Flory

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HEIDI A. FLORY, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-1140

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Neary)

:

v. :

:

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE :

UNIVERSITY; RONALD WILSON, :

DVM; WILLIAM WEISS, PHD; :

JENELLE IZER, DVM, MS; :

AMANDA P. JONES; HEIDI PAYNE; :

and BEHZAD SOLEIMANI, MD, :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Institutional defendants often prefer to litigate in a federal forum. Federal

courts, however, are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Absent certain,

narrowly defined circumstances, they do not hear purely state claims. Defendants

The Pennsylvania State University (the “University”); Ronald Wilson, DVM;

William Weiss, PhD; Jenelle Izer, DVM, Amanda P. Jones; Heidi Payne; and

Behzad Soleimani, MD (the “University Defendants”) removed this state law action

from the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, invoking the court’s federal

question jurisdiction. Plaintiff Heidi A. Flory seeks to remand this action to state

court. Because Flory brings only state law claims that do not fall within this court’s

narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction, the court will remand the case to the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Around November 1, 2012, Flory accepted a full-time position with the

University to serve as a research technologist for the University’s College of

Medicine. (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 19). She performed the duties of a veterinary technician. (Doc.

1-1 ¶ 19). Around February 1, 2023, she was promoted to the position of the Director

of Resource and Compliance Management for Animal Research Activities for the

Applied Biomedical Engineering program at the College of Medicine. (Id. ¶ 20). In

this position, Flory was responsible for, as relevant here, duties related to ensuring

the welfare of the laboratory animals used in research by the University. (Id. ¶¶ 21-

24). The laboratory was a federal funded research facility within the meaning of the

Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”), 7 U.S.C. § 2131, et seq. (Id. ¶ 35).

Around November 2023, Flory first became aware of improprieties committed

by Dr. Izer that she believed ran afoul of the AWA. In that month, she alleges she

discovered Dr. Izer was purchasing dairy cows at exceedingly high price points and

gifting them in an apparent scheme for personal gain. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41). Around April

2024, she discovered Dr. Izer was gifting laboratory sheep that were supposed to be

euthanized, instead reporting they had been sold at auction. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 44-46).

In another incident around December 2023, a resident veterinarian

performed a catheterization procedure on a lamb that went wrong, resulting in

significant blood loss and the lamb’s death. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49). Dr. Izer incorrectly

reported that the blood loss was due to a genetic clotting disorder. (Id. ¶ 50). Dr.

Izer then ordered a second lamb be euthanized to support her findings about the

genetic clotting disorder. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51). In February 2024, Dr. Izer encouraged

Flory to improperly change a medical chart concerning the delayed euthanasia of a

lamb. (Id. ¶¶ 63-66).

In December 2023, the University received anonymous reports about Dr.

Izer’s behavior, and the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee investigated

the reports. (Id. ¶¶ 67-68). Flory was placed charge of reviewing the medical charts

as part of this investigation. (Id. ¶ 69). During the course of her review, Flory

discovered that Dr. Izer had administered Naloxone during post-operative care and

initially included this information in the report sent to Dr. Izer for review. (Id. ¶¶

70-72). Dr. Izer then deleted the reference to Naloxone and instructed Flory to

submit a revised version that omitted its use. (Id. ¶ 73). In the same month, Dr. Izer

forged a controlled substances log to make it appear that Flory had made a mistake.

(Id. ¶¶ 75-78).

Prior to June 17, 2024, and after, Flory complained on a regular basis to her

immediate supervisors and reported Dr. Izer’s alleged misconduct. (Id. ¶ 81).

Around the same time, Flory filed a complaint with the Office of Laboratory Animal

Welfare, reporting that defendant Izer had engaged in conduct raising concerns

about animal welfare, wrongdoing, and waste. (Id. ¶ 82).

On February 3, 2025, Dr. Weiss informed Flory she was being “relieved of her

authority to perform all duties” as Director and revoked her access credentials to

two databases. (Id. ¶¶ 89-91). After February 3, Jones, the Assistant Vice President

of the University’s Human Resources Department, repeatedly urged Flory to resign.

(Id. ¶¶ 92-93). On April 10, 2025, Flory discovered her building access badge had

been deactivated. (Id. ¶ 94). In a meeting with Jones, Payne, and Dr. Soleimani the

same day, Flory was informed that her duties as Director were reassigned, and

while she would keep the Director title, her responsibilities would change to include

janitorial duties. (Id. ¶¶ 99-101).

On May 27, 2025, Flory filed a complaint against defendants alleging seven

counts under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law (“PWL”) pursuant, 43 P.S. §

1421, (id. ¶¶ 110-230), as well as several other Pennsylvania common law claims,

(id. ¶¶ 231-343). Flory properly served upon each of the defendants, (Doc. 1 ¶ 3),

and on June 23, 2025, defendants filed their notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(d). (Doc. 1 ¶ 5).

Defendants assert that Flory’s PWL claims require an interpretation of

federal law, the AWA, thus bringing this action within this court’s jurisdiction.

(Doc. 1 ¶ 10). Flory has moved to remand this case to state court, arguing that a

federal issue has not been presented. (Doc. 10). The motion is fully briefed and ripe

for disposition. (Docs. 11, 16, 17).

II. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an action brought in state

court to federal district court when the claims fall within the federal court’s original

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A plaintiff may challenge removal for lack of

jurisdiction by moving to remand the matter to state court. See id. § 1447(c). Such

motions may be filed at any time before final judgment is entered. Id. If the district

court indeed lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must remand to the state court

from which the action was removed. Id. Statutes permitting removal “are to be

strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of

remand.” Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 162

(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009)).

III. Discussion

Defendants’ desire for a federal forum does not entitle them to one. Removal

is proper only when a plaintiff’s claims could have been originally filed in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). That typically means diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a), and cases “arising under” federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity

jurisdiction is not alleged here, so to proceed the court must have federal question

jurisdiction.

Ordinarily, an action “arises under federal law when federal law creates

the cause of action asserted.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). A

“special and small category” of cases exist in which an action based solely on

state law may nonetheless give rise to federal question jurisdiction. Gunn v.

Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013). Federal

courts have federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim only when the

claim “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and

substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any

congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S.

308, 312 (2005).

Defendants argue this court has jurisdiction because this case falls into

that “special and small category.” Flory brings claims under the PWL, which

protects certain whistleblowers who report or are about to report in good faith

“wrongdoing” or “waste.” 43 P.S. §§ 1421, et. seq. Because the “wrongdoing”

Flory claims under the PWL involves alleged violations of the AWA, a federal

statute, defendants argue this case necessarily raises a federal issue. (Doc. 16,

8). To defendants, a court must determine whether an “actual” violation of the

AWA occurred, and that court must be a federal one. (Doc. 16 at p. 7). The

mere reliance on a federal statute, however, does not mean that this state law

claim arises under federal law.

Determining whether the defendants violated the PWL does not require

a court to analyze whether an actual violation of the AWA occurred. The PWL

states, “[a]n employee alleging a violation of this act must show . . . the

employee or person acting on behalf of the employee had reported or was about

to report in good faith, verbally or in writing, an instance of wrongdoing or

waste to the employer or an appropriate authority.” 43 P.S. § 1421.

“Wrongdoing” is defined as “[a] violation which is not of a merely technical or

minimal nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation . . . designed to

protect the interest of the public or the employer.” Id. § 1422.

Lastly, the PWL defines “[g]ood faith report” as:

A report of conduct defined in this act as wrongdoing or waste which is

made without malice or consideration of personal benefit and which the

person making the report has reasonable cause to believe is true. An

employer is not barred from taking disciplinary action against the

employee who completed the report if the employee’s report was

submitted in bad faith.

Id.

Thus, the statute protects reports made “in good faith,” meaning it protects

sincere but mistaken reports of “wrongdoing” or “waste” regardless of whether a

violation of law, state or federal, is ultimately proven. The court does not need to

interpret, apply, or construe the AWA to resolve Flory’s PWL claim. The issue

before the court is whether Flory engaged in protected activity under the PWL and

whether her discharge was retaliatory. Although this inquiry may require a court to

consider the AWA to assess the reasonableness of Flory’s belief, the PWL does not

require a finding that an actual violation occurred, only that the employee, in good

faith, reported conduct she reasonably believed constituted wrongdoing.

Even assuming this case requires interpretation of the AWA, the federal

issue is not substantial. Flory seeks protection under the PWL for reporting

alleged wrongdoing, not to vindicate an alleged right under the AWA. In Gunn,

the Supreme Court stated it “is not enough that the federal issue be significant

to the parties in the immediate suit.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 260. Rather, “[t]he

substantiality inquiry under Grable looks . . . to the importance of the issue to

the federal system as a whole.” Id. Thus, the bar for what constitutes a

substantial federal issue is high. Otherwise, the “special and small category” of

cases will become the rule rather than the exception to it.

The court must look no further than Grable itself, where the federal

government seized the plaintiff’s property to satisfy delinquent taxes. Grable,

545 U.S. at 310. When the plaintiff later brought a state law quiet title action

against the property’s new owner, arguing that the government’s seizure was

invalid because the IRS’s notice requirements violated federal law, the

Supreme Court held that this state law action did arise under federal law. Id.

The federal government had a “’strong interest’ in being able to recover

delinquent taxes through seizure and sale of property.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at

260 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 309). The federal government’s “’direct

interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own

administrative action’ made the question ‘an important issue of federal law

that sensibly belonged in federal court.’” Id. at 260-61 (quoting Grable, 545

U.S. at 315).

Thus, while the issue of whether Dr. Izer allegedly violated the AWA

may be important to the parties in this action, it is not a substantial federal

issue sufficient to invoke this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

IV. Conclusion

Because Flory’s claims do not fall within the “special and small category” of

cases where state law claims arise under federal law, this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the action. The court will grant Flory’s motion (Doc. 10) and remand

this action to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. An appropriate order

shall issue.

/S/ KELI M. NEARY

Keli M. Neary

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: November 17, 2025