Stringer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NICHOLAS STRINGER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-165

SPECIALTY OFFSHORE, INC., et al. SECTION M (5)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion by plaintiff Nicholas Stringer to reconsider this Court’s

August 27, 2025 Order & Reasons denying his motion for summary judgment on seaman status.1

Defendant Specialty Offshore, Inc. (“Specialty”) responds in opposition,2 and Stringer replies in

further support of his motion.3 Also before the Court is Specialty’s motion for summary judgment

on seaman status,4 to which Stringer responds in opposition,5 and Specialty replies in further

support of its motion.6 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable

law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons denying Stringer’s motion, granting Specialty’s, and

dismissing with prejudice those of Stringer’s claims that depend on seaman status.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a maritime injury. On June 27, 2023, Stringer began working for

Specialty as a dive tender.7 During his tenure with Specialty, Stringer also worked as an apprentice

diver and a laborer or general construction worker.8 In December 2024, Stringer worked for

1 R. Doc. 32 (citing R. Docs. 16 (Stringer’s motion for summary judgment); 27 (Order & Reasons denying

Stringer’s motion for summary judgment)).

2 R. Doc. 42.

3 R. Doc. 48.

4 R. Doc. 41.

5 R. Doc. 43.

6 R. Doc. 45.

7 R. Docs. 16-3 at 1; 26-5 at 1.

8 R. Doc. 26-5 at 1.

Specialty as a commercial diver on a project for the Alcoa Chemical Plant (the “Alcoa project”)

in Newburgh, Indiana, on the Ohio River.9 Specialty rented a small work barge from Compass

Marine to use as a platform to hold various equipment, including dive support equipment, for the

project.10 On December 5, 2024, Stringer, and other Specialty workers, met at Compass Marine’s

facility in Owensboro, Kentucky.11 Specialty’s workers loaded the equipment onto the barge,

which they then rode as it was pushed upriver by a Compass Marine pushboat.12 Dennis McGrady,

Stringer’s diver supervisor, operated the pushboat.13 Stringer rode in the crane on the work barge

to act as a lookout.14 When the barge arrived in Newburgh, it was secured by wedging it between

two pylons, about an inch away from each pylon, with the barge abutting directly against land.15

The work barge, which was secured in place with a “spud,” remained stationary for the duration

of Stringer’s work on the Alcoa project, other than being pushed forward five feet once and slightly

swaying when vessels passed.16 Once the barge was secured, Specialty’s workers, including

Stringer, disembarked, obtained lodgings on land, and were allotted a per diem allowance for their

onshore lodgings and food.17 On subsequent work days, Stringer and his co-workers drove to the

Alcoa project, parked near a bridge, walked to the pylons, and then descended a ladder to the

barge.18 Stringer did not sleep or regularly travel on the barge during the Alcoa project.19

However, Stringer did occasionally eat breakfast or lunch on the barge.20

9 R. Docs. 16-3 at 1; 26-5 at 1; 41-1 at 7.

10 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2; 41-1 at 8.

11 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2; 41-1 at 8.

12 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2; 41-1 at 8.

13 R. Docs. 32-1 at 13-16 (citing R. Doc. 32-5); 41-1 at 8.

14 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2; 32 at 16; 41-1 at 8.

15 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2; 41-1 at 8-9.

16 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2; 41-1 at 8-9.

17 R. Docs. 26-5 at 2-3; 41-1 at 9.

18 R. Docs. 26-5 at 3; 41-1 at 9.

19 R. Docs. 26-5 at 3; 41-1 at 9.

20 R. Doc. 32-1 at 16-18.

Stringer worked as a commercial diver on the Alcoa project for 14 days and made eight

dives.21 He alleges that, while he was conducting a series of dives on December 19, 2024, he

experienced central nervous system decompression illness (i.e., the “bends”), because he was not

provided with in-water decompression, and that Specialty then failed to provide him with prompt

and necessary medical treatment, resulting in “severe and disabling injuries” that have rendered

him “medically unfit to continue his career as a commercial diver.”22 Stringer brings claims

against Specialty for negligence under the Jones Act and general maritime law, along with general

maritime law claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure.23

Stringer previously moved for partial summary judgment on seaman status, arguing that,

as a matter of law, commercial divers, like him, are Jones Act seamen.24 Stringer first contended

that the Fifth Circuit in Wallace v. Oceaneering International, 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984), and

the Louisiana supreme court in Wisner v. Professional Divers of New Orleans, 731 So. 2d 200 (La.

1999), established a “diver’s exception” whereby divers are automatically considered Jones Act

seamen without the need to satisfy the traditional test for seaman status.25 Alternatively, Stringer

argued that the facts of his employment with Specialty show that he passes the seaman-status test

established by the Supreme Court in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995), and refined by

the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C., 997 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2021).26

Stringer asserted that he contributed to the mission of the barge (performing the Alcoa project) and

engaged in classic sea-going work (diving), which was substantial in nature and exposed him to

the perils of the sea.27 He also contended that he owed his allegiance to both a shoreside employer

21 R. Docs. 16-3 at 1; 41-1 at 10.

22 R. Docs. 16-3 at 3-4; 1 at 3.

23 R. Doc. 1 at 4-5.

24 R. Doc. 16.

25 R. Doc. 16-1 at 7-10.

26 Id. at 10-17.

27 Id. at 10-16.

(Specialty) and the barge.28 Further, Stringer said that he worked as a diver for Specialty for 85

days and that, during that time, he worked on vessels that were owned, leased, or controlled by

Specialty for 80 days, or 94% of the time.29

In opposition, Specialty argued that there is no “diver’s exception,” because the Fifth

Circuit and other courts have held that a diver must still satisfy the seaman-status requirements set

out in Chandris and Sanchez.30 Specialty contended that Wallace and Wisner are factually

distinguishable and have been limited in their application by subsequent decisions.31 Specialty

further argued that Stringer does not satisfy the Chandris/Sanchez test for seaman status because

he neither regularly lived, nor worked, on vessels.32 According to Specialty, between June 2023

and December 2024, Stringer worked sporadically for 87 days (a total of 924 hours), on nine

different projects, four of which did not use a vessel at all and two of which used vessels owned

and controlled by Specialty’s clients.33 And, of those 924 hours, Stringer spent only 50.5 hours

diving, equating to approximately 5.5% of his time working for Specialty.34 Further, said

Specialty, Stringer worked on vessels owned or controlled by Specialty on just three projects for

273 hours, which is less than one-third of his time working at Specialty.35 In light of these facts,

Specialty urged that more discovery was required to illuminate whether Stringer can satisfy the

seaman-status test articulated in Chandris and Sanchez.36 Specialty also moved to sever the

seaman-status issue from the rest of the case for expedited determination, including discovery on

28 Id. at 13.

29 Id. at 2, 13-14, 16-17.

30 R. Doc. 26 at 5-13.

31 Id.

32 Id. at 5-17.

33 Id. at 5 (citing R. Doc. 26-1).

34 Id. (citing R. Doc. 26-1).

35 Id. (citing R. Doc. 26-1).

36 Id. at 13-16.

that issue alone, arguing that, if Stringer is not a seaman, he would be classified as a longshoreman

and the causes of action alleged in his seaman’s complaint would be dismissed.37

Because this Court agreed with Specialty that discovery was required, it granted Specialty’s

motion to sever and denied Stringer’s motion for summary judgment.38 As to Stringer’s “diver’s

exception” argument, the Court held that neither Wallace nor Wisner creates a blanket “diver’s

exception” to the seaman-status test, meaning that a diver, like any other Jones Act plaintiff, must

satisfy the mandates of Chandris and Sanchez.39 The Court further noted that “[e]ven if there were

merit to Stringer’s position that Wallace and Wisner established some kind of ‘diver’s exception’

that still exists today, he has not demonstrated that the exception applies to him,” because he did

not live and work on vessels in the open sea.40 In holding that more discovery was required to

determine whether Stringer is a seaman under the Chandris/Sanchez test, the Court noted that

Stringer has at least two problems in satisfying the second prong: a connection to a vessel or

identifiable fleet of vessels that is substantial in both duration and nature.41

II. PENDING MOTIONS

Stringer argues that summary judgment in his favor on the seaman-status issue is

appropriate because discovery has revealed that he had a substantial connection to a fleet of vessels

controlled by Specialty that was substantial in both duration and nature.42 Stringer contends that

Specialty’s corporate representative, Deborah Wallace, testified at the company’s deposition taken

pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that Stringer was assigned to

vessels 97.6% of the time he worked for Specialty.43 Stringer says that this sworn deposition

37 R. Doc. 10.

38 R. Doc. 27.

39 Id. at 11-12.

40 Id. at 12-13.

41 Id. at 13.

42 R. Doc. 32-1 at 20-23.

43 Id. at 2-7 (citing R. Docs. 32-3; 32-4; 32-6).

testimony stands in stark contrast to the 5.5% figure that Specialty derived from the statements

made in Wallace’s declaration that Specialty attached to its opposition to Stringer’s prior motion

for summary judgment.44 Stringer also argues that the time he spent diving is irrelevant because

McGrady testified that the dive crew was always on call to do the vessel’s work.45 Thus, says

Stringer, he has satisfied the duration prong.46 Stringer further argues that all of the vessels on

which he worked for Specialty were controlled by Specialty, even if the company did not own or

charter them, because McGrady testified that Specialty’s dive supervisor can submit orders to a

vessel’s master to protect divers during dives.47 Stringer also says that Wallace admitted at

Specialty’s corporate deposition that Stringer was attached to a fleet of dive support vessels while

he worked for the company.48 Stringer points to McGrady’s testimony that McGrady operated the

Compass Marine pushboat used to move the dive support vessel to the Alcoa job, that Stringer

assisted in its navigation, and that Specialty’s employees sometimes ate on the dive support

vessel.49

In opposition to Stringer’s motion and in support of its own motion, Specialty contends

that the amount of time that Stringer was assigned to vessels (Chandris’s duration prong) is

irrelevant because he cannot satisfy the three additional Sanchez factors.50 Specialty asserts that

the undisputed evidence shows that Stringer “was a land based employee who worked on 9

44 Id. (referencing R. Doc. 26-1).

45 Id. at 5-7 (citing R. Doc. 32-5).

46 Id. at 2-7.

47 Id. at 7-12 (citing R. Doc. 32-5).

48 Id. at 12-13 (citing R. Doc. 32-6).

49 Id. at 14-18 (citing R. Doc. 32-5).

50 R. Docs. 41-1 at 3, 10-21; 42 at 8-9, 11-12. Specialty makes procedural arguments in its opposition to

Stringer’s motion to reconsider, which Stringer addresses in his reply. R. Docs. 42 at 1-5; 48 at 1-6. The Court need

not specifically address these arguments because it is considering Stringer’s motion as a renewed motion for summary

judgment. Specialty also clarifies Wallace’s testimony regarding the time Stringer spent diving and on vessels. R.

Docs. 42 at 6-7; 45 at 4-5. However, these clarifications are immaterial because the Court has determined that,

regardless of Stringer’s time spent aboard vessels, he cannot satisfy the Sanchez factors.

different jobs for 8 different clients in six different states; most of the jobs were only for a week

or less; except for one job, he was never ‘more than a gangplank from shore’; his job did not

involve going to sea; he did not travel by vessel from job to job; he had no vessel related duties on

any job; he often worked from land for certain jobs; other than one job, he did not live aboard any

vessel; and he was paid a per diem and lived ashore in hotels.”51 Citing these facts, Specialty

argues that Stringer does meet the “substantial connection” prong of the seaman-status test under

the three factors added by the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez.52 Specialty says that Stringer was a land-

based employee whose duties did not take him to sea because Stringer worked on nine different

projects while employed at Specialty and, during all except one, Stringer slept and mostly ate on

land, drove to the worksites that were adjacent to land, and was paid a per diem for meals and

lodging.53 Specialty cites to several cases with similar facts – including In re Ingram Barge Co.,

2023 WL 6123107 (5th Cir. Sep. 19, 2023); Rutherford v. Pontchartrain Materials Corp., 732 F.

Supp. 3d 536 (E.D. La. 2024); Meaux v. Cooper Consolidated, LLC, 601 F. Supp. 3d 38 (E.D. La.

2022); Bouton v. Manson Construction Co., 705 F. Supp. 3d 622 (W.D. La. 2023); and Burton v.

Weeks Marine, Inc., 2023 WL 8607016 (W.D. La. Dec. 12, 2023) – where the court found that it

did not need to consider the duration prong (or it did not matter that plaintiff satisfied the duration

prong), because the plaintiff could not meet one or more of the three Sanchez factors.54 More

particularly as to the three Sanchez factors, Specialty contends that Stringer owed his allegiance to

it as his employer, and not to a particular vessel (or fleet of Specialty vessels), because he worked

on nine different projects while employed at Specialty and only one – the Alcoa project – involved

the barge Specialty rented, whereas the other projects involved client-owned vessels or no vessel

51 R. Doc. 41-1 at 3; see also R. Doc. 42 at 9, 11-12.

52 R. Docs. 41-1 at 1-21; 42 at 11-12.

53 R. Doc. 41-1 at 13-14.

54 Id. at 15-20.

at all.55 Next, Specialty contends that Stringer’s work did not involve seagoing activity because

the barge on which he worked (like others on which he worked) was spudded down next to the

shore and accessed by the workers via a ladder from land.56 Finally, Specialty asserts that

Stringer’s assignment to a vessel, if there was a vessel assignment at all, would have ended with

the project and there is no evidence that Specialty would have rented the Compass Marine barge

for the next project.57

In opposition to Specialty’s motion and in a reply in further support of his own motion,

Stringer argues that Specialty’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and that of McGrady support that he is a

Jones Act seaman.58 Stringer reasserts that the deposition testimony shows that he was assigned

to vessels for 97.6% of the time he was employed by Specialty.59 Stringer also argues that the dive

support vessel was still a vessel when it was “spudded down” (contrary to what he says Specialty

asserts), and that he served the mission of an identifiable fleet of vessels owned or controlled by

Specialty.60 Stringer also reurges that he assisted in the navigation of the dive support vessel he

rode to the Alcoa job.61 He also contends that the case law cited by Specialty is distinguishable

because it “focuses on spud barges or stationary vessels anchored out of navigation l[a]nes,

connected to shore with gangplanks, and plaintiffs that did not sail with the vessels.”62

Specialty replies to Stringer’s opposition to its motion, reasserting that its “primary

argument is that [Stringer] does not qualify as a seaman because he does not satisfy the ‘substantial

in nature’ element of the second Chandris prong because he could not satisfy the three Sanchez

55 Id. at 19.

56 Id.

57Id. at 20.

58 R. Docs. 43 at 1; 48 at 4.

59 R. Docs. 43 at 2-4; 48 at 4.

60 R. Docs. 43 at 4-12; 48 at 4.

61 R. Docs. 43 at 8-10; 48 at 4.

62 R. Doc. 43 at 10.

factors.”63 Specialty again refers to the same evidence it previously cited to demonstrate that

Stringer cannot meet the Sanchez test for seaman status.64 Specialty reurges that courts have

denied seaman status when the circumstances of the plaintiffs’ employment did not satisfy

Sanchez, even if they satisfied the duration prong of Chandris.65 Specialty also disclaims making

any arguments regarding the vessel status of the Compass Marine work barge, which arguments it

says are red herrings in any event.66

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Rule 54(b) Standard

The rule under which Stringer seeks reconsideration – Rule 59 – is inapplicable. This

Court’s August 27, 2025 Order & Reasons was an interlocutory order that did not result in a final

judgment or disposition of the case. Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are

governed by Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, a “court is free

to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of

new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Austin v. Kroger

Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). Rule 54(b) “‘reflect[s] the

inherent power of the rendering district court to afford such relief from interlocutory judgments as

justice requires.’” Id. at 337 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). However, the district court must exercise this broad discretion sparingly

to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens and delays. See

Calpecto 1981 v. Marshall Expl., Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing that if “the

district court was required to reconsider [an interlocutory order] simply because [the losing party]

63 R. Doc. 45 at 1.

64 Id. at 1-2.

65 Id. at 2, 4-5.

66 Id. at 2, 5.

belatedly came forward with evidence not submitted prior to the ruling[,] ... the cycle of

reconsideration would be never-ending”); Domain Prot., LLC v. Sea Wasp, LLC, 2019 WL

3933614, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2019) (“[A]lthough a district court may revisit an interlocutory

order on any ground it sees fit, it may also use its discretion to prevent parties from, without

justification, raising new arguments for the first time.” (emphasis, alteration, and quotation

omitted)); 18B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4478.1 (3d ed. 2019)

(“A trial court could not operate if it were to yield to every request to reconsider each of the

multitude of rulings that may be made between filing and final judgment.”).

Stringer is not really seeking reconsideration of this Court’s prior ruling. Instead, he is

renewing and supplementing with new evidence his motion for summary judgment now that

discovery has been completed. Thus, the Court will consider both Stringer’s motion to reconsider

and Specialty’s motion for summary judgment under the Rule 56 standard.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A party

moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary

judgment and identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the

conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets

that burden, then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive

law identifies which facts are material. Id. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a

rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a

whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); EEOC

v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). Unsubstantiated assertions, conclusory

allegations, and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1994); Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary-judgment

motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co.

v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a court

must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet,

a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant “when there is an actual

controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37

F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmovant must articulate specific facts showing a genuine issue and point to supporting,

competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v.

Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). Such

facts must create more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586. When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essential

element of the nonmovant’s claim in order to satisfy its summary-judgment burden. See Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial that could

support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37

F.3d at 1075-76.

C. Analysis – Seaman Status

Depending on the status of an injured worker and the allegedly responsible party, a

maritime worker injured in the course and scope of his employment may bring an action under the

Jones Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), the general

maritime law, or state law. See Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355-56. The Jones Act permits a “seaman

injured in the course of employment ... to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury,

against the employer.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104. A Jones Act seaman may also bring a claim against

his employer for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness. See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335

F.3d 376, 387 (5th Cir. 2003); Meche v. Doucet, 777 F.3d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 2015). The LHWCA

is a workers’ compensation system and the exclusive remedy available to “a broad range of land-

based maritime workers” who are injured in the course and scope of their employment but are not

seaman and thus not entitled to sue under the Jones Act. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355 (citing 33

U.S.C. § 902(3)(G)).

The term “seaman” is not defined in the Jones Act. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104. A plaintiff

must establish seaman status. Becker, 335 F.3d at 390 n.8. Determining “whether an injured

worker is a seaman under the Jones Act is a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at 386. Although

the Jones Act does not define the term “seaman,” Congress has elsewhere defined it as the “master

or member of any crew of any vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G); see also Chandris, 515 U.S. at

355-56. However, not every “maritime worker on a ship at sea … is automatically a member of

the crew of the vessel within the meaning of the statutory terms.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363. Job

title does not determine seaman status. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 558

(1997). But seamen “owe their allegiance to a vessel and not solely to a land-based employer.”

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 359 (quotation omitted). The “inquiry is fundamentally status based: Land-

based maritime workers do not become seamen because they happen to be working aboard a vessel

when they are injured, and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when the course of their service

to a vessel takes them ashore.” Id. at 361. Moreover, “[i]n evaluating the employment-related

connection of a maritime worker to a vessel in navigation, courts should not employ a ‘snapshot’

test for seaman status, inspecting only the situation as it exists at the instant of injury; a more

enduring relationship is contemplated in the jurisprudence.” Id. at 363 (quotation and citation

omitted). “Thus, a worker may not oscillate back and forth between Jones Act coverage and other

remedies depending on the activity in which the worker was engaged while injured.” Id.

In Chandris, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for seaman status. First, the

employee’s duties must “contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its

mission.” Id. at 368. Satisfying this part of the seaman test is relatively easy because the individual

“need only show that he does the ship’s work.” Becker, 335 F.3d at 387-88. “This threshold

requirement is ‘very broad,’ encompassing ‘all who work at sea in the service of a ship.’” Id.

(quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368).

Second, the employee “must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an

identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (emphasis added). The claimed connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels

must be temporally, more than fleeting, and substantively, more than incidental, because the

fundamental purpose of the substantial connection requirement is “to separate the sea-based

maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who

have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose

employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.” Id.

“The duration of a worker’s connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker’s activities,

taken together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the ultimate inquiry

is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel’s crew or simply a land-based

employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.” Id. at 370. In determining

the durational aspect of the vessel-connection requirement, the Supreme Court has adopted the

Fifth Circuit’s general rule of thumb that “[a] worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his

time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.”

Id. at 371. The Supreme Court explained that this figure –

serves as no more than a guideline established by years of experience, and departure

from it will certainly be justified in appropriate cases. As we have said, the inquiry

into seaman status is of necessity fact specific; it will depend on the nature of the

vessel and the employee’s precise relation to it.

Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

In determining whether an employee has a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation

in terms of its nature, again, “it is not the employee’s particular job that is determinative [of seaman

status], but the employee’s connection to a vessel.” Id. at 364 (quotation omitted). Until Sanchez,

an employee would qualify for seaman status if the employee’s connection to a vessel “regularly

exposes him to the perils of the sea.” In re Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir.

2000) (explaining Papai, 520 U.S. at 554-55), abrogated by Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 573. Further,

an employee would still be deemed exposed to the perils of the sea despite limited experience in

the open water; therefore, workers involved in a vessel’s work near shore “still remain exposed to

the perils of a maritime work environment.” Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 934

(5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting “the categorical assertion that workers who spend their time aboard

vessels near the shore do not face maritime perils”), overruled on other grounds by Sanchez, 997

F.3d at 573.

In Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, expressly overruled the panel decision in

Naquin and called into question the panel decision in Endeavor Marine to the extent they held that

the nature prong of the Chandris test was satisfied simply by the plaintiff’s exposure to the “perils

of the sea,” without requiring more. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 573. In the wake of Sanchez, courts

examining the nature of a putative Jones Act seaman’s connection to a vessel must make the

following “additional inquiries” – that is to say, in addition to asking whether a worker was subject

to the perils of the sea, courts must ask:

(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel rather than simply to a

shoreside employer?

(2) Is the work sea-based or [does it] involve seagoing activity?

(3) (a) Is the worker’s assignment to a vessel limited to performance of a discrete

task after which the worker’s connection to the vessel ends, or (b) Does the

worker’s assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to port or location to

location?

Id. at 574.

This case is factually similar to two others in which this Court ultimately held that the

plaintiffs were not Jones Act seaman – namely, Meaux and Rutherford. See Meaux, 601 F. Supp.

3d at 43-54; Rutherford, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 546. In Meaux, the plaintiff was employed by Savard

Marine Services, Inc. d/b/a Savard Labor & Maritime Personnel, Inc. (“Savard”) to work for

Cooper Consolidated, LLC (“Cooper”) as a borrowed employee pursuant to a staffing agreement.

Meaux, 601 F. Supp. 3d at 41-42. Cooper’s operations consisted of loading and unloading large,

oceangoing cargo vessels midstream in the Mississippi River at three separate work locations. To

perform this work, Cooper owned and operated a fleet of floating derrick crane barges that were

brought by tugboat alongside the cargo vessels, which were moored to buoys midstream in the

Mississippi River. Id. at 43-44. Cooper assigned certain workers, who were either full-time

Cooper employees or employees hired through a union hall, to work aboard each crane barge as a

crew consisting of a crane operator, oiler, and deckhand. Id. at 44. Cooper also assigned other

workers, who were hired through staffing companies like Savard, to so-called “longshore crews,”

which consisted of a “flag person” (or flagger), “utility person,” and “equipment operator” to assist

with Cooper’s cargo operations. Id. Their work was typically done aboard the larger, oceangoing

cargo vessels that were being loaded and unloaded. Id. The plaintiff was a flagger and utility man

who was usually positioned aboard the oceangoing vessels that were being unloaded or the barges

containing cargo that was being loaded onto the oceangoing vessels. Id. at 45. Cooper controlled

the plaintiff’s work, he drove to and from work every day, and he did not sleep on any vessel. Id.

The plaintiff rode crew boats to the worksites, but never performed any work aboard the transport

vessels while he was a passenger. Id. at 47.

In Meaux, this Court considered the issue of the plaintiff’s seaman status four times. On

the fourth occasion, with the benefit of a bench trial and a more fully developed factual record, the

Court held that the plaintiff was not a seaman because the evidence showed that he did not engage

in sea-based or seagoing activity and did not sail with Cooper’s vessels. Id. at 51-54. The Court

did not specifically take into account the duration of the plaintiff’s time working on vessels. Id.

While acknowledging that the plaintiff worked midstream in the Mississippi River and took a crew

boat to get to his worksite, this Court concluded that:

Boarding a crew boat to get to work is not seagoing activity; nor is performing

longshore work near or around water. Otherwise, scores of maritime workers

would be transformed into Jones Act seamen who the law currently does not

recognize as such. As this Court previously observed, Meaux would certainly not

be categorized as a seaman if the vessel being loaded and on which he worked was

dockside. Simply put, it cannot be said that Meaux’s duties took him to sea in the

way Sanchez envisions to allow his work to be considered sea-based or its nature

seagoing activity.

Id. at 54 (citing Meaux v. Cooper Consol., LLC, 545 F. Supp. 3d 383, 390 (E.D. La. 2021)). As to

the third Sanchez inquiry – namely, whether the plaintiff’s assignment included sailing with the

crane barges from port to port or location to location – this Court noted that there was no evidence

that the plaintiff sailed with Cooper’s crane barges from cargo-handling location to cargo-handling

location, nor that he did any work on the crane barges or the crew boats while they were in transit.

Id. And, finally, “at the end of the [work] day, [the plaintiff] would take the crew boat to shore

and he would go home like any other longshoreman.” Id.

This Court reached the same result in Rutherford. Rutherford, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 546. The

plaintiff in that case was employed by Pontchartrain Materials Corporation, LLC

(“Pontchartrain”), which operated four aggregate construction material yards in southeast

Louisiana where its marine department unloaded the material from third-party-owned hopper

barges to shore. Id. at 539. Pontchartrain owned and operated three spud barges that it used in

conjunction with the material handling work. Id. For an unloading operation, Pontchartrain’s

barge was spudded down or tied to shore and connected to land by a gangplank for the duration of

the operation. Id. Then, a third-party-owned hopper barge full of aggregate material was placed

alongside Pontchartrain’s spud barge and Pontchartrain employees used an excavator or front-end

loader to unload the aggregate material from the material barge and place it in a dump truck or a

pile on land. Id. During the unloading operations, Rutherford worked on the third-party-owned-

and-operated material barges signaling the crane operator, or using a front-end loader, to move the

aggregate. Id. When an unloading operation was complete, the Pontchartrain spud barge was

moved by a third-party-owned tugboat to its next work location. Id.

Pontchartrain employees did not usually ride a spud barge to its next location, but have

done so on rare occasions, for a short time or to cover a short distance. Id. Pontchartrain employed

Rutherford as a loader operator and oiler on its spud barges. Id. He was primarily assigned to

work on one of Pontchartrain’s barges at various of Pontchartrain’s aggregate yards. Id.

Pontchartrain’s shoreside operations manager assigned Rutherford’s work locations and told him

where to report each day. Id. Rutherford drove to the assigned aggregate yard for each shift and

returned home every night. Id. He boarded the Pontchartrain spud barges by ladder or tow boat,

but did not sleep on or sail with any vessel. Id. Rutherford performed some maintenance on the

spud barges, such as fueling and greasing the excavators, cranes, and front-end loaders. Id. He

was also responsible for spudding down and cleaning Pontchartrain’s spud barges and tying up the

third-party-owned material barges to them. Id. at 539-40. Additionally, Rutherford unloaded

material barges or assisted his supervisor and the barge’s captain in unloading operations. Id. at

540. Rutherford estimated that he spent 80-to-90 percent of his time with Pontchartrain working

on water. Id.

With these facts, this Court held that, even if Rutherford satisfied all the other prongs of

the seaman-status test, he was not a Jones Act seaman because he did not engage in sea-based or

seagoing activity and did not sail with Pontchartrain’s vessels. Id. at 546. The Court

acknowledged that Rutherford did not present as close of a call as did Meaux. Id. But the

undisputed evidence showed that Rutherford nearly always worked on vessels that were only a

gangplank away from shore. Id. His work was performed on the third-party-owned material

barges that were tied off to the spud barges that were in turn almost always located near shore, and

he never worked on any vessel while it was in motion. Id. This Court just could not find that

Rutherford was a seaman when his work had him even closer to shore than the plaintiff in Meaux.

Id.

The facts of Stringer’s employment with Specialty yield the same result as in Meaux and

Rutherfurd. Simply put, even if he were to meet the other factors of seaman status, Stringer is not

a Jones Act seaman under the Sanchez factors. At the outset, the Court acknowledges that

Stringer’s work as a diver arguably constituted seagoing activity when he was diving. However,

the other facts of his employment with Specialty prove that he was not a Jones Act seaman.

Stringer owed his allegiance to the shoreside employer, not a vessel. He was assigned to multiple

different vessels when he worked for Specialty (including many that were not owned by Specialty)

and there is no evidence that he had allegiance to any of them. Although Stringer briefly rode

aboard the Compass Marine barge as it was being pushed to the dive site and served as a lookout,

this one-time, limited event does not mean that Stringer sailed with the vessel from port-to-port or

had any allegiance to that vessel. Rather, he performed this discrete task while riding the barge

to the dive site and then utilized the barge as a dive support vessel. There is no evidence that

Stringer ever would have worked on the vessel again after the Alcoa job ended. Moreover, other

than the act of diving, Stringer’s employment did not take him to sea. On eight of the nine jobs

Stringer did for Specialty, he was never more than a gangplank from shore. He nearly always

(other than the one job) lived on land, received a per diem for food and lodging, drove to the

jobsite, and boarded the dive support vessel from a gangplank. On the job where the injury

occurred, Stringer lived on land, drove to the worksite daily, and boarded the dive support vessel

by ladder. It is immaterial that he sometimes ate aboard the vessel for convenience. He still slept,

and ate most meals, on land. Under these facts, as in Meaux and Rutherford, Stringer is not a Jones

Act seaman.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Stringer’s motion for reconsideration (R. Doc. 32) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Specialty’s motion for summary judgment on seaman

status is GRANTED, and, as a result, Stringer’s claims that depend upon that status (negligence

under the Jones Act and general maritime law, along with general maritime law claims for

unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of November, 2025.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE