Holladay

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

NUTRIEN AG SOLUTIONS, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL CASE NO. 2:25-cv-347-ECM

) [WO]

JASON T. HOLLADAY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 5, 2025, Nutrien Ag Solutions, Inc. (the “Plaintiff”) filed suit against JT

Holladay Farms, LLC (“Holladay Farms”) and its two members, Jason T. Holladay

(“Jason”) and Ashey S. Holladay (“Ashley”), (collectively, the “Defendants”) related to

unpaid debts for goods and services. (See doc. 1 at 2–4, paras. 4, 8–12).1 In its complaint,

the Plaintiff alleges breach of contract and four alternative theories permitting relief in the

amount of $105,800.22 plus pre-judgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. (Id. at 4–7,

paras. 13–28).2 Following proper service on July 13, 2025 (docs. 5–7), the Defendants

failed to plead or otherwise defend. Consequently, on August 29, 2025, the Plaintiff

requested the Clerk of the Court enter default against the Defendants. (Doc. 9). On

1 For clarity, the Court refers to the document and page numbers generated by CM/ECF.

2 The other claims for relief are open account (Count II), “Account Stated” (Count III), “Goods Sold and

Delivered” (Count IV), and “Unjust Enrichment” (Count V). (Doc. 1 at 5–7). Because, as the Plaintiff

acknowledges, these claims seek the same relief on the same facts as the breach-of-contract claim (see doc.

11 at 5, para. 14), the Court may dismiss them without prejudice if the breach-of-contract claim succeeds.

September 5, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered default. (Doc. 10). The Plaintiff then

filed a motion for default judgment. (Doc. 11).

After careful review of the Plaintiff’s motion and briefing, and for the reasons that

follow, the motion for default judgment against the Defendants is due to be GRANTED.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court concludes that

venue properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A default judgment may be entered when a defendant “has failed to plead or

otherwise defend” as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P.

55(a). While the Eleventh Circuit has a “strong policy of determining cases on their merits”

and “therefore view[s] defaults with disfavor,” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d

1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003), it is well-settled that a “district court has the authority to enter

default judgment for failure . . . to comply with its orders or rules of procedure.” Wahl v.

McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985).

“When a defendant defaults, he ‘admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of

fact.’” Giovanno v. Fabec, 804 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lary v. Trinity

Physician Fin. & Ins. Servs., 780 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, “[t]he

3 The forum selection clause of the contract reads: “any action regarding this Agreement and collection of

amounts due to Nutrien may be brought in any state or federal court with jurisdiction that includes Larimer

County, Colorado.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4, para. 18 (emphasis added)). The Court finds this clause permissive

rather than mandatory as it “authorizes jurisdiction in a designated forum but does not prohibit litigation

elsewhere.” Glob. Satellite Commc’n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004).

allegations must be well-pleaded in order to provide a sufficient basis for the judgment

entered.” De Lotta v. Dezenzo’s Italian Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 4349806, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Nov. 24, 2009) (citing Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d

1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009)).4 A complaint is “well-pleaded” when it satisfies the

requirements set out in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Specifically, “the

factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Id.

Even though a plaintiff may satisfy the pleading requirements, “the Court [still

must] determine[] the amount and character of damages to be awarded.” Miller v. Paradise

of Port Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999). The court may—but is

not required to—hold a hearing before entering an award for damages with a default

judgment. See Giovanno, 804 F.3d at 1366 (“Given its permissive language, Rule 55(b)(2)

does not require a damages hearing in every case.”). Indeed, “[d]amages may be awarded

without an evidentiary hearing ‘only if the record adequately reflects the basis for award

via . . . a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.’” Robbie’s

of Key West v. M/V Komedy III, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (second

alteration in original) (quoting Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & Klan,

777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985)).

4 The Court here, and elsewhere in the Opinion, cites to non-binding authority. While the Court recognizes

that these cases are not precedential, the Court finds them persuasive.

IV. FACTS5

On February 23, 2023, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant Holladay

Farms to deliver agricultural goods and services on open account.6 (Doc. 1 at 3, para. 8).

Defendants Jason and Ashley personally and unconditionally guaranteed that contract. (Id.;

see also doc. 1-1 at 5). The contract also required, in the event of default, that the

Defendants pay the Plaintiff’s “reasonable attorney[] fees, plus all costs and expenses of

collection.” (Doc. 1 at 4, para. 12). Throughout 2023 and 2024, the Defendants procured

goods and services from the Plaintiff on open account. (Id. at 4, para. 9).

At the time of filing this action, on May 5, 2025, the Defendants had failed to

perform on the contract by paying the Plaintiff $105,800.22 owed on the account—

$88,694.37 in principal and $17,105.85 in interest. (Id. at 4, para. 11; see also doc. 11-2).

The Plaintiff properly served the Defendants after their failure to perform. (See docs. 4–7).

The Defendants did not respond, and on August 29, 2025, the Plaintiff requested the Clerk

of the Court enter default against the Defendants. (Doc. 9). On September 5, 2025, the

Clerk of the Court entered default. (Doc. 10). The Plaintiff then filed the pending motion

for default judgment. (Doc. 11).

5 This recitation of facts is based on the Plaintiff’s complaint (doc. 1) and the exhibit attached thereto (see

doc. 1-1). Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Holliday, 2023 WL 2777943, at *1 (N.D. Ala. April 4, 2023)

(“Attachments to a complaint are ‘part of the pleading for all purposes.’”) (quoting FED R. CIV. P. 10(c)).

The Court also considers the motion for default judgment and its attachments (docs. 11, 11-1, 11-2). See

Glennon v. Rosenblum, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2018).

6 An “open account” is “an account in which some term of the contract is not settled and remains open for

adjustment.” In re Qureshi, 2023 WL 2904935, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Apr. 11, 2023) (citation omitted).

V. DISCUSSION

Through the complaint and attached exhibit of the contract and evidence presented

with the motion for default judgment, the Plaintiff has shown it is entitled to default

judgment and damages. “A federal court sitting in diversity will apply the conflict-of-laws

rules of the forum state.” Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 485

F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he court must characterize the legal issue” and

“determine[] the choice of law rule that the forum state applies to that particular type of

issue.” Id. The legal issue in this case is breach of contract. “In a contractual dispute,

Alabama law would have [the Court] first look to the contract to determine whether the

parties have specified a particular sovereign’s law to govern.” Stovall v. Universal Constr.

Co., 893 So. 2d 1090, 1102 (Ala. 2004). Here, the contract indicates “[t]his Agreement

will be governed by an interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Colorado,

without regard to internal principles of conflict of laws.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4, para. 18).7 Thus,

the Court applies Colorado law.

Under Colorado law, it is “axiomatic” that a plaintiff suing for breach of contract

must show: “(1) the existence of a contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract

or justification for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s failure to perform the contract, and

(4) the plaintiff’s damages as a result of the defendant’s failure to perform the contract.”

Univ. of Denver v. Doe, 547 P.3d 1129, 1139 (Colo. 2024) (citing (W. Distrib. Co. v.

7 The Plaintiff initially identified Alabama law as applicable. (See doc. 11 at 4–5, para. 12). Upon an order

of the Court for further briefing on the applicable law (doc. 15), the Plaintiff addressed Colorado law (see

doc. 17).

Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Colo. 1992)). The existence of a contract under Colorado

law depends on “mutual assent to the terms of the contract and legal consideration for

which the parties bargained.” Id. (citing Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 981

P.2d 600, 603 (Colo. 1999); Marquardt v. Perry, 200 P.3d 1126, 1129 (Colo. App. 2008)).

The Plaintiff can show each element for the contract at issue. The Plaintiff attached

the agreement—which included several internal statements that it was a contract and was

signed by the Defendants (see doc. 1-1 at 5)—to the complaint, satisfying the first element.

Cf. Yaekle v. Andrews, 195 P.3d 1101, 1110 (Colo. 2008) (indicating that a signed

agreement “was understood by the parties as a binding and enforceable agreement, as

evinced by the document’s own provisions and the later representations to the court of both

parties”). In the complaint, the Plaintiff claims the Defendants failed to pay what they

agreed to in the contract (which the Defendants admit) despite the Plaintiff performing its

obligations. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has satisfied the second and third elements. Finally,

the unpaid balance satisfies the fourth element by demonstrating the Plaintiff was damaged

by the Defendants’ failure to pay. Cf. Hassler v. Acct. Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 274

P.3d 547, 550–51 (Colo. 2012) (noting that the damages at issue were the failure to pay

principal and interest for a loan).

With the elements of the claim established, the Court examines the evidence

presented by the Plaintiff for awarding damages. Based on the evidence in the record, the

Court finds that a hearing is not necessary on damages. See Giovanno, 804 F.3d at 1366.

In the motion for default judgment, the Plaintiff requests damages in the amounts of

$105,800.22 from the Defendant, which are supported by the agreement (see doc. 1-1), last

account statement (doc. 11-2 at 13), and Jeff Cochran’s (custodian of records for the

account) affidavit (id. at 1–2, paras. 1–2, 10). The Court accordingly finds the Plaintiff is

entitled to these damages.

The Plaintiff also requests attorney fees in the amount of $5,526.50 and costs in the

amount of $845.45. (Doc. 11 at 9, para. 21). Under Colorado law, “[a]s a general rule, in

the absence of any contractual or statutory liability therefor, attorney[] fees and expenses

of litigation of a plaintiff’s claim are not recoverable . . . either in a contract or a tort action.”

Hedgecock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 676 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Colo. App. 1983). This

general rule does not apply “if the parties agree, in a contract clause known as a fee-shifting

provision, that the prevailing party will be entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs.”

S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. & Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 343 P.3d

1044, 1047 (Colo. App. 2014) (citing In re Estate of Gattis, 318 P.3d 549, 558 (Colo. App.

2013)); see also Whiting-Turner v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am. USA, 440 P.3d 1282, 1291

(Colo. App. 2019) (citing Powder Horn Constructors, Inc. v. City of Florence, 754 P.2d

356, 365 (Colo. 1988)).

In this case, the contract contained a fee-shifting provision which specified that the

Defendants, in the event of default, agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs for the

Plaintiff’s recovery of funds. (See doc. 1-1 at 3, para. 11). The Plaintiff has provided

evidence of the costs and attorney fees to a sum certain—supported by counsel’s detailed

affidavit. (See Doc. 11-1). The affidavit contained an accounting that showed the firm

spent a total of 26.7 hours between a partner, two associates, and a paralegal, and billed the

Plaintiff $5,526.50 to recover over $100,000 flowing from the breach of contract by the

Defendants. (Doc. 11-1 at 3–5, paras. 2–4, 6).8 Typically, to estimate reasonable attorney

fees, Colorado courts determine a “lodestar amount,” which “represents the number of

hours reasonably expended on the case, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Payan v.

Nash Finch Co., 310 P.3d 212 (Colo. App. 2012) (citing Tallitsch v. Child Support

Services, Inc., 926 P.2d 143, 147 (Colo. App. 1996)). However—as the Court does here—

a court may also use a party’s requested amount of attorney fees as a starting point. Cf.

Weinstein, 343 P.3d at 1049–50; Plan. Partners Int’l, LLC v. QED, Inc., 304 P.3d 562,

568–69 (Colo. 2013). The Court finds the fees requested reasonable when considering,

among other things, the amount of attorney fees compared to the resulting award. See City

of Wheat Ridge v. Cerveny, 913 P.2d 1110, 1115–16 (Colo. 1996) (citations omitted). The

Court accordingly finds the Plaintiff is entitled to these fees and costs.

The Plaintiff also indicated it was seeking “pre-judgment interest” in its complaint.

(See doc. 1 at 4–7, paras. 13–28). However, the Plaintiff failed to request pre-judgment

interest or provide a method for its calculation in its motion for default and instead requests

“post-judgment interest at the applicable federal rate.” (Doc. 11 at 9 (emphasis added)).9

8 The hours spent included those working on a related bankruptcy action filed by Jason and Ashley that was

dismissed for cause. (Doc. 85 in In re Holladay, Case No. 24-31969 (Bankr. M.D. Ala.); doc. 11-1 at 3,

para. 2 n.1)). The Court finds the attorney fees for that action related to collection on the breach of contract

and a legitimate consequence of the breach because participation by the Plaintiff was important to retaining

its claims to the debt. See In re Holloway, 254 B.R. 289 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2000), aff’d, 261 B.R. 490 (M.D.

Ala. 2001) (“A discharge in bankruptcy relieves the debtor from his personal obligation to pay an

indebtedness . . . .”).

9 The Eleventh Circuit has explained that these two kinds of interest are to be treated distinctly:

There is a significant difference between pre- and post-judgment interest. . . . Post-

judgment interest can hardly be considered part of an award for compensation on a claim.

However, a successful claimant is theoretically entitled to receive the compensation on the

date of entry of the judgment; in practice, this is not feasible, and post-judgment interest

serves to reimburse the claimant for not having received the money in hand on that day.

Post-judgment interest “shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case

recovered in a district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The fact that the Plaintiff did not

address post-judgment interest in its complaint does not bar recovery. Cf. Walker v. Life

Ins. Co. of N. Am., 59 F.4th 1176, 1196 n.18 (11th Cir. 2023) (“We are satisfied that Walker

may recover post-judgment interest given that the operative complaint seeks ‘interest . . .

and such other relief as is just and appropriate’ in connection with the relevant breach of

contract claim.”); (doc. 1 at. 5 (“[The Plaintiff] demands judgment against the Defendants

. . . and any such other relief as the Court may award.”). Accordingly, the Court also

awards the Plaintiff post-judgment interest at a rate of 3.67%. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Such

interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the

weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding.”).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, and for good cause, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (doc. 11) is GRANTED.

2. Judgment will be entered in the Plaintiff’s favor and against the Defendants on

Count I.

This is effectuated by the federal statute providing interest on all federal court judgments.

28 U.S.C. § 1961. This is to be distinguished from pre-judgment interest, which forms part

of the actual amount of a judgment on a claim.

FIGA v. R.V.M.P. Corp., 874 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir. 1989).

3. The Plaintiff is awarded damages in the amount of $112,172.17 against the

Defendants, jointly and severally.

4. The Plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest at a rate of 3.67% on the

$112,172.17 awarded against the Defendants.

5. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot.

A final judgment will be entered in accordance with the Court’s Order.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to mail this Memorandum Opinion and Order

to the address reflected on the docket for the Defendants.

DONE this 17th day of November, 2025.

/s/ Emily C. Marks

EMILY C. MARKS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE