Quinones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JESSICA QUINONES, et al., ) Case No. 1:23-cv-2437

)

Plaintiffs, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

EDGEWATER YACHT CLUB, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Jessica Quinones, Allen Mentz, and Shannon Mesko filed suit

against Edgewater Yacht Club, Inc. Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko claim a hostile

work environment in violation of federal and State laws prohibiting sex

discrimination, and all three Plaintiffs allege retaliation. Defendant moves for

separate trials and to exclude the testimony of non-party witness Angelina Medina.

(ECF No. 14.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES both motions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At this stage of the proceedings, the record shows the following facts relevant

to disposition of the motion.

A. Jessica Quinones

Jessica Quinones worked at Edgewater Yacht Club. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 13, PageID

#3.) Beginning in April 2022 until the end of her employment in June 2022,

Ms. Quinones alleges that she experienced sexual harassment from coworker Lean

“Karlo” Almeda. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #3.) Ms. Quinones describes both verbal and

physical sexual harassment from Almeda, including unwanted touching, sexual

remarks about her body, and comments to her about his genitals. (Id., ¶¶ 16–18,

PageID #4.) In addition, Ms. Quinones alleges that she observed Mr. Almeda’s

physical advances toward and inappropriate comments about coworkers. (Id., ¶¶ 16,

18–20, PageID #3–4.) She claims that she saw another coworker, Tony Rancifer,

make sexually inappropriate comments about Shannon Mesko. (Id., ¶ 29, PageID

#6.)

During the period of alleged harassment between April and June 2022,

Ms. Quinones verbally complained to management regarding Almeda’s conduct. (Id.,

¶ 21, PageID #4.) Ms. Quinones complained to kitchen manager Abner Cortes, head

chef Ray Rodriguez, general manager Michael O’Malley, and general manager Ron

Wolfe, and she met with board chairman Duane Wolff. (Id., ¶¶ 21–24, 26, PageID

#4–5.) Because of the continued alleged sexual harassment and her suspicion that

management was shorting her wages, Ms. Quinones quit on June 16, 2022 and argues

that she was constructively terminated. (Id., ¶ 28, PageID #6; ECF No. 16, PageID

#571.)

B. Allen Mentz

Allen Mentz is Ms. Quinones’ son. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #6.) Then sixteen years

old, Mr. Mentz started working at Edgewater Yacht Club in May 2022, but was

terminated on June 18, 2022, two days after Ms. Quinones left. (Id.) Mr. Mentz had

not had any disciplinary issues during his employment. (Id.) On the day he was

terminated, Ms. Quinones called O’Malley and asked why Edgewater Yacht Club

fired her son. (Id., ¶ 31, PageID #6.) Mr. O’Malley answered that Mr. Mentz was an

at-will employee. (Id.) Mr. Mentz alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for

Ms. Quinones’ complaints of sexual harassment. (Id.)

C. Shannon Mesko

Shannon Mesko worked at Edgewater Yacht Club from approximately June

2021 to May 2022—overlapping with Ms. Quinones’ employment in April and May

2022. (Id., ¶ 33, PageID #7.) Ms. Mesko alleges that she experienced sexual

harassment by Almeda. (Id., ¶ 34, PageID #7.) She describes both verbal and

physical sexual harassment from Almeda, including unwanted touching, sexual

remarks about her body, and comments about his genitals. (Id., ¶ 34–35, PageID #7.)

Ms. Mesko also alleges that she experienced sexual harassment from Rancifer. (Id.,

¶¶ 43–45, PageID #9.) She describes both verbal and physical sexual harassment

from Rancifer, including unwanted physical touching, following her around the

workplace, and asking her out multiple times despite Ms. Mesko’s rejections. (Id.)

She alleges that she experienced verbal sexual harassment from O’Malley, including

an advance to see her after work. (Id., ¶ 40, PageID #8.) In addition, Ms. Mesko

alleges that she observed Almeda make sexually inappropriate comments and

advances toward other coworkers, including minors. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #7; ECF

No. 16, PageID #567–68.) Although she did not witness Almeda’s alleged harassment

of Ms. Quinones, Ms. Quinones told Ms. Mesko about it when it happened. (Id., ¶ 38,

PageID #8.) Ms. Mesko also alleges that she observed Almeda, Rodriguez, and

O’Malley make sexual jokes and witnessed O’Malley make sexually inappropriate

comments to employees and about female Yacht Club members. (Id., ¶¶ 39–41,

PageID #8.)

During the period of alleged harassment between August or September 2021

and May 2022, Ms. Mesko verbally complained to management regarding Almeda’s

and Rancifer’s harassment. (Id., ¶¶ 37 & 47, PageID #7 & #10.) As did Ms. Quinones,

Ms. Mesko complained to kitchen manager Cortes, head chef Rodriguez, general

manager Wolfe, and general manager O’Malley. (Id.) Also, she complained to bar

manager, Shioban Hobson. (Id., ¶ 47, PageID #10.) In May 2022, Ms. Mesko was

terminated. (Id., ¶ 48, PageID #10.) Edgewater Yacht Club told Ms. Mesko that the

reason for her termination was charging the service fee for to-go orders. (Id.)

However, because she charged orders that way throughout her nearly year-long

employment without discipline from management, Ms. Mesko alleges that this

explanation was pretextual and that she was fired for complaining about sexual

harassment. (Id.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs sued Edgewater Yacht Club, Inc. for sexually hostile work

environment and retaliation under both federal and State law. (ECF No.1.) After

beginning discovery, the parties mediated but were unable to reach a resolution.

(ECF No. 12.) Then, Defendant filed a combined motion to separate trials and motion

to exclude testimony of non-party witness Angelina Medina. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiffs

filed a combined opposition to the motions. (ECF No. 16.)

ANALYSIS

“Although not explicitly authorized by the Federal Rules of Evidence or the

Federal Rules of [Civil] Procedure, the practice of ruling on motions in limine ‘has

developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of

trials.’” United States v. Mack, 298 F.R.D. 349, 350–51 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting

Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984)). Ruling on motions in limine allows

both the court and counsel to avoid delay and “focus remaining preparation time on

issues that will be in fact considered by the jury.” Id. (citations omitted). But “[c]ourts

should exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when it is clearly inadmissible.”

Id. (citing Indiana Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio

2004)). If evidence is not “clearly inadmissible,” the court “should defer ruling until

trial” when it will have “proper context” to evaluate the evidentiary objection. Id.

(citation omitted). In limine rulings rest “within the sound discretion of the trial

court” and are merely preliminary, meaning the court can “change its ruling at trial

for any reason it deems appropriate.” Id. (citing United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d

999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994)).

I. Separate Trials

Defendant moves for separate trials of Ms. Quinones’ and Mr. Mentz’ claims in

one proceeding and Plaintiff Mesko’s claims in another. (ECF No. 14.) Defendant

argues that Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko experienced different actions from different

coworkers and did not work in the same location and that Plaintiffs fail to allege that

a member of management created the sexually hostile work environment. (Id.,

PageID #203–04.) Defendant also argues that trying the claims together would result

in bootstrapping Plaintiff Quinones’ claims on Plaintiff Mesko’s claims, and vice

versa. (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Quinones’ and Ms. Mesko’s claims are similar such

that judicial economy favors trying the claims together. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiffs

worked in food service at the same restaurant with the same staff and management.

(Id., PageID #579.) Plaintiffs describe the work environment as “intermingled” with

a non-bartender employee, Angelina Medina, complaining about harassment by a

cook, Almeda, to a bar manager, Hobson. (Id.) Plaintiffs argue that they are not

bootstrapping claims, but rather their direct experiences and observations make each

Plaintiff a witness in the other’s case and that other witnesses would need to testify

in both trials. (Id., PageID #580.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that bifurcation

would make this matter less convenient and less economical. (Id.)

A court may order separate trials for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to

expedite and economize the proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Only one criterion

must be met to separate. Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir.

1996). The decision to order separate trials lies within the discretion of the district

court and “is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. “A district

court needs to consider ‘the potential prejudice to the parties, the possible confusion

of the jurors, and the resulting convenience and economy.’” Huang v. Ohio State

Univ., 116 F.4th 541, 563 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308,

1311 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Title VII cases involving workplace harassment are highly fact dependent.

Where claims “center on allegations of continuous sex discrimination involving the

same modus operandi” and “are based on a similar series of transactions that were

committed by the same defendant over a relatively short time span,” the “potential

for jury confusion” is “outweighed by considerations of judicial economy” and the

defendant “suffer[s] no real prejudice given the similarities between the cases

involved.” Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 774 (5th Cir. 2009) (denying

bifurcation). Discrimination cases are “generally appropriate for combined

litigation.” Phillips v. Potter, No. 1:05-cv-1852, 2008 WL 11492752, at *31 (N.D. Ohio

Mar. 31, 2008) (denying a motion to sever because plaintiffs’ claims of sexually hostile

work environment possess sufficient commonality since plaintiffs worked at the same

location in the same capacity with the same supervisors and because of judicial

economy since plaintiffs will call many of the same witnesses).

Here, separate trials are not warranted. Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko allege

the same modus operandi of similar verbal and physical harassment from the same

individual, Almeda, over a relatively short time span that included some two

overlapping months. Ms. Quinones claims that Almeda harassed her from April 2022

to June 2022 (id., ¶¶ 16–18, PageID #4), and Ms. Mesko makes claims that Almeda

engaged in similar conduct with her from June 2021 to May 2022. (Id., ¶ 34–35,

PageID #7.) While the wording of the sexual comments and the physical touching

from Almeda might differ, both Plaintiffs allegedly experienced both verbal and

physical harassment and unwanted touching. (Id., ¶¶ 16–18 & 25, PageID #4 & #7.)

While Ms. Mesko also alleges verbal and physical harassment by Rancifer, the two

allegations of the two women center on Almeda. Additionally, Ms. Quinones and Ms.

Mesko reported the harassment to mostly the same management personnel,

specifically Cortes, Rodriguez, O’Malley, and Wolfe. (Id., ¶¶ 21–24, 26, 37 & 47,

PageID #4–5, #7 & #10.) Ms. Quinones also complained to board chairman Duane

Wolff, (Id., ¶ 26, PageID #5), and Ms. Mesko complained to bar manager Siobhan

Hobson. (Id., ¶ 47, PageID #10.) The fact that Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko each

complained to one different member of management does not outweigh the common

fact that they complained to four of the same members of management.

Because Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims involve the same modus operandi of alleged

verbal and physical harassment and are based on a similar series of transactions by

the same harasser over a relatively short time span, the claims substantially overlap

in evidence and witnesses. Separate trials would require many of the same witnesses

to testify twice. Trying the cases together promotes judicial economy and convenience

for the witnesses. On these facts and circumstances, the Court will exercise its

discretion to try the cases together with proper evidentiary safeguards and

appropriate jury instructions. Therefore, The Court DENIES the motion for separate

trials.

II. Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Non-Party Witness

Defendant moves to exclude testimony of non-party witness Angelina Medina

and, if her testimony is permitted, seeks to question Ms. Medina about her

settlement agreement.

II.A. Admissibility of Testimony

Defendant argues that Medina’s testimony should be excluded under Rule

403(b) because it has no probative value and would substantially prejudice

Defendant. (ECF No. 14, PageID #200.) Because Medina was sixteen and her

“alleged harasser was significantly older,” “[t]here is an ‘ick’ factor here that Plaintiffs

will wish to play up to create prejudice against Defendant. (Id.) Defendant also

argues that Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts to show conformity to character on a particular occasion, so Plaintiffs cannot

use evidence of what happened to Medina as character evidence that the same

harassment happened to Plaintiffs. (Id., PageID #198.) Defendant points out that

Medina’s EEOC charge involved harassment that occurred after Plaintiffs were no

longer employed at Edgewater Yacht Club. (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue that all of Medina’s testimony is relevant and admissible.

(ECF No. 16, PageID #575.) Defendant’s argument to exclude all of her testimony

relies on the timing of the harassment underlying her EEOC charge. (Id.) However,

Plaintiffs clarify that Medina’s experience of sexual harassment is not limited to the

incident with York that formed the basis of her EEOC charge. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege

that Almeda also harassed Medina, who witnessed his harassment of Ms. Quinones

and Ms. Mesko, Rancifer’s harassment of Ms. Mesko, and coworkers warn others

about harassment. Based on her experiences and observations, Plaintiffs argue that

Medina can speak to whether there was a culture of workplace harassment. (ECF

No. 15-1, PageID #337 & #368–72.)

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a “fact of consequence” to

the case “more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.

R. Evid. 401. To be relevant, the evidence need only “‘advance the ball’ by showing

that it is more (or less) likely that the plaintiff’s theory of the defendant’s liability is

true.” Huang, 116 F.4th at 564 (quoting Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir.

2009)). “Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely

be employed.” Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir.

1975). “A better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they

arise.” Id.

In the Title VII context, “‘other acts’ evidence consists of testimony or other

evidence of discrimination by the employer against non-party employees.” Griffin v.

Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 598 (6th Cir. 2012). Whether “other acts” evidence is

“relevant is a case-by-case determination that ‘depends on many factors, including

how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the

case.’” Id. (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 388, 388

(2008)). “[S]imilar acts of harassment of which a plaintiff is aware during her

employment can be introduced as evidence of a hostile work environment,” “even if

the harassing acts were directed at others or occurred outside of the plaintiff’s

presence.” Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 336–37 (6th Cir. 2008).

Medina is a third-party witness to Plaintiffs’ claims. She was hired in June

2021 as a hostess, food runner, and cleaner at Edgewater Yacht Club. (ECF No. 15-5,

PageID #558.) At the time of her employment, she was sixteen years old. (ECF

No. 16, PageID #571.) Her employment overlapped with Ms. Mesko’s from June 2021

to May 2022 (ECF No. 15-1, PageID #327) and eith Ms. Quinones’ from at least April

2022 to June 2022 (ECF No. 1, PageID #3 & 7).

During the time that Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko were employed by

Edgewater Yacht Club, Medina was also allegedly harassed by Almeda. (ECF

No. 15-1, PageID #362.) Ms. Quinones warned Medina about Almeda’s inappropriate

comments. (Id., PageID #362 & #363.) Ms. Quinones then reported these comments

about Medina to Ray Rodriguez. (ECF No. 16, PageID #570.)

During her overlapping periods of employment with Ms. Quinones and

Ms. Mesko, Medina allegedly observed harassment of coworkers, including Almeda’s

and Rancifer’s comments to Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko. (ECF No. 15-1, PageID

#337, #362, #365–66 & #368–72; ECF No. 16, PageID #567.) In December 2022, after

Ms. Quinones and Ms. Mesko were no longer employed by Edgewater Yacht Club,

Medina was allegedly harassed by Gerald York—who does not figure in the events

involving Ms. Quinones or Ms. Mesko. (ECF No. 15-5, PageID #558.) In December

2022, Medina filed an EEOC charge about Yorks’s harassment of her. (ECF No. 15-5.)

Medina settled this with Edgewater Yacht Club. (ECF No. 15-1, PageID #318–19.)

As of August 29, 2022, Medina was no longer employed by Edgewater Yacht Club.

(Id., PageID #327.)

The Court finds that some of Medina’s testimony is relevant and admissible.

The Court will impose evidentiary safeguards by limiting Medina’s testimony to

events through June 18, 2022—Mr. Mentz’ last day of employment, which is the latest

date of employment of any Plaintiff. Events involving Medina that occurred after

June 18, 2022 have no tendency to make any fact of consequence related to Plaintiffs’

claims more or less probable. Therefore, the Court will only permit a limited question

or two so that the jury knows that Medina stopped working at Edgewater Yacht Club

but not that she filed a claim or otherwise complained of harassment after that date.

II.B. Admissibility of Medina’s Settlement

If Medina testifies, Defendant seeks to “explore all circumstances of her claim,”

including the amount for which she agreed to settle. (ECF No. 14, PageID #201.)

Defendant argues that it “should be able to use the amount of Ms. Medina’s

settlement as a benchmark for the jury to consider when assessing the damages it

might award.” (Id.) Plaintiffs argue that allowing such evidence would violate the

plain language of Rule 408. (ECF No. 16, PageID #579.)

For two reasons, the Court will exclude such testimony from Medina. First, as

already discussed, the harassment of Medina that occurred after June 18, 2022,

Plaintiffs’ latest date of employment with Edgewater Yacht Club, have little if any

relevance. Therefore, the fact that she filed a charge with the EEOC and settled it

opens the door to a trial within a trial.

Additionally, evidence of settlement offers, negotiations, or agreements is “not

admissible—on behalf of either party—either to prove or disprove the validity or

amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a

contradiction.” Fed. R. Evid. 408. While Rule 408 “is ordinarily phrased in terms of

offers of compromise, it is apparent that a similar attitude must be taken with respect

to completed compromises when offered against a party thereto,” which “will not, of

course, ordinarily occur except when a party to the present litigation has

compromised with a third person.” Fed. R. Evid. 408 advisory committee notes.

Accordingly, Rule 408 bars the line of questioning Defendant proposes to

pursue. Medina’s settlement with Edgewater Yacht Club falls squarely within the

type of evidence to which the Rule applies. Conceivably, Defendant might offer this

evidence for some purpose that Rule 408 might not cover. In that case, consistent

with the standard for motions in limine, the Court will revisit the issue at trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for separate trials

and, subject to the Court’s limitations, DENIES the motion to exclude the testimony

of Angelina Medina.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2025

J.Philip Calabrese”

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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