Kantsepolsky

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-61725-CIV-DAMIAN/Strauss

VALERY KANTSEPOLSKY,

Plaintiff,

v.

RIVER SHORES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [ECF NO. 19]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss’s Report

and Recommendation (“Report”) [ECF No. 19], entered on September 25, 2025,

recommending that Plaintiff, Valery Kantsepolsky’s (“Plaintiff”), Emergency Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order, Reasonable Accommodation, and Preliminary Injunction

(“Motion for TRO”) [ECF No. 3] be denied.

THE COURT has considered the Motion for TRO, Defendant River Shores

Association’s (“Defendant”) Verified Response to the Motion for TRO (“Response to

Motion”) [ECF No. 16], Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to the

Motion for TRO (“Reply”) [ECF No. 17], the Report, Plaintiff’s Response and Request for

Reconsideration of Report and Recommendation Under the Fair Housing Act

(“Objections”), Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Response and Request for

Reconsideration of Report and Recommendation Under the Fair Housing Act (“Response

to Objections”), the pertinent portions of the record, and relevant authorities and is

otherwise fully advised.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 27, 2025, Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a Complaint against the

Defendant alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. and

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. See generally ECF No.

1 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff alleges that she owns and resides in a condominium unit that is

governed by the Defendant condominium association. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Plaintiff also suffers from

medical conditions that limit her ability to tolerate the environment created by demolition,

which may spread chemicals, dust, mold, and other breathing hazards. Id. ¶ 9. She alleges

that Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s health

conditions when it tried to conduct exploratory demolition to resolve maintenance issues

affecting other units. See id. ¶¶ 6-8. The Defendant filed suit against her in state court to

enforce its right of entry into her unit and otherwise resolve the parties’ dispute related to

the exploratory demolition. See id. ¶ 11.

In that underlying state court action (River Shores Association, Inc. v. Kantsepolsky, No.

CACE23-013970 (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. Ct.) (“State Court Action”)), Plaintiff raised as a

counterclaim an FHA violation similar to that which is presented in this action, and

Plaintiff moved for a ninety-day continuance of all pretrial and trial deadlines as a result of

her disability, which Defendant opposed. Id. ¶ 11. The trial court denied her motion on

August 5, 2025. Id. ¶ 12. On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which is

currently pending. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Here, Plaintiff appears to seek declaratory relief, injunctive

relief, and monetary damages from the Defendant. See generally id. The case was assigned to

Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss pursuant to Administrative Order 2025-11. See ECF No.

2.

The same day Plaintiff filed her case, she filed the Motion for TRO on an emergency

basis, which seeks an order from this Court enjoining the Defendant from “opposing or

interfering with Plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation in the form of a 90-day

extension of pretrial and trial deadlines in the pending state-court action,” directing the

Defendant to only engage in exploratory demolition and repairs in Plaintiff’s unit subject to

her medical conditions, and requiring the Defendant to engage in an interactive process

regarding Plaintiff’s accommodation requests. See Mot. for TRO at 4.

Because Judge Strauss could not directly enter an order on the Motion for TRO, see

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the case was randomly reassigned to the undersigned. [ECF No.

9]. This Court promptly entered an order concluding that the Motion for TRO was not a

true emergency, directing Plaintiff to serve the motion on the Defendant, re-styling the

Motion for TRO as one for a preliminary injunction, and referring the matter to Judge

Strauss for him to, inter alia, issue a report and recommendation on the Motion for TRO. See

ECF No. 11 at 6.

The Defendant filed its Response on September 5, 2025, arguing that Plaintiff’s

Motion for TRO is an effort to use a federal court to interfere in a pending state court

proceeding in a manner prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See Resp.

to Mot. at 5-6. On September 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 27-page Reply (excluding exhibits),

in which she concedes that she was “uncertain what information the Court may consider

most relevant and, out of concern for omitting critical facts, has submitted a longer

response.” See Reply at 1. With respect to the Anti-Injunction Act, Plaintiff argues that

because she “does not seek an injunction directed at the state court itself,” but rather “an

injunction directed at the Defendant, to prevent [it] from proceeding in a manner that denies

Plaintiff’s federally guaranteed rights under the Fair Housing Act and to prevent the

irreparable harm the Plaintiff now faces, [i.e., holding a trial to bring finality to the State

Court Action when Plaintiff cannot, due to her disability, adequately prepare to proceed pro

se].” See id. at 10.

In the Report, Judge Strauss recommends that the Court deny the Motion for TRO

on two bases: first, Plaintiff’s requested injunction is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act

because it would interfere with the State Court Action by imposing the very

stay/continuance of the trial date that the state court judge had declined to enter; second,

with reference to the injunction based on the ADA claim (which was not presented in

Plaintiff’s State Court Action counterclaim and appears for the first time in this action), the

ADA does not provide a basis for Plaintiff to receive injunctive relief for the Defendant’s

failure to accommodate her because the ADA applies only to “places of public

accommodation,” not residential condominiums. See Report at 6, 7, 10, 11.

In Plaintiff’s Objections, she spends the majority setting forth the background of how

Defendant has caused a deterioration of her health condition and has refused to

accommodate her disability despite several physician notes she provided in substantiation.

See generally Objections. Plaintiff repeats most of the factual background that appears in the

Complaint and the Motion for TRO. She explains what motivated her to file this lawsuit in

federal court as follows:

I believed the FHA protected individuals like me, ensuring a process where

disabilities are acknowledged and accommodations discussed. My doctors

made themselves available to clarify or provide depositions. But no such

process has occurred not with the association, nor in the state court. I turned

to the federal court because it has the authority to enforce the Fair Housing

Act and to intervene when a person’s federally protected housing 1ights or

disability civil rights are being disregarded or denied.

See id. at 4-5; see also Report at 7 (“Plaintiff essentially seeks in this Court what she fears she

will not get in state court.”). The only specific objection raised by Plaintiff is that the Report,

“while addressing the [Defendant’s] asserted access rights, did not consider the serious

health implications of my disability or the consequences of denying the reasonable

accommodations requested by my doctors.” Objections at 5.

In the Defendant’s Response to Objections, it points out that Plaintiff never

specifically identified any perceived error in the Report and did not identify any statutory,

rule, or case authority supporting her position. See generally Resp. to Obj. The Report is now

ripe for adjudication by this Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When a magistrate judge’s “disposition” has properly been objected to, district courts

must review the disposition de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). When no party has timely

objected, however, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face

of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory

committee’s notes (citation omitted).

“Parties filing objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must

specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

need not be considered by the district court.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361

(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). A party’s “objections are improper [if] they expand upon and

reframe arguments already made and considered by [the magistrate judge], or simply

disagree with [the magistrate judge’s] conclusions.” Melillo v. United States, No. 17-CV-

80489, 2018 WL 4258355, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018) (Bloom, J.); see Marlite, Inc. v.

Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (Moreno,

J.) (“It is improper for an objecting party to . . . submit [ ] papers to a district court which are

nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original

papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second

bite at the apple’ when they file objections to a R & R.” (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors

Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))).

While a pro se litigant’s filings are liberally construed, a pro se litigant must still

properly object to magistrate judge reports and recommendations and conform to

procedural rules, and pro se status does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for

a party to rewrite inadequate objections. See Lewis v. Mavis Tire & Auto Corp., No. 25-cv-

60659, 2025 WL 1854699, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2025) (Leibowitz, J.) (citing United States

v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024) and Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760

F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014)).

When the objecting party has not properly objected to the magistrate judge’s

findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Keaton v. United States, No. 14-21230-CIV,

2015 WL 12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015) (Altonaga, J.); see Lopez v. Berryhill, No.

17-CV-24263, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (Ungaro, J.) (stating that a

district judge “evaluate[s] portions of the R & R not objected to under a clearly erroneous

standard of review” (citing Davis v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2000))).

III. DISCUSSION

While Plaintiff only raised a specific objection with the manner in which Judge

Strauss considered her evidence of medical necessity/disability, in an abundance of

deference to the pro se litigant, this Court has undertaken a de novo review of the Report.

A. Standard For Preliminary Injunction.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate “(1) a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is

not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the

nonmovant; and (4) that the entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel

Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v.

Sunrise Int’l. Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying the test to a

preliminary injunction).

While the first step to determine if a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is

typically to determine if she has established a “substantial likelihood of success on the

merits,” when a litigant seeks injunctive relief to stay proceedings in state court, courts must

also ensure that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, does not prohibit such an

injunction.

B. The Anti-Injunction Act.

The Anti-Injunction Act states that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to

stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or

where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28

U.S.C. § 2283. “[I]n assessing the propriety of an injunction entered to stop a state court

proceeding, the sole relevant inquiry is whether the injunction qualifies for one of the

exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.” Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1028 (11th

Cir. 2006). Accordingly, this Court cannot issue Plaintiff’s sought injunction unless it is: (1)

“expressly authorized by Act of Congress”; (2) “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”; or (3)

“to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233,

1249 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283).

“Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by

intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state

appellate courts and ultimately [the Supreme Court].” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of

Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc.,

708 F.2d 582, 585 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The import of the Anti-Injunction Act, as its name

suggests, is that a federal court injunction of state litigation is to be the exception, not the

rule.”). Indeed, “[a]ny doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts

to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.” Atl. Coast Line, 398

U.S. at 297.

The Anti-Injunction Act cannot be avoided by framing the injunction as directed

against a state court litigant instead of against the state court. Id. at 287 (“It is settled that the

prohibition of s[ection] 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or

prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding.”). Unless an exception

applies, the Anti-Injunction Act thus prohibits a federal court from entering an order that

functionally stays the state court’s proceedings. See id.

A litigant also cannot avoid the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition by casting the

redress sought in the state court as a new, federal claim in the district court that was not

pursued in the state court. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229 (1972) (holding that a

section 1983 claim seeking an injunction of a state court public nuisance action must fall

under one of the three AIA exceptions for an injunction to be permitted).

Plaintiff argues that the injunction she seeks falls under the “expressly authorized by

Act of Congress” exception to the AIA. See Reply at 3. This Court independently finds that

neither the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”1 nor “to protect or effectuate its judgments”2

exceptions apply here even if Plaintiff had raised those arguments.

The Supreme Court provides a two-part analysis for determining whether a federal

statute comes within the Anti-Injunction Act’s “expressly authorized” exception: (1) the

statute “must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a

federal court of equity,” and (2) the federal right or remedy must be such that it can be

“given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.” Mercer v. Sechan

Realty, Inc., 569 F. App’x 652, 655 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. 237-38).

Plaintiff is mistaken that either the FHA or ADA, which govern her claims in the

Complaint, are “expressly authorized” by Congress as exceptions to the AIA’s general

1 Federal courts may enjoin state court proceedings based on the “necessary in aid of its

jurisdiction” exception in on ly two situations, where: “(1) the district court has exclusive

jurisdiction over the action because it had been removed from state court; or, (2) the state

court entertains an in rem action involving a res over which the district court has been

exercising jurisdiction in an in rem action.” In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d

1233, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). This matter is neither a removal case nor an in rem action, so

this exception does not apply.

2 Neither the Complaint nor Motion for TRO raise any related federal court proceedings

through which Plaintiff could argue that an injunction is necessary to effectuate or protect

any federal court order or judgment.

prohibition against imposing stays in state court actions. The Eleventh Circuit held that the

“expressly authorized” exception did not apply when a litigant raised an FHA claim to

enjoin eviction proceedings in state court because the litigant could always request a stay

from the state court of the unfavorable judgment pending appeal on the basis of the

judgment violating the FHA, so a stay was not necessary for the federal right to be given its

intended scope. See Mercer, 569 F. App’x at 655-56. While the Eleventh Circuit has not

directly weighed in on whether or not the ADA is an “expressly authorized” exception to

the AIA, several courts in this District have concluded that it is not. See Rudnikas v. Fidelity

Brokerage Servs., LLC, No. 24-24547-CIV, 2025 WL 434051, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2025)

(Martinez, J.) (holding that the plaintiff’s claims under Title II and Title V of the ADA are

not “expressly authorized” exceptions to the AIA and the AIA barred the injunctive relief

sought in a state court probate proceeding); Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC, No. 19-21826-CIV, 2019

WL 11769097, at *3-5 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2019) (Lenard, J.) (holding that no exception to

the AIA applied to the plaintiff’s ADA claims permitting her to seek an injunction of a state

court eviction proceeding); see also Grissom v. Baldwin Cnty., No. 25-cv-392-TFM-MU, 2025

WL 3713757, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2025) (“While the ADA is a federal statute, it does

not specifically authorize the Court to enjoin state court proceedings in favor of a separately

filed ADA case.”). This Court agrees with these district courts’ analyses and conclusions.

Because Congress did not “expressly authorize” either the FHA or ADA to enjoin ongoing

state court proceedings, the AIA prohibits the stay Plaintiff seeks.

Plaintiff’s objection that Judge Strauss did not adequately consider the medical

evidence she attached is without merit here. The specific legal issue central to the

adjudication of the TRO, whether or not the AIA prohibits the injunction she seeks in the

first place, is not impacted by any quantum of evidence of disability that Plaintiff presents.

The fact that Plaintiff suffers from disabilities and has multiple doctors supporting her

request for a continuance of the state court trial has no bearing on whether or not the AIA

prohibits this Court from granting the relief she seeks.

Because Plaintiff cannot show that any of her claims fall within an exception to the

AIA’s general prohibition against staying state court proceedings, her Motion for TRO

predicated on those same claims must be denied. The Motion for TRO must be denied on

this basis alone. This Court has also reviewed the remaining analyses in the Report in which

Judge Strauss recommends denial of the Motion for TRO because Plaintiff does not show a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her ADA claims and agrees with the

analysis and conclusions therein, including his conclusion that Plaintiff has not shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of her ADA claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The undersigned has undertaken a de novo review of the Report and the record and

agrees with Judge Strauss’s well-reasoned findings, thorough analysis, and conclusion that

the Anti-Injunction Act bars the injunction Plaintiff seeks here and, therefore, the Motion

for TRO should be denied.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Judge Strauss’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 19] is AFFIRMED

AND ADOPTED and incorporated by reference herein for the purpose of

appellate review. Plaintiff’s Objections [ECF No. 22] are OVERRULED.

2. The Motion for TRO [ECF No. 3] is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 10th

day of November, 2025.

MELISSA “da os

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: U.S. Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss

Counsel of record

Valery Kantsepolsky, Pro Se

2970 NE 16th Ave, Unit 416

Oakland Park, FL 33334

Email: kodiakisland7@gmail.com

12