Dcpp v. A.F., in the Matter of the Guardianship of A.Z., Jr.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1646-24

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.F.,

Defendant,

and

A.Z.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF A.Z., JR.,

ADR.Z., AL.Z., AN.Z., ADO.Z.,

and AM.Z., minors.

_____________________________

Submitted October 7, 2025 – Decided November 14, 2025

Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,

Docket No. FG-12-0046-24.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant (Mark E. Kleiman, Designated Counsel, on

the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Lakshmi Barot, Deputy Attorney

General, on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minors A.Z., Jr., ADR.Z., AL.Z., AN.Z.,

ADO.Z., and AM.Z. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy

Public Defender, of counsel; David B. Valentin,

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on

the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant A.Z. (Father) appeals from the January 16, 2025 Family Part

judgment terminating his parental rights to his six children. 1 We affirm.

I.

Father and defendant A.F. (Mother) are the biological parents of A.Z., Jr.

(Aaron), ADR.Z. (Alyssa), AL.Z. (Antoine), AN.Z. (Ava), ADO.Z. (Adam), and

AM.Z. (Amelia).

1

We identify the parties and their children by initials and pseudonyms to protect

confidential information in the record. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

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2

Plaintiff Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP or the

Division) first became involved with the family in 2012, following referrals for

substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect of the children's medical and

educational needs. DCPP had contact with the family on multiple occasions in

the years that followed.

In 2021, DCPP received a referral from the hospital where Mother was

taken after giving birth to Adam at home. The child was born with marijuana,

amphetamines, and methamphetamines in his system and was showing signs of

withdrawal. DCPP became further involved with the family and implemented a

safety protection plan, which limited Mother to supervised visits with the

children while she addressed her substance abuse. The Division would not

approve Father as a supervisor for the visits because of past allegations of

domestic violence.

While working with the family, DCPP determined Father and Mother were

not caring for their children or ensuring their attendance at school. DCPP

offered Father services such as individual counseling, marriage counseling, and

Family Preservation Services (FPS), in addition to the help being provided to

Mother. DCPP implemented FPS services in the home, but Father refused to

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3

participate.2 He also refused to engage in individual therapy and parenting

classes. DCPP scheduled a substance abuse evaluation for Father. He failed to

attend. He also failed to appear for the rescheduled appointment.

On January 14, 2022, DCPP petitioned the Family Part for care and

supervision of the five oldest children. The court granted the Division's request,

based on its finding domestic violence in the home and medical and educational

neglect of the children. The court directed Father to attend individual and family

counseling, and to ensure the children "attend school daily and on time." Father

did not attend the court-ordered counseling, the children continued to be

inconsistent in their school attendance, and Father failed to bring the children to

medical appointments. Two-month-old Adam had still not seen a physician,

even though DCPP offered to pay the cost of his medical care.

Alyssa, who was in kindergarten, had missed a significant amount of

school. When she did attend, school personnel had concerns about her

appearance and hygiene. The child appeared embarrassed that her hair was

"severely matted." By February 2022, the back of Alyssa's hair had been cut

2

FPS is an intensive, in-home crisis intervention, and family education

program.

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4

short, while the front remained long. Mother reported she cut gum, toothpaste,

and "other things" out of the child's hair.

Father often refused to produce the children or allow them to privately

speak to Division workers. He did not answer phone calls or door knocks and

would often not allow DCPP into the home. Although Father refused to

cooperate with all services, he readily accepted monetary help. The Division

provided necessities for the family such as a refrigerator, a washing machine,

car seats, furniture, groceries, and clothes.

In July 2022, Mother was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Mother's

condition resulted in her being immobile on occasion and unable to take care of

the children without assistance. Father was aware of Mother's medical condition

and agreed to act as supervisor to monitor the children when they were in

Mother's care. Father, however, continued to leave Mother alone with the

children. When DCPP confronted Father about the danger of leaving young

children with Mother, he insisted she was "faking" her illness. During this time,

Father also neglected the children's medical and educational needs as they

continued to miss school and scheduled medical appointments.

On October 25, 2022, DCPP learned Mother had overdosed and was

revived with Narcan while four of the children were present. The Division

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5

provided substance abuse services to Mother and again recommended FPS to

Mother and Father to rehabilitate the family. Both declined to participate. On

November 17, 2022, DCPP again recommended FPS to the family. Mother and

Father agreed but refused to follow the plan for family unit maintenance . They

did not register one of the children for kindergarten, despite having been

provided registration material on three occasions.

In December 2022, DCPP filed for custody, care, and supervision of the

five oldest children. The trial court granted DCPP's request after finding the

children were at risk because Mother and Father were neglecting their medical,

educational, and emotional needs. The children were placed in the custody of

Mother's mother (Maternal Grandmother). When the children were removed

from the home, Aaron had to be treated for lice, Antoine had a temperature of

over one hundred degrees, Adam had a severe rash in his genital area, and all

the children had bed bug bites.

Father recommended his sister (Paternal Aunt) and mother (Paternal

Grandmother) as caretakers for the children. However, both said they would be

unable to serve in that role.

After removing the children from the home, DCPP offered Father

supervised visitation. One week later, Father participated in his first and last

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6

supervised visit with the children. DCPP noted the visit was positive and upon

seeing him the children indicated they missed Father. After the first visit,

however, Father stopped responding to DCPP, which tried to reach him through

visits to his home, phone calls, and certified mail.

On February 4, 2023, Mother gave birth to Amelia at home. Mother

admitted using marijuana and cocaine during pregnancy. She did not receive

prenatal care. Mother and Father did not have essentials for the baby, including

a car seat and clothing.

Father visited the hospital on February 6, 2023. A DCPP caseworker

reported Father was "upset and hyper," had dilated pupils, and would not

maintain eye contact with the caseworker. Father refused a urine drug screen,

denied knowledge of Mother's drug use, and would not allow DCPP to conduct

a home assessment. Father again became unreachable after leaving the hospital.

Amelia remained in the hospital for five days while she was evaluated for

withdrawal. On February 10, 2023, DCPP emergently took custody of Amelia

and placed her in the custody of Mother's godmother (Godmother) because the

Maternal Grandmother could not accommodate another child.

On March 6, 2023, Mother filed for and was granted a temporary

restraining order (TRO) against Father pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic

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Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, following a domestic violence incident.

Maternal Grandmother reported Mother appeared at her home that day with her

hair cut off and showed signs of being "burned" and "beaten." Mother disclosed

she had been "handcuffed and tortured at gunpoint" by Father, who was

criminally charged and incarcerated for the assault.3 The TRO barred him from

having contact with Mother, Maternal Grandmother, and the children.

At a March 10, 2023 hearing in the DCPP matter, the trial court ordered

Father to have no visits with the children because of the TRO. Neither Aaron

nor Alyssa wanted to visit with Father because he "hurt" Mother and made her

cry. Father did not contact DCPP upon being released from jail. However, on

April 14, 2023, Mother reported Father had been released and was harassing and

threatening to hurt her.

On April 28, 2023, a court issued a final restraining order (FRO) against

Father, barring him from contacting Mother, Maternal Grandmother, and the

children. The court ordered Father to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and a

substance abuse evaluation, and complete an anger management class and a

batterer's intervention program. The court also issued a warrant authorizing

police to remove Father's handgun.

3

The record does not reflect the disposition of the criminal charges.

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8

Father again went missing in spring 2023, but appeared virtually at a June

2023 court proceeding. During the proceeding, the court informed Father he

would have to request a modification of the FRO if he wanted to visit with the

children. Father informed DCPP he was homeless and refused to provide his

contact information on the record but claimed he would have his attorney give

the information to the Division. DCPP never received Father's contact

information and Father took no action to modify or vacate the FRO.

Father remained out of contact with DCPP for the remainder of the

protective services litigation. Unable to contact Father, DCPP filed an affidavit

of diligent inquiry pursuant to Rule 5:12-2(b).

On April 1, 2024, DCPP filed for guardianship of the children. Around

this time, a Division caseworker learned Father had been incarcerated on

criminal charges of child prostitution and sex trafficking of a minor. A DCPP

caseworker arranged to meet with Father monthly. He remained incarcerated

for the duration of the guardianship litigation. 4

During a visit with Father, a DCPP caseworker inquired about completing

services while in jail. Father reported he had completed certain services but

4

The record does not reflect the outcome of these criminal charges. However,

according to Father's merits brief, at the time the brief was filed he remained

incarcerated at the Essex County jail awaiting trial.

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9

could not provide a point of contact to verify his progress. The Division

arranged for Father to undergo a psychological evaluation.

The psychological evaluation concluded Father "remains a high risk for

violence, abuse, and exploitation of others" and "was not consistent in

addressing the scholastic, medical, emotional and environmental needs of the

children." During the evaluation, Father denied engaging in domestic violence

or criminal activity. He claimed that "he [was] the victim in the case and that

all of the varied allegations, reports, findings and court rulings are false and part

of a conspiracy against him." The evaluation found Father cannot parent the

children now and was unlikely to be able to do so in the foreseeable future.

Thus, the evaluation recommended termination of Father's parental rights.

The psychologist also evaluated Aaron and Alyssa. Aaron reported "very

violent" acts of domestic violence in the family and said Father beat him "all the

time." He described Father beating him with a black belt, leaving "bruising and

bleeding." Aaron told the psychologist he did not want contact with Father, and

both children asked to stay with Maternal Grandmother. Alyssa disclosed

witnessing Father beat Mother and said Father used a belt to beat her.

The psychologist conducted individual bonding evaluations between

Amelia and Mother and Amelia and Godmother, her resource parent. Because

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10

of the restraining order barring Father from contact with the children, no

bonding evaluation was conducted between Father and the children.

Mother surrendered her parental rights to the children before the

guardianship trial commenced. The trial with respect to Father's parental rights

took place over two days. The Division called as an expert witness the

psychologist who conducted the evaluations, two DCPP caseworkers, Maternal

Grandmother, and Godmother. Father did not present any witnesses. The Law

Guardian for the children supported termination of Father's parental rights.

On January 16, 2025, the trial court issued an oral decision, finding DCPP

established all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing

evidence and concluding termination of Father's parental rights would be in the

children's best interests.

The court found Father was largely withdrawn from assisting his children

and did not meet the responsibilities of a parent. The court found when Father

had custody of the children, he consistently failed to ensure they were enrolled

in or attended school, appeared for medical appointments, and maintained

healthy levels of personal hygiene. The court noted when DCPP became

involved with the family, Father was often hostile to caseworkers, refused to

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comply with services tailored to issues identified in the home, and left the

children in unsafe situations despite available safe alternatives.

The court found Father was missing for significant amounts of time,

engaged in no services, did not visit with the children, and had refused efforts

by the Division to contact him. The court also found Father's failure to remain

in contact with DCPP or take action to modify the FRO demonstrated a lack of

intent to engage in meaningful reunification efforts with the children. The court

concluded there was no indication in the record Father "will be able to remediate

the risk to these children. The proofs show, instead, that he is unwilling, by his

conduct, or lack of conduct, and unable to eliminate the harm facing the children.

And the delay of that permanency for the children will add to the harm." The

court noted Father was detained pretrial on serious charges, had no scheduled

release date from detention, and offered no plan to provide a stable home for the

children.

The court also found DCPP made reasonable efforts to help Father address

the issues preventing him from having custody of his children. The Division

offered services, including "providing [Father] with school enrollment

documents, offering to go to the . . . psychological evaluation with Father,"

"offering to provide rides" to the children's appointments and the services

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12

recommended to Father and gave Father significant financial help to purchase

essentials for the children. The court found DCPP also offered individual

services for Father to develop his parenting skills and get psychological

counseling, all of which he refused. The court found Father "wanted the

financial help from the [D]ivision, but continuously refused any services." In

addition, during the litigation, the court ordered Father to engage in several

treatments and services, but he failed to comply with the court's directives.

Given Father's failure to comply with treatment or take steps to

meaningfully rehabilitate his relationship with the children, the court determined

Father's actions showed he could not meet the educational, medical, or day-to-

day needs of the children. The court noted the evidence and testimony made it

clear "[Father] never made it safe to place the children back with him. He did

not visit, he did not provide for them, he did not protect them. He never took

responsibility to care for them or nurture them."

The court found DCPP considered alternatives to termination of his

parental rights, but no viable option existed. For example, the Division explored

Father's recommendations for Paternal Aunt or Paternal Grandmother to be

guardians for the children, but both told the Division they were unwilling to take

on that role. The court found the resource parents clearly made their preference

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13

for adoption known after kinship legal guardianship (KLG) was explained to

them. The court found there was no compelling argument for KLG and the

children's best interests would be served through adoption. The court also found

the five older children were doing well with Maternal Grandmother, and Father

had no relationship with the youngest child, who was in the custody of

Godmother, as he had seen her only once when visiting the hospital days after

her birth. The court found the youngest child was also doing well with

Godmother, who wanted to adopt her.

The court credited the testimony of the psychologist and the

recommendations made after his evaluation of Father and three of the children.

The court found notable the expert's testimony Father has a history of violence,

intimidation, and exploitation of others, particularly those who are vulnerable .

In addition, the court noted Father's claims of being the victim of a conspiracy

and his denial of any wrongdoing. The court accepted the expert's conclusion

Father was unable to care for the children and unlikely to be able to do so in the

foreseeable future.

Balancing the children's need for permanency against the Father's parental

rights, the court found termination of Father's rights was warranted, given the

limited harm that would befall the children from a severing of their relationship

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with Father as compared to the benefits they would enjoy from the permanency

and stability offered to them by their resource parents. A January 16, 2025

judgment memorialized the court's decision.

This appeal follows. Father argues the trial court erred when it: (1) found

DCPP made "reasonable efforts" to offer appropriate remedial services while

Father was incarcerated; (2) found DCPP demonstrated by "clear and convincing

evidence" termination of Father's parental rights will not do more harm than

good; (3) based its conclusions on the expert's net opinion; (4) allowed one of

the caseworkers to offer a lay opinion with respect to the bond between the

children and their resource parents; (5) reached a decision without requiring an

assessment of Godmother's adult daughter who lives in Godmother's house; (6)

failed to order a comparative bonding evaluation of the children with their

resource parents and Father; and (7) ordered termination of Father's parental

rights because KLG remains a viable option for the children. The Law Guardian

argues the trial court's decision is supported by the record.

II.

Our scope of review on appeal from an order terminating parental rights

is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).

We will uphold a trial judge's factfindings if they are "supported by adequate,

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substantial, and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G.,

217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). "We accord deference to factfindings of the family

court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses

who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related

to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448

(2012); see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Only when the trial

court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an

appellate court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a

denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104

(2008) (quoting G.L., 191 N.J. at 605). We also accord deference to the judge's

credibility determinations "based upon his or her opportunity to see and hear the

witnesses." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88

(App. Div. 2006). We give no deference to the trial court's "interpretation of

the law," which we review de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012).

"New Jersey's child-welfare laws balance 'two competing interests: a

parent's constitutionally protected right "to raise a child and maintain a

relationship with that child, without undue influence by the [S]tate," and "the

State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children. "'" N.J.

Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 368 (2021)

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(alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213

N.J. 1, 18 (2013)). To ensure the rights of the parent are adequately protected

"[t]he New Jersey Legislature has long mandated . . . [DCPP] must prove by

clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of the 'best interests' test set forth

in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)," before terminating parental rights. N.J. Div. of

Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 7-8 (2023).

When terminating parental rights, the court focuses on the "best interests

of the child standard" and may grant a petition when the four prongs set forth in

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are established by clear and convincing evidence. In re

Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999). "The four criteria

enumerated in the best interests standard are not discrete and separate; they

relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that

identifies a child's best interests." Id. at 348.

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires DCPP to prove:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has

been or will continue to be endangered by the

parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to

provide a safe and stable home for the child and

the delay of permanent placement will add to the

harm;

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(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to

provide services to help the parent correct the

circumstances which led to the child's placement

outside the home and the court has considered

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more

harm than good.

Father argues DCPP did not establish prongs three and four of the

statutory test. With respect to prong three, he argues the Division failed to

provide him with sufficient services while he was detained at the Essex County

jail on charges alleging he engaged in sex trafficking of a minor. In addition,

he argues while DCPP "may have been hamstrung as it relates to visitation or

bonding evaluations because of the" domestic violence restraining order, it

failed to investigate what programs it might have offered during his pretrial

detention.

Under prong three, DCPP's efforts must be analyzed "with reference to

the circumstances of the individual case[,]" including the parent's degree of

participation. In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 390 (1999). N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(c) defines reasonable efforts as those reasonable "attempts by an

agency authorized by [DCPP] to assist the parents in remedying the

circumstances and conditions that led to the placement of the child and in

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reinforcing the family structure . . . ." The statute sets forth examples of

"reasonable efforts," including but not limited to:

(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in

developing a plan for appropriate services;

(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to

the family, in order to further the goal of family

reunification;

(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of

the child's progress, development, and health;

and

(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.

[Ibid.]

While Father focuses on the services he received while detained in the

county jail, he overlooks his failure to take advantage of the myriad services

DCPP offered him before his detention. The record firmly establishes Father

refused to meaningfully engage in any of the services offered to him by the

Division before he was arrested, apart from his willingness to receive financial

aid. He consistently refused to cooperate with the Division, failed to attend

scheduled services, visited his five oldest children only once, and disappeared

for long periods of time during which he was unreachable. Father saw Amelia

only one time a few days after her birth. He never again made any attempt to

visit that child.

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We must examine the Division's provision of services to Father during his

pretrial detention in the context of his utter abandonment of his parental

responsibilities prior to his arrest. In addition, Father's acts of domestic violence

against Mother, in the presence of two of his children, resulted in the entry of

an FRO prohibiting him from having contact with his children. As Father

acknowledges, the FRO precluded the Division from arranging for visitation

between him and the children during his pretrial detention. Father was informed

he could petition the court that entered the FRO to modify its provisions to allow

him to visit with the children, even if just for the purposes of conducting a

bonding evaluation. However, he failed to take any steps to seek that relief. In

light of the facts and circumstances of this case, we see no basis on which to

conclude the Division failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Father with

his children either prior to or after his pretrial detention. 5

With respect to the fourth prong, Father argues it was error to terminate

his parental rights in the absence of a bonding evaluation between the five older

children and Maternal Grandmother and those children and Father. He also

5

We note "incarceration alone – without particularized evidence of how a

parent's incarceration affects each prong of the best-interests-of-the-child

standard – is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights." R.G., 217

N.J. at 556.

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argues the court relied on the net opinion of the psychologist, who had not met

three of the older children, with respect to their bond with Maternal

Grandmother and Father. We disagree.

The fourth prong requires DCPP to show "[t]ermination of parental rights

will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). Termination of

parental rights poses a risk to children due to the severing of the relationship

with their natural parents, but it is based "on the paramount need the children

have for permanent and defined parent-child relationships." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at

355 (quoting In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 26 (1992)).

Thus, "the fourth prong of the best interests standard [does not] require a

showing that no harm will befall the child as a result of the severing of biological

ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Prong four "serves as a fail-safe against

termination even where the remaining standards have been met." G.L., 191 N.J.

at 609. "[T]he question to be addressed under [prong four] is whether, after

considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater

harm from the termination of ties with her natural parents than from permanent

disruption of her relationship with her foster parents." N.J. Div. of Youth &

Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 181 (2010) (quoting In re Guardianship of

J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 478 (2002)).

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Generally, to prove the fourth prong, DCPP "should offer testimony of a

well[-]qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive,

objective, and informed evaluation of the child's relationship with both the

natural parents and the foster parents." F.M., 211 N.J. at 453 (quoting N.J. Div.

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 281 (2007)); see R.G., 217 N.J.

at 564 (finding the Division's position lacked support because "no bonding

evaluation was conducted"); N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J.

Super. 418, 432 (App. Div. 2009) (affirming an order denying the termination

of parental rights where no bonding evaluation was conducted).

"N.J.R.E. 703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony." Townsend

v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015). "[A]n expert's opinion must be based on 'facts,

data, or another expert's opinion, either perceived by or made known to the

expert, at or before trial.'" Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 397 N.J. Super. 64,

78-79 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385,

401 (App. Div. 2002)). "[A] trial court may not rely on expert testimony that

lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any

standard about which the expert testified." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New

Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 373 (2011). "Under the 'net opinion' rule, an opinion

lacking in such foundation and consisting of 'bare conclusions, unsupported by

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factual evidence' is inadmissible." Carbis Sales, 397 N.J. Super. at 79 (quoting

Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984)).

The psychologist's opinion was based primarily on his evaluation of

Father, including his history of failing to provide meaningful parenting to his

children, and his propensity for violence. The expert opined Father was

incapable of parenting at that time and was unlikely to be able to parent in the

foreseeable future. The trial court primarily relied on that aspect of the expert's

testimony when it found prong four of the statute had been satisfied. See N.J.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 592 (App. Div.

1996) (termination of parental rights may be predicated on a parent's inability

to care for a child in the foreseeable future and the child's need for permanency).

The expert's ability to perform a bonding evaluation between the children

and Father was stymied by the FRO, from which Father failed to seek relief for

a bonding evaluation. In these circumstances, we see no error in the expert's

reliance on the Father's history of failing to meaningfully parent the children as

the basis for his opinion. Nor do we see a basis for reversing the trial court's

decision based on the caseworker's testimony regarding the bond between the

children and Maternal Grandmother. Nothing in the record suggests the court

considered the caseworker's testimony on that point to be crucial to its finding

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that termination of Father's parental rights was warranted. The court's decision

is primarily based on Father's long-term failure to provide his children with

meaningful parental supervision and the dim prospects for him remedying the

situation after resolution of his then-pending serious criminal charges.

We have considered Father's remaining arguments, some of which were

raised for the first time on appeal, and we conclude they lack sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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