Scott Drewry v. William Brenner, Individually, and In His Official Capacity as Chief of Police; and the Town of Greybull

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2025 WY 121

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2025

November 6, 2025

SCOTT DREWRY,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

S-24-0272

WILLIAM BRENNER, individually,

and in his official capacity as Chief of

Police; and the TOWN OF

GREYBULL,

Appellees

(Defendants).

Appeal from the District Court of Big Horn County

The Honorable Bill Simpson, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Philip E. Abromats and Letitia C. Abromats, Greybull, Wyoming. Argument by Mr.

Abromats.

Representing the Town of Greybull and William Brenner in his Official Capacity:

John D. Bowers, Bowers Law Firm, PC, Afton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr.

Bowers.

Representing William Brenner:

Bridget Hill, Attorney General, Mark A. Klaassen, Deputy Attorney General, Debra

Hulett, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Hulett.

Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, and JAROSH, JJ., and

MCGRADY, D.J.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the

permanent volume.

BOOMGAARDEN, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Scott Drewry sued the Town of Greybull and William Brenner, Chief of the Greybull

Police Department (Greybull PD) 1 after Chief Brenner issued a memorandum to Greybull

PD’s officers and several city and county officials. The memorandum created a new policy

and outlined concerns Chief Brenner had with Mr. Drewry based on Mr. Drewry’s former

employment with Greybull PD. Mr. Drewry brought claims for breach of a settlement

agreement made between Mr. Drewry and the Town when he left Greybull PD, as well as

for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation per se. The district court

granted summary judgment to Chief Brenner and the Town. We affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings.

ISSUES

[¶2] We restate, reorder, and consolidate the issues as follows:

1. Does qualified immunity preclude Mr. Drewry’s

defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims?

2. Are there genuine issues of material fact preventing

summary judgment on Mr. Drewry’s breach of contract

claim?

1

The caption in this case presents the appellees as Chief Brenner, in both his individual and official

capacities, and the Town of Greybull. This designation of the defendants is atypical in cases under the

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, e.g., Uinta Cnty. v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, 286 P.3d 138 (Wyo.

2012) (captioning the appellants as “UINTA COUNTY, WYOMING; UINTA COUNTY SHERIFF

LOUIS NAPOLI; and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF UINTA”), and

appears to borrow from the terminology used in federal cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where claims against

an officer in his personal capacity seek to impose liability on the officer personally, and claims against an

officer in his official capacity seek to impose liability on the governmental entity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361–62, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). We will refer to Chief Brenner “in his

individual capacity” as “Chief Brenner,” and to Chief Brenner “in his official capacity” and the Town

collectively as “the Town.”

1

FACTS

[¶3] In 2016, Mr. Drewry was living in California and applied for an open position as a

police sergeant with Greybull PD. His resume reflected that he had a “Bachelor of Arts

(Business Admin)” from Hawaii-Pacific University. Mr. Drewry did not have such a degree

and did not attend Hawaii-Pacific University. Chief Brenner did not discover this

misrepresentation until he had extended Mr. Drewry a conditional job offer. Nonetheless,

Chief Brenner moved forward with hiring Mr. Drewry.

[¶4] In 2017, Chief Brenner heard a rumor from a Greybull PD officer that Mr. Drewry

was having an extramarital affair with a local woman. Mr. Drewry denied the rumor and

Chief Brenner did not look into the matter further. In 2018, the Greybull Town

administrator informed Chief Brenner that he had heard similar rumors, and Chief Brenner

became concerned about misuse of Greybull PD time and resources relating to Mr. Drewry

spending time with the woman. Chief Brenner opened an internal investigation. Chief

Brenner was not able to confirm Mr. Drewry and the woman were romantically involved,

but Mr. Drewry did admit to going to her house while on shift without calling out his

location, as well as having her accompany him on several out-of-town training trips paid

for by Greybull PD. Greybull PD suspended Mr. Drewry for two days.

[¶5] In 2021, Mr. Drewry helped a Big Horn County Sheriff’s deputy investigate a single

vehicle crash. The driver was suspected of driving under the influence and was taken to a

nearby hospital. After Mr. Drewry secured the scene, another deputy called him and

requested that he bring a blood draw kit to the hospital. The driver refused to consent to a

blood draw. Mr. Drewry suggested that they could have the hospital draw the blood and

hold it until they could obtain a search warrant. The deputy believed the crash occurred

within Greybull PD’s jurisdiction and requested Mr. Drewry take over the investigation.

Mr. Drewry agreed, and again attempted to get the driver to consent to a blood draw. When

the driver refused, Mr. Drewry asked the attending nurse if he would draw the blood and

store it in the hospital’s “secure medicine refrigerator” until he could obtain a warrant. The

nurse drew the blood and Mr. Drewry labeled the vials, signed them, and left them with the

nurse.

[¶6] Mr. Drewry then ended his shift and went home at 6:00 a.m. After beginning his

next shift at 1:00 p.m., Mr. Drewry completed an affidavit for a search warrant to seize

“biological fluid” located “on the person of” the driver. A circuit court judge issued the

warrant. Mr. Drewry signed a warrant return stating he had seized the blood after the judge

issued the warrant.

[¶7] Several months later, the county attorney contacted Chief Brenner and informed him

of “some discrepancies” she noticed in the criminal case against the driver of the vehicle.

2

She was concerned that the blood appeared to have been drawn earlier than Mr. Drewry

had indicated he seized it. Chief Brenner opened an internal investigation. As part of the

investigation, Mr. Drewry provided a written narrative and confirmed he had the hospital

draw and hold the blood prior to obtaining a warrant. Mr. Drewry explained that he believed

the procedure to be lawful, and had previously instructed other officers that this process

was appropriate at a meeting Chief Brenner attended.

[¶8] After looking into the matter and meeting with Town officials, Chief Brenner told

Mr. Drewry that he would be terminated from Greybull PD. Chief Brenner offered Mr.

Drewry the option to resign, but Mr. Drewry declined and told Chief Brenner he planned

to appeal the termination. Mr. Drewry then returned his department-issued cell phone to

Chief Brenner and explained he had “wiped” it due to personal information he had on the

phone. Chief Brenner reviewed phone company records, and after extracting data from the

phone he discovered evidence that further suggested a relationship between Mr. Drewry

and the woman who was the subject of the affair rumors.

[¶9] Mr. Drewry and Greybull PD eventually executed a settlement agreement lifting

Mr. Drewry’s termination and allowing Mr. Drewry to resign from Greybull PD. In relevant

part, the agreement stated: “Chief Brenner and the Town Council, in both their professional

and personal capacities, shall not demean, disparage, defame or otherwise talk negatively

in any way about Mr. Drewry regarding the investigation, termination or resignation.” (the

non-disparagement clause).

[¶10] After leaving Greybull PD, Mr. Drewry worked as an officer for the Lovell Police

Department. He later accepted a position with the Basin Police Department. When Chief

Brenner heard Mr. Drewry had been offered a job in Basin, he issued the following

memorandum (the Brenner memo):

To: Greybull Officers

From: Chief Bill Brenner

CC: Administrator Hunt, City Attorney Kent Richins, County

Attorney Marcia Bean

Date: 07/14/2022

Re: Scott Drewry

3

Greetings,

It has been brought to my attention that Former Greybull Police

Officer Scott Drewry has been offered employment by the

Basin Police Department. Because of the close proximity to

Greybull I felt that this may be an issue for our agency given

the fact that we back-up officers in Basin, and they perform

back-up for our agency when needed.

Because of Mr. Drewry’s history of deception with our

department, he will not participate in any investigations

conducted by the Greybull Police Department, nor assist with

any investigations within our community if called for back-up

given the fact that he would not be considered a credible

witness, and may jeopardize any case that he is involved in.

Once your scene is secure and safe, Mr. Drewry will be

dismissed from the scene. When the Greybull Police

Department is requested to provide back-up for the Basin

Police Department, it will be limited to security of the scene

and officer safety. Once the scene is secure, the officer will

return to Greybull immediately.

For those of you who are not aware of Brady v. Maryland

Supreme Court Decision 1963 see below:

Police officers who have been dishonest are sometimes

referred to as “Brady cops.” Because of the Brady

ruling, prosecutors are required to notify defendants and

their attorneys whenever a law enforcement official

involved in their case has a sustained record for

knowingly lying in an official capacity.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please see me.

Thank you,

[signed]

4

Chief Bill Brenner

[¶11] Mr. Drewry and his wife sued Chief Brenner and the Town, claiming that the

Brenner memo violated the non-disparagement clause in the settlement agreement. They

also brought defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 2

[¶12] Chief Brenner and the Town each moved for summary judgment on all of the

remaining claims. The district court granted the motions. It interpreted the settlement

agreement and concluded that “the investigation” referenced in the non-disparagement

clause meant only the inquiry into the blood draw incident. The court noted the Brenner

memo did not expressly mention the investigation, termination, or resignation, but

concluded “it would be elevating form over substance to say that the memo was not

directed, at least in part, to the investigation into the blood draw when it discusses Mr.

Drewry’s history of deception.” However, the court determined the undisputed evidence

showed Mr. Drewry had a history of deception, and Chief Brenner had a duty to disclose

any impeachment issues under Brady, which was allowed under a settlement agreement

provision stating that the agreement did not relieve the parties of any duties otherwise

imposed by law.

[¶13] The district court also granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim, concluding there was not sufficient evidence of extreme and

outrageous conduct on Chief Brenner’s part to create a genuine issue of material fact. As

for the defamation claim, the district court found that the Brenner memo was truthful, and

that it was conditionally privileged. Finally, the district court concluded Chief Brenner was

entitled to qualified immunity, and he and the Town were entitled to summary judgment on

the intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims on that basis as well.

Mr. Drewry timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶14] A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” W.R.C.P. 56(a). We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment

2

Mr. Drewry’s wife also claimed loss of consortium, and Mr. Drewry and his wife sought punitive damages.

The district court dismissed the loss of consortium and punitive damages claims prior to the summary

judgment proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. Mr. Drewry does not contest those dismissals, and

we do not discuss them further.

5

de novo. Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63,

¶ 17, 569 P.3d 1120, 1126 (Wyo. 2025) (citing Leonhardt v. Big Horn Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,

2024 WY 128, ¶ 16, 559 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Wyo. 2024)).

We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district

court, using the same materials and following the same

standards. We examine the record from the vantage point most

favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that

party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be

drawn from the record.

Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 17, 569 P.3d at 1126–1127 (brackets and

footnote omitted) (quoting Leonhardt, 2024 WY 128, ¶ 16, 559 P.3d at 1058).

[¶15] A summary judgment motion involves shifting burdens. The moving party bears the

initial burden to make a prima facie showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kudar v.

Morgan, 2022 WY 159, ¶ 11, 521 P.3d 988, 992 (Wyo. 2022). A moving party who does

not have the ultimate burden of persuasion may establish a prima facie case for summary

judgment “by showing a lack of evidence on an essential element of the opposing party’s

claim.” Gowdy v. Cook, 2020 WY 3, ¶ 22, 455 P.3d 1201, 1207 (Wyo. 2020) (citing

Warwick v. Accessible Space, Inc., 2019 WY 89, ¶ 10, 448 P.3d 206, 211 (Wyo. 2019);

Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr. LLC, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 116, 437 P.3d 758, 796 (Wyo.

2019)). If the moving party meets this initial burden, “the opposing party is obligated to

respond with materials beyond the pleadings to show a genuine issue of material fact.”

Kudar, 2022 WY 159, ¶ 11, 521 P.3d at 992 (quoting Woodward v. Valvoda, 2021 WY 5,

¶¶ 12–13, 478 P.3d 1189, 1196 (Wyo. 2021)). “A material fact is one which, if proved,

would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action

or defense asserted by the parties.” Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 17, 569 P.3d

at 1126-1127 (quoting Leonhardt, 2024 WY 128, ¶ 16, 559 P.3d at 1058).

[¶16] We may affirm an order granting summary judgment on any basis supported by the

record. Bain v. City of Cheyenne, 2025 WY 67, ¶ 6, 570 P.3d 725, 727 (Wyo. 2025) (citing

Sorenson v. Halling, 2025 WY 8, ¶ 6, 561 P.3d 1241, 1244 (Wyo. 2025)).

6

DISCUSSION

[¶17] Mr. Drewry presents eight issues for our review. We begin by paring those down.

Two of the issues relate to alleged analytical errors made by the district court and its view

of the evidence presented by the parties. It is unnecessary for us to consider these issues

given that our standard of review is de novo and our reasoning is independent from that of

the district court. See Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 17, 569 P.3d at 1126.

[¶18] Mr. Drewry also argues the district court improperly relied on a “sham fact affidavit”

presented by Chief Brenner in which he set forth the reasons he believed Mr. Drewry had

a “history of deception.” See Woodward, 2021 WY 5, ¶ 18, 478 P.3d at 1198 (“[I]f the ‘court

determines that the conflict between the affidavit and the earlier testimony raises only a

sham issue of fact, the court is free to disregard the contrary affidavit for summary

judgment purposes.’”) (quoting Morris v. Smith, 837 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo. 1992)). Because

we do not rely on the affidavit in affirming the district court on the tort claims or in

reversing on the breach of contract claim, we need not address this issue.

[¶19] Mr. Drewry also contends the district court should not have considered Chief

Brenner’s summary judgment motion because it did not contain its own statement of facts

separate from the statement of facts contained in his W.R.C.P. 56.1 statement of material

facts. 3 Mr. Drewry asserts that “[t]his is problematic under WRCP 56(a), under which the

moving party has ‘the initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment[.]’”

Because he does not elaborate on why this is problematic or how it would affect the parties’

abilities to meet their respective burdens on summary judgment, we will not consider this

issue. See Vassilopoulos v. Vassilopoulos, 2024 WY 87, ¶ 28, 557 P.3d 725, 734 (“[T]his

Court does not address arguments unsupported by cogent argument or authority[].”) (citing

McInerney v. Kramer, 2023 WY 108, ¶ 14, 537 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Wyo. 2023)).

[¶20] Finally, we address the intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation

per se claims together because we conclude qualified immunity disposes of both claims.

We therefore address two dispositive issues: Chief Brenner’s qualified immunity on the

tort claims and the viability of Mr. Drewry’s breach of contract claim.

3

W.R.C.P. 56.1(a) requires a party to include with its summary judgment motion “a separate, short and

concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to

be tried.”

7

I. The doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Mr. Drewry’s defamation per se and

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

[¶21] “Qualified immunity developed at common law and remains available through

common law even if immunity is otherwise waived under the Wyoming Governmental

Claims Act.” Palm-Egle v. Briggs, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 33, 545 P.3d 828, 838 (Wyo. 2024)

(citing Uinta Cnty. v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 13, 286 P.3d 138, 142 (Wyo. 2012)).

Qualified immunity applies only to tort claims against an officer, and thus cannot preclude

Mr. Drewry’s breach of contract claim. See Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wyo.

1997) (“Under the common law, police officers . . . . enjoy only a limited immunity from

tort liability.”). A determination that a peace officer is entitled to qualified immunity

effectively disposes of tort claims against both the officer and the governmental entity. 4

Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 578 (Wyo. 1996) (“If the court determines the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity, then as a matter of law, the officer is not liable. If the officer

is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the conduct of the officer is not

tortious, and no vicarious liability exists on the part of the governmental entity.”) (citing

DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 655 (Wyo. 1986) (Thomas, C.J., specially concurring)); see

also Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 27, 286 P.3d at 146 (“Based on our holding that Sheriff

Napoli is entitled to qualified immunity, the ruling against the County and the Board must

also be reversed.”).

[¶22] Qualified immunity “is appropriate for disposition early in a case, prior to

adjudication on the merits.” Palm-Egle, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 35, 545 P.3d at 839 (citing Wyo.

State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021 WY 47, ¶ 8, 483 P.3d 840, 844 (Wyo. 2021); Wallace v. Dean,

3 So.3d 1035, 1044–45 (Fla. 2009)). While it may not be an appropriate basis for dismissal

at the motion to dismiss stage, it is appropriate for disposition on summary judgment if the

facts have been sufficiently developed. Palm-Egle, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 35, 545 P.3d at 839. A

peace officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he can establish four elements: “(1) the

officer acted within the scope of their duties; (2) and in good faith; (3) the acts were

reasonable under the circumstances; and (4) the acts were discretionary duties, not

operational or ministerial.” Id., ¶ 33, 545 P.3d at 838–39. Mr. Drewry concedes the first

and fourth elements are met in this case. We therefore address in turn whether Chief

Brenner acted in good faith and whether he acted reasonably under the circumstances.

4

This aspect of our qualified immunity jurisprudence is distinct from federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

where “[q]ualified immunity ‘is available only in suits against officials sued in their personal capacities,

not in suits against governmental entities or officials sued in their official capacities.’” Griffith v. El Paso

Cnty., Colo., 129 F.4th 790, 820–21 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder Cnty. Soc.

Servs., 569 F.3d 1244, 1263 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Palm-Egle, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 33 n.9, 545 P.3d at

839 n.9 (noting that aspects of Wyoming’s qualified immunity doctrine are “distinct from the federal

standard.”).

8

[¶23] With regard to the good faith element, we have agreed with cases from other

jurisdictions holding “that an officer asserting this affirmative defense must show that a

reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed

that his conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the conduct

occurred.” Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 17, 286 P.3d at 143 (citing Telthorster v. Tennell,

92 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. 2002)).

[¶24] Here, Chief Brenner explained that he prepared the Brenner memo “to inform

Greybull Officers about the process Greybull Officers would use if Drewry, as an officer

with the Basin Police Department, was at the scene of a Greybull police investigation, and

the process that Greybull officers would use if providing back-up for the Basin Police

Department.” He also explained that he implemented the policy to protect the Town from

risks he perceived with Mr. Drewry being involved with Greybull PD investigations. The

parties do not dispute that as Chief of Greybull PD, setting and communicating policies for

conducting investigations and providing backup to other departments was within Chief

Brenner’s discretion. Mr. Drewry counters that “numerous witnesses . . . testified that

Brenner had a vendetta against Drewry, probably because Brenner thought Drewry was

after his job.” He also argues that Chief Brenner “published the memo out of a personal

animus toward Drewry, and he negligently over-published the Memo[.]” Finally, he notes

many recipients of the Brenner memo disagreed with it.

[¶25] Though several witnesses did say they disagreed with the memo and thought Chief

Brenner had personal issues with Mr. Drewry, Mr. Drewry overlooks our precedent that

“[w]hether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law which the

court must resolve.” Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 16, 286 P.3d at 143 (citing Layland v.

Stevens, 2007 WY 188, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Wyo. 2007)). It is precisely for this

reason that we have agreed that good faith is established where an officer “could have

believed that his conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the

conduct occurred.” Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 17, 286 P.3d at 143 (emphasis added)

(citing Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 460). “If officers of reasonable competence could disagree

on the issue, the officer will be said to have acted in good faith as a matter of law.”

Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 21, 286 P.3d at 144 (citing Cherqui v. Westheimer St. Festival

Corp., 116 S.W.3d 337, 351 (Tex. App. 2003)). Therefore, the fact that several witnesses

believed Chief Brenner wrote the Brenner memo based on his personal issues with Mr.

Drewry cannot overcome the fact that a reasonably competent officer could have viewed

the memo as a good faith means of implementing a new department policy based on Chief

Brenner’s concerns with Mr. Drewry. We conclude Chief Brenner has established that he

acted in good faith for the purposes of qualified immunity.

[¶26] Differences of opinion are similarly immaterial when applying the reasonableness

element. “[R]easonableness, in the context of a qualified immunity analysis is defined ‘as

having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the influence of

9

reason; thinking, speaking, or acting rationally, or according to the dictates of reason;

agreeable to reason; just; rational.’” Palm-Egle, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 37, 545 P.3d at 839

(quoting Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 20, 286 P.3d at 144). This qualified immunity

standard is different than the reasonableness standard in a negligence analysis. Palm-Egle,

2024 WY 31, ¶ 37, 545 P.3d at 839. To show reasonableness, an officer need not show that

all reasonably prudent officers would have acted as he did; rather, he must show that a

reasonably prudent officer, acting under the same circumstances, “might have reached the

same decision.” Id., ¶ 37, 545 P.3d at 839 (emphasis added) (quoting Pennington, 2012

WY 129, ¶ 21, 286 P.3d at 144). Regardless of whether Chief Brenner’s concerns with Mr.

Drewry were potentially unjustified or based on improper motives, there was an objective

basis for setting the policy based on the multiple internal investigations while Mr. Drewry

was employed with Greybull PD that concluded with Mr. Drewry being disciplined. Based

on the record, a reasonable officer might have implemented the same policy in light of

those circumstances. We therefore conclude Chief Brenner satisfied the reasonableness

prong of the qualified immunity test, and Chief Brenner and the Town were entitled to

qualified immunity on Mr. Drewry’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and

defamation per se claims.

II. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Mr. Drewry’s

breach of contract claim.

[¶27] “To prove a breach of contract, the proponent must show a lawfully enforceable

contract, an unjustified failure to timely perform all or any part of what is promised therein,

and entitlement of [the] injured party to damages.” Eiden Constr., LLC v. Hogan Assocs.

Builders, LLC, 2024 WY 138, ¶ 43, 561 P.3d 304, 31718 (Wyo. 2024) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Larson v. Burton Constr., Inc., 2018 WY 74, ¶ 15, 421 P.3d 538,

544 (Wyo. 2018)). Here, the parties do not dispute that the settlement agreement was a

lawfully enforceable contract. Their disagreement is in their interpretation of the

agreement’s non-disparagement clause, and whether Chief Brenner breached that clause

when he issued the Brenner memo.

A. The phrase “the investigation” as used in the non-disparagement clause is

ambiguous.

[¶28] We interpret a contract by focusing on the parties’ intent as evidenced by the

language used in the contract. Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶ 20, 537 P.3d 751,

757 (Wyo. 2023) (citing Hofhine v. Hofhine, 2014 WY 86, ¶ 9, 330 P.3d 242, 245 (Wyo.

2014)). When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, we look only to the “four

corners” of the agreement to interpret it. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶ 20, 437 P.3d at 757.

10

“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a matter of law for the court to decide,” and when the

terms of a contract are unambiguous, the interpretation of those terms is also a matter of

law. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶ 20, 537 P.3d at 757 (quoting Claman v. Popp, 2012 WY

92, ¶¶ 26–28, 279 P.3d 1003, 1013 (Wyo. 2012)).

[¶29] However, where the terms of a contract are ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is

admissible to clarify those ambiguous terms. Kuhl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WY 85,

¶ 21, 281 P.3d 716, 724 (Wyo. 2012). “An ambiguous contract is an agreement which is

obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of expression, or because a double

meaning is present.” Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶ 20, 537 P.3d at 757 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Wyo. 1996)). Where

a contract term is ambiguous, summary judgment is typically improper. Hopkins v. Bank

of the West, 2013 WY 129, ¶ 13, 311 P.3d 151, 155 (Wyo. 2013). “In that instance, ‘there

exists a question of intent which the trier of fact must resolve.’” Meima v. Broemmel, 2005

WY 87, ¶ 71, 117 P.3d 429, 452 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Western Utility Contractors, Inc. v.

City of Casper, 731 P.2d 24, 28 (Wyo.1986)); accord Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶ 34, 537

P.3d at 760 (reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing “to determine the parties’

original intent and enforce the [agreement] accordingly.”).

[¶30] The settlement agreement’s non-disparagement clause provides that Chief Brenner

and the Town “shall not demean, disparage, defame or otherwise talk negatively in any

way about Mr. Drewry regarding the investigation, termination or resignation.” The words

“demean,” “disparage,” and “defame” all have common definitions and would convey a

plain and unambiguous meaning to reasonable persons at the time and place of the

settlement agreement’s execution. However, they are encompassed by the broadest phrase

in the non-disparagement clause: “otherwise talk negatively in any way[.]” In the context

of talking about another person, the word “negative” has relevant definitions of “adverse,

unfavorable”; “lacking positive qualities”; “marked by features of hostility, withdrawal, or

pessimism . . . that hinder or oppose constructive treatment or development”; and

“promoting a person or cause by criticizing or attacking the competition[.]” Negative,

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negative (last visited Oct.

6, 2025). The non-disparagement clause therefore prohibits a broad class of statements by

Chief Brenner and the Town that are adverse, unfavorable, not positive, hostile,

oppositional, critical, or attacking toward Mr. Drewry. See id.

[¶31] This broad prohibition, however, is limited by the non-disparagement clause itself,

which prohibits negative statements only to the extent they are “regarding the investigation,

termination or resignation.” Mr. Drewry challenges only those statements in the Brenner

memo pertaining to “the investigation.” He argues “the investigation” concerned more than

just the blood draw incident. He contends that Chief Brenner’s post-termination

investigation into Mr. Drewry’s cell phone records, as well as his reference to Mr. Drewry’s

alleged affair in a memo he authored prior to Mr. Drewry’s termination, indicate that “the

11

investigation” also pertained to the alleged affair. Chief Brenner and the Town respond that

the only subject of “the investigation” was the blood draw incident.

[¶32] The phrase “the investigation” is ambiguous. No party disputes that “the

investigation” referenced in the non-disparagement clause was initiated as a result of the

blood draw incident. However, the scope of the investigation is unclear from the record.

Before Chief Brenner terminated Mr. Drewry, he sent him a memo updating him on the

process. In it, he explained that he and Town officials “discussed possible outcomes, and

prior disciplinary actions taken since you have been employed here as well as reviewing

video and case laws.” (emphasis added) Additionally, Chief Brenner recorded the

conversation where he informed Mr. Drewry of his termination. During that conversation,

he explained that he and the Town council “also discussed your performance here and as

far as your other—other disciplinary actions years ago, and they felt that it was unbefitting

for a sergeant to be two—two times in five years of being in the hot seat, essentially.” While

“the investigation” was undoubtedly spurred by the blood draw incident, Chief Brenner’s

own statements indicate that the process that resulted in Mr. Drewry’s termination also

concerned Mr. Drewry’s past conduct.

[¶33] The word “investigation” means “to observe or study by close examination and

systematic inquiry.” Investigation, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/investigate. On its own, the phrase “the investigation” has a

common and uncontroversial definition. Notably, however, the non-disparagement clause

in the settlement agreement clearly references a specific investigation. We “may look to

the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose of the contract to

ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the [settlement] agreement was made,” N. Silo

Res., LLC v. Deselms, 2022 WY 116A, ¶ 15, 518 P.3d 1074, 1081 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting

Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Res., Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003)),

but doing so on this record still results in ambiguity and disputed issues of fact. It is possible

that by the time Chief Brenner and the Town council considered Mr. Drewry’s prior

disciplinary history, “the investigation” had already concluded and the consideration of that

history simply related to the appropriate disciplinary action. However, it is also possible

that “the investigation” continued until Chief Brenner and the council decided to terminate

Mr. Drewry. By the indefiniteness of their expression, the parties have created the

possibility of a double meaning. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶ 20, 537 P.3d at 757. Therefore,

summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was improper. Hopkins, 2013 WY 129,

¶ 13, 311 P.3d at 155.

[¶34] The parties also dispute what Chief Brenner meant when he referenced

Mr. Drewry’s “history of deception” in the Brenner memo. Chief Brenner argues that “[n]ot

one word, phrase, or sentence in the memorandum mentions the December 2021 internal

investigation[.]” The Brenner memo is not a contract though, and the trier of fact is not

bound by the four corners of the memo in determining its meaning. See Van Vlack, 2023

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WY 104, ¶ 20, 437 P.3d at 757. Additionally, until the phrase “the investigation” is clarified,

we cannot be certain what type of references in the memo would constitute a breach of the

settlement agreement. The task for the trier of fact in this case will be to first determine the

scope of the phrase “the investigation,” and then determine whether the Brenner memo

made any negative statements (express or implied) that concerned “the investigation.”

B. Chief Brenner was not obligated by law to distribute the Brenner memo.

[¶35] Chief Brenner and the Town argue a separate basis to affirm summary judgment on

the breach of contract claim. The settlement agreement contains the following provision:

Compliance with Law. Nothing in this agreement shall

be construed as relieving the Parties of the obligation to

comply with all federal, state or local laws, regulations,

ordinances or rules, nor shall any provisions of the Agreement

be deemed to be permission to engage in any act or practice

prohibited by law, regulation, or rule.

Chief Brenner and the Town contend the Chief had a duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) to disclose any credibility concerns

regarding Mr. Drewry to the relevant prosecutors.

[¶36] While the Brady obligation is an important one, Chief Brenner and the Town provide

little analysis for the weighty proposition that the Chief was somehow affirmatively

obligated to author and distribute the Brenner memo. They also overlook the fact that Brady

places a duty on the prosecutor to disclose material favorable evidence to the defendant in

each individual criminal case. 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b) (4th

ed. November 2024 Update). Even the most liberal interpretation of Brady requires that the

evidence in question have a “favorable relevancy” to the specific criminal case at hand. See

id. Any proper analysis under Brady must therefore be done in the context of a particular

criminal case. See id. Chief Brenner and the Town’s suggestion that the Chief was obligated

to prophylactically disclose Mr. Drewry’s alleged credibility issues in every future

hypothetical case involving Mr. Drewry is an extraordinary one, and it is not supported by

their brief analyses.

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CONCLUSION

[¶37] The undisputed facts in this case show that Mr. Drewry’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress and defamation claims are precluded by qualified immunity. We

therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Chief Brenner and the

Town on both of those claims. However, the phrase “the investigation” as used in the

settlement agreement is ambiguous. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding that

phrase’s meaning, the resolution of which will inform whether the Brenner memo, as

viewed by the trier of fact, violated the non-disparagement clause. We reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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