Opinion

In the Matter of the Adoption of Minor Children, William Kyle Murphy v. Lauren Taylor Murphy

  • 2025 Ark. App. 551
Court
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Filed
Nov 12, 2025
Status
Published
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 56.5%

The opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 551

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II

No. CV-24-609

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION Opinion Delivered November 12, 2025

OF MINOR CHILDREN

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON

WILLIAM KYLE MURPHY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

APPELLANT [NO. 72PR-24-41]

V. HONORABLE DOUG MARTIN,

JUDGE

LAUREN TAYLOR MURPHY

APPELLEE

AFFIRMED

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

Appellant William Murphy appeals the order of the Washington County Circuit

Court granting appellee Lauren Murphy’s petition for single-parent adoption of the parties’

two children, MB (D.O.B. 10-11-15) and MG (D.O.B. 04-17-18). The circuit court found

that appellant’s consent to the adoption was not needed and that the adoption was in the

best interest of the children. Appellant argues on appeal that (1) the circuit court’s justifiable-

cause finding was clearly erroneous because appellee interfered with appellant’s ability to

contact his children; (2) the preponderance of the evidence does not support the circuit

court’s best-interest finding and is, therefore, clearly erroneous; (3) the circuit court

improperly shifted the burden of proving a lack of justifiable cause to the party resisting the

adoption (appellant); and (4) the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to consider

appellant’s motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

The parties were divorced in Texas by a decree filed on September 24, 2019. The

decree stated that the parties had entered into an agreement whereby they were appointed

joint managing conservators of the children. The children were to reside with appellee, and

appellant was granted visitation the first weekend of each month with the ability to enjoy

other weekends if notice requirements were met. At the time of the divorce, appellant was

residing in Arkansas. Appellee subsequently moved to Arkansas with the children at the

beginning of 2020. Appellant hired an attorney in December 2023 to register the Texas

divorce decree. He also filed a motion for contempt against appellee. Appellee was served

with the contempt action that same month, and on January 16, 2024, she filed a petition for

single-parent adoption alleging that appellant’s consent was not needed and that the

adoption was in the children’s best interest. Appellant filed an answer on January 25 denying

the material allegations of appellee’s petition and asking the circuit court to deny the

petition.

The adoption hearing took place on April 22. Appellant testified that he is MB and

MG’s father and that he was opposed to appellee’s single-parent adoption. He stated that

appellee improperly withheld visitation from him. To support his position, he introduced

text messages to appellee dating back to April 2023, wherein he received no response at all

from appellee. He said that he purchased gifts for the children, but they were returned;

however, he did not have any returned mail with him. He testified that he and appellee were

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divorced on August 16, 2019, and at that time, the children were to remain with appellee,

and he was granted visitation of at least one weekend a month. He said that based on the

divorce decree, visitation with the children was to take place at his residence, but he moved

from that specific residence in December 2019. He stated that appellee moved to Arkansas

and that he knew where she lived for the last four years. He admitted that he told appellee

in February 2020 that he was going to get a lawyer to reopen the case, but he never did. He

also admitted that he sent a text message that same month telling appellee that he could not

afford to see his children. He stated that he threatened to reopen the cases on several

occasions but did not follow through with it. He also stated that he threatened to show up

at appellee’s residence with the police on June 6, 2023, to get his children but he did not go.

Appellant said that since the divorce, he never went to appellee’s residence to pick up the

children for visitation and that he never filed any reports alleging that appellee interfered

with his visitation. Appellant testified that he filed a contempt motion in Arkansas but

admitted that he did not ask for extra visitation or for modification of his arrangement. He

stated that he thought that by filing the foreign judgment in Arkansas, he would at least get

the state minimum for visitation. He said he didn’t want to reopen the case until he was

stable. He stated that he last saw the children in person in 2019 and that he last spoke to

them via FaceTime in June or July 2020.

Appellant stated on cross-examination that although he knew appellee’s address, he

did not just show up because he did not want to be charged with trespassing or something

domestic. He testified that he sent text messages to appellee between April 2023 and January

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16, 2024, with no response from her. He stated that appellee had been nonresponsive to

his text messages longer than that, but he no longer had access to those messages. He said

that his video communication with the children ended when he no longer had an iPhone

because appellee told him the Duo mobile app took up too much storage on her phone, and

she deleted it. He also said that visitation with his children ended when appellee moved

back to Arkansas, approximately an hour away from him. He admitted that he fell on hard

times and was even homeless for a period of time in 2021. He stated that even though he

threatened to take appellee back to court, his finances would not allow him to do so. He

testified that he registered the judgment from the Texas divorce decree and filed a contempt

complaint because appellee was not abiding by the Texas court’s order. He stated that he

has been paying child support since the divorce, resulting in over $44,000 being paid to

appellee for the benefit of the children. He said that he has never gone over a year without

making the payments. Appellant stated that appellee’s petition for single-parent adoption

should be denied because he had “never been allowed to be their father” and that “every

attempt that [he] made to be a part of their lives has been met with a wall.”

On redirect, appellant admitted that he was never told by appellee that he would be

arrested if he showed up to her residence. He also stated that he did not receive any warning

from the local authorities to stay away from her property.

Appellee testified that she has lived in Fayetteville since February 2020. She stated

that she wanted the circuit court to grant her petition because she had been the children’s

primary caregiver since birth. She said that she believed that the single-parent adoption was

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in the children’s best interest because “they have thrived, they have been stable, loved, very

healthy, [and] happy” over the last four years. She also stated that they had made friends

and were doing well in school due to the consistency she had been able to provide them

with. She opined that it was in the children’s best interest to maintain that consistency. She

said that appellant last scheduled a visit with the children in May 2020 but did not show up.

After that time, she stated that appellant’s contact had been inconsistent and sporadic. She

said that in 2021, appellant reached out only sixty-eight times to ask about the children. She

stated that when her phone could no longer support the Duo app, she told appellant to just

call the children, but he did not. Appellee testified that she has the facilities and resources

to substantially provide for the nurture and care of the children. She submitted an affidavit

of financial means that did not consider the child support she receives from appellant. She

stated that she did not have any concerns about being able to financially care for the children

and that she wished to establish a sole-parent relationship through the adoption. She said

that the children are doing great in school and that they have great attendance. She stated

that MB is in the gifted and talented program and that MG was awarded student of the

month. She was able to introduce the children’s report cards into evidence to support her

contention that they are doing well in school.

Appellee opined that she does not need appellant’s consent to adopt the children

because he had gone a year or longer without significant contact with the children. She

stated that she did not believe that appellant had a justifiable cause for the lack of contact.

She said that it was not in the children’s best interest to have a relationship with appellant

5

because “the last four years have shown that without him they have been successful, they

have thrived, and they are, in [her] opinion, doing well in school. They are happy, they are

healthy. They are maintaining relationships with friends and family members.” She also

stated that they are part of the community, the children do not lack for anything, and they

are stable. She said that it is hard to feel that it is in the children’s best interest to have a

relationship with appellant “when you go long periods of time without reaching out to your

children, two months, two weeks, two days, four months, just 68 times out of 365 days.” She

said that appellant sent only sixty-eight text messages to her in 2021. She testified that

appellant told her to be prepared to go to court when she moved from Texas if he could not

see the children every day, but he never filed anything. She said that she believed the

visitation order needed to be modified since appellant no longer lived at the address listed

in the decree, but that appellant never tried to get it changed. She stated that she was served

with a contempt charge in December 2023. She said that appellant only asked that she be

punished in the contempt petition, he did not ask for his visitation to be modified. She

testified that from April 2019 to May 2020, appellant was entitled to thirty-four visits, but

he canceled twenty-six of them and only took advantage of eight of them. She said that in

the eight visits appellant attended, none went the full duration because they either ended

early, or appellant showed up late.

Appellee testified that she began receiving child support from appellant in November

2019 once the withholding order went through. She stated that with the exception of

Christmas 2019 where MB received some dinosaurs and MG received a baby doll, the

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children had not received any cards or gifts from appellant. Appellee opined that appellant

is not currently fit to care for the children because he did not do everything in his power to

get his life together and see his children. She stated that there was no added benefit for

appellant coming into the children’s lives at this time “because he is a stranger to them.”

She said that the children do not even recognize that appellant is missing from their lives

and that they do not ask about him because they do not know him. She said that appellant

has been inconsistent and unreliable since their divorce. She testified that MG was two

when she last saw appellant. She opined that she is morally fit to have custody and care of

her children. She stated that she plays an active role in the children’s sports, that they go

places together, and they do things together regularly inside and outside the home. She said

that she has been the children’s sole parent for the last four years. Appellee stated that she

enjoys being a hands-on parent because she wants to make sure that the children feel safe

and supported, and she knows that she has done everything to make their childhood

memorable and special. Again, she stated that it was in the children’s best interest for her

adoption petition to be granted. She testified,

[T]hey’ve been with me their entire lives. I’ve maintained stability, love, care, support.

I would do anything and everything for them. I think that it is too late for [appellant]

to try to come back now and reintroduce himself as this stranger in their lives and it

not alter their lives. If we leave here today and this is granted, their lives would not

change. We would continue on the same path that we are on. They are not aware of

the proceedings. They are happy and stable. If he’s reintroduced into their lives, I

feel like that will disrupt everything.

She stated that she did not believe that appellant’s consent is necessary for her to solely adopt

the children.

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Appellee testified on cross-examination that at the time of the divorce, MG had just

turned one and MB was almost four. She stated that after the divorce, appellant exercised

his visitation in both Texas and Arkansas. She agreed that she did not respond to any of

appellant’s texts in the past year; however, she denied any similar action before that time.

She said that appellant had last visited with the children in March 2020 at her home in

Fayetteville. She stated that he requested other visits but subsequently canceled them. When

asked why she had not sent appellant the photos she introduced into evidence, appellee

responded, “Why would I send photos to a person who is a stranger to them[?]” She admitted

that she asked the circuit court to waive the children’s appearance because she did not think

it would be appropriate to put “them in a situation they know nothing about and then [ask]

them how they feel about it[.]” She testified that appellant’s mother exercised visitation with

the children a couple of time between 2020 and around 2023. She stated that she did not

stop letting the children see their grandmother, but that she and the grandmother just had

not spoken since around July 2023. Appellee stated that she was concerned about appellant’s

ability to provide stability and a safe environment for the children. She admitted that

appellant now has a house and a job and agreed that appellant has the financial means to

provide for the children. She denied creating the circumstances that led to appellant’s being

a stranger to the children. She stated that although appellant reached out sixty-eight times

in 2021, there were 297 other days that he did not. She also said that according to the

messages appellant provided, he did not reach out to her until April 2023 and that that

contact was inconsistent until about August 2023. She said that because of this, she did not

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“feel obligated to respond to somebody who can take that much time without reaching out

to their children because, again, his is a stranger. And I would not share details about my

children with a stranger.” She said that she filed for single-parent adoption after being served

with the contempt action because she felt that was her best option to ensure the children’s

safety. She admitted that the children have benefited from child-support payments since

2019. She testified that appellant robbed himself of time with the children that he cannot

get back.

At the conclusion of the hearing, appellee asked the circuit court to find that

appellant’s consent is not needed for her to adopt the children and to grant her petition for

single-parent adoption. Appellant asked the circuit court to find that appellant’s consent is

needed because there was a justifiable excuse for his lack of contact with the children. The

circuit court found that appellant had gone at least twelve months without having contact

with the children but also considered appellant’s reason for the lack of contact. The circuit

court ultimately found that appellant gave no justifiable cause for the lack of contact in 2022.

The circuit court found that the single-parent adoption was in the children’s best interest

based on appellant’s coming into the children’s lives and damaging their stability. The

adoption decree was filed on April 25, 2024. Appellant moved for reconsideration on May

1, contending that there was justifiable cause for his lack of contact with the children, the

circuit court improperly put the burden on appellant to prove that the lack of contact was

justifiable, his consent was needed for the adoption, and adoption was not in the children’s

best interest. Appellee filed a response on May 16 denying the material allegations of

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appellant’s motion and asking the circuit court to deny it. The circuit court denied

appellant’s motion in an order filed May 28. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on

June 27.

Appellant argues for his first point on appeal that the circuit court’s justifiable-cause

finding was clearly erroneous because appellee interfered with appellant’s ability to contact

his children. We review adoption proceedings de novo, and a circuit court’s decision will

not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.1

Ordinarily, the consent of a natural parent is required in an adoption case. 2 However,

this consent is not required “if the parent for a period of at least one (1) year has failed

significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for

the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree.” 3 The one-year period

may be any one-year period, not necessarily the one immediately preceding the filing of the

adoption petition.4 A significant failure is “one that is meaningful or important” and is

“unjustifiable if it is voluntary and intentional, i.e., arbitrary and without adequate excuse.”5

The issue of justifiable cause is factual but one that is largely determined on the basis of the

1

In re Adoption of A.P., 2021 Ark. App. 440, 638 S.W.3d 293.

2

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-206 (Repl. 2020).

3

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-207(a)(2) (Repl. 2020).

4

Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, 507 S.W.3d 486.

5

Gordon v. Draper, 2013 Ark. App. 352, at 6, 428 S.W.3d 543, 546.

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credibility of the witnesses.6 A person who wishes to adopt a child must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that consent is unnecessary.7 Clear and convincing evidence is defined

as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the

allegation sought to be established.8

Here, the circuit court heard evidence that appellant failed to contact his children for

at least one year during a four-year period. Appellant contended that he was unable to

contact the children because of appellee’s interference. He submitted text messages from

April 2023 to January 2024 showing that appellee had not responded to him. He testified

that this was a common theme with appellee but stated that he no longer had access to older

texts. Appellee testified that although appellant sent 68 texts in 2021, he did not start

communicating consistently until after she filed for single-parent adoption. She stated that

she told appellant he could call the children, which he did not do. She denied that she ever

told appellant he could not see the children. Appellant admitted he knew where appellee

and the children lived but said he never tried to go visit because he did not want the police

called. He agreed that appellee had not told him he could not come to her home and that

local authorities never warned him about staying away from appellee’s residence.

Additionally, appellant stated that he warned appellee on several occasions that he was going

6

In re of Adoption of M.C., 2024 Ark. App. 579, 701 S.W.3d 61.

7

In re Adoption of J.N., 2018 Ark. App. 467, at 7, 560 S.W.3d 806, 812.

8

Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007).

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to have the case reopened and never did. He also threatened to show up at appellee’s

residence with the police to see the children but never did that, either. He testified that he

waited to he was stable before reopening the case. Given these facts, we cannot say that the

circuit court erred in finding no justification for appellant’s failure to communicate with his

children for at least a year.

Appellant also challenges the circuit court’s best-interest finding. Before an adoption

petition can be granted, the circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that

the adoption is in the best interest of the child. 9 We review the evidence de novo.10 This

court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision regarding the best interest of a child to be

adopted unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, giving due regard to

the opportunity and superior position of the circuit court to judge the credibility of the

witnesses.11 We give great weight to a circuit court’s personal observations when the welfare

of young children is involved.12 The burden rests on the one seeking adoption to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that adoption is in the child’s best interest. 13 The ultimate

9

Newkirk v. Hankins, 2016 Ark. App. 186, 486 S.W.3d 827.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

12

determination of best interest is the primary objective of the circuit court in custody

matters.14

Here, appellee testified that for the last four years, she had been the only parent the

children have known. She stated that they were thriving and stable with her. She opined

that allowing appellant to come into their lives at this point would disrupt the children’s

stability. Appellant argues that appellee made it difficult for him to have a relationship with

his children. Appellant seems to argue that the circuit court did not consider all the evidence

before finding that the adoption was in the children’s best interest. The circuit court was in

the best position to decide which party to believe. Despite appellant’s contention, the court

did not find that appellee was to blame for appellant’s lack of contact with the children. This

is supported by the circuit court’s finding that appellant’s consent was not needed for the

adoption. The circuit court seems to have believed appellee when she testified that the

children’s lives would be disrupted if appellant, a stranger to them, was allowed back into it.

Appellant essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence in his favor. We have long held

that we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal or second-guess the circuit court’s credibility

determinations.15 We are satisfied that the circuit court’s best-interest finding is supported

by clear and convincing evidence.

14

Id.

15

In re Adoption of E.R., 2020 Ark. App. 418.

13

For his third point, appellant argues that the circuit court improperly shifted the

burden of proving a lack of justifiable cause to him, the party resisting the adoption.

Appellee contends—and we agree—that appellant did not raise this argument until his motion

for reconsideration. An argument raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration

is untimely and does not preserve an issue for appeal.16 However, even if the issue was

preserved, appellant has failed to show that the circuit improperly shifted the burden to him.

If the petitioner meets the initial burden, then the nonconsenting parent must show some

justifiable reason for the failure to contact.17 The ultimate burden of proof remains with the

petitioner—here, appellee—who must ultimately persuade the circuit court that appellant’s

reasons for a lack of contact are not legally justified.18 This is exactly what was done in this

case.

Finally, appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to

consider his motion for reconsideration. Appellant has failed to present any evidence to

support this contention. In the order denying appellant’s motion, the circuit court noted

that it had “reviewed the motion, the response thereto, and all other relevant documents

and filings.” Just because the circuit court did not rule in appellant’s favor does not mean

16

Plymate v. Martinelli, 2013 Ark. 194.

17

French v. Hoelzeman, 2020 Ark. App. 543, 614 S.W.3d 850.

18

Id.

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that it did not properly consider the motion. This argument is nothing more than a request

that we reweigh the evidence in appellant’s favor, which we will not do.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree.

Rojas Smith Attorneys, PA, by: Joseph Paul Smith; and Niblock Law Firm, PLC, by: Raymond

L. Niblock, for appellant.

Cullen & Co., PLLC, by: Tim Cullen, for appellee.

15

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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