. # 11 at

12–15.) In light of Petitioner’s clarification of his claims in his reply brief, however,

Respondent’s argument is no longer applicable.

Section 3625 explicitly states that the provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA) related to judicial review, found in 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, do

not apply to any “determination, decision, or order” made by the BOP under 18

U.S.C. §§ 3621 through 3626. Section 3625’s directive deprives the court of subject

matter jurisdiction to review decisions made by the BOP under these sections. See

Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1225–29 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing § 3625’s

preclusion as affecting subject matter jurisdiction). However, “§ 3625 does not

preclude judicial review where the petitioner challenges the underlying regulations

that establish the criteria governing the BOPs decision-making process.” Woolsey

v. Washington, 2025 WL 2598794, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2025) (citing Cook v.

Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Warmus, 151 F. App’x

783, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); and Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1397

(11th Cir. 1998)).

In his petition, Petitioner alleges that “the BOP has refused to apply the FSA

early prerelease credits earned while in [a] halfway house or [on] home confinement

as 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g) requires them [sic] to do.” (Doc. # 1 at 6.) In his reply brief,

Petitioner clarifies that he is seeking judicial review of the BOP’s regulations, 28

C.F.R. §§ 523.42 and 523.44, which he claims are “being used by the BOP to

withhold [FSA earned time] credits.” (Doc. # 14 at 4.) He argues that the regulations

exceed the BOP’s statutory authority because they “treat[] the earning and

application of [FSA earned time credits] as permissive, rather than mandatory” as

required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(g) and 3632(d)(4)(C), the latter of which also

references § 3624(g). (Doc. # 14 at 4, 5.) He emphasizes that he is not challenging

the BOP’s individualized decisions regarding his FSA earned time credits. (Doc.

# 14 at 4.) Although Petitioner’s § 2241 petition does not cite these BOP regulations

or clearly formulate the claims, Petitioner’s reply brief serves as a clarification and

more definite statement of his petition. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally

construed.”). Because Petitioner is challenging the BOP’s regulations rather than

the BOP’s individualized decisions made under those regulations, Petitioner has

alleged a pathway for judicial review. Respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction thus will be denied.

C. Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies5

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition should be dismissed due

to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. # 11 at 3–7.) In

support of this argument, Respondent has provided a declaration from a BOP

5 “That motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust are not expressly mentioned in Rule 12(b) is not

unusual or problematic.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008). “[E]xhaustion

should be decided on a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss; and in fact, this Circuit has previously done

so.” Id.

attorney advisor (Doc. # 11-1 (Decl. of A. McCall Young)), who outlines the

administrative remedy process at the BOP, as described in Part II (Doc. # 11-1 at 3,

¶¶ 6–7) and confirms that Petitioner has not filed any administrative remedy “related

to the claims made in his Petition.” (Doc. # 11-1, at 4, ¶ 11.) Furthermore,

Respondent argues that the futility exception to exhaustion, which Petitioner

attempts to invoke in his petition, does not apply to § 2241 exhaustion. (Doc. # 11

at 5–6.)

In his reply brief, Petitioner does not dispute Respondent’s contentions or

evidence. Rather, he asserts that exhaustion is not a prerequisite under § 2241.

Alternatively, if exhaustion is a requirement, he argues against it in his case, citing

the unavailability exception from Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016), and claiming

futility as an exception. (See Doc. # 1 at 2; Doc. # 14 at 1.)

The following discussion pertaining to the motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies unfolds in six parts. First, it rejects the argument

that § 2241 does not require exhaustion. Second, it addresses the necessity for a

§ 2241 petitioner to exhaust all available administrative remedies within the

applicable prison system before filing the petition. Third, it explores the

unavailability exception to the administrative exhaustion requirements. Fourth, it

examines the two-step analysis for motions to dismiss based on failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Fifth, it considers the potential and unsettled nature of a

futility exception to the exhaustion requirement. Sixth, the petition is analyzed using

the two-step process.

1. The Judge-Made Requirement of Exhaustion Under § 2241

Petitioner’s first argument—that § 2241 does not require exhaustion—

contradicts Eleventh Circuit case law. In the Eleventh Circuit, “prisoners seeking

habeas relief, including relief pursuant to § 2241, are subject to administrative

exhaustion requirements.” Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004)

(per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by, Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d

467, 474–75 (11th Cir. 2015). These requirements for § 2241 petitions are “judge-

made,” Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d at 474, and do not originate from the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.6

More than a decade after the Skinner decision, Santiago-Lugo clarified that

this “judge-made” exhaustion requirement “is still a requirement; it’s just not a

jurisdictional one.” 785 F.3d at 475. Courts cannot “disregard a failure to exhaust

and grant relief on the merits if the respondent properly asserts the defense.” Id.

However, they may “skip over” a properly raised exhaustion defense “if it is easier

to deny (not grant, of course, but deny) the petition on the merits without reaching

6 The Skinner court made it clear that the exhaustion requirement applicable to § 2241 petitions

does not come from the PLRA. See 355 F.3d at 1294 (“We, like several other circuits, have held

that the PLRA does not apply to habeas petitions . . . .”). The five cases that Petitioner string cites

(Doc. # 1 at 2, ¶ 8) merely recognize that the PLRA and its administrative-exhaustion requirement

do not apply to habeas petitions.

the exhaustion question.” Id. Non-jurisdictional, exhaustion requirements are

“claim-processing rules, . . . which seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation

by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”

Id. at 472 (cleaned up). However, the exhaustion requirement “is not merely a

gratuitous hurdle imposed to inconvenience litigants. Rather, . . . it serves important

purposes.” Carrillo v. Warden FPC Pensacola, 2025 WL 1439526, at *2 (N.D. Fla.

Apr. 21, 2025), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 1433566 (N.D. Fla. May 19, 2025). As

summarized in Carrillo:

First, [the requirement] “protects administrative agency authority,”

giving an agency the “opportunity to correct its own mistakes with

respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal

court.” Second, it promotes efficiency because claims can sometimes

be resolved at the agency level, obviating the need to proceed to federal

court. “And even where a controversy survives administrative review,

exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record

for subsequent judicial consideration.”

Id. (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (addressing the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement)); see also Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th

Cir. 2008) (describing the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement as “designed to eliminate

unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons” by

“seeking to afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints

internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” (cleaned up)).

Here, Petitioner’s failure to exhaust cannot be overlooked for two reasons.

First, Respondent has properly asserted this defense in his response. Second,

addressing the merits of the petition without considering exhaustion would not

simplify the analysis.

2. How a § 2241 Petitioner Exhausts Administrative Remedies

In the context of the PLRA, the United States Supreme Court has held that

“proper exhaustion” of administrative remedies is necessary. Woodford, 548 U.S.

at 84; see also Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2020)

(“The exhaustion requirement drawn from the PLRA means ‘proper exhaustion.’”

(quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93)). To properly exhaust available administrative

remedies, “the inmate must use ‘all steps’ that the prison makes available.” Blevins

v. FCI Hazelton Warden, 819 F. App’x 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90). This means that “the inmate must comply with

the prison’s deadlines and other procedural rules, including the rules relating to the

filing of appeals.” Id. (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 and Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d

1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Determining the “boundaries of proper exhaustion” is done by “look[ing] to

the requirements of the applicable prison grievance system.” McGuire-Mollica v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 146 F.4th 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Sims v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 75 F.4th 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2023)). Here, the

grievance system is the BOP’s administrative-remedy program. See Blevins, 819 F.

App’x at 857 (“Because Blevins is a federal prisoner, the BOP’s Administrative

Remedy Program procedural rules apply to her.”).

3. The Unavailability of Administrative Remedies as an Exception to the

§ 2241 Exhaustion Requirement

Blevins, drawing an analogy from PLRA decisions, recognized the

unavailability of administrative remedies as an “important exception to the

administrative exhaustion requirement” under § 2241, even when a prison has a

formal grievance procedure. 819 F. App’x at 856. An inmate is not obligated to

exhaust remedies that are unavailable. Id. (citing Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642

(2016)). The Blevins court identified an “unavailable” remedy as one that “cannot

capably be used to obtain some relief.” Id. (citing Ross, 578 U.S. at 641). Ross

outlined three circumstances where an administrative remedy, though formally in

place, is essentially unavailable and thus need not be exhausted.7 See 578 U.S.

at 633. These circumstances, as articulated in Blevins, are:

(1) where “despite what regulations or guidance materials may

promise,” the administrative process “operates as a simple dead end—

with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to

aggrieved inmates,” (2) where the administrative process is “so opaque

that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use” because “no

7 In Ross v. Blake, the Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s “special circumstances”

exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 587 U.S. 632, 638 (2016). However, the Court

recognized a “textual exception” to mandatory exhaustion in the PLRA: “An inmate . . . must

exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Id. at 642. Although Ross

established the excepting circumstances in the context of the PLRA, the Eleventh Circuit in Blevins

applied these circumstances in determining whether the § 2241 petitioner’s administrative

remedies were unavailable, thereby exempting her from the exhaustion requirement. Blevins, 819

F. App’x at 856.

ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it,” and (3) where “prison

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance

process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”

819 F. App’x at 856 (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44).

4. The Turner Two-Step Analysis for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies When Unavailability is

Raised

As a general matter, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense. See Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).

When a court reviews a motion to dismiss a § 2241 petition for the petitioner’s failure

to exhaust administrative remedies and the petitioner argues that remedies are

unavailable, a two-step process applies. See Blevins, 819 F. App’x at 856 (citing

Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082).

First, the court examines “the inmate’s and respondent’s factual allegations,

and if they conflict, take[s] the inmate’s version of the facts as true.” Id. (citing

Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082). If the facts show that the inmate failed to exhaust

available administrative remedies, the petition “must be dismissed.” Id. (quoting

Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082). If the inmate’s petition is not dismissed under the first

step, the court “must proceed to the second step and ‘make specific findings in order

to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.’”8 Id. (quoting Turner,

8 The exhaustion requirement in Turner originated from the PLRA. Relying on Bryant v. Rich,

530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008), the court in Turner treated the defense of failure to exhaust under

the PLRA as a matter in abatement. Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082 (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374).

541 F.3d at 1082). “And at that second step, the respondent bears the burden of

proving that that inmate has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.” Id.

(citing Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082). After making findings on the disputed factual

issues, the court must “then decide[] whether under those findings the prisoner has

exhausted his available administrative remedies.” Id. at 857 (quoting Turner, 541

F.3d at 1083); see also McGuire-Mollica v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 146 F.4th 1308,

1314 (11th Cir. 2025) (describing Turner’s two-step process).

In Blevins, the Eleventh Circuit applied Turner’s and Ross’s principles in the

context of a § 2241 petition. See 819 F. App’x at 856–59. There, the petitioner

argued the appeal process was unavailable for several reasons. These reasons

included the regional director’s repeated rejection of her appeals as illegible (despite

her having used the materials provided by the prison), a disciplinary hearing officer’s

refusal to provide necessary materials for her appeal, and interference by prison staff

with her mail. Id. at 858. The district court acknowledged only one of the reasons

and summarily rejected it. See id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the

petitioner’s proffered reasons aligned with the scenarios identified by the Supreme

A matter in abatement is “not generally an adjudication on the merits.” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374.

Where exhaustion is treated as a matter in abatement, “it is proper for a judge to consider facts

outside of the pleadings and to resolve factual disputes so long as the factual disputes do not decide

the merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” Id. at 1376 (footnote

omitted). The Blevins court acknowledged that “the unavailability exception stems from [PLRA]

cases.” 819 F. App’x at 856 n.3. It noted also that the Eleventh Circuit “ha[d] applied that

exception to cases involving § 2241 petitions.” Id.

Court in Ross that trigger the unavailability exception. Id. at 859 (citing Ross v.

Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016)).

In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s § 2241 petition,

the Blevins court concluded that the lower court did not properly undertake the

Turner two-step analysis, noting that had the district court accepted the petitioner’s

allegations as true under the first Turner step, the warden would not have been

entitled to dismissal at that step. Id. at 858. The district court should have accepted

the petitioner’s allegations as true and proceeded to the second Turner step to make

specific findings to resolve disputed factual issues related to exhaustion. See id. at

859. Those findings then could have been used to resolve the legal question “about

whether the BOP rules adequately informed [the petitioner] about what to do after

the Regional Director rejected her appeal as illegible for the second time.” Id.

Because the district court failed to undertake a proper review,9 the Eleventh Circuit

reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings to make the necessary

findings related to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See id. at 859–60.

The same year as Blevins, in Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, the Eleventh

Circuit explained how the Turner two-step process works incorporating Ross:

9 As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, the district court “did not hold an evidentiary hearing, call for

additional discovery, or cite to anything in the Warden’s motion or the record to explain why [the

petitioner’s] allegations were untrue.” Blevins, 819 F. App’x at 859.

[A] proper Turner analysis of exhaustion after Ross requires the

plaintiff to allege a grievance procedure is unavailable to him in

response to the defendant’s affirmative defense of failure to exhaust.

Responding with allegations that a prison system is unavailable allows

the district court to complete the necessary analysis set forth in Turner

for evaluating whether a defendant is entitled to have a complaint

dismissed for failure to exhaust. See Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082

(requiring a court to compare “the factual allegations in the defendant’s

motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s response” and accepting

the plaintiff’s version where there is a conflict). While the burden is on

the defendant to show an available administrative remedy, once that

burden has been met, the burden of going forward shifts to the plaintiff,

who, pursuant to Turner, must demonstrate that the grievance

procedure was “subjectively” and “objectively” unavailable to him. Id.

at 1085.

974 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2020) (footnote omitted).10

In Geter, it was undisputed that the plaintiff “did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies.” Id. at 1355. Rather, the sole dispute was “whether the

grievance process was ‘available’ to [the plaintiff].” Id. The plaintiff argued that

the process was unavailable due to his mental disabilities and misleading assistance

from a prison official. Id. Resultantly, the Eleventh Circuit stated that since proper

exhaustion was not at issue, it would not address Turner’s two-step analysis. Id. at

1355 n.12. Instead, it would focus on the availability of the grievance procedure.

Id. (citing Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082; cf. Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1214

10 This year, in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025), the Supreme Court held “that parties are

entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim

protected by the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 479. Perttu impacts and modifies the application

of Turner’s holding in cases where the issue of administrative exhaustion is intertwined with the

merits of the claim. However, this issue does not arise in the present case.

n.3 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to address the availability analysis because the

exhaustion requirements were satisfied)).

Another Eleventh Circuit decision further discussed a prison official’s burden

to demonstrate the availability of the administrative remedy. In Wright v. Georgia

Department of Corrections, 820 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam), the

Eleventh Circuit discussed Turner’s availability standard in evaluating an

exhaustion defense under the PLRA. The plaintiff-inmate contended, citing Turner,

that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof onto him regarding the

availability of administrative remedies. See id. at 845. Disagreeing, the Eleventh

Circuit said:

[The plaintiff] confuses the issue of whether a remedy is generally

available (i.e., a grievance procedure exists) with whether a remedy was

available to him practically speaking. Nothing in Turner dictates that

defendants initially establish this latter meaning of availability in

establishing a lack of exhaustion. Instead, Turner mandates that

“defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies,” which includes

showing that a remedy is generally available. 541 F.3d at 1082

(emphasis added). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of how a defendant

could show that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies without

showing that there was a remedy to be exhausted. In response, the

plaintiff may defeat the failure-to-exhaust argument by showing that

the general remedy was effectively unavailable to him.

Wright, 820 F. App’x at 845. In Wright, the plaintiff argued that the grievance

procedure at the Georgia Department of Corrections essentially “was an unavailable

dead end,” as wardens never approved inmate grievances related to medical

treatment. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had “provided no factual

support for his assertion.” Id. Consequently, it affirmed the district court’s decision

that the defendants had met their burden of showing that the plaintiff did not exhaust

available remedies and that the plaintiff had failed to show that the remedy “was

effectively unavailable to him.” Id.

In the unpublished Blevins decision, the Eleventh Circuit applied Ross’s

unavailability exception within the context of a § 2241 petition. This court will

adopt the same approach. However, to the extent Blevins addresses the burden(s)

differently than in the published decision in Geter, the court will adhere to Geter as

to the burden-shifting analysis. Notably, Geter is factually similar to this case, as

both involve an undisputed failure by the prisoner to properly exhaust administrative

remedies, with the primary issue being “whether the grievance process was

‘available’ to [the prisoner].” 974 F.3d at 1355. Hence, as described in Geter,

“[w]hile the burden is on the [respondent] to show an available administrative

remedy, once that burden has been met, the burden of going forward shifts to the

[petitioner], who, pursuant to Turner, must demonstrate that the grievance procedure

was ‘subjectively’ and ‘objectively’ unavailable to him.” Id. at 1356 (quoting

Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085). This analysis is detailed in Part III.C.6.

5. Futility as an Exception to Administrative Exhaustion Under § 2241

In addition to citing Ross’s unavailability exceptions to exhaustion of

administrative remedies, Petitioner also argues that exhaustion would be futile. (See

Doc. # 1 at 2, ¶ 10 (“Examples of situations in which the remedy process presents

no actual potential for relief include when the effect is futile.”).) Respondent

contends that under § 2241, failure to exhaust cannot be excused due to futility,

citing two Eleventh Circuit cases: Rey v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 359 F. App’x

88 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), and McGee v. Warden, FDC Miami, 487 F. App’x

516 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). (Doc. # 11 at 5–6.) Both cases barred any futility

exception to the pre-filing, administrative-exhaustion requirement. See Rey, 359 F.

App’x at 91 (“[T]he futility exception to exhaustion is inapplicable to [the

petitioner’s § 2241] claim because exhaustion is mandatory.”); see also McGee, 487

F. App’x at 518 (“[Petitioner] has not cited any case establishing that there is a

futility exception to the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under §

2241 . . . .”). However, these cases were decided prior to Santiago-Lugo’s

determination that circuit precedent requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies

as a jurisdictional requirement for § 2241 petitions had been “undermined to the

point of abrogation.” Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471–75 & nn.4–5

(11th Cir. 2015). The impact of Santiago-Lugo on the applicability of a futility

exception has not yet been addressed in a published Eleventh Circuit decision. See,

e.g., Straughter v. Warden FCC Coleman-Low, 699 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1307–08

(M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2023) (declining to categorically bar a potential futility exception

based on authority cited by the respondent that relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s pre-

Santiago-Lugo understanding of exhaustion when imposing that categorial bar in the

first instance).

To date, whether there is a futility exception to the “judge-made” exhaustion

requirement applicable to § 2241 petitions is “an unsettled question in the Eleventh

Circuit after Santiago-Lugo.” Cros-Toure v. Neely, 2024 WL 2178618, at *2 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 4, 2024), R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL 2163851 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2024).

However, in the years since Santiago-Lugo, some district courts within the Eleventh

Circuit, including the Northern District of Alabama in Cros-Toure, have found that,

if such an exception exists, it necessitates demonstrating “extraordinary

circumstances,” with the burden of showing futility resting on the inmate. Id. (citing

Jaimes v. United States, 168 F. App’x 356, 359 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (further

citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Carrillo v. Warden FPC Pensacola, 2025 WL

1439526, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2025) (recommending dismissal of the

petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

and did not present extraordinary circumstances that would justify exemption from

the exhaustion requirement), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 1433566 (N.D. Fla. May

19, 2025); Gomez-Feliz v. Jenkins, 2024 WL 5700925, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16,

2024) (acknowledging that no futility exception to the exhaustion requirement under

§ 2241 had been established, but even if this exception existed, it would “apply only

in extraordinary circumstances,” and concluding that the inmate had failed to

demonstrate such circumstances (citing Jaimes, 168 F. App’x at 359)). But see

Ochoa-Vasquez v. Swaney, 2024 WL 2967269, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2024)

(“There is no futility exception to the exhaustion requirement in a § 2241

proceeding.” (cleaned up)); Perez v. Joseph, 2022 WL 2181090, at *2 (N.D. Fla.

May 4, 2022) (“[T]here are grounds for doubt that a futility exception is available

on a § 2241 petition in this circuit.” (quoting Tankersley v. Fisher, 2008 WL

4371797, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sep. 22, 2008))).

Two decisions above relied upon Jaimes, which also is a pre-Santiago-Lugo

decision. Under the precedent at the time, which considered § 2241’s exhaustion

requirement as jurisdictional, Jaimes assumed for the sake of argument that the

petitioner could claim futility. 168 F. App’x at 359. In Jaimes, the Eleventh Circuit

referenced an out-of-circuit decision upon which the petitioner relied to argue

futility, without explicitly accepting or rejecting that decision’s premise. Jaimes

noted, though, that the out-of-circuit decision stated that exceptions to the exhaustion

requirement apply only in “extraordinary circumstances” and that the petitioner

“bears the burden of demonstrating the futility of administrative review.” Id.

(quoting Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). Under this

standard, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court correctly denied the

§ 2241 petition because the petitioner failed to demonstrate extraordinary

circumstances or sufficiently explain why pursuing administrative review would be

futile. Id.

Jaimes does not provide clear guidance on the applicability of a futility

exception under § 2241 after Santiago-Lugo. Considering the shift in this circuit’s

interpretation of the exhaustion requirement post-Santiago-Lugo, it would be

inappropriate to categorically dismiss a potential futility exception based on case law

decided before Santiago-Lugo. The court will consider whether any of Petitioner’s

contentions present valid futility exceptions, as done in Cros-Toure and Gomez-

Feliz. However, this task is challenging. While some district courts in the Eleventh

Circuit recognize the potential for a futility exception, the decisions focus on why

the specific circumstances alleged do not qualify as extraordinary. In practice,

decisions addressing futility generally conclude that no extraordinary circumstances

are present, reflecting a general reluctance to excuse a prisoner’s noncompliance

with an administrative-remedy process.

6. Whether the BOP’s Administrative-Remedy Program Was Available

to Petitioner or Whether Exhaustion Would Have Been Futile

In his petition, Petitioner makes no mention of any attempt to exhaust

administrative remedies at any level. Indeed, he seemingly concedes his failure to

exhaust. (See Doc. # 1 at 7.) In response to the petition, raising the affirmative

defense of failure to exhaust, Respondent has submitted a declaration from an

attorney advisor with the BOP. (See Doc. # 11-1 (Decl. of A. McCall Young).) In

the declaration, the attorney advisor details the administrative-remedy program in

place at the BOP (Doc. # 11-1 at 3, ¶¶ 6–7) and states that a review of the BOP’s

SENTRY records reveals that Petitioner has not filed any administrative remedy

“related to the claims made in his Petition.” (Doc. # 11-1 at 4, ¶ 11.) Young’s

declaration and the accompanying SENTRY record demonstrate that the BOP’s

administrative-remedy program is available and that Petitioner did not attempt to

commence—let alone exhaust—that process.

In his reply brief, Petitioner does not challenge Respondent’s contentions or

evidence that he failed to initiate or complete any step in the BOP’s administrative-

remedy program concerning the contentions in his petition. He also does not contest

the existence of the BOP’s administrative-remedy program. A review of the petition,

response brief, and reply brief demonstrates that there is no dispute in the facts

concerning (1) the general availability of a grievance procedure within the BOP and

(2) the fact that Petitioner did not properly exhaust that grievance procedure. See

Wright v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(“Turner mandates that ‘defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff has

failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies,’ which includes showing

that a remedy is generally available.” (citation omitted)); Geter v. Baldwin State

Prison, 974 F.3d 1348, 1355 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2020) (focusing the analysis on

whether the grievance process was available to the Plaintiff because the parties

agreed that the plaintiff had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies).

The dispute here, as in Geter, is not whether Petitioner exhausted available

administrative remedies—he did not, and that point is undisputed. Rather, the focus

is on whether the BOP’s administrative-remedy program was “‘subjectively’ and

‘objectively’ unavailable to him.” Geter, 974 F.3d at 1356. Petitioner also attempts

to invoke a futility exception to § 2241’s exhaustion requirement.

As to unavailability, the Eleventh Circuit in Geter—relying on Turner—

places the burden on the prisoner to show that the grievance process was both

“subjectively” and “objectively” unavailable.11 See 974 F.3d at 1356; accord

Wright, 820 F. App’x at 845 (citing Turner and holding that once the prison official

shows a remedy is generally available, the burden shifts to the prisoner to

demonstrate that the generally available remedy was effectively unavailable to him).

As for a potential futility exception, the burden likewise would lie on Petitioner. See,

e.g., Cros-Toure v. Neely, 2024 WL 2178618, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2024).

Petitioner’s arguments focusing on unavailability and futility find no support in the

facts or law.

11 While the court follows Geter on the allocation of these burdens, the outcome would be the same

even if the burden were assigned to Respondent.

First, Petitioner makes several arguments, when liberally interpreted, that

arguably fall into the first category the Supreme Court in Ross identified as

triggering the unavailability exception. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44

(2016). He argues that the BOP “appears to misunderstand” the FSA, making it

improbable that further review through “multiple layers of BOP bureaucracy” will

rectify this issue, and that the BOP has “a predetermined position of defying the

[FSA] through systematic non-compliance with [the] FSA and federal court

decisions.” (Doc. # 14 at 1–2.) Although Petitioner couches his assertions in a

futility exception, it appears that Petitioner is attempting to argue that the BOP’s

administrative process “operates as a simple dead end,” with BOP officials unwilling

to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643. But these

arguments, even liberally interpreted, do not suffice to show unavailability under

Ross or, alternatively, extraordinary circumstances under a potential futility

exception.12

The essence of these arguments is that exhaustion should be excused because

the BOP is certain to rule against him. However, the court is unaware of any

Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit decision recognizing this ground as a valid

12 Whether Petitioner’s arguments for excusing exhaustion arise out of principles of unavailability

or futility is unclear, and the lines are blurred as to when an argument of futility is really one of

unavailability and vice versa.

exemption for unavailability or futility.13 District courts in other circuits have found

that the BOP’s administrative remedy process is not futile “simply because a

prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his administrative appeals.” Williams

v. Warden, Allenwood-Low, 2024 WL 4204277, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 16, 2024)

(collecting cases). Additionally, as found by a district court in the Eastern District

of New York, the BOP’s prior rejection of similar claims did not render exhaustion

futile, since it was possible for precedent to be overruled and the BOP’s general

counsel has the authority to change agency policy. See Lallave v. Martinez, 609 F.

Supp. 3d 164, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (finding that futility cannot be presumed solely

based on previous unfavorable decisions, as it “is theoretically possible that the

precedent would be overruled” (collecting cases)). Hence, other district courts have

13 In arguing that “exhaustion requirements should not be applied if pursuing remedies throught

the administrative remedies process is futile” (Doc. # 14 at 2), Petitioner string cites cases

unhelpful to his position, including Hrycuna v. Ormond, 2019 WL 1304250, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb.

19, 2019), R. & R. adopted, 2019 WL 1302592 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2019), which directly opposes

his position. In Hrycuna, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (R&R) acknowledged

that the judicially imposed exhaustion requirement in § 2241 can be excused “when pursuit of

administrative remedies would be futile.” Id. However, the R&R went on to “[a]ccept that

§ 2241’s exhaustion requirement demands compliance with agency procedures to whatever extent

possible,” id., and it found that the petitioner had failed to comply with those procedures:

Here, each of [the petitioner’s] appeals was rejected because of specific procedural

deficiencies. In each instance, [the petitioner] had the opportunity to resubmit his

appeal with corrections or an explanation of the deficiency. He never attempted to

do so but instead filed suit in federal court seeking habeas relief. Excusing the

exhaustion requirement in this case would render the BOP disciplinary process a

dead letter and invite future disregard of its requirements.

Id. at *5.

required more than a mere prediction of an adverse outcome to excuse exhaustion

on the grounds of futility.14 This reasoning is particularly relevant to Petitioner’s

argument here, especially given the lack of factual support for his conclusion.

Furthermore, Petitioner’s arguments expressing pessimism about the

administrative outcome closely resemble those rejected in Jaimes and Wright. See

Jaimes v. United States, 168 F. App’x 356 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Wright v.

Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). In Jaimes, the

petitioner contended that pursuing administrative remedies would be futile, as he

believed the BOP would not rectify his concerns about sentencing credit without

judicial intervention. See 168 F. App’x at 359. Rejecting this argument, the

Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the petitioner “d[id] not adequately explain why

administrative review would prove futile.” Id. In Wright, the § 1983 plaintiff

claimed that the grievance procedure at the Georgia Department of Corrections

essentially “was an unavailable dead end,” as wardens never approved inmate

grievances related to medical treatment. 820 F. App’x at 845. However, the

Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had “provided no factual support for his

14 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1989),

is instructive. The court rejected the prisoner’s argument that exhaustion is futile because “the

higher-ups in the Bureau of Prisons are bound to turn down [his] remaining requests for relief, just

as they turned down his other claims.” Id. at 641. The court noted that while denial was probable,

that probability was not a valid reason to waive exhaustion: “Lightning may strike; and even if it

doesn’t, in denying relief the Bureau may give a statement of its reasons that is helpful to the

district court in considering the merits of the claim.” Id.

assertion.” Id. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s

decision that the defendants had met their burden of showing that the plaintiff did

not exhaust available administrative remedies and that the plaintiff had failed “to

defeat” that showing. Id.

Similarly, as in Jaimes and Wright, Petitioner speculates, without a factual

basis, that he will not receive a favorable administrative ruling. He offers only

conclusory statements asserting nothing more than his mere belief that exhaustion

of administrative remedies would be futile. See Higginbottom v. Carter, F.3d 1259,

1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an inmate’s belief that administrative procedures

are futile or needless does not excuse exhaustion in the context of the PLRA); see

also Martin v. Neely, 2024 WL 4521942, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 2024) (“[Section

2241 petitioner’s] belief that exhaustion would have been futile is entirely

conclusory and thus insufficient to excuse her failure to exhaust.”), R. & R. adopted,

2024 WL 4520939 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 17, 2024); Alanis v. Neely, 2024 WL 532338, at

*1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 2024) (“[The petitioner’s] futility argument is unavailing

because she points to no extraordinary circumstances. She does not argue that there

was any barrier to the remedy process. Instead, she simply filed her habeas petition

without first giving BOP officials the opportunity to address her complaints

internally. [Her] futility claim is entirely conclusory and based on her personal

beliefs. Such an argument cannot excuse a failure to exhaust.” (citation omitted)),

R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL 520021 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2024). It is not possible to

find futility in this case, as Petitioner neither initiated the administrative remedy

process nor demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances that would justify his

failure to do so.

Second, Petitioner argues that, pursuing the BOP’s administrative-remedy

program would be futile and “exacerbate the irreparable harm” to him because “the

time to remedy the problem has already passed,” and Respondent has taken no

corrective action. (Doc. # 1 at 2–3.) This argument is untenable because Petitioner

did not give Respondent an opportunity to address his claims through the

administrative-remedy program before claiming that relief cannot be obtained

promptly. By not allowing BOP officials a chance to correct the alleged mistake,

Petitioner undermines his argument for excusing the exhaustion requirement. The

exhaustion doctrine is designed to give BOP officials an opportunity to resolve

inmates’ grievances before judicial intervention is sought. Furthermore, the

offending FSA Time Credit Assessment, which reduced Petitioner’s projected FSA

conditional placement days and extended his conditional placement date from

December 20, 2025, to October 31, 2026, is dated December 30, 2024. (Doc. # 1

at 5; Doc. # 1-2 at 2 (BOP’s FSA Time Credit Assessment, dated Dec. 30, 2024);