Snelling

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ARNOLD DENARD SNELLING,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 3:25-cv-981-MMH-SJH

JODY PHILLIPS, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before the undersigned on pro se Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form)

(“Application”). Doc. 2. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends

that the Application be denied and that this case be dismissed without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed his Complaint for a Civil Case (“Complaint”), Doc. 1, along with

the Application, on August 27, 2025. On September 8, 2025, the undersigned entered

an Order (“Prior Order”) taking the Application under advisement and, after

identifying multiple issues and deficiencies to address and cure, directed that Plaintiff

had until September 29, 2025 to: (i) file an amended complaint in accordance with the

Court’s instructions and all applicable rules; and (ii) either pay the applicable filing fee

or file an amended motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Doc. 3. The Prior

Order also warned that Plaintiff’s failure to do so would likely result in a

recommendation that the Application be denied and that this action be dismissed

without prejudice. Id. at 6. Plaintiff has not paid the applicable filing fee or filed an

amended motion to proceed IFP, an amended complaint, or anything else in response

to the Prior Order.

II. Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may allow a plaintiff who is a

natural person to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs where such plaintiff has

demonstrated through the filing of an affidavit that he is “unable to pay such fees or

give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Even assuming a motion sufficiently

demonstrates a plaintiff meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP, when such a

motion is filed, the Court is also obligated to review the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) and to dismiss the case if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).1 The Court must also sua sponte dismiss an action if it determines at any

1 In considering whether a party has sufficiently stated a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the

same standards applicable under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. See Alba

v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions”

or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will

not do. Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) demands “more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me

accusation.” Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Courts accept “all factual allegations in the complaint as true”

but “need not apply this rule to legal conclusions.” Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 626 F.3d 1318,

1321 (11th Cir. 2010).

time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court should

also order repleading sua sponte if presented with a pleading that does not comply with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule(s)”). See Abel v. Porshe Cars N. Am., Inc.,

No. 6:24-cv-593-PGB-DCI, 2024 WL 4793326, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2024). Though

pro se pleadings are construed liberally: (i) such liberal construction does not permit a

court “to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading in order to sustain an action”; and (ii) pro se litigants must “comply with the

rules of procedure.” LaCroix v. W. Dist. of Ky, 627 F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2015).2

III. Analysis

As explained in the Prior Order, even liberally construed, the Application and

Complaint are each deficient. See Doc. 3. At the outset, the Application is insufficient

as many questions are left blank, and the totals do not correspond to the few numbers

that are provided (which numbers also appear internally inconsistent at times). See id.

at 1-2. The Prior Order thus directed Plaintiff to either pay the filing fee or file an

amended motion to proceed IFP, with all questions properly completed. Id. at 2, 6.

Moreover, even assuming Plaintiff meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP,

as the Prior Order explained, the Complaint, even liberally construed, is deficient and

2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; however, they may be cited when

persuasive on a particular point. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2000);

11th Cir. R. 36-2.

does not comply with Rules 8 and 10. Id. at 2-4.3 For example, the Complaint does not

contain any (i) statement on the grounds for this Court’s jurisdiction, (ii) statement of

the claim showing entitlement to relief; and/or (iii) demand for relief. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a); see also Gamble v. Gamble, No. 8:09-cv-369-T-30TGW, 2009 WL 580323, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2009).4 The Prior Order thus directed Plaintiff to file an amended

complaint curing the deficiencies identified in, and consistent with the instructions in,

the Prior Order. Doc. 2 at 4-6.5

3 Rules 8 and 10 “work together to require the pleader to present his claims discretely and

succinctly[.]” Palmer v. Albertson’s LLC, 418 F. App’x 885, 889 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). A

complaint that violates Rule 8(a), Rule 10(b), or both, may be described as a “shotgun” pleading. See

Mathis v. City of Lakeland, No. 22-12426, 2023 WL 2568814, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023). “Shotgun”

pleadings are strictly prohibited. Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018); see

also Moore v. Jasper City Bd. of Educ., No. 22-13943, 2023 WL 3719151, at *2 (11th Cir. May 30, 2023).

Complying with the rules of procedure includes not filing shotgun pleadings, and thus pro se shotgun

pleadings are also forbidden. See Brown v. Columbus Police Dep’t, No. 23-11896, 2024 WL 3451862, at

*6 (11th Cir. July 18, 2024); see also Mikov v. Vill. of Palm Springs, Fla., No. 23-13311, 2024 WL 3178043,

at *3 (11th Cir. June 26, 2024); Mathis, 2023 WL 2568814, at *4; LaCroix, 627 F. App’x at 818-19. “It

is not the district court’s job to parse out incomprehensible allegations from shotgun pleadings”;

rather, shotgun pleadings are subject to dismissal. Dvoinik v. Rolff, No. 23-14147, 2024 WL 2974475,

at *4 (11th Cir. June 13, 2024); see also Owens v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 22-10550, 2023 WL 4105378,

at *2-3 (11th Cir. June 21, 2023).

4 In addition to these fundamental deficiencies, the Complaint’s listing of defendants is also

internally inconsistent, making it unclear what defendant(s) are being named. See Doc. 1.

Compounding these issues, the Complaint is accompanied by nearly 50 pages of voluminous and

unmarked attachments—none of which are referenced in the body of the Complaint or labeled or

organized to correspond to any of the (sparse and incomplete) information provided in the body of the

Complaint. See id. Such attachments serve to confuse, rather than clarify, the nature and grounds for

Plaintiff’s alleged claims. See id.; see also Owens, 2023 WL 4105378, at *2 (affirming dismissal of

shotgun pleading that was “difficult to comprehend” and included “65 pages of exhibits with no

explanation as to their relevance”); Kibodeaux v. Morgan, No. 6:22-cv-662-RBD-LHP, 2022 WL

17326865, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17283162

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2022); Steward v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Loc. No. 1408, No. 3:16-cv-1194-J-

39PDB, 2018 WL 6621367, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018

WL 6620495 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2018).

5 This Prior Order did not purport to address all potential deficiencies in the Complaint. Nor

does this Report and Recommendation.

Notably, the Prior Order provided an opportunity to cure the identified

deficiencies, if possible, by directing Plaintiff to file an amended pleading and to pay

the filing fee or file an amended motion to proceed IFP by September 29, 2025. Id. at

1, 6. The Prior Order also expressly warned that a failure to do so would likely result

in a recommendation that the Application be denied and the case be dismissed without

prejudice. Id. at 6. However, Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee or file an amended

motion to proceed IFP, did not file an amended complaint, and did not otherwise

attempt to cure the deficiencies noted in the Prior Order. Therefore, the undersigned

recommends that the Application be denied and that this case be dismissed without

prejudice.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. The Application (Doc. 2) be denied.

2. This case be dismissed without prejudice.

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to terminate any pending motions and

close the file.

Notice

“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of [a] recommended disposition,

a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). “A party may respond to another party’s

objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Id. A party’s failure to serve

and file specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations impacts the

scope of review by a district judge and by an appellate court. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. “The district judge must determine

de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected

to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A party failing to object

to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and

recommendation ... waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions[.]” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

DONE AND ENTERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on October 10, 2025.

Samuel J. Horovitz

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:

The Honorable Marcia Morales Howard, United States District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff