Woods

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NATALIE HENDERSON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 25-1254

GLORIA WOODS, ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are two motions1 to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6) filed by defendants Gloria Woods (“Woods”),

UMG Recordings, Inc. (“UMG”), W Chappell Music Corp. (“Warner”), CMG

Enterprises II, Inc. (“CMG”),2 and BMG Rights Management (US) LLC (“BMG”)

(collectively, “defendants”). Plaintiff Natalie Henderson (“plaintiff”) opposes the

motions,3 and has filed a motion4 to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Defendants filed

replies5 to plaintiff’s oppositions and opposed6 plaintiff’s motion to conduct

jurisdictional discovery. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants’

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and denies plaintiff’s motion to conduct

jurisdictional discovery.

1 R. Doc. No. 17; R. Doc. No. 18.

2 Plaintiff incorrectly named defendant CMG as “Collective Music Group, LLC d/b/a

CMG The Label” in her complaint. R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 9; R. Doc. No. 17 at n.1.

Plaintiff’s counsel has advised this Court that plaintiff has no objection to defendant

CMG being referred to as “CMG Enterprises II, Inc.”

3 R. Doc. No. 22; R. Doc. No. 23.

4 R. Doc. No. 21.

5 R. Doc. No. 24; R. Doc. No. 25.

6 R. Doc. No. 26.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a copyright dispute between plaintiff and defendants.7

Plaintiff, professionally known as “Slimdabodylast,” alleges that defendant Woods, a

musical artist professionally known as “GloRilla,” infringed upon plaintiff’s copyright

for the song “All Natural” through the “unauthorized reproduction, distribution

and/or prior performance” of the song.8 Plaintiff also alleges that defendants9

infringed on her copyright through the production and distribution of defendant

Woods’s song “Never Find (feat. K Carbon),” (“Never Find”) which appeared on a

digital exclusive version of her album “Glorious.”10

Plaintiff alleges that beginning on January 6, 2024, she “made several social

media posts concerning her modeling and physique that went viral.”11 “Specifically,

[p]laintiff refers to her physique that is ‘all naturale, no BBL.’”12 Plaintiff alleges that

7 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.

8 Id. ¶ 12.

9 As stated in plaintiff’s complaint, defendant Woods “is known for the production,

recordation and composition of music that is distributed worldwide via the internet

and other digital devices” who “co-authored the musical composition and performed

vocals on” Never Find. Id. at 7. Defendant UMG “distributes and sells sound

recordings created by [d]efendant Woods.” Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

UMG “supervised the illegal reproduction of the [i]nfringing [t]rack . . . and

authorized the illegal reproduction and distribution of the [p]laintiff’s copyright

protected work.” Id. Defendant CMG is a music label who plaintiff alleges “does

substantial, continuous and systematic business in the State of Louisiana and in this

judicial district.” Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Warner “is responsible for music royalties from

the publication of the infringing works on behalf of the authors and composers of the

infringing work.” Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff states that defendant BMG is likewise

“responsible for collecting music royalties from the publication of the infringing work

on behalf of the authors and composers of the infringing work.” Id. ¶ 11.

10 Id. ¶ 17; R. Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 7; R. Doc. No. 17-3 ¶ 8.

11 Id. ¶ 13.

12 Id.

“[t]he aforesaid reference and video posts went viral through several published social

media posts on Instagram” and “has garnered over one (1) million views and likes.”13

Plaintiff alleges that to take advantage of her social media success, she wrote and

released the song All Natural.14 According to plaintiff, the lyrics to the song All

Natural included the “all naturale, no BBL” phrase from plaintiff’s Instagram posts

in its chorus, which is repeated three times during the song15 and includes the lyrics

“Slimdabodylast / All natural, no BBL / Mad h**s go to h**l / All natural, all natural,

all, all natural / No, no BBL.”16 Plaintiff states that her song is registered with the

U.S. Copyright Office under Registration Number SRul-579-013.17 Plaintiff alleges

she “is the listed author and copyright claimant on the aforesaid registration.”18

Plaintiff also alleges All Natural has been distributed through all major music

streaming platforms and digital music outlets.19 Plaintiff claims she is the sole owner

of the copyright registered for the song and the sole author of the “master, sound

recordings, musical composition, and lyrics for the subject song.”20

According to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant Woods “without express

authorization copied protected elements of ‘All Natural’ in her sound recording,

‘Never Find.’”21 Never Find was “released and distributed by [d]efendant UMG

13 Id.

14 Id. ¶ 14.

15 Id. ¶ 21.

16 Id. ¶ 14.

17 Id. ¶ 15.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id. ¶ 16.

21 Id. ¶ 17.

through its recording label imprints, CMG [sic] and Interscope Records, as part of

[d]efendant Woods’s album ‘Glorious.’”22 Plaintiff alleges that defendants “BMG and

[Warner] also collected royalties from the exploitation of the infringing work on behalf

of several publishers and [d]efendant Woods.”23 Plaintiff states that “[d]efendants

released and distributed the infringing work in the State of Louisiana, United States

and worldwide for streaming on all major streaming services” and that “[t]he

infringing work is accessible, and available for consumer use, in Louisiana by the

[p]laintiff and other Louisiana Residents through utilizing one of the streaming

services” which are “available for use by Louisiana residents.”24

Plaintiff states that she did not authorize the defendants to reproduce,

distribute, or otherwise create a derivative work of All Natural.25 However, plaintiff

alleges that defendants “have misappropriated many of the recognizable and key

protected elements of the [p]laintiff’s works into their infringing work ‘Never Find.’”26

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendant[] Woods copies the lyrics, content, and

melody from [p]laintiff’s ‘All Natural’ to create the infringing ‘Never Find.’”

Plaintiff alleges that Never Find misappropriates the lyrics “Slimdabodylast,

all naturale, no BBL, mad h**s go to h**l” of All Natural and interpolates them as

“Natural, no BBL, but I’m still gon’ give them h**l.”27 Plaintiff alleges that due to

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. ¶ 18.

26 Id. ¶ 20.

27 Id. ¶ 21.

defendants’ unauthorized copyright infringement, “a layperson . . . could conclude

that [the] songs are essentially identical.”28

Plaintiff filed her complaint29 on June 18, 2025, alleging copyright

infringement against all defendants based on the previously mentioned facts she

alleged.30 Defendants filed a motion31 to dismiss plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule

12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3), and another motion32 to dismiss plaintiff’s claims pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed responses33 in opposition to each motion, as well as a

motion34 to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. Defendant filed a reply35 to each

of plaintiff’s responses in opposition to their motions, and a response36 in opposition

to plaintiff’s motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

In the context of a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), a plaintiff must

establish a court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d

644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994). While the plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that

jurisdiction is proper by a preponderance of the evidence, courts are permitted to

defer the resolution of that question until trial to allow it to be resolved along with

28 Id. ¶ 19.

29 Id.

30 Id. ¶¶ 23–35.

31 R. Doc. No. 17.

32 R. Doc. No. 18.

33 R. Doc. No. 22; R. Doc. No. 23.

34 R. Doc. No. 21.

35 R. Doc. No. 24; R. Doc. No. 25.

36 R. Doc. No. 26.

the merits. See Walk Haydel & Assoc., Inc. v. Coastal Power Production Co., 517 F.3d

235, 241 (5th Cir. 2008).

“When the defendant challenges personal jurisdiction pursuant to a Rule

12(b)(2) motion, the matter may be determined without an evidentiary hearing,” in

which case the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the

Court has jurisdiction over a defendant. Diagnostic Affiliates of Ne. Hou., LLC v.

Aetna, Inc., 654 F.Supp.3d 595, 602 (S.D. Tex. 2023); Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l

Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). A court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing unless “material facts” regarding the existence of personal jurisdiction “are

in dispute.” Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002). “Establishing

a prima facie case still requires the plaintiff to show the nonresident defendant’s

purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of and minimum contacts with

the forum state.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,

868 (5th Cir. 2001). “Moreover, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,

uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and

conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the

plaintiff’s favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal

jurisdiction exists.” Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609. Additionally, “the court may receive

interrogatories, depositions, or any combination of the recognized methods of

discovery to help it resolve the jurisdictional issue.” Id. (citation modified).

A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant if (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over

that defendant; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moncrief Oil Int’l v. OAO Gazprom,

481 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2007). As “the limits of the Louisiana long-arm statute

are coextensive with constitutional due process limits,” the Court need only consider

the second step of the inquiry. Walk Haydel, 517 F.3d at 242–43 (citing A&L Energy,

Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 791 So.2d 1266, 1270 (La. 2001)). The constitutional

requirements for personal jurisdiction may be satisfied by a showing that (1) the

defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that imposing a

judgment (2) would not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Luv N’ care, Ltd., v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

“The ‘minimum contacts’ prong is further subdivided into contacts that give

rise to specific jurisdiction and those that give rise to general jurisdiction.”

Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Serv., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 343 (5th Cir. 2004).

Where a defendant has continuous and systematic general business

contacts with the forum state, the court may exercise general

jurisdiction over any action brought against the defendant. Where

contacts are less pervasive, the court may still exercise specific

jurisdiction in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts

with the forum.

Luv N’ care, 438 F.3d at 469 (citation modified).

A. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

defendant regardless of whether the claim arises from specific contacts between the

defendant and the forum state. Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. The two “paradigmatic” places

in which a corporation is typically subject to general jurisdiction are (1) its state of

incorporation and (2) the state in which it maintains its principal place of business.

Strong v. Bank of America Corp., No. 25-10199, 2025 WL 1795109, at *2 (5th Cir.

2025) (applying this test to determine whether general jurisdiction could be asserted

over a defendant-corporation). “When determining the scope of general personal

jurisdiction over a limited liability company (“LLC”), the Fifth Circuit conducts the

same inquiry as it does for corporations.” Laday v. Roderick, No. 22-261, 2023 WL

2188706, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2023) (citing Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) LLC,

947 F.3d 331, 336–38 (5th Cir. 2020)). For example, in Laday, the court looked to the

state where the LLC was organized and maintained its principal place of business.

Id. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is

the individual’s domicile.” Evergreen Media Holdings, LLC v. Safran Co., 68

F.Supp.3d 664, 674 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571

U.S. 117, 137 (2014)).

It is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than”

the “paradigmatic” place in which a defendant is typically subject to jurisdiction.

Monkton Ins. Servs. Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). To meet this

high threshold, plaintiff must show that defendant maintains such “continuous and

systematic” contacts with the forum state such that the defendant can fairly be

described as “at home” in the forum state. Frank, 947 F.3d at 336 (quoting Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).

B. Specific Jurisdiction

In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-

specific inquiry, allowing a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant

only for claims that arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Wilson,

20 F.3d at 647. “A plaintiff bringing multiple claims that arise out of different forum

contacts of the defendant must establish specific jurisdiction for each of them . . . the

Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction over any claim that does not

arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum contacts.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros

Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2006).

The Fifth Circuit follows a three-step analysis for specific jurisdiction. First,

the Court must determine “whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the

forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state

or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there.” Nuivo

Pignone, SpA v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). The “minimum

contacts” inquiry is fact intensive and no one element is decisive; rather the

touchstone is whether the defendant’s conduct shows that it “reasonably anticipates

being haled into court” in the forum state. Luv N’ care, 438 F.3d at 470 (quoting World

Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). “Random, fortuitous,

or attenuated contacts are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.” Moncrief Oil, 481

F.3d at 312 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985)).

Second, the Court considers “whether the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out

of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts.” Nuivo Pignone, 310 F.3d

at 378. The focus of the analysis is the “relationship among the defendant, the forum,

and the litigation.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir.

2008).

Third, “[i]f the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the burden

shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that [the court’s] exercise of

jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable.” Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271 (citing Burger

King, 471 U.S. at 482). “The relationship between the defendant and the forum must

be such that it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend the particular suit

which is brought there.” Johnston, 523 F.3d at 615. (quoting Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco

Co., 188 F.3d 619, 630 (5th Cir. 1999). However, “it is rare to say the assertion of

jurisdiction is unfair after minimum contacts have been shown.” Id. (citing Wein Air

Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)). To determine whether the

defendant met its burden to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair or

unreasonable, the Court analyzes five factors: “(1) the burden on the nonresident

defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief,

(4) the interest of the interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of

justice, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental

social policies.” Luv N’ care, 438 F.3d at 473.

III. DISCUSSION

A. General Jurisdiction

Defendant Woods is a resident of and domiciled in the State of Georgia.37

Defendant UMG is a corporation incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of

business in California.38 Defendant CMG is also incorporated in Delaware and its

principal place of business is in Tennessee.39 Defendant Warner is incorporated

pursuant to the laws of the State of California, and maintains its principal place of

business in California as well.40 Defendant BMG is a Delaware limited liability

company with its principal place of business in New York.41 None of the defendants

reside in, are incorporated or organized under the laws of, or maintain their principal

place of business in Louisiana.42 Thus, none of the typical avenues for general

jurisdiction apply here, and plaintiff must therefore show that each defendant

maintains “continuous and systematic” contacts with Louisiana such that defendants

can be fairly considered to be “at home” in this forum. Frank, 947 F.3d at 337.

Plaintiff’s complaint falls short of establishing these facts.

Plaintiff contends in her complaint that defendants “conduct continuous,

systematic, and routine business within the State of Louisiana and/or within this

district.”43 In support of this claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant Woods “has

37 R. Doc. No. 17-6 ¶ 3 (affidavit of Frederick Files, defendant Woods’s business

manager).

38 R. Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 4 (affidavit of Sheryl L. Gold, corporate secretary for defendant

UMG).

39 R. Doc. No. 17-3 ¶ 4 (affidavit of Randy Acker, outside corporate general counsel

for defendant CMG).

40 R. Doc. No. 17-4 ¶ 3 (affidavit of Jeremy Blietz, Senior Vice President of

Administration for North America for defendant Warner).

41 R. Doc. No. 17-5 ¶ 3 (affidavit of Keith Hauprich, General Counsel and Executive

Vice President for defendant BMG).

42 R. Doc. No. 17-1 at 3–4.

43 R. Doc. No. 1 at 2.

performed and/or will perform concert touring dates in this district” and “regularly

returns to New Orleans to promote her career.”44 Plaintiff further alleges that

defendants “have licensed, distributed, and exploited the [Never Find] (and other

songs) in this state.”45

However, in her response in opposition46 to defendants’ motion47 to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff does not present any factual support with

respect to her general jurisdiction claim.48 Even if she had made this argument,

plaintiff would not be able to show that defendants are “at home” in Louisiana.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges four specific instances in which defendant Woods

“has performed and/or will perform” and “promote[d] her career” in Louisiana.49 She

alleges that defendant Woods performed in New Orleans on September 19, 2023,

June 10, 2024, and July 4–7, 2025.50 She further alleges that defendant Woods made

a personal appearance in New Orleans “to promote her career” and “to further exploit

the infringing work” during Super Bowl LIX. 51 Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that

the other defendants conduct “continuous, systematic, and routine” business in

Louisiana based on their distribution of musical works into and collection of royalties

from Louisiana.52

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 R. Doc. No. 22.

47 R. Doc. No. 17.

48 R. Doc. No. 22.

49 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 4.

50 Id.

51 Id.

52 Id. ¶ 3.

This falls far short of the contacts needed to establish general jurisdiction over

defendants. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Jagger, No. 23-891, 2023 WL 6880431, at *3–5

(E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2023) (Fallon, J.) (finding that no personal jurisdiction existed over

defendants when they had distributed music in Louisiana and defendant-musicians

had performed in New Orleans four times), aff’d, 2024 WL 3717264 (5th Cir. Aug. 8,

2024) (affirming the district court’s holding that there was no personal jurisdiction

over defendants); Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415–16 (5th Cir. 1993)

(finding no personal jurisdiction existed over defendants who had distributed music

into the forum state); Johnson v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 610–12

(5th Cir. 2008) (finding that no general personal jurisdiction existed over the

defendant in Texas when it had sold goods and service contracts to ten different

customers in Texas, its employees periodically traveled to Texas to service equipment,

it advertised in a national trade journal that circulated in Texas, and its employees

attended multiple trade conferences in Texas). Merely conducting some portion of its

business in a state is not sufficient to render a company subject to general jurisdiction

in that forum. Johnston, 523 at 611–12. Moreover, the “prima-facie-case requirement

does not require the court to credit conclusory allegations,” such as plaintiff’s claim

that “[d]efendants conduct continuous, systematic, and routine business within the

State of Louisiana and/or within this district.”53 Panda Brandywine, 253 F.3d at 869.

The factual circumstances in this case are extremely similar to those in

Fernandez, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, where the court found that there was no

53 Id.

jurisdiction over the defendants. 2023 WL 6880431, at *3–5. In Fernandez, the

defendant-musicians had also performed in New Orleans four times and the

defendant-companies distributed music throughout Louisiana, just as plaintiff’s

complaint alleges defendants have done.54 Id. Four visits to New Orleans by

defendant Woods, and distribution of music in Louisiana by all defendants, are

insufficient to meet the “high threshold” of establishing the “continuous and

systematic” contacts that would render defendants “at home” in the State of

Louisiana. See, e.g., id.; Monkton, 768 F.3d at 432.

Plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case that defendants are subject to

general jurisdiction in the State of Louisiana. Accordingly, this Court cannot exercise

general jurisdiction over defendants within the limits of the Due Process Clause.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction exists over defendant Woods based on

her creation of the song Never Find and her performances in New Orleans.55 She

argues that specific jurisdiction exists over defendants UMG and CMG based on their

distribution of Never Find.56 And she alleges that jurisdiction exists over defendants

BMG and Warner based on their collection of royalties relating to Never Find.57

Plaintiff also argues that defendant’s affidavits are hearsay and should not be

considered by this Court.58 Regardless of whether hearsay evidence may be

54 Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.

55 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 17.

56 Id. ¶ 17

57 Id.

58 R. Doc. No. 21-1 at 5.

considered when deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), see Head v.

L.V. Sands, LLC, 298 F.Supp.3d 963, 967–69 (S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d 760 F.App’x 281

(5th Cir. 2019), plaintiff has not pointed to any specific statements in defendants’

affidavits that she identifies as hearsay.59 Moreover, the affidavits do not appear to

contain hearsay statements as each affidavit begins with a statement that all the

facts in the affidavit are within the declarant’s personal knowledge.60

Two other sections of this Court have recently denied the existence of specific

jurisdiction in cases with very similar factual circumstances. Fernandez, 2023 WL

6880431, at *3–5; Paynes v. Woods, No. 23-1308, 2024 WL 894901, at *2–3 (Guidry,

J.) (Mar. 1, 2024), aff’d 2024 WL 3717264. The Fernandez court, affirmed by the Fifth

Circuit in Fernandez v. Jagger, No. 23-30909, 2024 WL 3717264 (5th Cir. Aug. 8,

2024) [hereinafter Fernandez II], explained that the defendant performers “have not

purposely directed their activities or availed themselves of the privileges of this

District”61 when they only performed in New Orleans four times, the same number of

New Orleans performances that plaintiff alleges defendant Woods has conducted.

2023 WL 6880431, at *4. Additionally, in both Fernandez and the instant case, the

59 R. Doc. No. 22 at 5.

60 R. Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 1 (affidavit of Sheryl L. Gold, corporate secretary for defendant

UMG). R. Doc. No. 17-3 ¶ 1 (affidavit of Randy Acker, outside corporate general

counsel for defendant CMG); R. Doc. No. 17-4 ¶ 1 (affidavit of Jeremy Blietz, Senior

Vice President of Administration for North America for defendant Warner); R. Doc.

No. 17-5 ¶ 1 (affidavit of Keith Hauprich, General Counsel and Executive Vice

President for defendant BMG); R. Doc. No. 17-6 ¶ 1 (affidavit of Frederick Files,

business manager for defendant Woods).

61 The Court in Fernandez evaluated the defendants’ contacts specifically with the

Eastern District of Louisiana. However, in Fernandez II, the Fifth Circuit clarified

that “our circuit has not yet endorsed this interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a).”

2024 WL 3717264 at *2 n.2.

plaintiff did not claim that the work which allegedly infringed upon a copyright was

ever performed in Louisiana.62 Id. Nor had the defendant distributors purposefully

availed themselves of Louisiana law when they “distributed the Accused Work like

all other recordings that they control, with no special emphasis on this District.” Id.;

Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264, at *3 (“[Plaintiff] has not alleged that the defendants

have targeted Louisiana in any particularized way beyond making music generally

available on the internet.”)

The Paynes court noted that, as in the instant case, defendants had made “the

allegedly infringing work available for worldwide internet download” without a

special emphasis on Louisiana. 2024 WL 894901 at *3. It found that plaintiff failed

to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction based on

this worldwide digital distribution would subject the defendants to jurisdiction based

on “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts,” which is prohibited by the

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475

(1985)).

62 See generally R. Doc. No. 22. The defendants have also provided affidavits stating

that Never Find has never been performed in Louisiana. R. Doc. No. 17-6 ¶ 7

(affidavit of Frederick Files, defendant Woods’s business manager). The Court is

able to consider affidavits submitted by defendants in deciding a motion to dismiss

without allowing for jurisdictional discovery. See Paz v. Brush Engineered

Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he district court may consider

the contents of the record at the time of the motion, including affidavits.”); Innova

Hosp. San Anotnio, L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 995 F.Supp.2d 587,

615 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Paynes, 2024 WL 894901 at *3 (considering affidavits

submitted by defendants in its decision to deny jurisdictional discovery and citing

cases that followed similar procedures).

Plaintiff does not allege that, during the worldwide distribution of and

collection of royalties relating to Never Find, defendants placed any special emphasis

on distribution in Louisiana.63 If this Court was to find that it could assert personal

jurisdiction over defendants, that “would result in the necessary conclusion that such

a defendant would be subject to specific jurisdiction in any forum,” which “is in plain

contradiction with the due process requirement that ‘no federal court may assume

jurisdiction in personam of a non-resident defendant unless the defendant has

meaningful contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state.” Paynes, 2024 WL

894901, at *3 (emphasis in original) (quoting Luv N’ care, 438 F.3d at 469). Plaintiff’s

claims would be properly brought in defendants’ states of organization, principal

place of business, or residence. See Frank, 947 F.3d at 337.

Both courts also found that at most, “a highly attenuated relationship” existed

between the plaintiffs’ underlying claims and the defendants’ distribution of the

infringing work. Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264, at *3 (“[S]imply marketing an

allegedly copyright-infringing song to the ‘broadest possible geographical basis’—

including the forum state—amounts to a ‘highly attenuated relationship’ between the

allegedly unlawful acts and the forum state that is insufficient to establish minimum

contacts.”) (quoting Ham, 4 F.3d at 416); Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at *3. As the

Fernandez II court stated, “there is no connection between the forum and the specific

claims at issue.” 2024 WL 3717264, at *3 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super.

63 See generally R. Doc. No. 22.

Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017) (“What is needed—and what is

missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”)).

The same reasoning applies in the instant case. The defendants’ distribution

of music into Louisiana and collection of royalties, or lack thereof, has no bearing on

the issue of whether defendants infringed upon plaintiff’s copyrighted work.

Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264, at *3; Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at *2–4; Ham, 4

F.3d at 416 (“[Plaintiff] alleges no injury flowing from that distribution. Rather,

resolution of this action depends solely upon whether [plaintiff] infringed copyrights

owned by [defendants]”). It is undisputed that Never Find was not written, produced,

or recorded in Louisiana.64 Nor has the work ever been performed in Louisiana.65 As

previously stated, it is well settled that a defendant cannot be “haled into a

jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” without

violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at *3 (quoting

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475). The underlying copyright claim does not “arise out of or

result from the defendant’s forum-related contacts” when those contacts consist solely

of music distribution, musical performances at which the allegedly infringing work

was not performed, and the collection of royalties. Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264,

at *3; Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at *2–4.

Nor would it be “fair and reasonable” to assert jurisdiction over defendants in

this case. Fernandez, 2023 WL 6880431, at *3–5 Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at *2–4.

64 R. Doc. No. 17-6 ¶ 4 (affidavit of Frederick Files, defendant Woods’s business

manager).

65 Id. ¶ 7.

As discussed, the relationship between defendants and this forum is “highly

attenuated.” Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264, at *3; Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at

*2– 4. And like in Fernandez II, Never Find “was written and recorded outside of

Louisiana and was distributed nationwide without a particular emphasis on

Louisiana.” 2024 WL 3717264, at *3. Without more, such as an argument that

defendants placed “special emphasis” on Louisiana in marketing Never Find, it would

not be “fair and reasonable” for this Court to assert specific jurisdiction over

defendants. Id.

Plaintiff, citing Luv N’ care, argues that specific jurisdiction may be asserted

based on “the mere placement of a product in the stream of commerce.”66 However,

Luv N’ care, which concerned the defendant’s regular shipments of physical products

into Louisiana, is inapplicable in this context. See Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264 at

*2–3. When addressing virtual contacts, the Fifth Circuit follows a different line of

cases, and it has held that “accessibility on the internet alone cannot sustain our

jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21 F.4th 314, 320

(5th Cir. 2021); see also Admar Int’l, Inc. v. Eastrock, LLC, 18 F.4th 783, 788 (5th Cir.

2021) (“Merely running a website that is accessible in all 50 states, but that does not

specifically target the forum state, is not enough to create the ‘minimum contacts’

necessary to establish personal jurisdiction in the forum state . . .”). When, as here,

the contacts plaintiff alleges give rise to specific personal jurisdiction are based on

internet availability, the Fifth Circuit has made it clear that something more than

66 R. Doc. No. 22 at 8.

“universal accessibility” is required, and Luv N’ care’s stream-of-commerce theory

does not apply. See Johnson, 21 F.4th at 317–26; Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264 at

*2–3; Admar Int’l, 18 F.4th at 786–88.

C. Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery to establish further contacts between

defendants and this forum that plaintiff argues would show defendants’ purposeful

availment of the laws of Louisiana.67 Specifically, plaintiff seeks discovery relating

to: (1) “concerts in Louisiana whereby [d]efendant Woods may have performed;” (2)

“any contracts the [d]efendants had with vendors in Louisiana to distribute and/or

publish the infringing works or any musical work;” (3) “any marketing the

[d]efendants directed toward Louisiana for the publication and distribution of the

infringing works or any musical works of the [d]efendants;” (4) “the number of visits

to Louisiana of [d]efendant Woods for the exploitation of [defendant Woods’s] musical

works;” (5) “any documents illustrating that the musical works created, published

and distributed by the [d]efendants were consumed by residents of Louisiana;” (6)

“any documents evidencing that the [d]efendants have chosen for their musical works

to not be consumed in Louisiana;” (7) “copies of any and all advertisements and/or

solicitations in Louisiana of any and all musical works of the [d]efendants;” (8) “any

licensing agreements contracted with entities or persons in Louisiana regarding the

musical works of the [d]efendants;” (9) “any social media posts of the [d]efendants

directed toward consumers in Louisiana regarding the exploitation of the musical

67 See generally R. Doc. No. 21.

works of the [d]efendants;” (10) “any agreements or other documents indicating the

publication of the musical works on radio stations in Louisiana, documents and

information regarding the publication of music videos exploiting the musical works

of the defendants in Louisiana;” and (11) “the number of copies of the infringing work

and other musical works sold and/or purchased in Louisiana.”

The plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating the necessity of jurisdictional

discovery.” Paynes, 2024 WL 894901, at *3. Jurisdictional discovery is inappropriate

when it would not lead to the disclosure of significant material facts. Monkton, 768

F.3d at 434; Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 221 (5th Cir. 2000);

Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 284 (5th Cir. 1982). Such is the case before this Court.

Most of plaintiff’s discovery requests seek information relating to “any musical

work” of defendants.68 However, plaintiff’s claims do not “arise out of or result from”

other musical works by defendant Woods that plaintiff does not allege infringe upon

any of her copyrighted works. See Paynes, 2024 WL 849901 at *3 (rejecting

jurisdictional discovery regarding the distribution of “any musical work” of the

defendants). In the case of the other defendants, plaintiff’s claims certainly do not

“arise out of or result from” the musical works of artists other than defendant Woods

and the efforts of defendants to distribute those works in Louisiana. See id. And

plaintiff’s claims do not “arise out of or result from” the distribution of musical works

that were written before plaintiff’s original work was released. See id.

68 R. Doc. No. 21-1 at 3–4.

Nor do plaintiff’s other jurisdictional discovery requests suggest that they

would lead to the disclosure of significant material facts. See id.; Monkton, 768 F.3d

at 434. First, as previously discussed, plaintiff’s claims do not “arise out of or result

from” defendant Woods’s concerts or personal appearances in Louisiana, particularly

when plaintiff has not made any allegations that Never Find was ever performed in

Louisiana.69 See Fernandez II, 2024 WL 3717264 at *3; Ham, 4 F.3d at 416.

Regarding plaintiff’s request for contracts with vendors relating to defendant’s

distribution of “the infringing works or any musical work” in Louisiana, it is well-

settled that contracts alone are not a sufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction

over a defendant. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985); Rudzewicz, 471

U.S. at 479–87. Defendants have also submitted affidavits that no such contracts

exist.70

Plaintiff relies on her counsel’s purchase of a copy of defendant Woods’s album

“Glorious” on vinyl at a New Orleans record store as evidence that defendants

“specifically targeted consumers in Louisiana.”71 However, Never Find was not

included on the vinyl that plaintiff’s counsel purchased, as it was only released as a

bonus track on “an exclusive digital version” of the album “Glorious.”72

69 See generally R. Doc. No. 21-1; R. Doc. No. 17-6 ¶ 7 (Defendant Woods’s business

manager’s affidavit stating that the allegedly infringing work has never been

performed in Louisiana).

70 R. Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 9; R. Doc. No. 17-3 ¶ 6; R. Doc. No. 17-4 ¶ 8; R. Doc. No. 17-5 ¶

5.

71 R. Doc. No. 21-1 at 4.

72 R. Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 7 (affidavit of Sheryl L. Gold, corporate secretary of defendant

UMG); R. Doc. No. 17-3 ¶ 8 (affidavit of Randy Acker, outside corporate general

counsel for defendant CMG).

Plaintiff supports her motion for jurisdictional discovery with mere

speculation, and plaintiff lacks factual support to support a finding that jurisdictional

discovery would lead to the disclosure of significant material facts.73 Instead, plaintiff

lists a laundry list of unsupported allegations without linking them to particular

defendants.74

Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery would not be likely to lead to the

disclosure of significant material facts and must be denied. See Fernandez II, 2024

WL 3717264 at *3; Monkton, 768 F.3d at 434; Alpine View Co., 205 F.3d at 221; Wyatt,

686 F.2d at 284.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion75 to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED.76 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion77 to conduct

jurisdictional discovery is DENIED.

73 See generally R. Doc. No. 21.

74 Id.

75 R. Doc. No. 17.

76 Because of this Court’s opinion with respect to personal jurisdiction, the Court does

not reach defendant’s venue arguments or whether plaintiff failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Cf. Fernandez, 2023 WL 6880431 (declining to

address defendants’ arguments for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) after

determining that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants); United

States v. Texas Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (evaluating the

question of personal jurisdiction before addressing any claim on its merits).

77 R. Doc. No. 21.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motions”® to dismiss pursuant

to Rules 12(b)(8) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are

DISMISSED AS MOOT.

New Orleans, Louisiana, November 21, 2025.

os M. AFRICK

UNITED STAZES DISTRICT JUDGE

78 R. Doc. No. 18.

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