MAZO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EUGENE MAZO,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 20-8336 (ZNQ) (TJB)

v.

OPINION

CHRISTOPHER J. DURKIN, et al.,

Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant

Christopher J. Durkin (ECF No. 109), and a Motion for Summary Judgment1 filed by Defendants

E. Junior Maldonado and Joanne Rajoppi (Durkin, along with Maldonado and Rajoppi, the

“Defendants”) (ECF No. 110). Durkin filed a brief in support of his motion (MTD Br., ECF No.

109-1.) Maldonado and Rajoppi also filed a brief in support of their motion. (ECF No. 110-1.)

Plaintiff Eugene Mazo (“Plaintiff”) filed identical briefs in opposition to the two motions. (Opp.,

1 Although Maldonado and Rajoppi have styled their motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will construe it as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1). A factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction concerns “the actual failure of [a plaintiff’s] claims

to comport [factually] with the jurisdictional prerequisites.” United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co.,

473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation modified). In this scenario, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for

itself the merits of jurisdictional claims,” Mortenson v. First Federal Sav. And Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.

1977), and “the court may consider and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to determine if it has jurisdiction.”

Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000). See Shark River Cleanup Coalition v.

Township of Wall, 47 F.4th 126, 133 n.11 (construing district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

as a dismissal pursuant to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction although the defendant raised their

argument in a motion for summary judgment) (citing IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int'l Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d

298, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (construing a party’s filing by its “substance,” not its “form”)).

.

ECF Nos. 112, 113.) Durkin filed a reply (ECF No. 114), as did Maldanado and Rajoppi (ECF

No. 115).

The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the Motions

without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motions.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises out of the 2020 Democratic primaries and the New Jersey laws that affect

candidate placement on the ballot. (TAC, ECF No. 66 ¶ 1.) In that election, Plaintiff

unsuccessfully ran for U.S. Congress in New Jersey’s Tenth Congressional District. (Id.) After

his loss, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging that New Jersey’s ballot design system is

unconstitutional. (Id. ¶ 4.) At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, New Jersey law allowed

candidates who run for office to file a “joint petition with the county clerk” to have their names

placed on the same line or column of the ballot. (Id. ¶ 84.) New Jersey used the term “bracketed”

to describe the group of joint petition candidates. (Id. ¶ 92.)

Prior to an election, the county clerks would hold a ballot draw to determine the placement

of the various candidates running for office. (Id. ¶ 95.) Each bracketed group of candidates was

treated as a single group and chosen together as a unit, which meant that only one candidate’s

name had to be drawn for all the bracketed candidates to get placed on the same row or column.

(Id. ¶ 93.) For example, imagine a ballot that has Columns A to E. If a county clerk decided to

draw the names of U.S. Senate candidates first, then the candidates running for that open seat

would automatically be placed in either column A or column B (assuming only two candidates are

running for Senate). If a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives decided not to bracket

with a candidate for the Senate, then, if the county clerk drew the names of the candidates for the

House next, the best position he or she could receive would be column C. Meanwhile, a candidate

for the House of Representatives that did bracket with a Senate candidate would automatically be

placed in either column A or column B given that bracketed candidates are placed on the same line

or column. This system is referred to as the “Bracket System.”

Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on February 21, 2023, alleging that

the Bracket System violates numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, including the First and

Fourteenth Amendment, Article I §2, the Qualifications Clause, and the Elections Clause. Plaintiff

further alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him of his rights, privileges,

and immunities by administering an unlawful ballot bracketing system. In the TAC, Plaintiff

requests: (1) a declaration that the Bracket System is unconstitutional; (2) a declaration that the

Bracket System serves no compelling governmental interest; (3) a declaration that the Bracket

System is not the least-restrictive means to advance a governmental interest; (4) a declaration that

the Bracket System is not appropriately tailored to a governmental interest; (5) such injunctive

relief as the Court may direct; (6) costs and attorneys’ fees; (7) and any other relief the Court may

grant in its discretion.

Since the TAC was filed, there have been two intervening events that Defendants argue

have rendered Plaintiff’s claims moot.2 First, in an unrelated case, this Court granted a preliminary

injunction that required nineteen County Clerks to structure the 2024 democratic primary ballot

by office sought, as opposed to columns and rows, and to conduct separate draws for ballot position

for every office and candidate (“Office Block Style”). (MTD Br. at 3.) Following an unsuccessful

appeal of the preliminary injunction, Essex County3 and Hudson County4 entered into a settlement

2 Although Defendants filed separate motions, they each raise similar arguments challenging subject matter

jurisdiction based on mootness.

3 Defendant Durkin is the County Clerk for Essex County.

4 Defendant E. Junior Maldonado is the County Clerk for Hudson County.

agreement that ensures all future primary ballots are designed using the Office Block Style (the

“Settlement Agreement”). (MTD Br. at 4.) Specifically, the Settlement Agreement requires Essex

County and Hudson County to “[afford] each candidate for the same office an equal chance at

obtaining the first ballot position.” (Id.)

The second intervening event occurred on March 6, 2025, when Governor Philip D.

Murphy signed legislation passed by the New Jersey Legislature that requires primary election

ballots to be arranged in an Office Block Style, with the order beginning with the highest federal

offices under consideration and ending with political party offices (the “Ballot Legislation”).

(MTD Br. at 5.) The Ballot Legislation allows for the placement of a slogan or endorsement next

to or below the name of a candidate and permits candidates for the same office with multiple open

seats to associate in the same office block. Id. Importantly, the legislation specifically prohibits a

design that separates a candidate from other candidates running for the same office. (Id.)

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1331.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have subject matter

jurisdiction only over matters involving “cases” or “controversies,” which acts as an essential

limitation to our system of separation of powers. See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of Readington,

555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation modified). “In cases involving state or local

government, it also serves to protect and preserve the principle of dual sovereignty embedded in

our founding charter.” Id. To that end, subject matter jurisdiction is nonwaivable and can be

raised at any time in a proceeding. See Brown v. Phila. Housing Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 346–47 (3d

Cir. 2003).

Within the “cases” or “controversies” requirement lies the doctrine of mootness. See

Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013). A case becomes moot when the

issues are no longer “live,” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A.S.

Harrison Twp. Bd. of Educ., 66 F. Supp. 3d 539, 545 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing Powel v. McCormack,

395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). Moreover, “[a] case might become moot if subsequent events made it

absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000); see also

Genesis Healthcare Corp., 569 at 72 (“If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a

personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer

proceed and must be dismissed as moot.”). However, under the voluntary cessation doctrine,

where a defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct in response to litigation, the case

might only be moot if “subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful

behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. at 189 (quoting United States v.

Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that the Ballot Legislation renders Plaintiff’s claims moot. “Where a law

is amended so as to remove its challenged features, the claim . . . becomes moot as to those

features.” Khodara Envl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.

2001) (citation omitted). The key question the Court must ask is whether the amended statute

prohibits the defendant from engaging in the challenged behavior again. See Hartnett v. Pa. State

Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2020). However, even if the amended statute prohibits

the challenged conduct, a court must still ensure that the defendant cannot be reasonably expected

to “return to its old ways later on.” Id. at 307 (citation modified).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that when he ran for U.S. Congress in 2020, Hudson County, Essex

County, and Union County violated his constitutional rights by conducting preferential ballot

draws that automatically placed Plaintiff in a worse position on the ballot because of his decision

not to bracket with any other candidate. (TAC ¶¶ 59, 65, 77.) Throughout the TAC, Plaintiff

complains of the Bracket System and discusses various studies highlighting the negative impact,

such as bias, that the Bracket System has on New Jersey elections. (TAC ¶¶ 108–23.) However,

as explained, the Ballot Legislation amended the Bracket System and revised the ballots in New

Jersey to follow the Office Block Style. Specifically, the Ballot Legislation now states that

“candidates shall be arranged by office sought in an office block format, each office block shall be

separated on the ballot from other office blocks, and candidates for the same office shall be listed

within the same office block without a page break appearing between their names, and as further

provided under R.S.19:23-25.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:23-23.2. Under R.S. 19:23-25, office blocks

are arranged by the highest office first, starting with the President and ending with candidates for

county party positions. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:23-25. Moreover, each candidate running for

office must be placed underneath the title of the office and position the candidate is running for.

Id. If an office has multiple open seats, candidates may choose to be associated within the same

office block. Id. Simply put, the Ballot Legislation expressly prohibits the exact ballot process

that Plaintiff challenges as unconstitutional. Given that Defendants cannot reasonably be expected

to engage in the Bracket System, Plaintiff’s claims are moot. See Hartnett, 963 F.3d at 306.

None of Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are persuasive. First, Plaintiff argues that the

Ballot Legislation amended only part of the Bracket System, while leaving other parts of it intact.

(Opp. at 10.) He argues that in this case, the Bracket System arose out of various statutory

authorities, court cases, and practices that developed over many decades. (Id. at 12.) According

to Plaintiff, these disjointed statutes were not abolished wholesale by the Ballot Legislation and

that “important characteristics of [the Bracket System] remain in force.” (Id.) Plaintiff then goes

on to discuss how New Jersey’s slogan statutes, which authorize a candidate running in a primary

to put a slogan next to his or her name on the ballot, were not repealed or amended by the Ballot

Legislation. (Id. at 13.) Under the slogan statutes, if a candidate’s slogan refers to the name of

any person or to any association, the candidate must obtain the written consent of such person or

association before the county can approve it. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the slogan statutes

violate his First Amendment rights as applied to him. (Id.) He then cites to several instances in

which New Jersey denied his request to use slogans with the names of Russian President Vladamir

Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping because Plaintiff lacked the required consent to use their

names. (Id. at 14.)

Although the Court doubts the merits of Plaintiff’s First Amendment challenge to the

slogan statutes5, there is no need to delve into that issue now because Plaintiff does not actually

make these allegations in the TAC. Rather, Plaintiff’s only discussion of the slogan statutes was

in the context of how candidates running for office with a common ballot slogan could be grouped

together on the same line or column of the ballot. (TAC ¶¶ 80–87.) This, Plaintiff alleged, violated

the First Amendment because “the state privileges [bracketed candidates’] rights of association

over the rights of association of candidates who do not wish to bracket with other candidates on

the ballot.” (Id. at ¶ 138.) But as already explained, the Ballot Legislation eliminates this process.

5 In an unrelated case, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s facial challenges to the slogan statutes

based on his failure to state a claim. See Mazo v. N.J. Sec’y of State, 54 F.4th 124 (3d Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to association, as alleged in the TAC, is no longer implicated.6

See Black United Fund of N.J., Inc. v. Kean, 763 F.2d 156, 160–61 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding the

plaintiff’s claims were mooted by an amendment because the “raison d’etre for the injunction no

longer exists,” and noting that the amendment “will give plaintiff substantially the relief it sought

in the district court”). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot raise for the first time in an opposition brief an

as-applied challenge to the slogan statute’s requirement to obtain consent. See Bereczki v.

Mansfield Tp., Civ. No. 03-276, 2005 WL 3454297, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2005) (“[C]laim was

not alleged in the complaint and cannot be raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for

summary judgment.”)

Plaintiff further argues that his claims are not moot because “Defendants cannot show that

there is no reasonable likelihood that unconstitutional practices will not continue to occur.” (Opp.

at 15.) As evidence of this, Plaintiff points to a ballot used in Newark’s special school board

election in which candidates with the same slogan were bracketed next each other, which pushed

the candidates without slogans to the end of the ballot (the “Newark Ballot”). (Id. at 16–17.)

However, as Plaintiff acknowledges, the Newark Ballot was unquestionably “an office block

ballot,” and importantly, the candidates were only grouped together because the Ballot Legislation

allows candidates running for the same office to be grouped together. (Id. at 17.) This type of

grouping permitted by the Ballot Legislation poses no problem for Plaintiff, because there can only

be one open seat for the U.S. House of Representatives (the position Plaintiff ran for), and the

Ballot Legislation only allows candidates running for the same office with multiple open seats to

6 Plaintiff cites to Nextel West Corp. v. Unity Township to support his argument, in which the Third Circuit reversed

a finding of mootness by the district court. 282 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the facts of Nextel are

inapposite to the facts of this case. There, the plaintiff could not build a wireless tower in its desired location either

before or after the city amended the challenged ordinance, which meant that “the gravamen” of the plaintiff’s

complaint remained. Id. at 263. But in this case, “the gravamen” of Plaintiff’s complaint (i.e., the Bracket System)

has been remedied by the Ballot Legislation, rendering Plaintiff’s claims moot.

be grouped together if they use the same slogan. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:23-23.2. Nowhere in

the TAC does Plaintiff allege that he ran for a position with multiple open seats (nor does he claim

that he plans to do so in the future). Because the “mootness inquiry . . . depends on the particular

facts of each case,” Plaintiff’s arguments regarding other ballots and positions for offices other

than the one he ran for are irrelevant and cannot save his claims. Hartnett, 963 F.3d at 308. Given

that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s TAC has been addressed by the Ballot Legislation, his claims are

now moot. Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motions. This matter

will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order

will follow.

Date: November 12, 2025

s/ Zahid N. Quraishi

ZAHID N. QURAISHI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE