Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIAMOND ERICA PACE, 5:25-cv-02330-DSF-E

individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated, Order DENYING Plaintiff’s

Plaintiff, Motion to Remand (Dkt. 12)

v.

KEOLIS TRANSIT AMERICA,

INC.; and DOES 1 through 20,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Diamond Erica Pace moves to remand this action to the

San Bernardino County Superior Court. Dkt. 12-1 (Mot.). Defendant

Keolis Transit America, Inc. (Keolis) opposes. Dkt. 15 (Opp’n). The

Court deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral

argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons

stated below, the motion is DENIED.

I. Procedural History

On January 18, 2024, Pace filed this putative class action in San

Bernardino County Superior Court alleging violations of California

wage and hour laws. Dkt. 1-2 (Compl.) ¶ 3. On June 27, 2024, Pace

filed the operative First Amended Complaint, adding a ninth cause of

action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Dkt. 1-7

(FAC) ¶ 5. Keolis removed this case to federal court on September 8,

2025 based on subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action

Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Dkt. 1 (Notice of

Removal) at 1. On October 7, 2025, Pace moved for remand asserting

that Keolis’ notice of removal was untimely. Mot. at 1-2.

On November 8, 2024, Pace’s counsel sent Keolis the PAGA

notice she had previously sent to the California Labor & Workforce

Development Agency. Dkt. 12-4 (PAGA Letter).1 The PAGA Letter

identifies Labor Code violations but does not state an amount in

controversy. Id. at 5-3. On November 8, 2024, Pace’s counsel emailed

counsel for Keolis asking for the size of the putative class, and counsel

for Keolis responded, “I don’t know yet.” Dkt. 12-3 (Class Size Email)

at 5. On January 6, 2025, in the same email exchange, counsel for

Keolis sent a list of 1,707 employee ID numbers. Class Size Email at 3.

II. Legal Standard

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess

only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .”

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A

defendant may remove an action to federal court if the federal court

could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal

jurisdiction” and “[t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing that

removal is proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome,

Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). CAFA gives federal courts

jurisdiction over class actions involving at least 100 class members

where there is minimal diversity and at least $5 million in controversy.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). “Congress designed the terms of CAFA specifically

to permit a defendant to remove certain class or mass actions into

1 Before bringing a PAGA claim, the employee must provide written notice to

the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the employer, including

the specific California Labor Code provisions allegedly violated and “facts and

theories to support the alleged violation.” Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d

1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(1)).

federal court . . . [and] intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively.”

Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015).

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), provides “two different

potential 30-day removal deadlines.” Franklin, et al. v. Healthsource

Glob. Staffing, Inc., No. 23-cv-0662-AGS-DEB, 2024 WL 1055996, at *2

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2024). The first, under § 1446(b)(1), is triggered by

the “defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading only when that pleading

affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court

jurisdiction.” Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91

(9th Cir. 2005). If the initial pleading is not removable on its face, a

second 30-day period under § 1446(b)(3) may begin when “the

defendant receives ‘an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper’

from which it can be ascertained from the face of the document that

removal is proper.” Id. at 694 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)). For “an

amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” under § 1446(b)(3),

such paper must “make[] a ground for removal ‘unequivocally clear and

certain.’” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2021).

“As long as the complaint or an amended pleading, motion, order or

other paper does not reveal that the case is removable, a defendant, in

effect, may remove at any time.” Kenny v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 881

F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

“[N]otice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined through

examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through

[the defendant’s] subjective knowledge or a duty to make further

inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. “[T]he [removal] statute requires a

defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining

removability.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136,

1140 (9th Cir. 2013). But “defendants need not make extrapolations or

engage in guesswork” to determine if a case is removable, nor are they

“obligated to supply information which [the plaintiff] ha[s] omitted.”

Id.

III. Discussion

A. Local Rules Violations

In opposition to the instant motion, Keolis argues Pace’s motion

to remand must be denied because it is procedurally defective in two

ways. Opp’n at 2. First, Keolis asserts Pace’s motion to remand was

untimely under Local Rule 6-1, which requires filing no later than 28

days before the date set for hearing. Id. at 4. Pace filed her motion to

remand 27 days before the originally scheduled hearing date of

November 3, 2025. See Dkt. 12 (Not. of Mot.). Second, Keolis contends

Pace violated Local Rule 7-3 because she did not timely meet and confer

at least seven days before filing the instant motion.

The Court will consider the motion as it has a continuing

obligation to evaluate jurisdiction. Pace is admonished to comply with

the Local Rules in the future and is warned that failure to do so may

result in sanctions.2

B. Timeliness of the Notice of Removal3

Pace argues that Keolis’ notice of removal was untimely because

it was filed after a 30-day removal deadline triggered by any one of the

2 The Court also notes Pace’s counsel has entirely omitted citations to

authority—even quoted authority—in the Argument section of the Reply.

See Dkt. 18 (Reply). This Court’s Standing Order requires citations to

authority that identify the case cited and specific page reference. Dkt. 9 at 4.

The Court orders Pace’s counsel to familiarize themselves with the Local

Rules, the Court’s rules, and lawyering best practices. Future violations may

result in the Court striking the motion or imposing sanctions and will impact

the Court’s evaluation as to whether counsel are adequate to serve as class

counsel in this case.

3 In her motion to remand, Pace challenges only the timeliness of Keolis’

notice of removal, not the basis for removal. See Mot. Nevertheless, Keolis

has plausibly alleged this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Acad. of

Country Music v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 991 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A]

notice of removal need . . . only [contain] plausible allegations of the

jurisdictional elements.”). In its Notice of Removal, Keolis added estimated

following: (1) the initial complaint, (2) the operative FAC, (3) the PAGA

Letter, (4) the Class Size Email exchanges on November 8, 2024 and

January 6, 2025. Mot. at 5-7. In opposition, Keolis argues none of the

documents cited by Pace triggered the 30-day removal deadline. Opp’n

at 5-7.

1. Initial Pleading Under § 1446(b)(1)

In her motion, Pace states “[Keolis] clearly failed to remove

within the 30-day period mandated by Section 1446(b)(1) following the

filing of the operative complaint.” Mot. at 5.4 Pace does not identify

any information on the face of the initial pleading made removability

ascertainable, rather she appears to argue the complaint itself was

sufficient to start the removal clock. See id.5

The Court finds the Complaint does not reveal on its face that the

action is removable. As an initial matter, service of the complaint does

not on its own start the removal clock; it must affirmatively reveal the

basis for removal. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 690-91. The Complaint does

not specify the amount of damages or wages, nor does it contain

estimates of class size. See Compl. The only specific figures alleged in

the complaint are: (1) an estimate of the class size of more than 50

damages, penalties, premiums, and fees to reach an amount in controversy of

$23,797,315, exceeding the $5,000,000 jurisdictional requirement. Dkt. 1

(Notice of Removal) at 21-22. Keolis alleges Pace is a citizen of California

while Keolis is a citizen of either Delaware or Massachusetts, satisfying

diversity of citizenship. Id. at 8-9.

4 It appears Pace refers to the initial complaint filed on January 18, 2024,

rather than the operative FAC. Amended pleadings trigger the deadline

under § 1446(b)(3), not § 1446(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The Court

considers the operative FAC and § 1446(b)(3) below.

5 Throughout Pace’s motion, she makes little to no attempt to point the Court

to specific information contained within complaints or other papers that put

Keolis on notice of removability. “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for

truffles buried in [the record].” United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956

(7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

individuals and (2) a request for civil penalties not exceeding $4,000

per employee. Id. ¶¶ 25, 84. Even if Keolis had multiplied these

numbers to calculate civil penalties of up to $200,000, it would not have

met the amount in controversy of $5 million necessary for federal

jurisdiction under CAFA. See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1140 (finding

“multiplying figures clearly stated in a complaint” is within the

defendant’s duty to ascertain removability). Therefore, Keolis was not

required to remove this action within 30 days of receiving the initial

complaint under § 1446(b)(1).

2. First Amended Complaint and Other Papers Under

§ 1446(b)(3)

a. First Amended Complaint

Pace asserts that the FAC, filed on June 12, 2024, triggered the

30-day removal deadline under § 1446(b)(3). Mot. at 5. Pace has not

directed the Court to any additional information in the FAC sufficient

to show the case was removable, and the Court can find none. See Mot.

at 5. While Pace added a cause of action under PAGA seeking civil

penalties, the FAC is missing crucial figures—like pay periods, work

weeks, and damages—from which the amount in controversy could be

determined. See FAC ¶¶ 102-09. The addition of a cause of action

under PAGA did not make removability “unequivocally clear and

certain.” Dietrich, 14 F.3d at 1091. The Court finds Pace’s FAC did not

obligate Keolis to remove within 30-days under § 1446(b)(3).

b. PAGA Letter

Pace argues the copy of the PAGA Letter, which Pace sent to

Keolis through counsel on November 8, 2024, put Keolis on notice that

the case was removable. Mot. at 7. Pace does not point to any specific

information in the letter from which Keolis could have ascertained

removability. See id. The Court does not find any damages, class size

estimates, wage rates, or other information in the PAGA Letter that

would have allowed Keolis to calculate the amount in controversy. See

PAGA Letter at 5-7. Pace merely summarizes previous allegations and

claims, attaching the complaint. See PAGA Letter at 5-28. Therefore,

the PAGA Letter did not trigger the 30-day deadline for removal under

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).

c. Class Size Email

Finally, Pace contends two exchanges within the Class Size

Email were “other papers” triggering a 30-day removal deadline. Mot.

at 6-7. First, she cites the November 8, 2024 exchange in which Pace’s

counsel asked Keolis’ counsel to provide the size of the putative class.

Id.; Class Size Email at 5. This correspondence seems to be the

opposite of notice, as Pace acknowledged she did not have basic

information needed to calculate the amount in controversy. The

November 8, 2024 email exchange is therefore woefully insufficient to

start the § 1446(b)(3) removal clock.

Next, Pace points to the parties’ exchange on January 6, 2025

within the same email thread in which Keolis provided information

about the putative class size and timekeeping data. Mot. at 7; Class

Size Email at 3. She argues the email shows Keolis had the

information necessary to determine the amount in controversy by

January, making removal in September untimely. Id. This argument

relies on an incorrect reading of the law in two ways. First, to be

“charge[d] . . . with notice of removability,” Keolis must have “received a

paper that [gave it] enough information to remove.” Kuxhausen, 707

F.3d at 1141 (emphasis added); see 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3) (“[A] notice of

removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant . . . of

an . . . other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case

is . . . removable.”) (emphasis added). The email does not qualify as an

“other paper” because Keolis was the sender, not the recipient. Second,

Keolis’ subjective knowledge does not trigger the 30-day removal

deadline. Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1126

(9th Cir. 2013) (finding the defendant’s subjective knowledge cannot

start the “time limit of § 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) . . . to run against the

defendant”). And even if Keolis’ response was an “other paper” under

§ 1446(b)(3), class size alone with no dollar amount of damages is not

sufficient to make removability unequivocally clear and certain.

Because neither 30-day window under § 1446(b) was triggered by

Keolis’ receipt of the complaint or any other paper, Keolis could have

removed “at any time.” Kenny, 881 F.3d at 791. Therefore, Keolis’

Notice of Removal was timely.

IV. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the Court DENIES Pace’s motion to

remand.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 12, 2025 at alee □□□ ES

Dale 8S. Fischer

United States District Judge