Hopkins

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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9 ROGER B. HOPKINS AND SANDY No. 2:25-cv-00030-JAM-AC

HOPKINS,

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Plaintiffs,

11 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

v. MOTION TO REMAND

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY; and DOES

13 1 through 10, inclusive,

14 Defendants.

15

16 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Roger and

17 Sandy Hopkins’ motion to remand. ECF No. 13-1, Plaintiffs’

18 Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”). Defendant Ford

19 Motor Company filed an opposition (ECF No. 16 (“Opp’n”));

20 Plaintiffs did not reply. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’

21 motion is denied.1

22 I. BACKGROUND

23 In 2024, Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit in Yolo County

24 Superior Court, arising out of their 2018 purchase of a Ford

25 Explorer (the “Subject Vehicle”), which they claim is defective.

26 See generally Mot. at 1-2; Opp’n at 2. Defendant then removed

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1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without

28 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g); see also ECF No. 17.

1 the matter to this Court, based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and

2 1446, alleging the parties were diverse and the amount in

3 controversy exceeded $75,000. ECF 1. Specifically, Defendant

4 alleged the Plaintiffs are California citizens and the Defendant

5 is a Delaware citizen. Id. Defendant also averred the removal

6 was timely, because it was made within 30 days of the dismissal

7 of other defendants that shared California citizenship. Id.

8 II. OPINION

9 A. Legal Standard

10 Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction

11 over civil actions between parties with diverse citizenship

12 where “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of

13 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C.

14 § 1332(a). Such an action may be removed to federal court under

15 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is well-established that “[r]emoval

16 statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right

17 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand. This rule of

18 narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of

19 federal courts and protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.”

20 Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024)

21 (citing and quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553

22 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) and Harris v. Bankers Life &

23 Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations

24 and quotations removed).

25 “The presumption against removal means that the defendant

26 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”

27 Casola, 98 F.3d at 954 (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244)

28 (quotations removed). Indeed, when removal is challenged based

1 on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, “‘the

2 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a

3 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy

4 exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold,” unless it is clear from

5 the face of the state court complaint. Urbino v. Orkin Services

6 of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013)

7 (quoting Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404

8 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit defines the “amount in

9 controversy as the amount at stake in the underlying litigation,

10 [that is,] any result of the litigation, excluding interests and

11 costs, that entails a payment by the defendant. This amount

12 includes, inter alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or

13 otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well

14 as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.”

15 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49

16 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing and quoting Theis Research, Inc. v.

17 Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) and Guglielmino

18 v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007)

19 (internal quotations, citations, and brackets removed)).

20 In assessing whether the defendant has met its burden, a

21 court “may consider allegations in the complaint and in the

22 notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence

23 relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan

24 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kroske v.

25 U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)).

26 B. Analysis

27 Plaintiffs contest jurisdiction by claiming Defendant did

28 not establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

1 generally Mot. As correctly noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs do

2 not dispute this matter was timely removed, nor do they dispute

3 complete diversity. Opp’n at 2.

4 The parties agree it is not apparent from the face of the

5 complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (see

6 Mot. at 5-6 and Opp’n at 4); accordingly, Defendant bears the

7 burden of establishing by a preponderance that the amount in

8 controversy exceeds $75,000. See Urbino, 726 F.3d 1118. Only

9 Defendant has presented evidence for the Court to consider in

10 determining the amount in controversy here. See ECF No. 16-1–

11 16-5.

12 1. Actual Damages

13 In the body of their complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages

14 under the Song-Beverly Act, including “the entire contract

15 price,” “reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle,”

16 offset by the Plaintiffs use prior to the alleged problems

17 manifesting, “any ‘cover’ damages,” and incidental,

18 consequential, and general damages. Opp’n, Exh. A (“Compl.”)

19 ¶¶ 17–22, 35. Plaintiffs also sue Defendant for “Fraudulent

20 Inducement-Concealment,” and repeat in their prayer for relief

21 requests for “general, special, and [] actual damages,”

22 “restitution,” and “consequential and incidental damages.”

23 Id. ¶¶ 50-62 and pg. 11-12.

24 Defendant provides the Retail Installment Sales Contract

25 (“RISC”) for the Subject Vehicle. See Opp’n, Exh. B. Defendant

26 also provides a declaration; this evidence demonstrates the

27 purchase price of the subject vehicle was $80,176.19 without

28 financing, $84,873.84 with. Id. Defendant submits evidence

1 from its “Analytical Warranty System [] Standard Claims List

2 Report,” and a corresponding repair order. Id., Exhs. C and D.

3 Using this evidence, Defendant offers a detailed analysis of a

4 proposed mileage offset which provides a more favorable

5 calculation of actual damages for the Plaintiffs. See Opp’n at

6 3-4, 6-8. Since the first repair occurred after Plaintiffs

7 drove approximately 28,986 miles, according to the Defendant’s

8 calculated Song-Beverly offset, this mileage, divided by 120,000

9 and multiplied by the purchase price, results in a $20,501.28

10 deduction, totaling $64,372.56 in actual damages. Id. Without

11 the financing included in the purchase price, the deduction is

12 $19,366.56, totaling $60,809.63 in actual damages. Id. at 7-8.

13 Plaintiffs claim these numbers are “purely speculatory,”

14 “lack a supporting evidentiary basis,” and arbitrarily self-

15 serving. Mot. at 8-10. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs have

16 not provided any alternative proposal for the Court regarding

17 their actual damages. Plaintiffs did not file a reply, nor did

18 they present any evidence for the Court to consider otherwise.

19 The evidence and calculations before the Court are

20 uncontroverted. Accord Carrington Stonemasons, Inc. v. Ford

21 Motor Company, No. 24-cv-00080, 2024 WL 1745038 at *3 (N.D. Cal

22 Apr. 22, 2024) (“Because [Plaintiff] has not filed a reply,

23 [Defendant]’s calculation of the use offset and actual damages

24 is undisputed.”).

25 Although Plaintiffs rely on a number of cases to support

26 their argument that Defendant failed to meet its evidentiary

27 burden here, they are distinguishable. See Mot. at 5-11. For

28 example, in Steeg, the defendant simply relied on the

1 allegations in the complaint and the vehicle’s MSRP

2 (manufacturer’s suggested retail price). Steeg v. Ford Motor

3 Company, No. 19-cv-05833, 2020 WL 2121508 (N.D. Cal. May 5,

4 2020). The defendant did not present other evidence, including

5 the actual sales price, and the court found defendant failed to

6 demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.

7 Id. Similarly, defendants in Schneider and Limon-Gonzalez

8 relied on the claimed damages in the plaintiffs’ complaints of

9 at least $25,000, argued this number would be doubled if civil

10 penalties were included, and made general claims about

11 attorneys’ fees. See Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp.

12 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020); Limon-Gonzalez v. Kia Motos

13 America, Inc., No. CV 20-4381, 2020 WL 3790838 (C.D. Cal. Jul.

14 7, 2020). Both courts granted plaintiffs’ motions to remand

15 because defendants failed to meet their burden. Id. Unlike

16 these cases, and the many others cited by Plaintiffs, Defendant

17 presented evidence of the actual damages at issue here,

18 supported by the RISC, Analytical Warranty System Standard

19 Claims List Report, and a repair order; Defendant did not simply

20 rely on the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint and make vague

21 claims about possible damages. Cf. Edwards v. Jaguar Land Rover

22 N. Am. LLC, No. 21-cv-05061, 2022 WL 854515 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23,

23 2022) (motion to remand granted because defendant relied on

24 allegations in complaint, civil penalties doubling the claimed

25 amount of damages and general arguments about attorneys’ fees,

26 and did not present evidence to meet its burden); Echemendia v.

27 Subaru of America, Inc., No. 20-cv-09243, 2020 WL 7311348 (C.D.

28 Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (defendant provided sales contract, but no

1 other evidence or analysis to “allow the Court to reliably

2 estimate actual damages”); Chajon v. Ford Motor Company, No.

3 2:18-cv-10533, 2019 WL 994019 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2019)

4 (defendant failed to meet its burden establishing requisite

5 amount in controversy because it relied on MSRP, did not provide

6 other evidence or an offset calculation, and speculated about

7 penalties and attorneys’ fees).

8 “District courts within the Ninth Circuit disagree whether

9 . . . the ‘use offset’ or the ‘mileage offset[]’ should be

10 considered when determining the amount in controversy for

11 purposes of jurisdiction.” Carrington, 2024 WL 1745038 at *2.

12 Without the offset, Defendant has demonstrated by a

13 preponderance that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000

14 based on the RISC, containing the actual purchase price, and

15 Plaintiffs request for actual damages to include “the entire

16 contract price,” under the Song-Beverly Act, alone.

17 Considering the mileage offset and assuming the most

18 favorable calculation to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs baseline

19 damages would still be at least $60,809.63. See Opp’n at 8.

20 Accordingly, the Court turns to the parties’ arguments regarding

21 penalties.

22 2. Civil Penalties

23 Plaintiffs seek a statutory civil penalty of twice

24 Plaintiffs’ actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act, punitive

25 damages, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. See

26 Compl. at pg. 11-12. The parties disagree about the appropriate

27 way to include and calculate civil penalties here, citing a

28 number of cases supporting their respective positions. See Mot.

1 at 11-14; Opp’n at 8-10. Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s

2 assumption that Plaintiffs will recover the penalty authorized

3 by the Song-Beverly act is unsupported; since Defendant has

4 failed to meet its burden, which Plaintiffs claim requires proof

5 of a willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act, civil penalties

6 should not be included in the amount in controversy calculation.

7 Mot. at 11-14. Plaintiffs rely on a number of cases that

8 include underlying complaints requesting civil penalties “up to

9 twice the amount of [] actual damages,” which are unlike

10 Plaintiffs’ complaint and moving papers that repeatedly aver

11 Plaintiffs are “entitled” to a civil penalty twice the amount of

12 their underlying, actual damages. Compare, e.g., Echemendia,

13 2020 WL 7311348 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s sole

14 allegation remotely inferring willfulness is that Subaru

15 misrepresented it would cure the Vehicle’s defects”) with Compl.

16 ¶¶ 30, 36, 39 (containing descriptions of Defendant’s “willful”

17 failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act and repeated claim

18 that “Plaintiffs are entitled to a civil penalty of two times

19 Plaintiffs’ actual damages”) and ECF No. 10, Joint Status

20 Report, at pg. 4 (stating if the standard double civil penalty

21 under the Song-Beverly Act does not apply, “Plaintiffs will

22 [otherwise] seek a penalty in the amount of two times [their]

23 damages.”). The Court is persuaded by Carrington and the

24 Verastegui cases cited by the Defendant, which support the

25 inclusion of a civil penalty doubling the actual damages in the

26 amount in controversy calculation; these cases are more

27 analogous to the claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the

28 evidence before this Court than any cited by the Plaintiffs.

—e——e mm EIEN ON IERIE IRI EE IE Om EE OSI IE OS III EE

1 See Carrington, 2024 WL 1745038 at *3-4 (relying on Sanchez v.

2 Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1996) and

3 Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2018) to

4 support the application of the civil penalty in determining the

5 amount in controversy); Verastegui v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-cv-

6 | 04806, 2020 WL 598516, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2020)

7 (recognizing “courts in this district have varying views as to

8 whether the maximum civil penalties should be considered when

9 | deciding the amount in controversy,” but finding the penalty

10 doubling the actual damages applied because “it is what

11 Plaintiff put in controversy.”). Using the underlying actual

12 damages calculation most favorable to Plaintiffs, $60,809.63,

13 the inclusion of the civil penalty Plaintiffs claim they are

14 entitled to brings the amount in controversy to nearly $122,000.

15 This number well exceeds the requisite jurisdictional threshold,

16 | without considering attorneys’ fees or other damages requested

17 by Plaintiffs. Based on the evidence before the Court,

18 Defendants have met their burden establishing by a preponderance

19 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

20 Til. ORDER

21 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES

22 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 Dated: September 30, 2025

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HN A. MENDEZ.

26 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE

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