Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUMMER-ANNIE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

25-CV-2210 (LLS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

RESORTS WORLD HUDSON VALLEY, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

Defendant.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that her employer

discriminated against her on the basis of a medical issue.1 She sues Resorts World Hudson

Valley. The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as claims under the New York State

Human Rights Law. By order dated April 2, 2025, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claims in an

amended complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

1 Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action without a signature. By order dated March 20,

2025, Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain directed her to cure this deficiency, which she did on

March 28, 2025.

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating

legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings her claims using the court’s general complaint form. She checks the box

on the form to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction. In response to the question on the

form asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights were violated, Plaintiff

writes, “Unfair Employment Practices regarding health accommodations/medical issue.

Retaliation/Wrongful Termination.” (ECF 1, at 2.)2

The following allegations are drawn from the complaint. Plaintiff was previously

employed by Defendant Resorts World Hudson Valley, located in Newburgh, New York. She

states that the events giving rise to her claims occurred on February 20, 2023. Plaintiff was told

by Sarah Chatfield, an employee in the organization’s human resources department, that she

needed a doctor’s note in order to wear a mask at work. Plaintiff provided a note from her doctor,

but she “was constantly harassed by [her] superiors in the security department that they could not

hear [her] over the radio and that [she] needed to take the mask off.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff was

“harass[ed]” to provide another doctor’s note, which she did. (Id.) Her superiors responded “by

us[ing] other methods to work to remove me from the job because I would not remove my

mask.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s supervisors claimed that her “work performance was poor,” that she

called out sick, and that she “would not follow directions.” (Id.) Plaintiff was also “written up”

for accidentally taking a company radio home with her, which she promptly returned the next

day. (Id.) One of the security managers asked Plaintiff to fill out a “survey” related to her

employment, after which Plaintiff’s employment was “mysteriously terminated.” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that based on “mistreatment at the job by [her] superiors,” she believes

that she was retaliated against “for following the rules by bringing a doctor’s note to continue

wearing a mask,” and for “doing a survey about how I feel I was treated on the job.” (Id.)

In the section of the complaint form to describe her injuries, Plaintiff writes, “Acne

Vulgaris.” (Id. at 6.)

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff seeks $55,000 in damages.

DISCUSSION

A. Discrimination claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

Title I of the ADA “prohibits employers from ‘discriminat[ing] against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees.’” Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a) (emphasis in original)). To state a claim of employment discrimination under Title I

of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is disabled within the

meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by [the] employer; (3) she was

otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without

reasonable accommodation; (4) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(5) the adverse action was imposed because of her disability.

Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2015).

A person is disabled under the ADA if the person (1) has “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” (2) has a history or record

of a disability, or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C).

12102(1)(C). “Major life activities” include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,

reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). An

individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual shows that she “has been

subjected to an action prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical or

mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life

activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).

The causation standard for employment discrimination claims brought under Title I of the

ADA is a “but-for” standard; a plaintiff must allege but for her disability, the defendant would

not have discriminated against her. See Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 347-50.

The Rehabilitation Act adopts the ADA’s definition of “disability” by reference. See 29

U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). The pleading standard is largely the same for such a claim under the

Rehabilitation Act, see Davis, 804 F.3d at 235; Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d

Cir. 1995); Rubin v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 20-CV-10208 (LGS), 2023 WL 2344731, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023) – even the “but for” causation requirement is the same for both types of

actions, Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 345-49. With respect to claims of employment discrimination

under the Rehabilitation Act, however, there is an additional requirement that the employer

either be a federal executive agency, the United States Postal Service, or receive federal funding.

See Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1514-15 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that she has a disability as defined by the

ADA or Rehabilitation Act. She alleges only that she had a doctor’s note to wear a mask at work

and that she suffers from acne. Plaintiff does not identify any “physical or mental impairment” or

explain how any alleged impairment “substantially limits one or more major life activities.”

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Nor does she allege facts suggesting that she is “regarded as having

such an impairment.” § 12102(3)(A). Moreover, even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has a

disability or is regarded as having a disability, her allegations do not suggest that her

employment was terminated or that she was otherwise subjected to an adverse employment

action because of any such disability.

Because Plaintiff may be able to plead facts showing a violation of the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead her claims in an amended

complaint that cures the deficiencies identified above.

B. Claims of retaliation under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as also asserting claims of retaliation under the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. To state a claim of retaliation under either the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: “(i) a plaintiff was engaged in protected activity;

(ii) the alleged retaliator knew that plaintiff was involved in protected activity; (iii) an adverse

decision or course of action was taken against plaintiff; and (iv) a causal connection exists

between the protected activity and the adverse action.”3 Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 353 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “An employee can satisfy the protected activity

requirement even if ‘h[er] condition was not a disability within the meaning of the ADA’ so long

as ‘[s]he can establish that [s]he possessed a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying

challenged actions of the employer violated’ the ADA.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.,

103 F.4th 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183

F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

To demonstrate a causal connection, a plaintiff must allege facts showing “that ‘but for’

the protected activity, the adverse action would not have been taken.” Id. Such a causal

connection may be shown either “(1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was

3 As with a claim of discrimination brought under the Rehabilitation Act, with respect to

a claim of retaliation under that statute, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant is either a

federal executive agency, the United States Postal Service, or receives federal funding. Daly v.

Westchester Cnty. Bd. of Legislators, No. 19-CV-4642 (PMH), 2023 WL 4896801, at *4, 7-8

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-1220-cv, 2024 WL 3264125 (2d Cir. July 2, 2024)

(summary order).

followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as

disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly, through

evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against because she got a doctor’s note to

continue wearing a mask at work. Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff’s doctor’s note was

protected activity in the form of a request for a reasonable accommodation, her allegations do not

suggest that her request to wear a mask is a “but for” cause of her termination. She does not

allege facts suggesting retaliatory animus and it is unclear from the complaint how closely in

time her termination followed her request to wear mask. Indeed, she appears to allege that she

was “mysteriously terminated soon after” she responded to a “survey,” the details of which

Plaintiff does not describe. (ECF 1, at 5.) The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for

retaliation under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging facts to state a

viable claim that Defendant retaliated against her in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act.

C. State law claims

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims

when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and

only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Having dismissed the federal

claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New

York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms

the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which

district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522

U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).

LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts

generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.

2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has

cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to

amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid

claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v.

USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege

additional facts to state valid claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to amend her complaint to cure the

deficiencies identified above.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will

direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30

days’ leave to replead.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff

may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil

judgment is entered.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2025

New York, New York

LOUIS L. STANTON

U.S.D.J.