The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5091.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-5091
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. NORTON.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton, Slip Opinion No.
2025-Ohio-5091.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Attorney violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) and (h) by
possessing drugs and criminal tools, which he pleaded guilty to in common-
pleas court, and possessing illegal child-abuse material on his cellphone—
Two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed.
(No. 2024-1723—Submitted March 11, 2025—Decided November 13, 2025.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
Court, No. 2023-047.
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by DEWINE, OSOWIK, DETERS,
and SHANAHAN, JJ. KENNEDY, C.J., dissented, with an opinion joined by FISCHER
and HAWKINS, JJ. THOMAS J. OSOWIK, J., of the Sixth District Court of Appeals,
sat for BRUNNER, J.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Eric Edward Norton, of Cleveland Heights, Ohio,
Attorney Registration No. 0071563, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in
1999.
{¶ 2} On November 15, 2007, we imposed a conditionally stayed six-month
suspension on Norton’s license to practice law based on his neglecting two client
matters, failing to inform clients that he lacked professional-liability insurance, and
failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. See Cleveland Bar
Assn. v. Norton, 2007-Ohio-6038, ¶ 2, 11.
{¶ 3} On May 24, 2023, we imposed an interim remedial suspension on
Norton under Gov.Bar R. V(19)(B), upon receipt of substantial, credible evidence
demonstrating that Norton had committed a violation of the Ohio Rules of
Professional Conduct and that he posed a substantial threat of serious harm to the
public. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton, 2023-Ohio-1740, ¶ 2. That suspension
remains in effect.
{¶ 4} In a December 2023 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged
Norton with violating two ethical rules arising from an incident in which he
attempted to enter the Cuyahoga County Justice Center with illegal drugs in his
possession. As a result of that incident, Norton was indicted in the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas on five felony counts. See State v. Norton,
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-679867-A (Mar. 29, 2023). After Norton pleaded guilty
to two of those charges, the remaining charges were dismissed, and Norton was
granted intervention in lieu of conviction. Norton, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-
679867-A (Nov. 27, 2023).
{¶ 5} The parties to this case entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct,
and aggravating and mitigating factors and submitted 19 stipulated exhibits.
Norton submitted ten more exhibits. After conducting a hearing, a three-member
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panel of the Board of Professional Conduct issued a report in which it found by
clear and convincing evidence that Norton had committed the charged misconduct.
The panel recommended that Norton be suspended from the practice of law for two
years with one year stayed on conditions related to his continued participation in
treatment programs for his diagnosed substance-use disorder. It further
recommended that Norton receive no credit for the time he has served under his
interim remedial suspension. In addition to the requirements for reinstatement to
the practice of law set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(24), the panel recommended that
Norton be required to submit a report from his treating addiction counselor
certifying that he is capable of returning to the competent, ethical, and professional
practice of law. The panel further recommended that upon reinstatement, Norton
be required to work for one year with a practice monitor approved by relator. The
board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended
sanction.
{¶ 6} Norton raises three objections to the board’s report and
recommendation: he challenges one of the board’s findings of fact, its
recommended sanction, and its determination that he is not entitled to credit for the
time he has served under his interim remedial suspension.
{¶ 7} After independently reviewing the record and our precedent, we
overrule Norton’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct
and its recommended sanction.
MISCONDUCT
{¶ 8} The stipulated evidence shows that on December 15, 2022, at 7:40
p.m., Norton was at the Cuyahoga County Justice Center to meet with a prospective
client who was an inmate in the county jail. As Norton prepared to go through the
security checkpoint, he emptied his pockets and placed the contents in a tray.
Immediately thereafter, one of the officers on duty saw Norton remove a small
plastic baggie containing a white substance from the tray and walk to the men’s
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restroom in the justice center’s atrium. Norton exited the restroom within a minute,
went through security, and entered the jail.
{¶ 9} A sheriff’s deputy searched the men’s restroom in the atrium and
located underneath the trash can a plastic baggie containing a white substance. A
K-9 unit identified the contents of the baggie as a controlled substance. After being
informed of the circumstances, a sergeant ordered that Norton’s visit with his
prospective client be immediately terminated and that Norton be detained.
{¶ 10} The deputy who detained Norton detected an odor of alcohol on
Norton’s breath. Although Norton initially denied that he had consumed alcohol,
he later admitted that he had been drinking hours earlier. The sergeant who had
ordered Norton’s detention advised Norton of his Miranda rights and seized his
cellphone as evidence before permitting him to leave the justice center. The next
day, law-enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search Norton’s cellphone.
{¶ 11} On December 16, Norton visited a Cuyahoga County assistant
prosecutor in her office, and on December 19, he called her. Norton acknowledged
during his disciplinary hearing that if that assistant prosecutor were to testify, she
would state that Norton admitted to bringing drugs into the justice center and that
he explained that the drugs were for his personal use, not for the purpose of
smuggling drugs into the jail. Norton also asked the assistant prosecutor to pause
the data-extraction process on his cellphone.
{¶ 12} Norton’s DNA was on the plastic baggie found in the men’s
restroom at the justice center and on the cellphone taken from him. And testing
confirmed that the baggie contained 5.12 grams of methamphetamine. The parties
stipulated and the board found that a forensic analysis of Norton’s cellphone
revealed two images containing illegal child-abuse material.
{¶ 13} On March 29, 2023, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury issued a five-
count indictment, charging Norton with the following offenses:
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January Term, 2025
(1) illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or a nudity-oriented
performance, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1);
(2) drug possession, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A);
(3) illegal conveyance into a detention facility, a third-degree felony, in
violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2);
(4) tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); and
(5) possessing criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2923.24(A).
{¶ 14} In November 2023, Norton filed a motion for intervention in lieu of
conviction under R.C. 2951.041. The judge referred Norton to the court’s
psychiatric clinic to determine his eligibility for the program.
{¶ 15} On November 27, 2023, Norton pleaded guilty to two of the five
charges against him: drug possession and possessing criminal tools. The prosecutor
dismissed the remaining charges. The trial court granted Norton’s motion for
intervention in lieu of conviction, subject to several conditions, placing him under
the supervision of the Cuyahoga County Adult Probation Department. And as part
of his guilty plea, Norton forfeited his cellphone.
{¶ 16} During his disciplinary hearing, Norton testified that a drug dealer
had sent him the illicit images that were found on his cellphone. He stated that
unbeknownst to him, the images were automatically downloaded to his phone
through an app that he had used to communicate with the drug dealer. After
Norton’s criminal case concluded, he provided information about the drug dealer
to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office with the intent to help law-
enforcement officers locate the source of the images.
{¶ 17} The parties stipulated, and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence, that Norton’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer
from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or
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trustworthiness) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). We adopt these findings
of misconduct, and we find that Norton’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to
support a finding that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), see Disciplinary Counsel v.
Bricker, 2013-Ohio-3998, ¶ 21-22.
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
{¶ 19} The parties stipulated and the board found that just one aggravating
factor is present—Norton’s prior discipline. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1); see also
Norton, 2007-Ohio-6038. The parties also agreed that four mitigating factors are
present, and the board found the same: (1) Norton did not possess a dishonest or
selfish motive, (2) he made full and free disclosure to the board and exhibited a
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, (3) he had other penalties
or sanctions imposed for his misconduct, and (4) he presented evidence of other
interim rehabilitation, i.e., his participation in both inpatient and outpatient drug-
treatment programs. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2), (4), (6), and (8).
{¶ 20} During his disciplinary hearing, Norton testified that he had a
drinking problem that probably dated back to his college days and that around 2018,
he started taking Adderall without a prescription to help him focus. He testified
that in late 2020, he started using methamphetamine, which initially helped his
work performance, gave him energy, and eliminated his interest in alcohol. And
he stated that by 2021, he was dependent on the drug and by 2022, he was starting
to see problems with his drug use.
{¶ 21} On April 13, 2023, Norton entered into a two-year chemical-
dependency contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).
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January Term, 2025
Although that contract required Norton to refrain from using mood-altering
substances, including alcohol, Norton tested positive for methamphetamine just
five days later. He testified that he began using methamphetamines again on
December 28, 2023—a little more than one month after the trial court granted his
motion for intervention in lieu of conviction—and that he continued doing so until
January 3 or 4, 2024. OLAP suspended Norton’s contract in February 2024, when
he failed to comply with his monitor’s order to enter an inpatient rehabilitation
program.
{¶ 22} Norton relapsed again in late March 2024 and missed several
appointments with his probation officer. He entered an inpatient treatment program
in early April, but following his release from that program, he missed two more
meetings with his probation officer. In July 2024, he admitted to violating the terms
of his release under the intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program. The trial court
continued Norton’s release under that program but ordered him to report to his
probation officer more frequently and to complete an outpatient treatment program.
{¶ 23} Meanwhile, OLAP reactivated Norton’s contract in June 2024, after
he completed his inpatient treatment program. But Norton’s previously contentious
relationship with his OLAP monitor continued to deteriorate: the monitor reported
that Norton was not submitting his Alcoholics Anonymous–meeting logs and other
documents in a timely manner and that he had not provided proof of his
participation in individual counseling sessions.
{¶ 24} On July 20 or 21, 2024, Norton used methamphetamine after
receiving some disturbing health news. Consequently, he tested positive for
methamphetamines on July 25. In the month that elapsed between Norton’s
positive drug test and his August 27 disciplinary hearing, he had two negative drug
tests. But two weeks before that hearing, Norton’s OLAP monitor submitted a
report to relator stating that while Norton was attending 12-step-program meetings
and weekly OLAP group meetings, he was not in compliance with his OLAP
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contract, because he had not provided the monitor with the required meeting logs,
a participant questionnaire pertaining to his participation in individual therapy, or
a copy of the discharge summary from his inpatient treatment facility.
{¶ 25} Despite his relapse before the disciplinary hearing, Norton argued in
his posthearing brief that he had satisfied the requirements of Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(C)(7) for his substance-use disorder to be considered as a mitigating factor.
Specifically, Norton argued that (1) he had been diagnosed with a substance-use
disorder by a qualified chemical-dependency professional, (2) his disorder
contributed to cause his misconduct, (3) he had successfully completed an approved
treatment program, and (4) he had received a prognosis from a qualified chemical-
dependency professional that he would be able to return to the competent, ethical,
and professional practice of law under specified conditions.
{¶ 26} The board acknowledged that Norton had presented a letter from his
addiction counselor stating that Norton “suffers from Stimulant Use Disorder,
Severe,” and that he was in “early partial remission.” The counselor explained,
“Early partial remission is evidenced by none of the criteria for stimulant use
disorder being met for at least three months but less than 12 months with the
exception that craving, or a strong urge to use the stimulant may exist.” The
counselor also opined, “Provided Mr. Norton remains sober and sustains a full
recovery, I believe he is fully capable of, and I support his return to the competent,
ethical and professional practice of law.”
{¶ 27} However, in his disciplinary-hearing testimony, Norton admitted
that he had asked his addiction counselor to write the letter knowing that he had
used illegal drugs and tested positive for drug use in late July 2024 and that he had
failed to disclose those facts to her. The board therefore concluded that Norton’s
evidence failed to satisfy the fourth requirement of Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) and
declined to accord mitigating effect to his substance-use disorder.
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January Term, 2025
RECOMMENDED SANCTION
{¶ 28} The board compared this case to two cases in which we imposed
partially or fully stayed term suspensions on attorneys with substance-use disorders
who engaged in similar acts of misconduct: Disciplinary Counsel v. Norris, 1996-
Ohio-418, ¶ 5, 8 (attorney suspended for two years with one year stayed, based on
his conviction of a misdemeanor cocaine-possession charge), and Disciplinary
Counsel v. Scacchetti, 2007-Ohio-2713, ¶ 1, 19 (attorney suspended for two years
with 18 months conditionally stayed to ensure further treatment and attorney’s
preparedness for practice, based on his conviction of a fourth-degree felony
cocaine-possession charge). The board also compared this case to one involving
an attorney who did not have a substance-use disorder but whose ethics violation
involved a criminal sanction: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Strauss, 2021-Ohio-
1263, ¶ 1, 16, 18 (attorney who did not have a substance-use disorder suspended
for one-year, conditionally stayed, based on his conviction of operating a vehicle
while intoxicated, leaving the scene of an accident, and unsafe operation of a
vehicle).
{¶ 29} Recognizing that Norton admitted to using methamphetamines three
times in the 12 months preceding his disciplinary hearing and that he has had
difficulties complying with his OLAP contract, the board recommends that Norton
be suspended from the practice of law for two years with one year stayed on the
conditions that he (1) remain in compliance with the terms of his April 13, 2023
OLAP contract and any recommended extension thereof, (2) submit to random drug
and alcohol testing through OLAP, and (3) remain in compliance with all court
orders related to or arising from his criminal case.
{¶ 30} In addition to the requirements for reinstatement to the practice of
law set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(24), the board recommends that Norton be required
to submit a report from his treating addiction counselor certifying that he is able to
return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. The board further
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recommends that upon reinstatement, Norton be required to serve a one-year period
of monitored probation with a practice monitor approved by relator. And relying
on our pronouncement that “[t]he plain text of Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2) lists various
types of interim suspensions for which credit for time served is allowed, but an
interim remedial suspension is not among them,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Harvey,
2024-Ohio-5232, ¶ 32, the board recommends that Norton receive no credit for the
time he has served under his interim remedial suspension.
NORTON’S OBJECTIONS TO
THE BOARD’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
{¶ 31} Norton raises three objections to the board’s report and
recommendation, which for ease of discussion will be addressed out of order.
The record supports the board’s finding that forensic analysis of Norton’s
cellphone revealed two images containing “illegal child-abuse material”
{¶ 32} In his third objection to the board’s report and recommendation,
Norton challenges the board’s finding that a forensic analysis of his cellphone
revealed two images containing “illegal child abuse material.” He contends that
the board’s finding is “factually unsupported,” and he accuses the board of
“mischaracterizing” the facts in an attempt to convince this court to judge his
misconduct more harshly than it would without that finding.
{¶ 33} Norton asserts that the State dismissed the charge related to the
images found on his cellphone because he “did not affirmatively take any step to
save the images to his phone and was not even aware they had been auto
downloaded into an apps folder.” He therefore asks this court to strike the finding
regarding “illegal child abuse material” from the board’s report—and presumably
not include it in our decision.
{¶ 34} Although the disputed images are not part of the record in this case,
we find that Norton stipulated to the authenticity and admissibility of the February
15, 2023 report of the Ohio Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (“ICAC
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January Term, 2025
task force”) regarding the forensic analysis of his cellphone. That report states that
the FBI provided a mobile-device-extraction report to the Cuyahoga County
Prosecutor’s Office and that while viewing that report, the prosecutors “observed
one file of child exploitation material.”
{¶ 35} The prosectors informed the commander of the ICAC task force of
that finding. The task-force commander reviewed the file in question and
“determined that it depicted a aaaa minor female child seen standing in a state of
nudity with her breasts and genitals exposed.” (Redaction in original.) The report
states that on further analysis of data extracted from Norton’s cellphone, the
commander “located two (2) files which he categorized as Child Abuse Material
(CAM) – Illegal.” The first file contained the image identified in the mobile-
device-extraction report. The other was an eight-second video depicting the same
“minor female child,” the actions of whom the commander described in some
detail. Accordingly, the record supports the board’s finding that a forensic
examination of Norton’s cellphone revealed two images containing “illegal child-
abuse material.”
{¶ 36} Although Norton entered into a plea bargain with the prosecutor that
resulted in the State’s dismissal of the charge alleging illegal use of a minor in
nudity-oriented material or a nudity-oriented performance in violation of
R.C. 2907.323(A)(1), the presence of those images on Norton’s cellphone was
alleged in relator’s certified disciplinary complaint.1 The presence of those images
is relevant here because it gives context to the range of criminal charges that were
leveled against Norton and to the substantial threat of serious harm that he poses to
1. R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) prohibits a person from “[p]hotograph[ing] any minor or impaired person
who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, or creat[ing], direct[ing], produc[ing], or
transfer[ring] any material or performance that shows the minor or impaired person in a state of
nudity” in the absence of a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious,
governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose and without written consent of the depicted child or
ward’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
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the public, which precipitated this court’s issuance of an order of interim remedial
suspension preventing Norton from practicing law during the pendency of his
criminal case and these disciplinary proceedings. And Norton’s possession of those
images may have provided some support for the board’s finding that Norton
engaged in an illegal act that adversely reflects on his trustworthiness in violation
of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) or its finding that he engaged in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).
{¶ 37} On these facts, we overrule Norton’s third objection to the board’s
report and recommendation.
The appropriate sanction for Norton’s misconduct is
a two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed
{¶ 38} In his first objection to the board’s report and recommendation,
Norton argues that the appropriate sanction for his misconduct is a fully stayed
suspension. In support of that sanction, Norton notes that he has been subject to
“other severe sanctions,” including the May 2023 interim remedial suspension that
this court imposed in relation to this case, see Norton, 2023-Ohio-1740, at ¶ 1-2,
which he characterizes as “an unusually long actual suspension for his misconduct.”
He contends that requiring him to serve additional time out of the practice of law
would serve no purpose and that our decisions in Disciplinary Counsel v.
Casalinuovo, 66 Ohio St.3d 367 (1993), Disciplinary Counsel v. May, 2005-Ohio-
5320, and Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kelley, 2021-Ohio-770, support the imposition of
a fully stayed suspension here.
{¶ 39} In addition, Norton asserts that despite several relapses, he
successfully completed his intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program and that the
criminal charges against him were dismissed on December 12, 2024—several
months after his disciplinary hearing. Although he filed a motion to supplement
the record with evidence to establish that fact one day before the board submitted
its report to this court, the board did not rule on that motion. Norton urges us to
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January Term, 2025
remand this case to the board with instructions for it to grant the motion and allow
him to supplement the record with documentation of that success.
{¶ 40} Remand would further delay these proceedings. And evidence that
Norton successfully completed his intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program
would, at most, demonstrate that he completed an intensive outpatient treatment
program, that he remained drug free for several months after his July 25 relapse,
and that the trial court dismissed the criminal charges against him. While Norton’s
completion of the intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program is a positive
development, that fact alone is insufficient to persuade us that he is presently
capable of returning to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.
{¶ 41} Furthermore, this case is readily distinguishable from Casalinuovo,
May, and Kelley for several reasons, including that the attorneys in each of those
cases established a sustained period of sobriety and had no prior disciplinary
violations.
{¶ 42} In May, the attorney pleaded guilty to two fifth-degree felony counts
of obtaining a dangerous drug through deception by presenting forged prescriptions
for Vicodin to a pharmacy. He successfully completed a treatment-in-lieu-of-
conviction program, abstaining from drugs and alcohol for a year before the
criminal charges against him were dismissed. In contrast to Norton, May
successfully established his diagnosed chemical dependency as a mitigating factor
by presenting evidence showing that his chemical dependency contributed to cause
his misconduct, that he had successfully completed an approved treatment program,
and that he was capable of providing ethical and professional service to his clients.
May, 2005-Ohio-5320, at ¶ 8. We imposed a conditionally stayed two-year
suspension for his misconduct. Id. at ¶ 11.
{¶ 43} In Casalinuovo, the attorney committed two ethical violations
arising from his indictment on a single fourth-degree felony drug charge. He had
already commenced a drug-abuse rehabilitation program when he entered a no-
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contest plea to that criminal charge and was offered treatment in lieu of conviction.
More than a year later, he successfully completed that program, and the trial court
dismissed the indictment. In contrast to this case, our decision in Casalinuovo does
not mention any relapses. Moreover, there was no evidence that Casalinuovo’s
drug use affected his clients or his legal practice, whereas Norton admitted that he
drank alcohol before going to visit his incarcerated prospective client in December
2022 and that his substance abuse negatively affected his practice. We imposed a
two-year, conditionally stayed suspension for Casalinuovo’s misconduct and
required him to serve a two-year period of monitored probation. Casalinuovo, 66
Ohio St.3d at 369.
{¶ 44} In Kelley, 2021-Ohio-770, the attorney admitted that as a result of
his substance-abuse and mental-health issues, which resulted in his admission to an
inpatient mental-health and chemical-dependency facility, he abandoned 15 clients.
And he stipulated to multiple ethical violations arising from that conduct. Although
Kelley had several substance-use relapses while working with OLAP, by the time
of his disciplinary hearing, he was in compliance with his OLAP contract, having
completed 11 weeks of a 12-week outpatient treatment program and having
abstained from all mind-altering drugs, including alcohol, for 11 months. By
comparison, Norton was not in compliance with his OLAP contract at the time of
his disciplinary hearing and he relapsed just a month before the hearing.
{¶ 45} In addition, Kelley’s chemical-dependency counselor opined that he
could return to the practice law, provided that he continued to follow treatment
recommendations and remained in compliance with his OLAP contract. While
Norton’s addiction counselor also submitted a favorable report on Norton’s behalf,
Norton failed to disclose his July 2024 relapse to her before she prepared that report.
We therefore conclude that the conditionally stayed two-year suspension that we
imposed on the attorney in Kelley, id. at ¶ 19, is not appropriate in this case.
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{¶ 46} We find two of the cases considered by the board—Norris, 1996-
Ohio-418, and Scacchetti, 2007-Ohio-2713—to be most instructive.
{¶ 47} In Norris, the attorney pleaded guilty and was convicted of a federal
misdemeanor count of cocaine possession while serving as a county prosecutor. No
aggravating factors were noted. As for mitigating factors, Norris resigned as
prosecutor, regularly attended rehabilitation meetings, participated in OLAP, did
not test positive for illegal drugs in the six months preceding his disciplinary
hearing, and presented testimony from multiple witnesses regarding his
commitment to rehabilitation. Norris at ¶ 3. We suspended Norris from the
practice of law for two years with one year stayed on conditions that were imposed
to ensure his continued compliance with his drug-treatment program. Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶ 48} In Scacchetti, the attorney pleaded guilty to a fourth-degree felony
count of possession of cocaine, and like Norton, Scacchetti participated in an
intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program. He completed a three-year period of
rehabilitation under that program, which included a period of intensive outpatient
treatment, 112 days of inpatient treatment, compliance with a four-year OLAP
contract, and daily check-ins with his OLAP monitor. Although Scacchetti
voluntarily closed his law practice within two weeks of his arrest, the judge
presiding over his criminal case also required him to change his attorney
registration to inactive for a period of two years.
{¶ 49} Compared to Norton’s multiple relapses here, Scacchetti suffered a
single relapse and tested positive for cocaine approximately eight months into his
drug-treatment program. Consequently, the trial-court judge ordered Scacchetti to
serve one week in jail and enter a transitional housing program to support his
recovery. Scacchetti’s one-time relapse occurred three months before his
disciplinary hearing, at which he testified that he had learned valuable lessons about
his recovery from that relapse.
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{¶ 50} No aggravating factors were identified in Scacchetti, but mitigating
factors consisted of Scacchetti’s clean disciplinary record, his lack of a dishonest
or selfish motive, his cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, and the
imposition of other sanctions for his misconduct. Scacchetti, 2007-Ohio-2713, at
¶ 16. The parties stipulated that a conditionally stayed two-year suspension was
appropriate for Scacchetti’s misconduct, id., but the board and this court found that
a two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed was the appropriate
sanction to facilitate Scacchetti’s recovery and ensure his return to the competent,
ethical, and professional practice of law, id. at ¶ 17-19.
{¶ 51} In this case, Norton does not appear to fully appreciate the severity
of his substance-use disorder. His OLAP contract was temporarily suspended for
several months because of his failure to attend an inpatient treatment program, and
even though that contract was reinstated, Norton was not in compliance with that
contract at the time of his disciplinary hearing. Although Norton testified that his
addiction counselor got him into a 60-day inpatient treatment program, he did not
think he needed a program that lasted that long. Instead of enrolling in the 60-day
program recommended by his counselor, Norton took advantage of the fact that
OLAP had not specified a required length for his inpatient treatment and “shopped
around” for a 30-day program. Despite completing that program, Norton suffered
three drug relapses in the nine months preceding his disciplinary hearing, with the
last one occurring just one month before the hearing.
{¶ 52} Additionally, in contrast to the attorneys in Norris and Scacchetti,
Norton has been previously disciplined. Compare Norris, 1996-Ohio-418, and
Scacchetti at ¶ 16, with Norton, 2007-Ohio-6038, at ¶ 25. He also engaged in
dishonest conduct by withholding information about his July 2024 relapse from his
addiction counselor when he asked her to prepare a report for submission as
evidence in these disciplinary proceedings. And Norton’s explanation that his July
2024 relapse occurred after he received some disturbing health news does not
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January Term, 2025
inspire confidence that he has gained the necessary tools to remain sober as he
confronts the everyday stresses attendant to the practice of law.
{¶ 53} On these facts, we have serious concerns about Norton’s ability to
achieve and maintain his sobriety. We therefore overrule Norton’s first objection
and conclude that a two-year suspension with one year stayed on the conditions
recommended by the board is the appropriate sanction for Norton’s misconduct.
Norton is not entitled to credit for time served
under his interim remedial suspension
{¶ 54} In his second objection to the board’s report and recommendation,
Norton contends that despite our recent pronouncement that the plain language of
Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2) does not permit the award of credit for time served under
an interim remedial suspension, see Hartley, 2024-Ohio-5232, at ¶ 32, he should
nonetheless receive credit for the time he has served under the interim remedial
suspension we imposed on his license to practice law, see Norton, 2023-Ohio-1740,
at ¶ 2, for two reasons. First, Norton contends that because we have previously
awarded credit for time served under interim suspensions when credit was not
specifically authorized by rule, we should do so in this case. And second, Norton
contends that denying him credit for time served will deprive him of due process
and equal protection of the law because there is no rational basis for treating him
“worse than his similarly situated peers.” These arguments are unavailing.
{¶ 55} In the past, this court has granted attorneys credit for time served
under interim suspensions—including time served under interim remedial
suspensions—even though our rules did not expressly authorize those credits when
they were issued. For example, in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Austin, 2019-
Ohio-3325, ¶ 27, and Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Marrelli, 2015-Ohio-4614, ¶ 6-
7, we granted attorneys credit for time served under interim default suspensions,
though when we decided those cases, Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2) authorized credit
only for time served under interim felony and child-support suspensions imposed
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under Gov.Bar R. V(18). See Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2), 159 Ohio St.3d XCIX
(effective Nov. 1, 2020) (adding interim default and impairment suspensions
imposed under Gov.Bar R. V(14) and (15) to the types of suspensions for which
credit for time served may be granted). And we once awarded credit for time served
under an interim remedial suspension to an attorney who neglected multiple client
matters, engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice and
that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law, and failed to maintain a
respectful attitude toward the court. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 2000-
Ohio-82, ¶ 4-7, 12. However, each of those cases predates our pronouncement in
Hartley that credit for time served is proper only for the types of suspensions
expressly identified in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2). Our determination in Hartley has
foreclosed our discretion to award Norton credit for the time he has served under
the interim remedial suspension.
{¶ 56} Norton claims that denying him credit for the time he has served
under his interim remedial suspension would deprive him of due process and equal
protection of the law. He presents his constitutional claims as as-applied challenges
to our application of Hartley, and to our interpretation of Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2)
in Hartley, to the facts of this case. These arguments are likewise unavailing.
{¶ 57} To prevail on a constitutional challenge to a statute or rule as applied
to a particular set of facts, the challenger must present clear and convincing
evidence of the constitutional defect. See State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents &
Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 21, citing Belden v. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329 (1944), paragraph six of the syllabus.
{¶ 58} In his objections, Norton asserts that “denying [him] credit for time
served given the facts of the case would violate his due process rights because there
is no rational basis for treating him worse than [his] similarly situated peers.” He
later filed a notice of additional authorities pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.08, stating
his intention to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
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Constitution, four decisions from the United States Supreme Court, and one
decision from this court in support of his constitutional argument. At oral
argument, however, he offered little more than the same conclusory argument
advanced in his objections.
{¶ 59} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“prohibits treating similar groups differently based on criteria that are unrelated to
the purpose of the law.” State v. Noling, 2016-Ohio-8252, ¶ 13. But the only
similarity that Norton has identified between his case and Austin, Marrelli, and
Brown, is that like we did here for Norton, in each of those cases, we imposed an
interim suspension on the attorneys’ license to practice law. We imposed interim
default suspensions on Austin and Marrelli after they failed to answer disciplinary
complaints filed against them and then failed to respond to the show-cause orders
issued by this court. See Austin, 2019-Ohio-3325, at ¶ 2; Marrelli, 2015-Ohio-
4614, at ¶ 2 and fn. 2. But both Austin and Marrelli eventually participated in the
disciplinary proceedings, thereby remedying the conditions that led to the
imposition of their interim default suspensions. See Austin at ¶ 2; Marrelli at ¶ 2.
{¶ 60} It is unclear from our decision in Brown, 2000-Ohio-82, or our
suspension order, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 87 Ohio St.3d 1427 (1999),
which facts gave rise to our imposition of an interim remedial suspension in that
case. However, we noted in our decision that Brown “was found not to be suffering
from mental illness,” Brown, 2000-Ohio-82, at ¶ 2, and that there was no suggestion
that Brown suffered from any substance-use disorder as Norton does in this case.
Rather, our decision in Brown suggests that Brown’s interim remedial suspension
was related to his failure to respond to complaints filed in two previous disciplinary
actions in 1997 and 1998 and to an amended complaint filed between May and
October 1999. See id. at ¶ 2-3.
{¶ 61} Here, by comparison, we imposed an interim remedial suspension
on Norton after receiving substantial, credible evidence demonstrating that he had
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violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and that his methamphetamine use and
related indictment on drug charges posed a substantial threat of serious harm to the
public. While Norton represents that the criminal charges related to his drug use
have been resolved, the evidence shows that Norton’s drug use continues to pose a
substantial threat of serious harm to the public. Simply stated, Norton has not
demonstrated that he is similarly situated to the attorneys who were disciplined in
Austin, Marrelli, or Brown. Norton has therefore failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that our application of Gov.Bar R.
V(17)(D)(2) has resulted in his being treated differently than his similarly situated
peers.
{¶ 62} Also without merit is Norton’s claim that the board’s failure to
recommend that he be credited for time he has served under our interim-remedial-
suspension order—and our refusal to grant that credit—somehow deprived him of
due process of law. We have previously explained the due-process rights afforded
to respondents in disciplinary cases:
The boundaries of due process for attorney-discipline
proceedings are different from those in civil or criminal
proceedings. In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr, 76
Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 667 N.E.2d 956 (1996). A disciplinary
respondent’s due-process rights have been adequately protected as
long as the respondent has been “afforded a hearing, the right to
issue subpoenas and depose witnesses, and an opportunity for
preparation to explain the circumstances surrounding his actions.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 129 Ohio St.3d 60, 2011-Ohio-
2902, 950 N.E.2d 177, ¶ 76.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, 2016-Ohio-8014, ¶ 21.
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{¶ 63} Here, Norton has received all the process he is due. In addition,
Norton requested and the panel chair granted a 90-day continuance of the
disciplinary hearing to permit Norton to complete his inpatient drug-treatment
program and establish a lengthier record of postdischarge sobriety. The panel also
granted his motions to extend the time for filing posthearing briefs and to hold the
record open until October 28, 2024, so he could submit additional mitigating
evidence. And after Norton missed the deadline for filing his posthearing brief, the
panel allowed him to file his brief out of time.
{¶ 64} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Norton’s second objection and
find that he is not eligible to receive credit for the time he has served under the
interim remedial suspension that we imposed on May 24, 2023. Having overruled
each of Norton’s objections, we adopt the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommended sanction.
CONCLUSION
{¶ 65} Eric Edward Norton is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio
for two years with one year stayed on the conditions that he (1) remain in
compliance with the terms of the OLAP contract he originally entered on April 13,
2023, and any recommended extension thereof, (2) submit to random drug and
alcohol testing through OLAP, and (3) remain in compliance with all court orders
related to or arising from his criminal case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-679867-A.
If Norton fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted and
he will serve the entire two-year suspension.
{¶ 66} In addition to the requirements for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar
R. V(24), Norton shall be required to submit a report from his treating addiction
counselor certifying that he is able to return to the competent, ethical, and
professional practice of law. And upon reinstatement, Norton shall serve a one-
year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), with the
practice monitor to be approved by relator. Costs are taxed to Norton.
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Judgment accordingly.
__________________
KENNEDY, C.J., joined by FISCHER and HAWKINS, JJ., dissenting.
{¶ 67} If the misconduct committed by respondent, Eric Edward Norton,
involved solely his commission of drug-related offenses, a suspension from the
practice of law in Ohio for two years with one year stayed might be an appropriate
sanction. That is how the majority treats this matter, which is why the cases it
reviews concern attorneys whose misconduct involved drug abuse and therefore
support the imposition of a partially stayed term suspension.
{¶ 68} However, Norton’s misconduct involved an added element that
made it more egregious than just his commission of drug-related offenses. His
cellphone had child pornography on it, and we have consistently imposed an
indefinite suspension when an attorney’s misconduct involved child pornography.
Consequently, considering all of Norton’s misconduct, I would suspend him from
the practice of law indefinitely, with no credit for time served under his interim
remedial suspension. Because the court does otherwise, I dissent.
{¶ 69} Norton was indicted in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas for drug-related offenses as well as one count of the illegal use of a minor in
nudity-oriented material or a nudity-oriented performance, a second-degree felony
in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1). The latter charge stemmed from law
enforcement’s search of Norton’s cellphone, which revealed two files containing
child pornography, including a depiction of a female minor with breasts and
genitals exposed. In his disciplinary case, Norton stipulated and the Board of
Professional Conduct found that illegal child-abuse material had been discovered
on Norton’s cellphone.
{¶ 70} I recognize that the count related to child pornography was
dismissed by the prosecutor as part of a plea agreement in which Norton pleaded
guilty to two drug-related offenses. “However, in disciplining an attorney for
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misconduct that also constitutes a criminal offense, we are not limited to
considering the charges brought for a particular crime; rather, we must also examine
the conduct underlying the offense.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodman, 2024-
Ohio-852, ¶ 24. Since the misconduct related to the two child-pornography
depictions found on Norton’s cellphone was alleged by relator, disciplinary
counsel, in the disciplinary complaint and has been litigated before the board and
this court, it should be fully considered in determining the appropriate sanction for
Norton’s misconduct.
{¶ 71} We stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Martyniuk that “[a]n indefinite
suspension with no credit for the time served under an interim felony suspension is
often the appropriate sanction for an attorney who has engaged in sexually
motivated conduct involving children,” and that includes misconduct involving
child pornography. 2017-Ohio-4329, ¶ 10. In that case, we imposed an indefinite
suspension with no credit for time served under an interim felony suspension on an
attorney who was convicted of 20 fourth-degree felony counts of pandering
sexually oriented material involving a minor. Id. at ¶ 3, 11.
{¶ 72} Similarly, we indefinitely suspended the attorney in Dayton Bar
Assn. v. Greenberg with no credit for time served under his interim felony
suspension, based on his convictions for possessing child pornography and
transferring obscene material to minors. 2013-Ohio-1723, ¶ 4-5. And we imposed
the same sanction in Disciplinary Counsel v. Butler on an attorney who was
convicted of 10 counts of pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor.
2011-Ohio-236, ¶ 1, 5. More recently, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who
possessed child pornography, and we gave him no credit for the time he served
under an interim felony suspension. Disciplinary Counsel v. Connors, 2020-Ohio-
3339, ¶ 5, 14. But see Disciplinary Counsel v. Ridenbaugh, 2009-Ohio-4091, ¶ 2,
40-41 (imposing an indefinite suspension with credit for time served under an
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interim-felony suspension on an attorney whose misconduct involved acts of
voyeurism and use of child pornography).
{¶ 73} We have found an indefinite suspension with no credit for time
served under an interim felony suspension to be appropriate even when the attorney
possessed only a few depictions of child pornography. In Dayton Bar Assn. v.
Ballato, we imposed that sanction on an attorney who possessed three child-
pornography images on his office computer. 2014-Ohio-5063, ¶ 5, 30.
{¶ 74} Following this precedent, Norton should be indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law based on the combination of his possession of child
pornography and his drug-related offenses.
{¶ 75} Credit for time served under an interim remedial suspension is not
available to Norton. Gov.Bar R. V provides for “various types of interim
suspensions for which credit for time served is allowed, but an interim remedial
suspension is not among them.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Hartley, 2024-Ohio-5232,
¶ 32. And while I acknowledge Norton’s arguments that denying him credit for
time served under his interim remedial suspension would deprive him of due
process and equal protection, I agree with the majority that his arguments are
conclusory and underdeveloped. Not only that but, as noted above, we have
consistently denied credit for time served under an interim felony suspension to
attorneys who committed misconduct like Norton’s; so as applied to him, the denial
of credit is not arbitrary.
{¶ 76} In any case, Norton would not be entitled to credit for time served
under his interim remedial suspension even if it were an option, because his drug
addiction meant that his practice of law posed a substantial threat of harm to the
public throughout his period of suspension. See Gov.Bar R. V(19). In April 2023,
Norton entered into a two-year chemical-dependency contract with the Ohio
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) yet tested positive for drugs five days later.
During his interim remedial suspension, which began in May 2023, see
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Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton, 2023-Ohio-1740, he relapsed at least three times—
in December 2023, March 2024, and July 2024. At the time of his disciplinary
hearing in August 2024, he had maintained barely a month of sobriety, even though
his license to practice law was on the line.
{¶ 77} But it is not just the fact that Norton relapsed that leads me to
conclude that he should not receive credit for time served under his interim remedial
suspension. I realize that recovery is a difficult journey; however, Norton struggled
to take the necessary steps to even try to maintain his sobriety. He initially refused
inpatient treatment as ordered by his OLAP monitor, and even after engaging in
inpatient and outpatient treatment, he failed to consistently document his
attendance at recovery meetings. And while he also worked with a drug-abuse
counselor, he failed to reveal his last relapse to her so that she could help him move
forward in his recovery. Giving Norton credit for time served under his interim
remedial suspension would make him eligible to apply for reinstatement to the
practice of law at a time when his commitment to maintaining his sobriety and his
ability to maintain it remain in question.
{¶ 78} For these reasons, I would suspend Norton from the practice of law
in Ohio indefinitely with no credit for the time he has served under his interim
remedial suspension. Because the majority does otherwise, I dissent.
__________________
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Ryan N. Sander, Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
Eric Edward Norton, pro se.
__________________
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