Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

MELISSA M. MITCHELL, as the personal

representative of the Estate of Andrew T.

Mitchell, deceased. PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 6:24-cv-06080

RISER MOTORS, INC.;

CAMERON N. RISER; and

PAUL G. RISER. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment filed separately by Defendant Riser

Motors, Inc. (ECF No. 41), Defendant Paul Riser (ECF No. 55), and Defendant Cameron Riser

(ECF No. 58). Plaintiff Melissa Mitchell (“Plaintiff”) filed her Response to each. (ECF Nos. 44,

63, 65). Defendants Riser Motors, Inc., Paul Riser, and Cameron Riser have replied. (ECF Nos.

47, 67, 69). The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an accident that occurred on April 27, 2023. Defendant Cameron

Riser was driving during a heavy rainstorm when she struck and killed decedent Andrew T.

Mitchell while he was crossing an intersection. Cameron was allegedly intoxicated after drinking

for over two hours on “the Square,” a popular bar area located in downtown Oxford, MS. (ECF

No. 2, at 3). Cameron drank one “pink Starburst shot” and a few sips of an alcoholic seltzer at the

Library Bar with her friends Tate Miller and Michaela Spiller. (ECF No. 66, at 3). Cameron

dropped Tate and Michaela off at Tate’s home and drove to Jimmy Johns to pick up an online food

order. The accident occurred while Cameron was driving on Jackson Avenue back to Tate’s house.

(ECF No. 66, at 3).

Cameron had a green light as she approached the intersection of Jackson Avenue and

Fraternity Row. Andrew was crossing the intersection despite the “don’t walk” sign for

pedestrians. (ECF No. 66, at 3). Andrew was almost completely through the crosswalk when

Cameron struck him with her vehicle. Cameron fled the scene of the accident without rendering

aid or calling 911. (ECF No. 66, at 4). The police were called by bystanders who witnessed the

accident. (ECF No. 66, at 3). Andrew died of blunt force trauma to the head thirty minutes after

being struck by Cameron Riser. The Parties dispute whether Cameron was speeding and

intoxicated when she struck and killed Andrew.

At the time of the accident, Cameron was driving a 2022 Ford Bronco Sport (“the Bronco”).

The Parties agree that Cameron and Defendant Paul Riser entered into a lease agreement with

Defendant Riser Motors, Inc. for the Bronco six months before the accident. (ECF No. 45, at 1).

Paul is the president of Riser Motors and Cameron’s father. (ECF No. 64, at 1). Though both Paul

and Cameron were lessees of the Bronco, only Paul made payments on the lease. (ECF No. 46, at

2). Riser Motors was the named lessor; however, the Bronco was registered to CAB East, LLC,

the leasing arm of the Ford Motor Credit Company. (ECF No. 35, at 2). On October 31, 2022,

Riser Motors endorsed the Certificate of Origin to CAB East, LLC, and delivered possession of

the Bronco to Cameron. (ECF No. 43-2).

On the morning following the accident, Cameron texted Paul, “Hey I’m so sorry about this

dad. I hit a deer last night. What should I do?” Cameron followed up with “I’m ok just the car

isn’t.” (ECF No. 64, at 6). When Paul asked what happened, Cameron responded that “It was

pouring rain last night and a deer ran right in front of me.” (ECF No. 64, at 6). Paul and Cameron

then spoke on the phone for three minutes. The parties dispute the contents of this phone call.

Paul asserts that he told Cameron that a driver from Riser Motors would travel to Oxford to retrieve

the damaged Bronco and provide her with a replacement vehicle. (ECF No. 64, at 6-7). Plaintiff

asserts that Paul and Cameron’s testimony cannot be trusted and that they conspired to hide the

evidence of the Bronco from the police. (ECF No. 64, at 7). Plaintiff alleges that Paul told

Cameron to move the Bronco to a spot in her driveway that would make it difficult for police to

observe the damage from the street. (ECF No. 2, at 5). Following the phone call, Cameron texted

Paul, “Thank you dad! I’m so sorry.” Paul responded, “Please don’t apologize! You aren’t a deer,”

adding an emoji and “Lol!” (ECF No. 64, at 7). Paul sent an employee of Riser Motors to Oxford

to bring the Bronco to the Riser Motors dealership in Hot Springs. When the employee arrived in

Oxford, the police were questioning Cameron at her home. (ECF No. 64, at 7). Cameron was

arrested and charged with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. (ECF No. 64, at 4).

Cameron pled guilty on May 7, 2024. (ECF No. 2, at 5).

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case.1 (ECF No. 2). In the Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges negligent entrustment against Paul Riser and Riser Motors, civil conspiracy

against Paul Riser and Cameron Riser, and negligence against Cameron Riser. Plaintiff requests

compensatory and punitive damages for all claims.

On April 22, 2025, Riser Motors filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 41).

In its Motion, Riser Motors argues that Plaintiff cannot show that Riser Motors negligently

entrusted the Bronco to Cameron because Riser Motors did not have ownership of the Bronco

when the accident occurred. (ECF No. 42, at 3-5). Riser Motors also argues that Ark. Code Ann.

§ 27-14-911 shields it from liability. (ECF No. 42, at 4).

On October 2, 2025, Paul Riser filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 55).

1 The Court has jurisdiction over this case through diversity of citizenship between the parties. Under Erie R. Co. v.

Tompkins, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). No party

disputes that Arkansas law applies to Plaintiff’s claims.

Paul argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim

because (1) he had no right to control the Bronco at the time of the accident, (2) Cameron was a

competent driver, and (3) even if Cameron was incompetent, he did not know or have reason to

suspect so. (ECF No. 56, at 4). Paul also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim because (1) Plaintiff did not allege an underlying intentional tort

and (2) Plaintiff did not provide evidence of a conspiracy. (ECF No. 56, at 10). Finally, Paul

argues that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against him should be dismissed. (ECF No. 56,

at 14).

On October 7, 2025, Cameron Riser filed her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF

No. 58). Cameron argues that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim must fail because (1) it is not based

on an underlying intentional tort and (2) Plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the

elements of conspiracy. (ECF No. 59, at 4). Cameron also argues that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive

damages against her should be dismissed. Cameron does not challenge Plaintiff’s negligence

claim against her.

The Court will consider all three Motions for Summary Judgment herein.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for summary judgment is well established. The Court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur,

47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). This is a “threshold inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for

trial — whether, in other words, there are genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only

by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects

the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause

a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider all the evidence and

all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-Op, 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The moving

party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir.

1996). The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific material facts in the

record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957.

III. DISCUSSION

The issues before the Court are (1) whether Paul Riser and Riser Motors are entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim; (2) whether Paul Riser and

Cameron Riser are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim; and (3)

whether Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages must be dismissed. The Court will review each in

turn.

A. Negligent Entrustment

Plaintiff alleges that Paul Riser and Riser Motors negligently entrusted the Bronco to

Cameron Riser. To prove a claim of negligent entrustment, the Plaintiff must establish: “(1) the

entrustee was incompetent, inexperienced or reckless; (2) the entrustor knew or had reason to know

of the entrustee’s conditions or proclivities; (3) there was an entrustment of the chattel; (4) the

entrustment created an appreciable risk of harm to the plaintiff and a relational duty on the part of

the defendant; and (5) the harm to the plaintiff was proximately or legally caused by the negligence

of the defendant.” Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 297, 914 S.W.2d 306, 310 (1996) (citation

omitted).

The Court will examine Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Paul Riser and Riser Motors

in turn.

1. Paul Riser

Paul Riser argues that Plaintiff cannot show that (1) Cameron had a proclivity for

incompetent driving, (2) he “knew or had reason to know” of Cameron’s proclivity for incompetent

driving, or (3) he entrusted the Bronco to Cameron.

In a claim for negligent entrustment of a vehicle, the driver’s incompetence and lack of

capacity in operating a vehicle must be established first. Ponder v. Gorman, 94 Ark. App. 159,

163, 227 S.W.3d 428, 430 (2006). Proof of the entrustee’s incompetence may be demonstrated

with evidence of their general reputation or specific acts. Pace v. Davis, 2012 Ark. App. 193, 5,

394 S.W.3d 859, 862 (2012); see Arkansas-Louisiana Lumber Co. v. Causey, 228 Ark. 1130, 1134,

312 S.W.2d 909, 911 (1958) (“It is conceded that, while proof of general reputation is preferable,

such reputation may also be shown by evidence of specific acts.”).

Plaintiff argues that Cameron’s driving record establishes that she has a proclivity for

incompetent driving. (ECF No. 63, at 3). In her eight years of driving before the accident,

Cameron received two speeding tickets and was involved in two collisions. (ECF No. 64, at 3).

Both speeding tickets were issued in 2022 for driving approximately 15 mph above the speed limit.

(ECF No. 55-3). The first collision was a fender bender that occurred in 2017. According to the

accident report, Cameron was cited for “careless and prohibited driving” but was not suspected of

alcohol use. (ECF No. 55-4). The second collision was a minor fender bender in 2021, in which

Cameron was rear ended. (ECF No. 64, at 3). Neither collision resulted in personal injuries, and

the 2021 collision was so minor that it did not result in an accident report or notation on Cameron’s

driving record. (ECF No. 64, at 3).

Paul argues that Cameron’s driving record reveals only minor driving infractions that are

insufficient to render Cameron an incompetent driver. Paul compares Cameron’s record to those

which courts have found no incompetence on the part of the entrustee-driver. See Ponder, 94 Ark.

App. at 162-63, 227 S.W.3d at 430 (holding that the driver was not incompetent because he had

no history of traffic violations and was not under the influence at the time of the accident); see also

Fleming v. Stifolter, 656 F.Supp.2d 764, 773 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (holding that the operator of a jet

ski was not incompetent because there was no evidence that the operator had a history of operating

watercrafts in a reckless manner or that he was under the influence at the time of the accident)

(applying Arkansas law); see also Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So.2d 45, 51-52 (Ala.

1995) (holding that an entrustee’s driving record of two speeding tickets and a suspended

prosecution of a DUI charge over a ten-year period was not sufficient to show that the entrustee

was incompetent); see also Eyrich v. Estate of Waldemar, 765 N.E.2d 504, 506-7 (Ill. App. Ct.

2002) (finding that the entrustee’s “poor driving record” of one speeding ticket and one ticket for

having tinted windows does not support the conclusion that the entrustee posed a risk of harm to

others); see also Matysyuk v. Pantyukhin, 595 S.W.3d 543, 549-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)

(concluding that a two traffic offenses, including a severe collision, that took place more than two

years prior to the at-issue accident did not establish a habit of recklessness). Plaintiff argues that

Cameron’s driving record extends beyond those of the entrustees in the cases cited by Paul.

Courts routinely recognize a driver’s history of traffic violations as evidence that the driver

is incompetent. See LeCave v. Hardy, 73 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases).

The two cases cited by the Parties that apply Arkansas law noted the driver’s lack of previous

traffic violations in holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the driver was incompetent.

See Ponder, 94 Ark. App. at 162-63, 227 S.W.3d at 430; see also Fleming, 656 F.Supp.2d at 773

(applying Arkansas law). Further, a review of caselaw from other states demonstrates that several

traffic violations in a short period of time close to the accident support submitting the question of

incompetence to the jury. See Swicegood v. Cooper, 459 S.E.2d 206, 208 (N.C. 1995) (submitting

the issue of incompetence to the jury when the driver had three movement violations and six

speeding convictions, including one for speeding over sixty miles per hour, within a span of six

years); see also Thompson v. Havard, 235 So.2d 853, 857 (Ala. 1970) (holding that evidence of

eleven moving violations within three years prior to the accident was sufficient evidence to submit

the issue of incompetency to the jury); see also Broesche v. Bullock, 427 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tex. App.

1968) (holding that evidence of seven moving violations, a warning letter, and driving restrictions

within a three year period prior to the accident was sufficient to submit to the jury the question of

incompetency); see also Tortora v. General Motors Corp., 130 N.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Mich. 1964)

(holding that a jury could find a driver incompetent based on twelve moving violations during a

period of less than five years before the accident).

Compared to these cases, the Court declines to find that Cameron’s driving record alone

presents sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find she was an incompetent or habitually

reckless driver. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“[T]he trial judge’s summary judgment inquiry as

to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying

[the] evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.”). Within

a period of seven years prior to the accident, Cameron only received three traffic violations on her

driving record: two speeding tickets in 2022 and a fender bender in 2017. See Pryor, 674 So.2d

at 51-52 (holding that a driving record of two speeding tickets and a suspended DUI charge over

ten years was not sufficient to show that the driver was incompetent).

Cameron’s driving record, however, is not the only basis on which Plaintiff asserts

Cameron’s alleged incompetency. Plaintiff alleges that Cameron was intoxicated when the

accident occurred. (ECF No. 2, at 4). Evidence that a driver was under the influence of drugs or

alcohol at the time of the accident is sufficient to show incompetence. In Ponder v. Gorman, for

example, the plaintiff claimed a father negligently entrusted his car to his son who he knew had a

history of marijuana use. 94 Ark. App. at 162, 227 S.W.3d at 430. The Arkansas Court of Appeals

held that the plaintiff failed to prove incompetence because the son had never received a traffic

citation and because there was “no evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol or other

drugs at the time of the accident.” Id. at 163, 430; see also Fleming, 656 F.Supp.2d at 773 (applying

Arkansas law to hold that the plaintiff failed to prove incompetence because there was no evidence

that the jet ski operator was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the accident). In

the instant case, unlike in Ponder and Fleming, the parties dispute whether Cameron was under

the influence of alcohol on the night of the accident. (ECF No. 56, at 10). The question of whether

Cameron was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and thus an incompetent driver, is one for the

jury.

The inquiry does not stop there, however, because Plaintiff must also establish that Paul

had knowledge of Cameron’s alleged proclivity for driving under the influence. In other words,

Plaintiff must show that Paul knew or should have known that Cameron was driving drunk that

night or was in the habit of doing so. See Renfro, 323 Ark. at 297, 914 S.W.2d at 310.

In Arkansas-Louisiana Lumber Co. v. Causey, for example, a driver was operating his

employer’s truck under the influence of alcohol when he collided with the plaintiff. 228 Ark. 1130,

1131, 312 S.W.2d 909, 910 (1958). The Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the evidence of

four instances of driving under the influence over a period of several years was sufficient to

establish a pattern of drunk driving and incompetence. Id. at 1133-34, 911. Testimony was

disputed as to whether the employer had been told that the driver previously drove his truck while

he was “so drunk he didn’t know what he was doing.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court of Arkansas

concluded that the question of the employer’s knowledge of the driver’s incompetence was a

question for the jury. Id. (noting that witness credibility is a jury issue).

In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the accident, Paul knew of Cameron’s

propensity to drive the Bronco under the influence of alcohol. However, Plaintiff produces no

proof that Paul knew Cameron was driving intoxicated on the night of the incident or that she had

a habit of driving under the influence. Instead, Plaintiff only points to Paul’s testimony that he

knew of Cameron’s speeding tickets and prior collisions. (ECF No. 62, at 5). The Court finds that

Plaintiff fails to show that Paul knew or should have known that Cameron was either driving drunk

at the time of the accident or had the proclivity to do so. Accordingly, Defendant Paul Riser’s

motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim is granted.

2. Riser Motors

Plaintiff also asserts a claim of negligent entrustment against Riser Motors. (ECF No. 2,

at 11). Plaintiff alleges that when Riser Motors leased the Bronco to Paul and Cameron, it knew

of Cameron’s proclivity for incompetent driving because Paul is both Cameron’s father and the

president of Riser Motors. (ECF No. 2, at 12-13). Plaintiff’s allegations of Cameron’s proclivity

for incompetent driving and the extent of Riser Motors’s knowledge of such mirrors Plaintiff’s

allegations against Paul Riser.

Riser Motors argues that Plaintiff failed to establish that Riser Motors entrusted the Bronco

to Cameron Riser. Under Arkansas law, ownership interest, or at least the “right to control” the

use of the vehicle, is necessary to entrust a vehicle to another. See Mills v. Crone, 63 Ark. App.

45, 50, 973 S.W.2d 828, 831-32 (1998) (upholding a grant of summary judgment for appellees on

the issue of negligent entrustment when the appellees were not owners of the vehicle and had no

right to control its use); see also Renfro, 323 Ark. at 296-97, 914 S.W.2d at 310 (holding that the

question of ownership was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment on

a negligent entrustment claim).

The parties dispute whether Riser Motors entrusted the Bronco to Cameron. Riser Motors

argues that Arkansas Code § 27-14-911 shields it from liability in this case because it transferred

ownership of the Bronco by endorsing the Certificate of Origin and delivering possession of the

Bronco to Paul and Cameron before the accident.2 (ECF No. 41, at 5). Riser Motors also argues

that the Ford Motor Credit Company, not Riser Motors, held ownership of the Bronco on the date

of the accident. (ECF Nos. 42, at 3-5; 45-3, at 34).

Plaintiff argues that § 27-14-911 does not apply in this case. (ECF No. 44, at 2). Plaintiff

further argues that Riser Motors maintained an ownership interest in the Bronco after it leased it

to Paul and Cameron because entry into a lease does not extinguish the lessor’s interest. Plaintiff

then argues that even if the lease gave Paul and Cameron conditional ownership of the Bronco,

2 Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-911 provides that:

The owner of a motor vehicle who has made a bona fide sale or transfer of his or her title or interest

and who has delivered possession of the vehicle to the purchaser or transferee shall not be liable for

any damages thereafter resulting from negligent operation of the vehicle by another. Furthermore,

the selling or transferring owner, upon delivery of possession, shall not be liable for any such

damage or negligence if one (1) of the following requirements is fulfilled:

(1) Delivered the certificate of title, properly endorsed and dated with the date of the endorsement, to

the purchaser or transferee;

(2) Delivered to the Office of Motor Vehicle or placed in the United States mail, addressed to the Office

of Motor Vehicle, the notice as provided in § 27-14-916; or

(3) Delivered to the Office of Motor Vehicle or placed in the United States mail, addressed to the Office

of Motor Vehicle, the appropriate documents and fees for registration of the motor vehicle to the

new owner pursuant to the sale or transfer.

Riser Motors had cause to terminate the lease due to false and misleading statements by the lessees.

(ECF No. 44, at 10-11).

The Court finds it unnecessary to determine who held ownership interest in the Bronco at

the time of the accident because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the first and second elements of

negligent entrustment, as discussed above. The driver’s incompetence and lack of capacity in

operating a vehicle must be established before addressing whether the vehicle was entrusted. See

Ponder, 94 Ark. App. at 163, 227 S.W.3d at 430. The crux of Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment

claim against Riser Motors is that it knew about Cameron’s driving record by way of Paul Riser

through his role as both Cameron’s father and president of Riser Motors, and it still leased the

Bronco to Cameron. (ECF No. 44, at 6). Since the Court has found that a reasonable jury could

not find that Cameron was an incompetent driver based on her record and that Plaintiff offers no

evidence that Paul knew or should have known that Cameron was driving under the influence or

had the proclivity to drive drunk, Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim must also be dismissed

against Riser Motors.

B. Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiff also alleges that Cameron Riser and Paul Riser conspired to destroy or conceal

evidence of Cameron’s intoxication on the night of the accident and of the Bronco itself. (ECF

No. 2, at 16). To prove civil conspiracy, Plaintiff must show “that two or more persons have

combined to accomplish a purpose that is unlawful or oppressive or to accomplish some purpose,

not in itself unlawful, oppressive or immoral, but by unlawful, oppressive or immoral means, to

the injury of another.” Chambers v. Stern, 347 Ark. 395, 404, 64 S.W.3d 737, 743 (2002) (citing

Dodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 Ark. 430, 445, 47 S.W.3d 866, 876 (2001)). Civil conspiracy is

“not actionable in and of itself, but recovery may be had for damages caused by acts committed

pursuant to the conspiracy.” Id. Further, civil conspiracy is “an intentional tort requiring specific

intent to accomplish the contemplated wrong.” Id. A plaintiff may prove civil conspiracy through

“direct evidence of an actual agreement or understanding between conspirators, but it may also be

shown by circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citing Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 529, 446

S.W.2d 543, 548 (1969)).

Plaintiff alleges the following facts to support her claim of civil conspiracy against Paul

and Cameron. (ECF No. 2, at 15-16). After an evening out drinking on “the Square,” Cameron

hit Andrew with her Bronco. Rather than call 911, Cameron called Paul to seek instruction on how

to conceal the incident because she recognized that she may be cited for driving under the

influence. Paul instructed Cameron not to call the police in order to allow her additional time to

sober up. Paul also told Cameron to move the Bronco to a location where the damage would be

hidden from view. Paul and Cameron conspired to have the Bronco towed out of Oxford and

provide Cameron with a replacement vehicle by the time the police identified Cameron as a

suspect.

Plaintiff argues that Cameron’s phone data provides evidence of Cameron and Paul’s act

of conspiracy. The phone records revealed that Cameron made several internet searches related to

the hit-and-run the night of the accident, including searching “what happens if you accidentally

run over someone.” (ECF No. 64-7, at 132-37). Though Cameron did not call Paul on the night

of the accident, her phone records reveal that she did text him early the next morning. Cameron’s

first message said “Hey I’m so sorry about this dad. I hit a deer last night. What should I do.” (ECF

No. 64-6). When Paul responded by asking “What happened[,]” Cameron texted that “It was

pouring rain last night and a deer ran right in front of me.” (ECF No. 64-6). Paul then called

Cameron and the two spoke for around three minutes. The parties dispute what was said over this

phone call. Paul and Cameron assert that during the call Paul checked on Cameron and arranged

to send a driver to retrieve and take the Bronco to an auto shop in Hot Springs and provide Cameron

with a replacement vehicle. (ECF Nos. 56, at 12; 59, at 5-6). Plaintiff disputes the contents of this

phone call and questions the credibility of Paul and Cameron’s testimony. (ECF No. 64, at 7).

Plaintiff alleges that Paul suggested Cameron move the Bronco to a spot in her driveway that

would make it difficult for the police to observe the damage to the vehicle.3 (ECF No. 2, at 5).

Both Paul and Cameron argue that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim fails because Plaintiff

alleges no underlying intentional tort claim and because Plaintiff cannot produce evidence to meet

the elements of conspiracy. The Court will analyze Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim against Paul

and Cameron separately.

1. Paul Riser

The Court finds it unnecessary to determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently produced

evidence of a conspiracy on the part of Paul because a claim of civil conspiracy requires an

underlying tort, and the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim against Paul.

Civil conspiracy under Arkansas law is “not a separate tort and must be based on the underlying

tortious activity.” Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying

Arkansas law); see also Chambers, 347 Ark. at 404, 64 S.W.3d at 743 (“[A civil] conspiracy is not

actionable in and of itself.”); see also KBX, Inc. v. Zero Grade Farms, 2022 Ark. 42, 19, 639

S.W.3d 352, 364 (2022) (holding that the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict on the

plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim when the underlying torts to which it was attached were

dismissed). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for civil conspiracy against Paul

3 The Court notes that besides placing doubt on the credibility of Paul and Cameron’s testimony, Plaintiff fails to

produce evidence demonstrating that Paul told Cameron to conceal the Bronco. To survive a motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff must show sufficient evidence that would permit a finding in her favor more than “mere

speculation.” See Brinkly v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 602 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2010).

Riser fails.

2. Cameron Riser

The Court first turns to Cameron’s argument that an underlying claim of negligence cannot

support a civil conspiracy claim because negligence is not an intentional tort. In her Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, Cameron does not challenge the negligence claim asserted against her.

Thus, for a claim of civil conspiracy to be found, it must be based on the underlying tort of

negligence alleged against Cameron. See Touhey v. Chenal Healthcare, LLC, 173 F.Supp.3d 804,

812 (E.D. Ark. 2016) (“A plaintiff alleging a claim for civil conspiracy must state a prima facie

case for the underlying tort in order to support a conspiracy claim.”).

The parties disagree as to whether Arkansas courts require the underlying tort to be an

intentional tort. Cameron argues that negligence alone cannot be the basis of a civil conspiracy

since civil conspiracy requires intentional conduct. (ECF No. 59, at 4). Plaintiff argues that case

law supports civil conspiracy claims where the underlying tort is one of negligence. In support,

Plaintiff cites to two Arkansas cases in which she argues that the court recognized civil conspiracy

based only on a claim of negligence.

First, Plaintiff asserts that the reversal of a grant of summary judgment dismissing civil

conspiracy and negligence claims by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Guy Maris Trust v.

Truemper demonstrates that Arkansas courts allow jury trials based on only claims of civil

conspiracy and negligence. See 2012 Ark. App. 232, at 11, 405 S.W.3d 427, 433 (2012). The

Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s reading of Truemper. In Truemper, the plaintiffs sued based on a

timber-cutting statute, conversion, negligence, and civil conspiracy after the defendants cut down

the plaintiff’s trees. Id. at 1-3, 428-29. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court

because there remained a question of material fact as to the parties’ intent in their conversion claim.

Id. at 9-11, 433. Put simply, the evidence of whether the defendants were given permission to cut

down the plaintiff’s trees was in dispute. The Arkansas Court of Appeals also reversed the circuit

court’s grant of summary judgment on both the civil conspiracy and negligence claims because

those claims relied on the same evidence that was held to be in dispute for the conversion claim.

Id. Thus, the underlying tort of the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim was not their negligence claim,

but rather the conversion claim, which is an intentional tort. See McQuillan v. Mercedes-Benz

Credit Corp., 331 Ark. 242, 247, 961 S.W.2d 729, 732 (“[The intent] required [for a conversion

claim] is that there be intent to exercise control or dominion over the goods.”).

Second, Plaintiff relies on the fact that the plaintiff in Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,

U.S.A. alleged civil conspiracy alongside claims of negligence, breach of warranty, and strict

products liability to argue that civil conspiracy need not be based on an underlying intentional tort.

See 466 Ark. 238, 234 S.W.3d 838 (2006). However, in that case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas

affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint on personal jurisdiction grounds

without addressing the merits of the claims or the feasibility of basing a civil conspiracy claim on

non-intentional torts. Id. at 253, 848. The Court finds unpersuasive Plaintiff’s assertion that the

fact that a plaintiff has alleged civil conspiracy alongside non-intentional torts before shows that

Arkansas courts allow negligence as the underlying tort to civil conspiracy.

Further, while other states have explicitly held that civil conspiracy may be based on an

underlying claim of negligence, Arkansas courts have not done so. See Wright v. Brooke Group

Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 173 (Iowa 2002) (ruling that while other states require a civil conspiracy

claim be based on an intentional tort, a plaintiff in Iowa may base a claim of civil conspiracy on

an underlying tort of negligence). Rather, Arkansas courts appear to trend towards requiring that

civil conspiracy must be based on an underlying intentional tort. In KBX, Inc. v. Zero Grade

Farms, for example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that evidence did not support a jury

verdict on the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants

conspired to commit the underlying torts of deceit, constructive fraud, or conversion. 2022 Ark.

12, at 19, 639 S.W.3d 352, 364 (2022). In the “absence of an agreement to commit an underlying

intentional tort,” the Arkansas Supreme Court held that “substantial evidence did not support the

jury’s verdict on the [defendant’s] conspiracy claim.” Id.; see also Stouffer v. Kralicek Realty Co.,

No. CA 04-502, 2005 WL 605597, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (“Because civil conspiracy requires

a specific intent to commit a wrong, appellant’s allegations of negligence cannot support this cause

of action.”); see also Foster v. Boch Industries, Inc., No. 08-CV-5093, 2009 WL 485407, at *5

(W.D. Ark. Feb. 26, 2009) (stating that in order to establish a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff

must prove that “an intentional tort can be proven on the part of one conspirator[.]”); see also Ark.

Model Jury Instructions 714-Civil (2025 ed.) (noting that the plaintiff must prove all essential

elements on their underlying intentional tort claim to recover damages for civil conspiracy).

Regardless, assuming that Plaintiff may recover for civil conspiracy based on an underlying

tort of negligence, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is not the tort underlying her civil conspiracy claim.

In her negligence claim, Plaintiff alleges that Cameron negligently hit and killed Andrew with her

car and fled the scene while under the influence of alcohol. (ECF No. 2, at 5-6). Plaintiff asserts

that she does not claim that Paul and Cameron conspired to kill Andrew but rather alleges that

Cameron and Paul conspired to cover-up Cameron’s involvement in the accident. (ECF No. 65,

at 4). Plaintiff does not assert that an agreement existed between Cameron and Paul to commit the

tort of negligence that resulted in Andrew’s death.4 See KBX, Inc., 2022 Ark. at 19, 639 S.W.3d at

4 The Supreme Court of Iowa expressly allows civil conspiracy claims based on an underlying tort of negligence.

Wright, 652 N.W.2d at 174. However, even applying the Wright analysis to the instant case, Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy

claim would fail. In Wright, the court reasoned that “[s]o long as the underlying actionable conduct is of the type that

one can plan ahead to do, it should not matter that the legal system allows recovery upon a mere showing of

364. Thus, the underlying tort that Cameron and Paul allegedly conspired to commit was not the

tort of negligence. Accordingly, the Court finds that the civil conspiracy claim against Cameron

Riser must be dismissed.

C. Punitive Damages

The final issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff may seek punitive damages against

Cameron Riser in relation to her remaining negligence claim. Summary judgment on punitive

damages is only appropriate “if the evidence [is] such that no reasonable jury could [find] grounds

for awarding punitive damages.” In re Aircraft Accident at Little Rock, 351 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir.

2003) (applying Arkansas law).

To recover punitive damages under Arkansas law, a plaintiff must prove:

that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and that either or

both of the following aggravating factors were present and related to the

injury for which compensatory damages were awarded:

(1) The defendant knew or ought to have known, in light of the

surrounding circumstances, that his or her conduct would naturally

and probably result in injury or damage and that he or she continue

the conduct with malice or in reckless disregard of the consequences,

from which malice may be inferred.

(2) The defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the

purpose of causing injury or damage.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-206. A plaintiff must prove this by clear and convincing evidence.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-207. The standard for punitive damages is high because negligence, or

even gross negligence, is insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Nat’l By-Prod., Inc.

unreasonableness (negligence) rather than requiring an intent to harm.” Id. at 173. The Wright court gives the example

of manufacturers who agree to suppress information about their product to facilitate its sales and, in doing so, subject

themselves to liability for failure to warn of the risks of using the product. Id. In that example, the negligent products

liability tort is the result of the manufacturer’s intentional conspiracy. In the instant case, in contrast, the underlying

tort of negligence alleged is not the type that one plans to do ahead or the result of Cameron and Paul’s alleged

conspiracy.

v. Searcy House Moving Co., 292 Ark. 491, 494, 731 S.W.2d 194, 196 (1987).

In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to award punitive damages in a

negligence action, “it must appear that the negligent party knew, or had reason to believe, that his

act of negligence was about to inflict injury, and that he continued in his course with a conscious

indifference to the consequences, from which malice may be inferred.” D’Arbonne Constr. Co.,

Inc. v. Foster, 354 Ark. 304, 308, 123 S.W.3d 894, 898 (2003). The Supreme Court of Arkansas

has repeatedly held that malice may be inferred from the operation of a motor vehicle while

impaired by alcohol. Honeycutt v. Walden, 294 Ark. 440, 442, 743 S.W.2d 809, 810 (1988)

(collecting cases).

Cameron argues that punitive damages are inappropriate for two reasons: (1) her actions

of leaving the scene of the accident lack a proximate connection to the injury and (2) Plaintiff’s

allegations of her impairment during the accident are not supported by the facts developed in

discovery. The Court finds both unpersuasive.

First, Cameron compares her post-accident actions to those by the defendant in Freeman v.

Anderson, where the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the

evidence of the defendant fleeing the scene of the accident, which the plaintiff proffered to

establish punitive damages. 279 Ark. 282, 286-87, 651 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (1983). In Freeman,

the defendant changed lanes, forcing another vehicle to swerve across the center line into the path

of the plaintiff’s vehicle and causing a collision. Id. at 283, 450. The defendant did not stop at the

scene of the accident. Id. The plaintiff requested punitive damages, alleging that the defendant

fleeing the scene showed a willful and wanton disregard for her welfare. Id. The trial court

excluded evidence of defendant’s flight, ruling that punitive damages were not recoverable on

events occurring after the collision because they had no proximate causation. Id. In affirming the

trial court, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reasoned that nothing from the evidence of the

defendant’s flight indicated that the defendant “knew or had reason to believe that his conduct [of

fleeing the scene] would likely cause injury.” Id. at 287, 452.

The pertinent question is whether Cameron “knew or had reason to believe” that her action

of leaving the scene after hitting Andrew would likely cause injury. The Court finds that there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that she did. Cameron’s testimony that she began

searching the internet “what happens if you run over someone” minutes after hitting Andrew

suggest that she at least “had reason to believe” her action of fleeing the scene would likely cause

injury. (ECF No. 66-2, at 135). Additionally, Plaintiff’s negligence claim also alleges that Plaintiff

was negligent for driving intoxicated, which the Arkansas Courts have routinely held is grounds

for awarding punitive damages. See Honeycutt, 294 Ark. at 442, 743 S.W.2d at 810.

Second, Cameron argues that punitive damages should be barred because Plaintiff has not

established enough evidence conclusively showing that she was intoxicated at the time of the

accident. This evidence, however, is also disputed. Cameron asserts that she was not intoxicated

because testimony and video footage demonstrate that she only drank one shot and took a few sips

of a “White Claw” within a two-hour period before leaving the bar. (ECF No. 59, at 9-10). Plaintiff

responds that Cameron testified that she had a “very, very low tolerance for alcohol on the date of

[the accident]” and that she was drinking on an empty stomach. (ECF No. 65, at 9). The parties

also dispute whether Cameron applied her brakes within the normal range of perception and

reaction. (ECF Nos. 59, at 10; 65, at 9). Accordingly, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could

find that Cameron knew or had reason to believe that driving under the influence and leaving the

scene of the accident would likely cause injury. Thus, Cameron’s motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendant Paul Riser’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 55) and Defendant Riser Motor’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 41) should be and hereby are GRANTED. All claims against Defendants Paul Riser

and Riser Motor are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Court also finds that Defendant Cameron Riser’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 58) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s

negligence claim against Defendant Cameron Riser remains in the case, as does her request for

punitive damages. All other claims against Defendant Cameron Riser are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of November, 2025.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey

Susan O. Hickey

United States District Judge