BUCHANAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AMERICAN CLASSICS OF :

LAKEWOOD, LLC, et al., : Civil Action No. 22-5382 (GC)(JTQ)

:

Plaintiffs, :

: MEMORANDUM OPINION

v. : AND ORDER

:

DANIEL BUCHANAN, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

:

The recipients of third-party subpoenas—Latrecia Littles-Floyd (“Littles-

Floyd”), Michael P. Rutherford, Gregory D. Focarino, Brittni V. Pizzarelli, Tamika M.

Day, Tavia S. Kelly, Christopher Hillmann, James S. Walker, George P. Kinczel,

Andre M. Bethea, and Ernest F. DiStefano (collectively, “MVC Employees”)

(collectively with Littles-Floyd, “Third Parties”)—filed a motion to quash subpoenas

that were served on them. ECF No. 61. On June 2, 2025, Plaintiffs American Classics

of Lakewood, LLC (“ACL”), American Classics of Lakewood IV, LLC (“ACL IV”), and

John Patel (“Patel”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Cross-Motion to Compel and

Disqualify Counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. ECF No. 73. The Court has fully reviewed

the submissions of the parties and addresses the motions without oral argument

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, the Third Parties’

Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiffs own and manage several properties throughout New Jersey, many of

which are leased to used car dealerships. Compl. ¶ 3. This matter arises out of

Defendants’ Daniel Buchanan (“Buchanan”), Theodore Lefkowich2 (“Lefkowich”), and

the New Jersey Motor Vehicles Commission (the “MVC”) denial of used car dealer

licenses to Plaintiffs.

In 2017, MVC investigators Buchanan and Lefkowich were assigned to conduct

routine inspections of Plaintiffs’ properties and review the related licensing

applications. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. Buchanan and Lefkowich denied multiple license

applications connected to Patel’s properties. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs allege that Buchanan

and Lefkowich made false, reckless, and malicious statements to Plaintiffs’ existing

clients, stating, among other things, that Patel is dishonest, engages in fraudulent

business practices, and, at that time, was the subject of an ongoing criminal

investigation. Id.

In 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit in New Jersey Superior Court against Buchanan

and Lefkowich, asserting claims for interference with contractual relations, trade

disparagement, and economic harm. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. The parties entered into a

settlement agreement on February 7, 2020 whereby Buchanan and Lefkowich were

1 The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”), and

are assumed true for the purposes of this decision.

2 Defendant Lefkowich is mistakenly identified as Theodore “Lefkowitz” in the

Complaint. Compl. ¶ 6.

barred from inspecting or reviewing applications for any properties owned by

Plaintiffs until February 7, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 38-41.

Following that exclusionary period, Buchanan and Lefkowich resumed

oversight of Plaintiffs’ properties. Id. ¶ 47. From October 2021 onward, Buchanan

and Lefkowich denied sixteen separate license applications, each of which Plaintiffs

allege met all regulatory requirements and were otherwise satisfactory. Id. ¶¶ 48-49.

Plaintiffs further claim that Buchanan and Lefkowich have again made disparaging

comments regarding Patel’s character, accusing him of “dropp[ing] envelopes to state

officials,” to imply bribery. Id. ¶ 68.

Plaintiffs filed the instant federal action in 2022 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

raising First Amendment retaliation and selective enforcement claims. Id. ¶ 77.

Plaintiffs’ suit against the MVC was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, and

the only claims that remain are the First Amendment retaliation claims. ECF No. 21.

B. Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Depose Third-Party Witnesses and to

Disqualify Counsel

On February 21, 2025, Plaintiffs served Subpoenas Duces Tecum and

Testificandum (“Subpoenas”) requiring the Third Parties to appear for a deposition

and to produce certain documents. On March 18, 2025, the New Jersey Office of the

Attorney General (“OAG”) acknowledged service of the Subpoenas on the Third

Parties. See ECF No. 73, Ex. N. That same day, the OAG lodged a formal objection to

the Subpoena served on Littles-Floyd under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B), arguing it was

vague and overbroad. Id. The objection made no reference to the Subpoenas served

on other MVC Employees.

On April 18, 2025, Plaintiffs sent the OAG two letters. Plaintiffs’ first letter

requested that the OAG withdraw as counsel. According to Plaintiff, the OAG’s prior

representation of Defendants created an unwaivable conflict of interest of the Third

Parties here.3 Id., Ex. O. The second letter advised the OAG that their objection to

the Subpoena was without merit. Id., Ex. P. The Parties met and conferred on April

24, 2025, which resolved nothing.

The OAG promptly filed the instant motion. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion followed

shortly thereafter.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the issuance, service, and

enforcement of subpoenas. If the information sought falls within the scope of

permissible discovery, then a party may serve a subpoena on a third party to obtain

documents, testimony, and/or other information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c). Rule

26(b)(1) sets forth scope of permissible discovery. See In re Novo Nordisk Sec. Litig.,

530 F. Supp. 3d 495, 501 (D.N.J. 2021). Pursuant to Rule 26,

[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged

matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and

proportional to the needs of the case, considering the

importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount

in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the

discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden

or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely

benefit.

3 In this matter, Defendants were initially represented by the OAG. However, the

OAG notified the Court of its intent to withdraw as attorney on February 18, 2025.

ECF No. 53. Private counsel substituted into the matter on March 4, 2025. ECF No.

56.

Clearly, “Rule 26 establishes a liberal discovery policy.” S.M. v. Tamaqua Area Sch.

Dist., 2023 WL 3689607, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 26, 2023). And federal courts have

“discretion to manage discovery[.]” Resser v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 2022 WL

1240859, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2022) (citing Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d

724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995); Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999)). However,

courts should not allow discovery to “serve as a fishing expedition.” Saller v. QVC,

Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82895, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2016). To that end, if the

requests do not fall within the permissible scope of discovery under Rule 26, the

subpoena may be quashed or modified. Schmulovich v. 1161 Rt. 9 LLC, 2007 WL

2362598, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Motion to Quash and The Cross-Motion to Compel

The Third Parties argue that the Subpoenas should be quashed on multiple

grounds. The Third Parties contend that the Morgan doctrine prohibits the

deposition of Littles-Floyd, who serves as the Chief Administrator of the MVC. The

Third Parties also maintain that the Subpoenas should be quashed because they

improperly seek documents belonging to the MVC, which was not subpoenaed.

Finally, the Third Parties argue that the Subpoenas must be quashed because they

are unduly burdensome and duplicative with respect to both the testimony and

documents sought by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs dispute these arguments and ask that the

Court compel the Third Parties to respond to the Subpoenas, produce the requested

documents, and appear for depositions. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

i. The Morgan Doctrine

Littles-Floyd argues that as the Chief Administrator of the MVC, her

deposition is precluded by the “Morgan doctrine.” Littles-Floyd is correct.

In United States v. Morgan, the Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary of

Agriculture—who had previously conducted quasi-judicial proceedings in connection

with certain rate settings—should not be required to testify about his mental

deliberations. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1941). The Supreme

Court found such an inquiry would be as improper as an examination to that into

deliberative process of a judge. Id. at 422 (“Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such

a scrutiny, . . . so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally

respected.”). Morgan thus stands for the proposition that high-ranking government

officials should not be subject to the taking of depositions absent extraordinary

circumstances.” United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316

(D.N.J. 2009). Accordingly, district courts must “balance the need for broad discovery

with the need to protect high-ranking government officials from nettlesome

deposition taking.” Id. at 321.

But who qualifies as such an official and what constitutes extraordinary

circumstances has been the subject of much judicial writing, with courts articulating

different rationales for the doctrine, including protecting the decision-making process

of officials, ensuring officials are able to perform their official tasks without

disruption, and avoiding discouraging qualified individuals from entering public

service. Id.

In determining whether the Morgan doctrine applies, the Court must first

consider whether Littles-Floyd qualifies as a high-ranking government official.

Courts generally have identified high-ranking officials to include individuals such as

governors, agency heads, mayors, and corporation counsel, given the significant

responsibilities they hold and the potential disruption their depositions may cause.

See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 1998 WL 132810, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1998) (treating

the Mayor of New York City as a high-ranking official); see also Buono v. City of

Newark, 249 F.R.D. 469, 470–71 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding the Corporation Counsel of

Newark to be high-ranking due to their leadership and advisory role in city

governance).

Here, Littles-Floyd asserts that the Chief Administrator of the MVC

unquestionably qualifies as a high-ranking government official protected by the

Morgan doctrine. ECF No. 61-1 at 7. Littles-Floyd explains that as the head of the

MVC, she: (1) oversees more than 2,500 State employees; (2) is a member of Governor

Phil Murphy’s Cabinet; and (3) has extensive powers and duties. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that Littles-Floyd does not qualify as a high-ranking

government official because she allegedly oversees only a “directorate of a component

of a government agency.” ECF No. 73-22 at 19. Plaintiffs rely on Florida v. United

States, where the court held that the Executive Associate Director of Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not a high-ranking government official subject

to the doctrine because, in his position, he oversaw only a portion of a government

agency and was not at the uppermost part of the government agency. 625 F. Supp. 3d

1242, 1247 (N.D. Fla. 2022).

The Court concludes that Littles-Floyd is a high-ranking government official

and that Florida v. United States is easily distinguishable from the facts at hand.

Littles-Floyd does not oversee only a component of an agency as the government

official did in Florida v. United States; instead, she oversees and manages the entire

agency. For this reason alone, the decision is inapposite, and Plaintiffs’ reliance on it

is misplaced. The Court likewise rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that Littles-Floyd is not

“at the uppermost part of a government agency.” ECF 73-22 at 19 (citing Florida, 625

F. Supp. 3d. at 1247. Plaintiffs’ position on this score is neither factually nor legally

sound. Indeed, as Plaintiffs, themselves, admit, Littles-Floyd, as Chief

Administrator, oversees thirteen individual Deputy Administrators and a Chief of

Staff, who each in turn oversee an organizational unit of the MVC. ECF No. 73-22 at

19. These fourteen delegates would be more akin to the Executive Associate Director

of ICE as discussed by the Florida court. Florida, 625 F. Supp. 3d at 1247. Moreover,

Littles-Floyd serves as the Chair of Directors for the agency. ECF No. 73-22. Thus, it

cannot be disputed that Littles-Floyd is the top official of the MVC, requiring

application of the Morgan doctrine.

That, of course, is but step one of the analysis. The Court must next address

whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist to warrant Littles-Floyd’s deposition.

See Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d at 316. They do not.

Buono v. City of Newark is instructive. 249 F.R.D. 469 (D.N.J. 2008). In

Buono, then Magistrate Judge Shwartz outlined a five-part test to determine whether

extraordinary circumstances exist to permit the deposition of a high-level government

official. Specifically, a party seeking such a deposition must show: (1) that the

official’s testimony is necessary to obtain relevant information that is not available

from another source; (2) the official has first-hand information that could not be

reasonably obtained from other sources; (3) the testimony is essential to that party’s

case; (4) the deposition would not significantly interfere with the ability of the official

to perform his government duties; and (5) that the evidence sought is not available

through any alternative source or less burdensome means. Buono, 249 F.R.D. at 471

n.2.

The application of this test is flexible. The court in Sensient Colors, for

example, considered factors 1, 2, and 5 together, as these three are all directed to the

key question of “whether the government official had personal involvement or

knowledge relevant to the case.” Stevenson v. City of Newark, 2024 WL 1526102, at

*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2024) (citing Sensient Colors, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 322). Doing the

same here, the Court finds that Littles-Floyd (1) did not have personal involvement

in underlying events, (2) has no firsthand knowledge relevant to this case, and (3) the

information sought by Plaintiffs can be obtained through other means. Nothing

Plaintiffs argue changes this conclusion.

Plaintiffs’ claim that Littles-Floyd’s firsthand knowledge is based on her status

as:

(1) [A]n official whose signature block accompanied the

November 18, 2024, Proposed Order of Denial and January

10, 2025 Formal Order of Denial issued by the BLS;

(2) [T]he recipient of correspondence requesting the

Orders of Denial be rescinded and documenting the extent

to which employees of the BLS serving under her

supervision retaliated against Plaintiff;

(3) [T]he supervisor of the Defendants, and therefore,

the individual who provided instructions to the Defendants

concerning the issues in this case;

(4) [A] long-time employee of the NJ MVC, and former

Director of the Security, Investigations, and Internal Audit

Unit, Littles-Floyd not only has direct knowledge of the

disparate treatment of Plaintiff’s tenant dealer

applications, but of how a neutral system of licensure is to

be conducted; and

(5) [A] supervisor and overseer of the NJ MVC, Littles-

Floyd’s deposition testimony is essential to prove elements

of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim.

ECF No. 73-22 at 21-22.

The Court fails to see how the above constitutes first-hand knowledge of the

facts of Plaintiffs’ case or how the same information sought through Littles-Floyd’s

deposition could not be obtained through other (less disruptive) means. Plaintiffs’

only remaining claim is that “Buchanan and Lefkowich retaliated against them for

‘filing grievances with the [MVC] … and commencing the 2018 Action’ by ‘improperly

denying licensing applications made in connection with properties owned by the

Plaintiffs.’” ECF No. 61-1 at 9 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 87-88).

But Plaintiffs fail to connect any of this conduct to Littles-Floyd. Plaintiffs

make no accusations as to Littles-Floyd’s involvement with the denials at issue, nor

allege that Littles-Floyd spoke with Buchanan or Lefkowich regarding the denials.

Littles-Floyd did not even so much as sign the denial forms. The mere presence of

Littles-Floyd’s typed name in the signature block on the forms is insufficient to

demonstrate first-hand knowledge of or involvement in the matter to justify the

taking of her deposition. Further, to the extent Plaintiffs seek information regarding

MVC policy, there are ample other means to obtain such information without unduly

burdening the Agency Chief with sitting for hours of deposition questioning. As such,

Plaintiffs have failed to show that extraordinary circumstances exist to depose

Littles-Floyd. Consequently, the Court grants the Third Parties’ application to quash

the Subpoena for the deposition of Littles-Floyd.

ii. MVC Employee Depositions

Plaintiffs also seek to depose ten non-party MVC Employees. The MVC

Employees include the MVC BLS supervisor, a former supervisor for the MVC’s Office

of Legal and Regulatory Affairs, a former Director of Legislative Affairs for the NJ

MVC, Compliance Processors, a Deputy Director at the MVC BLS, and both Junior

and Senior Technicians in the Processing Unit of the BLS. ECF No. 73-22 at 11-13.

Plaintiffs largely seek information pertaining to MVC policies and processing

practices for license applications. Id.

Although the scope of discovery is broad under Rule 26(b)(1), it is “not

unlimited and may be circumscribed.” Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 191

(3d Cir. 1999). “Such limitation may be particularly appropriate in the context of

third-party subpoenas, as ‘the standards for nonparty discovery require a stronger

showing of relevance than for simple party discovery.’” Phillips v. Archdiocese of

Newark, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80184, at *9 (D.N.J. May 8, 2023) (quoting Burgess

v. Galloway, et al., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195505, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2021)); see

also Chazanow v. Sussex Bank, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89279, at *2 (D.N.J. July 1,

2014) (granting a non-party greater protection from discovery).

As discussed briefly above, Plaintiffs’ only surviving claim is for alleged

retaliation against Buchanan and Lefkowich, neither of whom Plaintiffs have sought

to depose at this point. Further, Plaintiffs maintain this action against Defendants

in their individual capacities, not as employees of the MVC. And despite the limited

nature of the suit, Plaintiffs seek to depose eleven individuals4 on twenty-one

identical topics, requesting information that spans over two decades. See ECF No. 61,

Exs. B-K. But Plaintiffs have produced no evidence indicating that these MVC

Employees either participated in Buchanan’s or Lefkowich’s denials of the licensing

applications or were involved in processing said applications to a greater extent than

routine intake of the applications.5 Other employees subpoenaed by Plaintiffs were

involved in overseeing Plaintiffs’ license applications, but only after the period at

issue, i.e., once Buchanan and Lefkowich were “walled off.”6 See ECF Nos. 61-2 ¶¶ 6-

4 The Court includes Littles-Floyd in this count.

5 MVC Employees Tamika Day, Tavia Kelly, and Brittni Pizzarelli are technicians

involved at the beginning of the dealer license application review process, before final

decisions are made. See ECF No. 80 at 15-16. With respect to MVC Employees George

Kinczel, Andre Bethea, and Ernest DiStefano, Plaintiffs broadly state that they were

“were all involved in processing Plaintiff’s tenant-dealer applications and played

central roles in retaliating against Plaintiff for his refusal to accept a bribe.” ECF No.

73-22 at 13. However, Plaintiffs fail to provide any support of same.

6 This is true for MVC Employees Michael Rutherford and Gregory Focarino.

7. It is apparent that Plaintiffs do not know exactly whom they are seeking to depose

or in what capacity.7

Plaintiffs have presented no justification for the breadth and number of the

Subpoenas. Thus, the Court finds the Subpoenas to be unduly burdensome and

unreasonably duplicative and cumulative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i), (iii). The

Third Parties’ Motion to Quash the Subpoenas as to the depositions of the MVC

Employees is granted.

iii. Production of MVC Documents

Plaintiffs’ request for the production of certain documents fares no better, as

the Court also denies this request and grants the Third Parties’ Motion to Quash.

Plaintiffs have subpoenaed the Third Parties for documents belonging to the

MVC. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the MVC has ownership of the documents, but

instead argue that under Rule 34, legal ownership of a document is not determinative,

with possession and control “sufficient to permit a request for production.” ECF No.

73-22 at 23 (quoting In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 109 B.R. 658, 661 (E.D.Pa.

1990)). Plaintiffs further note that Rule 34 requires parties “to produce and permit

the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test or sample . . . any

designated documents or electronically stored information-including writings,

7 Plaintiffs at various points in their brief identify Littles-Floyd, Christopher

Hillman, and James Walker as Buchanan’s and Lefkowich’s direct supervisor and do

not address this inconsistency. ECF No. 73-22 at 19, 12. Plaintiffs also mistakenly

claim that Christipher Hillman has retired from the MVC despite his continued role

as the MVC’s Director of Legislative Affairs and Secretary of the MVC Board. ECF

No. 80 at 16 n.9.

drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images and other data or

data compilations-stored in any medium from which can be obtained directly . . . .”

ECF No. 73-22 at 23 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A)-(B)).

Third Parties reject the contention that because they have access to MVC

documents, they are required to produce them. Third Parties cite to Lowe v. District

of Columbia, in which the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the production

of documents belonging to the District of Columbia Department of Health from

employees of the agency, including its director. 250 F.R.D. 36, 39 (D.D.C. 2008). The

court held that a government employee’s “‘control’ of documents created in the

ordinary course of the government’s business is secondary to that of his employer; he

cannot on his own initiative remove government files and provide them to a third

party.” Id. (citing United States ex. rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467 (1951)).

The court further found that the appropriate remedy was to subpoena the agency

directly for the documents. Id.

Plaintiffs’ argument misses the mark, and their reliance on In re Sunrise

Securities Litigation is misplaced. In that case, the defendant sought the production

of documents from multiple agencies. In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 109 B.R. at

660. One such agency, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

(“FSLIC”), argued that it could not produce the documents, despite its access to same,

since “[f]ederal regulations establish that all bank examination reports, workpapers

and internal agency memoranda are the exclusive property of the Federal Home Loan

Bank Board (‘FHLBB’), and only FHLBB has control over the documents.” Id. at 661.

The court agreed with FSLIC’s argument and found that: (1) “FSLIC has never had

possession, custody or control over the documents in question . . .”; and (2) “FSLIC

cannot be compelled to produce the documents pursuant to Rule 34(a).” Id. In that

same opinion, the court granted the defendant’s motion to compel with respect to a

different agency, but only because the documents at issue were not subject to the

same federal protection and were the property of the agency at issue. Id. at 663.

Significantly, the defendant in that action sought to compel the agencies themselves,

not employees of the agencies. This case thus provides no support for the blanket

proposition that employees of a state agency have possession, custody, or control over

agency documents for the purposes of Rule 34(a).

Instead, the Court agrees with the sentiments expressed by the Lowe court

that government documents should not and cannot be compelled from government

employees. Lowe, 250 F.R.D. at 39. Rather, it is proper to subpoena such documents

from the government or agency itself. Id. Here, the documents sought by Plaintiffs

belong to the MVC and are state property—i.e., not property of the Third Parties. And

because the MVC is the proper party, Plaintiffs should have directed their subpoena

for documents to that entity. Indeed, Plaintiffs must have recognized this to some

extent as they allege to have served a subpoena duces tecum on the MVC on May 15,

2025. This claim, although contested by the MVC and Third Parties,8 proves that the

8 Counsel for Third Parties, the OAG, asserts that on May 16, 2025, Plaintiffs e-

mailed a subpoena (without a place, date, or time for production) to the Division of

Law (not the MVC). ECF No. 80-1, Ex. A. Plaintiffs’ counsel was informed that the

subpoena should be served on the MVC directly. Id. Ex. B. Third Parties allege that

no such subpoena has been served.

Subpoenas at issue are unreasonably cumulative, as Plaintiffs seek production of the

same documents from twelve different parties. Accordingly, the Third Parties’ Motion

to Quash is granted in its entirety.

B. The Cross-Motion to Disqualify Counsel

Plaintiffs additionally cross-move to disqualify the OAG as counsel for the

Third Parties. Plaintiffs’ thin cross-motion is denied.

As a preliminary matter, the Court must point to the well-established principle

that “because motions to disqualify can have such drastic consequences, courts

disfavor such motions and grant them only when absolutely necessary.” Maldonado

v. New Jersey, 225 F.R.D. 120, 136-137 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing Alexander v. Primerica

Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993)). Furthermore, “[a]lthough

doubts are to be resolved in favor of disqualification, the party seeking

disqualification must carry a ‘heavy burden’ and must meet a ‘high standard of proof’

before a lawyer is disqualified.” Alexander, 822 F. Supp. at 1114. Plaintiffs have not

sustained their burden.

i. Disqualification under RPC 1.9

Plaintiffs first contend that the OAG’s continued representation of the Third

Parties poses a successive conflict of interest under the American Bar Association’s

Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.9(a)9 meriting disqualification from

9 Pursuant to the local rules of this Court, the RPCs, as modified and adopted by the

New Jersey Supreme Court, govern the ethical conduct of attorneys in this

Court. Maldonado v. New Jersey, 225 F.R.D. 120, 136-137 (D.N.J. 2004); see also Rule

6A, General Rules of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

further proceedings. ECF No. 73-22 at 25. Plaintiffs take the position that the Third

Parties’ interests are adverse to those of the OAG’s previous clients, Buchanan and

Lefkowich, such that disqualification is required. To support this assertion, Plaintiffs

claim that “if a Third Party might testify that the Defendants took deliberate actions

to prevent Plaintiffs’ tenants from obtaining dealers licenses, such testimony would

be a clear conflict for the OAG,” and note the possibility that Plaintiffs may later

amend the Complaint to include the Third Parties as defendants. ECF No. 73-22 at

27. This is insufficient to establish the existence of any materially adverse interest,

especially as the Subpoenas have been quashed in their entirety.

RPC 1.9(a) states that

A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter represent another client in the same or a

substantially related matter in which that client’s interests

are materially adverse to the interests of the former client

unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed

in writing.

Plaintiffs cite to no evidence to support the theory that the Third Parties interests

are “materially adverse” to the interests of Buchanan or Lefkowich and instead rely

only on vague hypothetical testimony with no support from the record. Plaintiffs also

fail to provide any precedent for the disqualification of a state attorney general from

representing a state agency on any grounds, much less under RPC 1.9(a). Absent

clear evidence of materially adverse interests, the Court will not order the

disqualification of the OAG.

Moreover, although the provisions of RPC 1.10 set forth that the restrictions

in RPC 1.9 apply both to individual attorneys and firms, the Court is satisfied that

different attorneys within the OAG were assigned to represent Defendants and the

Third Parties. The Court further appreciates the OAG’s reassurance that if a conflict

were to arise in the future, it would take immediate action “to screen the affected

attorneys and/or to retain outside counsel for the Third Parties.” ECF No. 80 at 20.

ii. Disqualification under RPC 1.7

Plaintiffs also submit that the Attorney General Matthew Platkin’s (“Platkin”)

continued role as a Director for the MVC likewise demonstrates a conflict of interest

that warrants the OAG’s disqualification from this action under RPC 1.7. Id. Platkin

serves on the Board of Directors to the MVC pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:2A-

12(a)(2). Plaintiffs argue that by holding this position while representing the Third

Parties, Platkin has created a concurrent conflict of interest as set forth in RPC 1.7,

requiring the disqualification of the entire OAG from future proceedings. ECF No.

73-22 at 29. The Court finds no merit in this argument.

Pursuant to RPC 1.7(a),

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not

represent a client if the representation involves a

concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of

interest exists if:

(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse

to another client; or

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one

or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's

responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third

person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

Here, as the Third Parties are not directly adverse in this action or in any other, RPC

1.7(a)(1) does not apply. See RPC 1.7 cmt. 6. Nor is there any indication that

representation will be materially limited under RPC 1.7(a)(2).

The American Bar Association offers guidance that “[t]he critical questions are

the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it

will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in

considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be

pursued on behalf of the client.” RPC 1.7 cmt. 8. However, “[t]he mere possibility of

subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent.” Id. As discussed

above, there is no evidence of adverse interest at this time such that any harm would

likely result from continued representation. The Court gives little credence to

Plaintiffs’ claim that because Platkin maintains his statutorily prescribed role on the

MVC Board of Directors, there exists a concurrent conflict of interest. ECF No. 73-22

at 29. If such were true, the OAG would be precluded from representing numerous

New Jersey agencies and employees across the state. The Court will not set this

precedent. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ cross-motion to disqualify is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Having considered the papers submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 78 and for the reasons set forth above;

IT IS on this 19th day of November, 2025

ORDERED that the Third Parties’ Motion to Quash (ECF No. 61) is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Compel (ECF No. 73) is DENIED;

and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is to terminate ECF Nos. 61 and 73.

s/ Justin T. Quinn

JUSTIN T. QUINN

United States Magistrate Judge