Temethy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROGER GEORGE TEMETHY, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1664

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

)

JUDGE SHANNON M. GALLAGHER, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

) ORDER

Defendant. )

)

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Roger G. Temethy has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Shannon M. Gallagher. (ECF

No. 1). Judge Gallagher presided over a 2025 civil case brought by Plaintiff against the Ohio

Department of Job and Family Services and the Ohio Court of Claims (collectively, “State

Defendants”). See Temethy v. Ohio Dep’t of Job and Fam. Servs., CV-25-114635 (Cuyahoga

Cnty. Ct. Com. Pleas); (ECF No. 1-4, PageID #12–14, 17). On May 27, 2025, Judge Gallagher

granted State Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Journal Entry, Temethy v. Ohio Dep’t of Job and Fam. Servs., CV-25-114635

(Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pleas May 27, 2025). Plaintiff generally alleges that Judge Gallagher

violated his due process rights and right to a jury trial. (ECF No. 1, PageID #4). For relief, Plaintiff

acknowledges that judges are immune from suits for money damages and requests that the Court

“take action” against Judge Gallagher without any clarification. (Id. at PageID #4–5).

With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).

That motion is GRANTED. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his complaint is subject to initial screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required

to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal

standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs

dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at

471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading

that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

meet this pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though the standard of review for pro

se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading

requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the

nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Even liberally construed, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted for several reasons. First, the complaint fails to meet the minimum pleading

standard under Twombly and Iqbal as it fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim

showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint generally

states that Plaintiff was denied due process but provides little in the way of factual allegations.

(ECF No. 1, PageID #4). In fact, the complaint simply alleges that: (i) there was a case

management conference scheduled for April 9th; and (ii) Judge Gallagher dismissed the case on

May 27th. (Id.). Without more explanation or citation to any authority, the complaint states that

these actions were done without due process. (See id.). Such conclusory, “unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me” accusations are insufficient to state a claim and do not meet the

minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court also notes that

Plaintiff’s request for relief is vague and it is unclear what precise relief (injunctive or damages)

he is requesting.

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff is requesting relief in the form of overturning or vacating

the state court’s decisions, such relief is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Federal courts

may also raise the issue of abstention sua sponte. See O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 642 (6th

Cir. 2008) (holding that “abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte”); see also Louisville

Country Club v. Watts, Nos. 97-5758 and 97-5829, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7828, *7 (6th Cir. Apr.

16, 1999) (“The proper time from which to judge the applicability of Younger abstention is the

date at which the federal complaint was filed.”). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal

district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments, as well as interlocutory

orders, from state courts. See Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child and Family Servs., 606

F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2010); RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380, 396

(6th Cir. 2021); see also Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a claim

alleging error in a state court decision”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] federal court

lacks jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court, as only the United States

Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.” Higgs v. Dupuis, No. 5:19-cv-

192, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104359, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 3, 2021); see also District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A party raising a federal question must

appeal a state court decision through the state system and then directly to the Supreme Court of

the United States.”).

In this case, it appears that Plaintiff filed an appeal from the state court’s order of dismissal

and that appeal is still pending before the Ohio Court of Appeals. Notice of Appeal, Temethy v.

Ohio Dep’t of Job and Fam. Servs., CV-25-114635 (Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pleas June 6, 2025).

The Sixth Circuit has held that Rooker-Feldman abstention does not require a state court judgment

to have been finalized after the exhaustion of all appeal rights. See RLR Invs., LLC, 4 F.4th at

393–96; see also T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 139 F.4th 344, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2025)

(adopting the same approach); Parker Law Firm v. Travelers Indem. Co., 985 F.3d 579, 584 (8th

Cir. 2021) (“Even so, that an appeal is pending in the New York state courts does not mean that a

federal district court has jurisdiction to consider a parallel appeal. This court, like other circuits,

has concluded that Rooker-Feldman applies to state court judgments that are not yet final.”). That

said, Younger1 abstention would also apply.

“Younger abstention requires a federal court to abstain from granting injunctive or

declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” O’Neill v.

Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41

(1971)). “The Younger abstention doctrine provides that a federal court should abstain from

interfering in a state court action when (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) the

state proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in

the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Graves v. Mahoning Cnty., 534 F. App’x

399, 406 (6th Cir. 2013). The doctrine is designed to prevent federal courts from interfering with

the functions of state courts in order to preserve the principles equity and comity. Doe v. Univ. of

Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017). To the extent that the underlying state court action

is pending, the Court finds that all three factors supporting Younger abstention are present.

Finally, state court judges are immune from civil suits for money damages. Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are

accorded broad protection to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of their judgment

in a case is not impaired by the exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes, 105 F.3d at

1115. For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome only when: (1) the conduct alleged is

performed at a time when the defendant is not acting as a judge; or (2) the conduct alleged, although

judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over

which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. A state court

judge will not be deprived of immunity even if the action at issue was performed in error, done

1 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

maliciously, or was in excess of his or her authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356

(1978); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 1984) (acting in excess of authority does not

preclude immunity).

Here, neither exception to absolute immunity applies. Judge Gallagher was acting as a

judge when she issued the dismissal of the underlying state court action initiated by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has also not established, nor is there any indication, that Judge Gallagher acted clearly

outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which she presides. Thus, Plaintiff cannot

seek monetary damages against Judge Gallagher. Because Plaintiff has not met the pleading

standard under Rule 8, and his requests for relief are barred by abstention doctrines (injunctive

relief) and absolute immunity (damages), this action must be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The

Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could

not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 13, 2025 (aby Huse

CHARLES E.FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE