Noem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

)

FRANCISCO MEJIA OLALDE,

)

)

Petitioner,

)

)

v. )

) No. 1:25-cv-00168-JMD

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the United

States Department of Homeland )

Security, et al. )

)

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Francisco Mejia Olalde, a citizen of Mexico, has lived in the United States for almost

40 years, but he was never lawfully “admitted” into the country. Now, he is detained,

awaiting immigration proceedings. Mejia Olalde petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, asking

either that the Court order him released or order that he receive an individualized bond

hearing. The parties disagree over which statute governs Mejia Olalde’s detention, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a). If § 1225(b)(2) governs, then the Federal Government must detain

him without bond. But if § 1226(a) governs, then an individualized bond hearing may be

permitted. District courts are divided over the application of these statutes when individuals

have been living within the country for many years. See, e.g., Vargas Lopez v. Trump,

8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (holding that § 1225(b)(2)

applies); Maldonado v. Olson, 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411, at *11 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025)

(holding that § 1226(a) applies).

The Court concludes that the Federal Government has the better of the argument.

The plain text provides that Mejia Olalde is an applicant for admission to the United States,

so he is governed by § 1225(b)(2) and is ineligible to receive a bond hearing. Mejia Olalde

says that the “overwhelming” majority of district courts have agreed with his position. ECF

25 at 6. But even if so, the overwhelming majority of district courts sometimes get the law

very wrong. See, e.g., Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 840 (2025) (declaring universal

injunctions beyond the equitable authority of federal district courts despite widespread use

of that injunction). And some of the court decisions Mejia Olalde cites appear to defer

substantially to each other. What governs this case is the text of the statute, not what other

district courts have concluded. Because § 1225(b)(2) plainly covers Mejia Olalde and requires

detention without bond, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF 1.

Factual Background

Mejia Olalde requested expedited consideration by November 10, when he will appear

for a merits hearing before the Kansas City Immigration Court. The facts are not in dispute.

Mejia Olalde is neither a citizen nor a national of the United States. Mejia Olalde is a citizen

of Mexico. He entered the United States without inspection in 1988 and has been in the

United States ever since. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained Mejia Olalde on

September 22, 2025, and Mejia Olalde has been in custody since that date. Mejia Olalde

requested an individualized bond hearing, but an immigration judge declined to entertain

that request. This petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed initially in the Northern

District of Illinois. At the time the petition was filed, however, Mejia Olalde was detained in

the Eastern District of Missouri. But jurisdiction for core habeas petitions “’lies in only . . .

the district of confinement,’” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (per curiam) (quoting

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)), so the judge transferred this case to the

Eastern District of Missouri. Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 25 C 11481, 2025 WL 2841999, at *3

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025). The parties do not dispute the Court’s jurisdiction here.

Statutory Background

“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Green,

553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Mejia Olalde asks the Court to either order his release or,

alternatively, order that he be granted an individualized bond hearing under the framework

of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). ECF 1 at 5; ECF 25 at 14.

The dispositive question is whether § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) governs Mejia Olalde’s

detention. Although the latter section generally permits bond, the former does not; it

requires that an individual “shall be detained.” The Court agrees with those courts who have

held that § 1225(b)(2) applies, so Mejia Olalde is not entitled to a bond hearing.

The parties agree that two provisions do not apply here. The first provides expedited

removal “without further hearing” for an “arriving” alien whom an immigration officer

determines is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Second, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) provides

for removal without further hearing for an alien “who has not been admitted or paroled into

the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration

officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the

2-year period immediately prior.” The respondents agree that neither provision applies to

Mejia Olalde, who has been continuously present in the United States for almost 40 years.

Two other provisions are relevant, and the parties dispute which one applies. The

Federal Government argues that § 1225(b)(2) covers Mejia Olalde. That provision requires

that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration

officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled

to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.”

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). “Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) . . .

mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018). The Board of Immigration Appeals recently

interpreted § 1225(b)(2) to prohibit an immigration judge from holding a bond hearing for an

alien who had been in the United States for longer than two years. Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

29 I&N Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025).

By contrast, Mejia Olalde argues that § 1226(a) applies. It provides: “On a warrant

issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on

whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Section 1226(a)(2)(A) further

says that the Attorney General “may” release the alien on bond. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303

(“Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond . . . .”).

Section 1226(c)(1) includes several exceptions, restricting the Attorney General from

releasing aliens who committed or are charged with certain offenses. The parties agree that

none of the exceptions in § 1226(c) applies here.

Analysis

The Court concludes that § 1225—not § 1226—applies, so Mejia Olalde is not entitled

to a bond hearing or release. When interpreting a statute, the Court begins “with the

statute’s plain language, giving words the meaning that proper grammar and usage would

assign them.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 113 F.4th 823, 833 (8th Cir. 2024)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The question here is whether Mejia Olalde is an

“applicant for admission.” He is. That question is dispositive because an “an applicant for

admission . . . shall be detained” unless an immigration officer determines that the alien is

“clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted”—which did not happen in this case.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A).

Mejia Olalde is an “applicant for admission.” Under § 1225(a)(1), “[a]n alien present

in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall

be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” Mejia Olalde is an “alien.”

He is “present in the United States.” He “has not been admitted,” id. § 1225(a)(1), because

he did not “lawful[ly] ent[er] the country after inspection and authorization by an

immigration officer,” § 1101(a)(13)(A); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (“Under [] 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225, an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not

been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’”). Because Mejia Olalde is “an

applicant for admission,” § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. He is not eligible for a bond hearing.

Arguing otherwise, Mejia Olalde emphasizes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to a person

who is “seeking admission.” True, some district courts have read “seeking admission” to

imply some “action” beyond continuous presence in the country when an individual has been

in the country for several years, concluding “those who have been present in the country for

years are not actively ‘seeking admission.’” See, e.g., Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, 25 CV 10865,

2025 WL 2938779, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025). Mejia Olalde argues that “an immigrant

submits an application for admission at a distinct point in time and stretching the phrase . . .

to refer to a period of years would push the statutory text beyond its breaking point.” United

States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(describing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)). Mejia Olalde argues that “seeking admission” must occur

in the context of an “examin[ation]” by an “immigration officer.” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Mejia

Olalde thus contends that § 1225(b)(2) applies only to recently arrived noncitizens seeking

entry at a border or point of entry, where they are examined by an immigration officer. ECF

25 at 11.

But Mejia Olalde’s argument fails for several reasons. First, the statute defines Mejia

Olalde as seeking admission. “An alien present in the United States who has not been

admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter

an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute explicitly includes

more than just arriving aliens in the definition of “applicant[s] for admission.” Because Mejia

Olalde is an alien, present in the United States, who has not been admitted, the law defines

him to be an applicant for admission. He is thus seeking admission.

Second, it makes no sense to describe an active applicant for admission as somebody

who is not “seeking” admission. To “seek” is a synonym of to “apply” for. Apply (for),

Merriam-Webster (last visited Nov. 6, 2025);1 see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting

Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes and the Constitution 111 (2016) (reasoning that

“meaningful variation of terminology within a statute ought not be as powerful a

consideration as ordinary meaning” and concluding that “the Legislature is not required to

be overly repetitive in its choice of language”) (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court

describes § 1225(b)(2) as a “broader,” “catchall provision that applies to all applicants for

admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Mejia Olalde’s hair-

splitting parsing of the statute’s text contradicts the ordinary meaning and undermines the

role of § 1225(b)(2) as a catchall.

Third, other provisions in the statute buttress the conclusion that Mejia Olalde is

seeking admission. “[A] fundamental canon of statutory construction” is “the words of a

statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme.” National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 666 (2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Mejia Olalde points to the broader context of § 1225,

including its caption: “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible

arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” Mejia Olalde emphasizes that the caption references

arriving aliens. But even accepting that the caption of a statute is relevant for interpreting

its meaning, see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539–40 (2015), the caption cuts against

1 https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/apply%20for

Mejia Olalde’s reading. The three subjects referenced in it are separated by semi-colons, and

§ 1225(b)(2) addresses the third subject (“referral for hearing”), not the second subject

(“expedited removal”). Another provision of § 1225 requires inspection of “[a]ll aliens . . . who

are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission.” § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added).

This text reinforces the reading that all “applicants for admission” are “seeking admission”

because it recognizes that there are “other[]” ways to seek admission besides being an

“applicant[] for admission.” Otherwise, Merriam-Webster (last visited Nov. 6, 2025) (defining

“otherwise” as 1. “in a different way or manner,” 2 “in different circumstances,” and 3. “in

other respects”).2 Also, the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define “admission”

merely as “entry.” Rather “admission” means “the lawful entry of the alien into the United

States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” § 1101(a)(13)(A). An

alien can have physically entered the country many years before and still be an applicant for

lawful entry, seeking legal “admission.” See Matter of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 n.6 (BIA

2012). The context around § 1225(b)(2) favors reading the provision to cover aliens like Mejia

Olalde.

Further, the rest of § 1225 establishes that Congress knows how to limit the scope of

the text geographically and temporally when it wants to. For example, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)

applies to an alien “who is arriving in the United States.” Here, in contrast, § 1225(b)(2) has

no similar language limiting applicability only to aliens who are in the process of “arriving.”

Likewise, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) applies to an alien who cannot show he has been physically in

the United States “continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior.” Yet the very next

paragraph (§ 1225(b)(2), the provision applicable here) includes no time limit. If Congress

meant to say that an alien no longer is “seeking admission” after some amount of time in the

2 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/otherwise

United States, Congress knew how to do so. Mejia Olalde asks the Court to insert “some

arbitrary time limit devised by courts” that is not in the text of the statute. Jennings, 583

U.S. at 304. The Court cannot do so.

Mejia Olalde also cites the legislative history of § 1225. But “the problems with

legislative history are well rehearsed.” Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 381 (2022)

(Barrett, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring). “In the interpretation of legislation, we aspire

to be ‘a nation of laws, not of men.’ This means (1) giving effect to the text that lawmakers

have adopted and that the people are entitled to rely on, and (2) giving no effect to lawmakers'

unenacted desires.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 29 (2012).

Next, Mejia Olalde argues that interpreting § 1225(b)(2) to apply to him would render

superfluous a recent amendment to § 1226. The Laken Riley Act added another exception to

the Attorney General’s power to allow bond under § 1226. Specifically, the Act restricts the

Attorney General from releasing “any alien” who is “inadmissible” under certain provisions

and “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits

committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” certain crimes. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

If § 1225(b)(2) is interpreted to require detention of all aliens within the United States who

have not been admitted, then Mejia Olalde argues that the requirement on the Attorney

General to take into custody certain inadmissible aliens is superfluous. That argument fails

for several reasons.

First, the Government points out that the Laken Riley Act may apply to situations

where § 1225 might not. For example, an individual who has been admitted through fraud

might not be an “applicant for admission” under § 1225. See § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (“Any alien

who, by fraud . . . has procured . . . a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United

States . . . is inadmissible.”) (emphasis added). But the Laken Riley Act may require that

person to be detained even if § 1225 would not apply.

Second, even assuming there were surplusage, that cannot trump the plain meaning

of § 1225(b)(2). “As the Supreme Court has explained, when confronted with a choice between

an interpretation that honors a statute’s plain meaning but produces surplusage, and an

interpretation that ignores the plain meaning but avoids surplusage, there is no choice at

all—the plain meaning must control.” Artola v. Garland, 996 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2021).

Third, it is perfectly possible to interpret the provisions as merely overlapping, and

Congress often takes a “belt and suspenders approach” to legislation. Atl. Richfield Co. v.

Christian, 590 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (2020). Section 1226(c) regulates not only what the Attorney

General must do (take aliens into custody), but also when the Attorney General must do so.

§ 1226(c)(1) (requiring the Attorney General to “take into custody” the alien “when the alien

is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or

probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for

the same offense”); see also § 1226(c)(3) (requiring that the Secretary of Homeland Security

“shall issue” a “detainer” for an alien and “if the alien is not otherwise detained by Federal,

State, or local officials, shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of the alien”). By

contrast, § 1225 does not specify a timeline for when an alien is to be taken into custody.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (providing only, in the passive voice, that the alien “shall be detained”). The

Court’s interpretation of § 1225 thus does not render the Laken Riley Act superfluous. See

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 305 (explaining that a provision of the Patriot Act was not superfluous

to § 1226(c) because, although “the two provisions overlap in part, they are by no means

congruent”); see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 176 (describing the surplusage canon

as “courts avoid a reading that renders some words altogether redundant”) (emphasis added).

Fourth, while the canon against superfluity “applies to interpreting any two

provisions in the U.S. Code, even when Congress enacted the provisions at different times,”

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 608 (2010), it is “pretty weak when applied to acts of Congress

enacted at widely separated times,” Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991)

(expressing a “deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous

other provisions in the same enactment”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted); United States v. Smith, 100 F.4th 1244, 1250 n.6 (10th Cir. 2024) (explaining “we

are not persuaded that the canon against superfluity stretches to after-the-fact legislation;

this is to say, we can best understand the breadth of legislation by its text, not by presuming

the non-redundancy of later legislation”). The Laken Riley Act was passed this year—

decades after the other relevant provisions—so the canon against superfluity does not apply

strongly here.

Mejia Olalde also cites the longstanding practice of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

True, the Board acknowledged “for years Immigration Judges have conducted bond hearings

for aliens who entered the United States without inspection.” Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29

I&N at 225 n.6. And “the longstanding practice of the government . . . can inform a court’s

determination of what the law is.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386

(2024) (cleaned up). “But a ‘long-established practice’ does not justify a rule that denied

statutory text its fairest reading.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320,

329 (2015). And the “weight” of an administrative agency’s judgment depends “upon the

thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with

earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Mejia Olalde nowhere cites a thorough,

reasoned analysis from administrators explaining why aliens covered by § 1225(b)(2) are

eligible to receive bond hearings. Indeed, a 1997 interim rule from the Department of Justice

merely asserts: “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without

having been admitted or paroled . . . will be eligible for bond.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323

(Mar. 6, 1997). The interim rulemaking offered no interpretation of the statute to justify that

nontextual policy, so the Court accords it little to no weight. The plain meaning prevails.

Conclusion

Because § 1225(b)(2), not § 1226(a), governs Mejia Olalde’s detention, the Court denies

Mejia Olalde’s request to order an individualized bond hearing. And because Mejia Olalde is

lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) for proceedings, Jennings, 583 U.S. at 302, the Court

denies Mejia Olalde’s request for release.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Mejia Olalde’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF 1, is

DENIED.

Dated this 10th day of November, 2025 Jy TN.

JOSHUA M. DIVINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11