Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 23-cv-23556-JB/Reid

GREAT LAKES INSURANCE SE,

A Delaware limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

LILY WILLIAMS and BAYWATCH

BOAT RENTALS, TOURS &

CHARTERS, INC. d/b/a CAPTAIN JOE’S

BOAT RENTALS, TOURS & CHARTERS,

INC.,

Defendants.

________________________________________/

ORDER ON MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE was referred to the Honorable Lisette M. Reid, United States

Magistrate Judge, for a Report and Recommendation on three cross-motions for

summary judgment as follows:

1. Plaintiff Great Lakes Insurance SE (“Great Lakes”) Motion for Summary

Judgment and Statement of Facts in Support, ECF Nos. [94] and [93];

Defendant Lilly Williams (“Williams”) Opposition and Statement of Facts in

Opposition, ECF Nos. [113] and [106]; Defendant Baywatch Boat Rentals,

Tours & Charters, Inc. d/b/a Captain Joe’s Boat Rentals, Tours & Charters,

Inc.’s (“Captain Joe’s”) Opposition and Statement of Facts in Opposition, ECF

Nos. [116] and [115]; and Great Lakes’ Reply in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment and Replies to Williams’ and Captain Joe’s Additional

Statement of Facts, ECF Nos. [129], [127], and [128];

2. Williams’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Facts in Support,

ECF Nos. [95] and [90]; Great Lakes’ Opposition and Statement of Facts in

Opposition, ECF Nos. [110] and [109]; and Williams’ Reply in Support of her

Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Statement of Facts, ECF Nos. [130]

and [131]; and

3. Captain Joe’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Facts in

Support, ECF Nos. [97] and [96]; Great Lakes’ Opposition and Statement of

Facts in Opposition, ECF Nos. [111] and [108]; and Captain Joe’s Reply in

Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Statement of Facts,

ECF Nos. [133] and [132].

See ECF No. [58].

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from an incident aboard a charter vessel operated by

Captain Joe’s. ECF No. [95] at 3–4. On June 23, 2020, Williams was among several

invited guests who boarded one of three chartered vessels, each embarking on a four-

hour cruise to a local sandbar and returning to docks located behind a hotel in North

Bay Village, Florida. Id. at 4. Prior to returning to the docks, Williams was unable

to locate her sandals and returned to the charter vessels to look for them. Id. at 5.

Having no luck on one of the vessels, she walked to one of the other vessels which

was in the process of being cleaned. Id. Williams ascended a ladder from the cockpit

of the vessel up to the flybridge to continue her search. Id. While descending the

same ladder, Williams slipped and fell, sustaining serious injuries, among which were

fractures of her right tibia and fibula. Id. at 6. Williams notified Captain Joe’s of her

injuries in July and August of 2020. Id.

The incident has since prompted multiple legal actions. In addition to

Williams’ suit against Captain Joe’s in state court (the “State Court Action”), Great

Lakes, who insured Captain Joe’s at the time of Williams injury, also filed a

declaratory action seeking a finding that the insurance policy between Great Lakes

and Captain Joe’s (the “Policy”) was void (the “Declaratory Action”). See Great Lakes

Insurance SE v. Baywatch Boat Rentals, Tours & Charters, Inc., No.1:21-cv-21220-

JLK (S.D. Fla. October 13, 2022).

During the pendency of the Declaratory Action, Captain Joe’s filed a motion to

dismiss for failing to join Williams as an indispensable party. See Great Lakes Ins.,

SE v. Baywatch Boat Rentals, Tours & Charters, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-21220-JLK, 2022

WL 22835905, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2022). The Honorable Senior United States

District Judge King held that Williams was not an indispensable party, and did not

need to be included in the Declaratory Action because Williams’ interest was “not

legally protectable because they derive ‘from a purely speculative outcome in the state

action still pending, not the insurance policy at issue here.’ [ ] Williams . . . [is not a]

party to the insurance policy at issue in this declaratory judgment action and thus

[has] no legally protectable interest in it.” Id. (citing to Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v.

Basdeo, No. 08-cv-61473, 2009 WL 2450386, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2009).

Ultimately, the Declaratory Action resulted in a settlement agreement

between Great Lakes and Captain Joe’s, (the “Settlement” or “Great Lakes

Settlement”) in October of 2022. Among the terms of the Great Lakes Settlement

were that: (1) Great Lakes would return $150,000 worth of premium payments to

Captain Joe’s; (2) Captain Joe’s would release Great Lakes from all liability under

the Policy; (3) the Policy would be void from its inception; (4) the Policy would not

cover Williams’ claim; (5) Captain Joe’s would not assign any rights it may have

against Great Lakes to Williams; and (6) Captain Joe’s would indemnify Great lakes

from any claims by Williams arising from the incident with Captain Joe’s. See ECF

No. [93–7].

In the State Court Action, Williams and Captain Joe’s ultimately settled their

claims in the State Court Action by way of a consent judgment and a settlement and

assignment agreement, (the “Consent Judgment”). See ECF No. [95] at 6; see

generally Lilly Williams v. Baywatch Boat Rentals, Tours & Charters, Inc., No.

CACE-21-007626, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 2021). The Consent Judgment stated that

Williams could seek satisfaction of the agreed upon $800,000 judgment against “any

other responsible agent or party, including but not limited to Great Lakes Insurance

SE pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Assignment,” and

assigned to Williams “all claims, rights, or benefits that Baywatch may have against

Atlass and/or under the policy with Great Lakes . . . .” ECF No. [96–5] at 2.

On July 20, 2023, Williams then turned to Great Lakes to satisfy the Consent

Judgment by filing a Civil Remedy Notice, alleging that Great Lakes was acting in

bad faith. See ECF No. [1–10].

The third action, the instant suit filed by Great Lakes on September 15, 2023,

is a declaratory action which asks the Court to recognize, amongst other things, the

Settlement it reached with its insured, Captain Joe’s, from its original Declaratory

Action. See generally ECF No. [94] at 1–2. Specifically, the Complaint seeks: (1) a

declaratory judgment that the Policy was void from its inception (“Count I”); (2) a

declaratory judgment that Great Lakes did not commit bad faith under New York

Law (“Count II”); (3) in the alternative to Count II, a declaratory judgment that Great

Lakes did not commit bad faith under Florida law (“Count III”); (4) a breach of the

Great Lakes Settlement Agreement against Captain Joe’s (“Count IV”), and (5) a

Contractual Indemnity against Captain Joe’s (“Count V”). See ECF No. [33–1].

Williams filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the Policy provides

indemnity coverage to Williams for her Consent Judgment. See ECF No. [10] at 12.

The parties each filed Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting statements of

material facts, which were referred to Magistrate Judge Reid for a Report and

Recommendation. See ECF Nos. [93], [94], [90], [95], [96], [97]; see also ECF No. [58].

II. THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Magistrate Judge Reid filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),

recommending that Great Lakes’ and Williams’ Motions for Summary Judgment be

granted in part and denied in part, and that Captain Joe’s Motion for Summary

Judgement be denied. ECF No. [135]. More specifically, regarding Great Lakes’

Count I claim for a declaratory judgment that the Policy was void from its inception,

and Williams’ counterclaim for coverage under the Policy, the R&R concluded that

the policy was not void from inception, that Williams has standing to challenge the

Policy, and found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Policy could be

void for other reasons. See id. at 23–27.

As to Counts II and III, the R&R found Williams’ bad faith claims under

Florida and New York law were without merit, and granted Great Lakes’ motion for

summary judgment, and denied Williams’ motion for summary judgment. Id. at 29.

As to Great Lakes’ Count IV for breach of contract, the R&R granted Great

Lakes’ motion for summary judgment and denied Captain Joe’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that Captain Joe’s did indeed breach its contract with Great Lakes

by purporting to assign any rights to Williams. See id. at 31.

Lastly, the R&R found that the indemnity clause contained in the Great Lakes

Settlement Agreement did indeed apply to any claims Williams would assert against

Great Lakes as a result of her injuries, and recommended that summary judgment

be granted in favor of Great Lakes on Count V. Id. at 33–34.

III. THE OBJECTIONS

Great Lakes, Williams, and Captain Joe’s each filed objections to the R&R (the

“Objections”), ECF Nos. [146], [138], and [145], to which each party responded, ECF

Nos. [151], [152], [154], [155].

In its Objections, Great Lakes argues that the Policy was void from its

inception based on the Great Lakes Settlement Agreement because Williams was not

a party to the Policy nor a third-party beneficiary at such time, and because this

Court previously confirmed the same. See ECF No. [146] at 4–5; see also Great Lakes

I, No. 1:21-CV-21220-JLK, 2022 WL 22835905, at *2. To find otherwise, says Great

Lakes, is to “vitiate the freedom of contract, create chaos, and leave insurers and

insureds to question whether such an agreement could ever be made.” See id. at 5.

Great Lakes argues that the R&R eludes this point by not reaching a conclusion as

to whether the Policy was voided by the Great Lakes Settlement Agreement and

avoiding a ruling on whether it was void for other reasons. Id. at 6 (quoting R&R at

30–31).

Great Lakes also asserts that the Great Lakes Settlement Agreement negated

the duty of Great Lakes to indemnify Captain Joe’s with respect to any damages for

Williams’ injuries. In that case, argues Great Lakes, whether the Policy is void or

not may not matter, because Captain Joe’s already agreed to release Great Lakes of

such duties to indemnify for any claims related to Williams’ injuries. Id. at 13.

Williams’ Objections agreed with the R&R as to Williams’ ability to challenge

the Great Lakes Settlement Agreement, but contested that the Policy could be void

for any other reason.1 ECF No. [138] at 4–5. Williams also argued that the R&R

should not have considered certain arguments presented by Great Lakes in response

to Williams’ counterclaims, disagreeing with the R&R’s conclusion that such

arguments were included in Great Lakes’ Amended Complaint and in Great Lakes’

Affirmative Defenses. Id. at 6 (quoting R&R at 5, n.10).

Lastly, Captain Joe’s Objections take issue with the R&R’s findings that

Captain Joe’s (1) breached the Great Lakes Settlement Agreement by assigning its

rights to Williams in the Captain Joe’s Settlement Agreement; and (2) must

indemnify Great Lakes should Williams be able to collect on the Policy. See ECF No.

[145]. More specifically, Captain Joe’s argues that there is no causal connection

between the alleged breach of contract and the damages that resulted because neither

1 Williams also had objections to certain findings of fact in the R&R that the Court

does not find relevant for purposes of its ruling.

Williams nor Captain Joe’s believed there was an assignment as part of the Captain

Joe’s Settlement Agreement. Id. at 4–10. Captain Joe’s also argued that the

indemnification clause in the Great Lakes Settlement Agreement did not apply to

future claims by Williams, such as her present counterclaim. Id. at 12.

The Court held oral argument on the objections to the R&R on July 24, 2025.

See ECF Nos. [169], [171]. Prior to Oral Argument, Williams filed a Notice of

Supplemental Authority in which she provided case law for the proposition that it is

against public policy for an insurer and its insured to enter into a settlement

agreement which voids an insurance policy from its inception while there is notice of

an existing third-party claim against the insured. ECF No. [161]. Great Lakes and

Captain Joe’s each filed a Response. See ECF Nos. [166] and [167]. On September

18, 2025, the Court requested additional briefing on this issue. ECF No. [175]; see

ECF Nos. [181], [182], [183], [184], [185], [186].

IV. ANALYSIS

In evaluating the R&R, this Court has a duty to “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). It also may

“accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” Id.

The threshold question before the Court is whether an insurer and its insured

can enter into a settlement agreement that voids a policy from its inception if there

is notice of an existing claim against the insured at the time the settlement agreement

was entered. There appears to be no precedent that clearly answers that question.

The R&R distilled that claim, articulated in Count I of the Amended Complaint

and Williams’ counterclaim, into two questions: (1) whether Williams has standing to

challenge her rights under the Policy (despite the Settlement that voided the policy),

and if so, (2) whether the Policy is nevertheless void for reasons other than the

Settlement.2 ECF No. [135] at 17–18. As to the first question, the R&R concluded

that although Williams was not an indispensable party and had no standing to

challenge the Declaratory Action (which eventually resolved by way of the

Settlement), she now has a judgement in her favor as to the underlying liability, and

therefore, has standing to assert her rights against the Policy. Id. at 20.

The issue for the undersigned, however, is not whether she now has standing

to challenge her rights under the Policy. Indeed, although she did not have standing

at the time the issue was addressed in the Declaratory Action before Judge King,

there appears little question that she does have standing now given that she has

secured a judgment in the underlying tort action. Instead, the issue is whether there

is any Policy for her to challenge, given that the Settlement between the insurer,

Great Lakes, and insured, Captain Joe’s, resulted in the Policy being void from

inception. As such, in order for Williams to have any cause of action against Great

Lakes at this juncture, the Settlement between Great Lakes and Captain Joe’s would

have to be set aside.

2 For the reasons stated herein, we need not reach the second question.

On this point, Great Lakes and Captain Joe’s both argue that there is no

applicable exception to the inviolable right of parties to enter (and exit) contracts

freely. See ECF Nos. [181] at 4; ECF No. [183] at 11. Great Lakes and Captain Joe’s

both rely on New York’s “deeply rooted” public policy favoring the freedom of contract,

and distinguish the exceptions that Williams raises from the facts at hand. See ECF

Nos. [146] at 5–6; [155] at 3–4; [181] at 3; [183] at 2–3 (citing to Beatty v. Guggenheim

Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 387 (1919) (“Those who make a contract may unmake

it”)). Similarly, Captain Joe’s argues that there is no statutory provision or

compulsory insurance framework that would nullify their contractual autonomy, and

that the answer to the issue at hand is answered with New York’s freedom-of-contract

principles. ECF No. [183] at 9, 16. See Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Oppenheim, Appel,

Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 691, 660 N.E.2d 415 (1995) (“(t)he policy favoring

freedom of contract requires that, within broad limits, the agreement of the parties

should be honored even though forfeiture results”); 159 MP Corp. v. Redbridge

Bedford, LLC, 33 N.Y.3d. 353, 358 (2019) (upholding a contract that resulted in the

waiver of a right to bring a declaratory judgment “in light of the strong public policy

favoring freedom of contract”).

In advancing the argument that the Settlement should be set aside, Williams

relies heavily on a district court decision from Vermont, West v. Carolina Casualty

Inc. Co., 325 F. Supp. 3d 501 (D. Vt. 2018). Williams argues that West addresses the

“unique insurance contract/public policy issues raised by the instant case.” ECF No.

[161] at 1. In West, the plaintiff sued her employer, insured by Carolina Casualty

Insurance Company, for age discrimination. West, 325 F.Supp.3d at 502. After a

disagreement regarding the parties’ preferred legal representation, the employer

executed a release discharging Carolina from any obligation to defend or indemnify

the employer in connection with the plaintiff’s pending lawsuit. Id. Ultimately, the

plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the employer, and a jury determination

on damages resulted in a $400,000 judgment against the employer. Id. The plaintiff

then filed an action in federal district court against the insurer seeking payment of

the judgment under Vermont’s direct action statute. Id.

The court in West relied on precedent from a handful of cases to conclude that

there was a public policy interest against the cancellation of coverage in cases where

litigation has commenced following a third party’s injury. See id. at 505 (citing to

Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527 (1876); Ins. Co. of North

America v. United States, 159 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1947); Spann v. Commercial

Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, Tex., 82 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1936); Capuano v. Kemper

Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 949 (R.I. 1981); In re Matthews, 207 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. Minn.

1997); Couch on Insurance § 31.49; Appleman on Insurance Law & Practice Archive

§ 5020). It reasoned that because the insurer and the insured have little interest in

cancelling coverage, the third party’s interest in seeking damages under the policy

was superior. West, 325 F.Supp.3d at 506. Although the public policy arguments in

West are certainly compelling, the Court sees no precedent for extending that

reasoning here.

In her supplemental briefing, Williams addresses this concern by arguing that

the Settlement should be set aside because it is New York3 public policy to ensure

compensation to third parties who put insurers on notice of their claims. See ECF

No. [182] at 1. Williams relies on Sales v. U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co., where, similar

to the instant case, the insurer settled a declaratory action against the insured and

agreed, pursuant to that settlement agreement, that the insured would be absolved

of any coverage obligation flowing from injuries sustained by a third party. Case No.

93-cv-7580, 1995 WL 144783 at *8 (S.D. N.Y. April 3, 1995). The injured third party

brought an action under New York’s Insurance Law, § 3240, which applies to policies

issued or delivered in New York, and allows injured third parties to sue an insurer

directly provided that certain conditions are satisfied. See id. at *1. The insurer filed

a motion to dismiss, arguing that the policy did not cover the plaintiff’s injuries as

evidenced by a settlement agreement between the insurer and the insured that

agreed that the insurer was not obligated to indemnify the injuries at issue. Id. at

*2; see also id. at n.4. The court found that the plaintiff’s rights arising under New

York’s direct-action statute § 3240(a)(2) accrued at the time of the injury, and that

“any subsequent settlement or release effectuated” by the insurer and the insured is

“not determinative of plaintiff’s rights.” 1995 WL 144783 at *9. The Court held that

whether the injured plaintiff could recover on the policy or whether the policy could

3 The parties do not dispute that New York law applies. See ECF Nos. [181] at 4;

[182] at 3; [183] at 2. Although Williams argues that she should not be bound by the

Settlement or its choice-of-law provision, Williams does not cite to any case law in

this Circuit that supports her argument that the Settlement should be set aside.

be void for some other reason would have to be determined at a later stage, and that

the insurer and the insured’s reasoning for entering into their settlement agreement

was not binding on the plaintiff.4 Id. at *9.

The Court finds Sales distinguishable. In Sales, the injured third party sued

an insurer under a New York direct action statute not at issue or applicable here.

The statute, § 3420(a), applies to insurance policies issued in the state of New York,

or that cover a risk located in New York. See Preserver Ins. Co. v. Ryba, 10 N.Y.3d

635, 642 (2008) (“A policy is ‘issued for delivery’ in New York if it covers both insureds

and risks located in this state”); see also Carlson v. Am. Intern. Group, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d

288, 305 (2017) (“[S]ection 3420 applies to policies that cover insureds and risks

located in [New York].”). Here, both the insurance policy and injury at issue were

issued and occurred in Florida, not New York, and accordingly the statute does not

apply. See Sales, 1995 WL 144783 at *2.

Indeed, even if the policy was issued in New York or insured risks located in

New York, Great Lakes points to Miller v. American Steamship Owners Mutual

Protection and Indemnity Company for the proposition that the public policy

argument in the context of marine insurance policies is futile. 509 F. Supp. 1047

(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see ECF No. [181] at 5–7. In Miller, the plaintiff suffered injuries on

a vessel, after which the vessel owner and the insurer cancelled the existing maritime

4 Indeed, the case was ultimately decided in favor of the insurer for the notice issue

raised in the Court’s reasoning. See Sales v. U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 93 CIV.

7580 (CSH), 1997 WL 13773, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1997).

policy. Miller, 509 F. Supp. at 1048. The defendant insurer filed a motion for

summary judgment arguing that the policy did not cover anyone but the insured, and

that the New York direct action statute does not permit a direct action against the

insurer because the insurance contract is one of maritime matters, which fell under

a statutory exception under New York law. Id. Ultimately, the Southern District of

New York was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that New York courts “have

adopted a policy of protecting the intended beneficiaries of insurance policies . . . .”

Id. at 1049. Indeed, the court in Miller refused to entertain the argument on the basis

that the marine policy at issue was distinct from the kind of policy that the New York

direct action statute applied to at such time.5 Like the Southern District of New York

in Miller, this Court is not convinced by the public policy argument as applied to

Captain Joe’s’ policy because the direct action statute does not apply to it.6

Finally, the Court does not find that Bodden v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am.,

which the R&R relies upon, answers the question at hand. 423 F.Supp.3d 1341 (S.D.

5 The court in Miller pointed out that at that time, New York’s direct action statute

specifically carves out marine insurance policies, like the one at issue here. Id. at n.1

(quoting New York Insurance Laws § 167(4), 112(2)(c) and 46(21)).

6 Captain Joe’s and Great Lakes’ supplemental briefing also noted that some of the

case law recognizing the public policy exception arise in compulsory automobile

insurance coverage claims. ECF No. [184] at 3–4; see also ECF No. [183] at 12–16.

For example, in Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, Tex., the Eighth

Circuit considered the issue of cancellation of an automobile policy following a suit by

an injured party under the Arkansas direct action statute. 82 F.2d 593, 594–95 (8th

Cir. 1936). Great Lakes and Captain Joe’s point out, and this Court agrees, such

protections were set forth by the legislative scheme, which is distinct form the

maritime insurance policy at issue here.

Fla. 2019). The plaintiffs in Bodden were a captain and five crewmembers who

became stranded after their boat ran out of fuel and were left adrift for nearly a year.

Id. at 1343. The plaintiffs filed suit against their employer for damages they suffered

as a result of being stranded at sea. The employer was covered under a policy issued

by Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”). Id. Nearly a year

after the plaintiffs filed suit, Travelers filed an action for declaratory relief against

the employer seeking to void the policy ab initio. The declaratory action resulted in

a default judgment against the employer, following which Travelers stopped

defending the employer in the plaintiffs’ underlying action. Id.

The plaintiffs then filed suit against Travelers to collect the final judgment

issued in their favor in their suit against their employer. Travelers filed a motion to

dismiss arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an

action against the insurer, and that the policy was declared void ab initio as a result

of the default judgment. Id. at 1344. The Bodden court denied the motion to dismiss.

In so ruling, the Court analyzed whether the parties, or those in privity with them,

were identical in both the declaratory action and the action plaintiffs brought against

Travelers, and concluded that the prior default judgment against the employer did

not preclude the plaintiffs’ claims.

As a preliminary matter, the decision in Bodden addressed whether, at the

motion to dismiss stage, a third party was precluded from suit on res judicata

grounds, an argument not raised here. The Court’s reasoning was limited to whether

the claim was sufficiently plead. In addition, Bodden made no finding as to whether

the third party could set aside a settlement agreement where the parties agreed that

the claim was void from inception and where the third party had no standing to assert

any claim at the time the settlement was reached. In short, the Court’s analysis in

Bodden fails to address the question here.

The public policy reasons raised by Williams are not taken lightly by the Court.

However, in the absence of any case adopting that position in this kind of case, the

Court declines to set aside the Settlement that was reached between Great Lakes and

Captain Joe’s. Because the Court here sees no basis to set aside the Settlement, the

Policy at issue is void, and summary judgment as to Count I of Great Lake’s Amended

Complaint must be granted.

As to the remaining issues addressed by the parties’ Objections to the Report

and Recommendation, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the record and

the issues presented and ADOPTS the remainder of the Report and

Recommendation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after careful consideration, it is hereby ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED that the R&R is REJECTED IN PART and AFFIRMED AND

ADOPTED IN PART. More specifically:

1. For the reasons stated herein, Summary Judgment as to Count I of Great

Lakes’ Amended Complaint, ECF No. [33], (the “Amended Complaint”) is

GRANTED in favor of Great Lakes.

2. For the reasons stated in the R&R, Summary Judgment as to Count II and

Count III of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED in favor of Great Lakes.

3. For the reasons stated in the R&R, Summary Judgment as to Count IV of the

Amended Complaint is GRANTED in favor of Great Lakes.

4. For the reasons stated in the R&R, Summary Judgment as to Count V of the

Amended Complaint is GRANTED in favor of Great Lakes.

5. For the reasons stated herein, Williams’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to

her Counterclaims is DENIED.

6. For the reasons stated in the R&R, Captain Joe’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Count IV and Count V of the Amended Complaint, is DENIED.

Pursuant to Rule 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Final Judgment

will be entered by separate order.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case, and any pending motions

are DENIED as moot.

DONE and ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 10th day November, 2025.

JACQUEALINE BECERRA

UNITEDSSTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17