Horton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

IRISH HORTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-01259-WFJ-CPT

BEACON WOODS EAST

MASTER ASSOCIATION, INC.,

RONNIE ARMSTRONG, and

CHRISTOPHER SKENE,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Christoper Skene, Beacon Woods East

Master Association, Inc. (“Beacon Woods”), and Ronnie Armstrong’s Motions to

Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Dkts. 27, 28, 32. Plaintiff Irish Horton has

responded in opposition. Dkts. 39, 40, 45. After careful consideration, the Court

grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of Plaintiff Horton’s expulsion from a residential

clubhouse in his subdivision when attempting to attend a resident association

meeting on May 20, 2023.1 Horton is an “extremely dark-skinned, Black/African-

1 The Court recites the facts based on the allegations within the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 17), which it must accept

as true in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1992); Quality Foods

de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp. S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994 (11th Cir. 1983).

American male,” who is physically disabled. Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 10, 12. Horton’s physical

disability requires “continued medical treatment related to his back, shoulder, and

limbs,” along with the use of a service dog. Id. ¶ 10. Horton’s wife is also

“Black/African American.” Id. ¶ 12.

Horton and his spouse are residents of Barrington Woods, a residential

subdivision located in New Port Richey, Florida. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant Beacon Woods

is a master association overseeing multiple residential subdivisions, including the

Barrington Woods residential subdivision. Id. ¶¶ 4, 14. As part of Defendant Beacon

Woods’ master association, Barrington Wood and all its residents, including Horton,

are bound to the homeowners association covenants. Id.; see Dkt. 21-1 (showing the

“Beacon Woods East Recreation Associate Rules and Regulations”). Defendant

Beacon Woods provides a clubhouse for Barrington Woods residents, and Horton

claims he submitted registration papers for his service dog to the clubhouse manager

in 2020. Dkt. 21 ¶ 16.

On May 20, 2023, Horton, along with his wife and service dog, went to the

clubhouse to attend an association meeting for Barrington Woods residents. Id. ¶ 17.

Defendant Armstrong, who served as Beacon Woods’ homeowners association

(“HOA”) president, and Defendant Skene, who was the Barrington Woods HOA

vice president, were in attendance. Id. ¶ 18. Defendants Armstrong and Skene are

both “White/Caucasian.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Armstrong and Skene, “[a]cting under the

authority of their official roles, . . . collaborated to deny Horton access to the

Clubhouse, and its bathroom facilities because of Horton’s race and . . . disability.”

Id. ¶ 19. Specifically, when Horton arrived at the clubhouse, Defendant “Armstrong

invaded Horton’s privacy” by following Plaintiff “into the men’s restroom and

forcibly opened the bathroom stall where Horton was defecating.” Id. ¶ 22. While

Plaintiff was in the bathroom, Defendant Armstrong “repeatedly harassed and

threatened Horton to leave the premises,” telling Plaintiff that clubhouse policy did

not allow pets in the facility, despite official signage posted a week before the

incident allowing service animals in the clubhouse. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23. During these

interactions, Plaintiff informed Defendant “Armstrong that his dog was a certified

service animal to no avail.” Id. ¶ 25.

After leaving the restroom, Plaintiff attempted to attend the scheduled

association meeting and implored Defendants Skene and Armstrong to cease the

abuse and harassment. Id. ¶ 26. Defendant Armstrong, however, continued to tell

Plaintiff to leave, loudly stating, “Sir, you can’t have that dog in the building.” Id. ¶

27. During this time, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Skene was aware of the dog’s

designation as a service animal, but “acquiesced in the discrimination and

harassment . . . by further denying access to the Clubhouse facilities . . . and also

demanded that Horton leave the premises.” Id. ¶ 28. At some point, Defendants

Armstrong and Skene “chased Horton out of the Clubhouse, and continued to berate

Horton in the presence of other community residents by loudly exclaiming, ‘Prove

it!’” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff further alleges that shortly after the incident, Horton

approached Defendant Armstrong to discuss his disability, but “Armstrong remained

unapologetic and maintained that Horton was ‘fit,’ ‘anyone could buy the [service]

vest [for a dog],’ and ‘that didn’t prove anything.’” Id. ¶ 33.

On or about May 27, 2023, Plaintiff informed Maureen Gontarek, a Master

Beacon Woods HOA board member, of the alleged discrimination and harassment

on May 20, 2023. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff also complained to Timothy Littlefield, a Beacon

Woods official, about the alleged discrimination. Id. ¶ 35. When Defendant Beacon

Woods remained indifferent and unresponsive to Plaintiff’s complaints, Plaintiff

wrote a letter dated June 15, 2023, to Barrington Woods HOA President David Hale.

Id. ¶ 36.

On August 6, 2023, at another Barrington Woods HOA meeting, Defendant

Skene characterized the incident as a “misunderstanding,” and a corresponding note

was published in the October 2023 newsletter for residents. Id. ¶ 37. Additionally,

on November 15, 2023, a Beacon Woods meeting was held to address discrimination

and harassment against Plaintiff, but no admonishment or disciplinary action was

taken against Defendants Armstrong and Skene. Id. ¶¶ 38–39.

On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against Defendants. Dkt.

1. On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, alleging sixteen counts

against Defendants under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and

3617; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982; and common law Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress (“IIED”). See Dkt. 21. In response, each Defendant filed a

motion to dismiss the various counts against them. See Dkts. 27, 28, 32. Specifically,

Defendant Beacon Woods seeks a partial dismissal of Counts III–VII (Dkt. 28),

Defendant Armstrong seeks dismissal of Counts VIII–X2 (Dkt. 32), and Defendant

Skene seeks dismissal of Counts XI–XVI (Dkt. 27). The Court will discuss each

motion in turn.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief to give the defendant fair

notice of the claims and grounds. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (citation omitted). The plaintiff is required to allege “more than labels

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Id. (citation omitted). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the

court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wiersum v.

2 Defendant Armstrong’s motion mistakenly seeks dismissal of “claims XII through X.” Dkt. 32 at 1. However, a

review of the motion to dismiss clearly shows that Defendant Armstrong seeks dismissal of Counts VIII–X in the

Amended Complaint. See generally id.

U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015). A complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78

(2009) (citation modified). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent

dismissal.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Beacon Woods’ Motion to Dismiss Counts III–VII

a. Count III—Unlawful Race Discrimination under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §

3604(b)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate

against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because

of race, color, . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The Eleventh Circuit has

explained that “the language of the FHA is broad and inclusive, prohibits a wide

range of conduct, has a broad remedial purpose, and is written in decidedly far-

reaching terms.” Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 133 F.4th 1032,

1039 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). As such, “[s]ection 3604(b) prohibits race-

based discrimination related to the sale or rental of a home, including its attendant

facilities and services.” Id.; see 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (clarifying that unlawful

post-acquisition conduct includes limitations on a homeowner’s access to privileges,

services, or facilities associated with their home).

“A plaintiff can establish a violation under the FHA by proving intentional

discrimination (disparate treatment), discriminatory impact (disparate impact), or a

refusal to make a reasonable accommodation.” Price v. Howard, No. 1:22-CV-

02056-SDG, 2023 WL 2767770, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2023) (citing Bonasera v.

City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x 581, 583 (11th Cir. 2009)).3 In this case, the

allegations in the Amended Complaint seem to suggest that Plaintiff is bringing a

disparate treatment claim. See Dkt. 21 ¶ 55.

A claim for disparate treatment “requires a plaintiff to show that he has

actually been treated differently than similarly situated” individuals outside of his

protected class. Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216 (11th Cir.

2008); see also Bonasera, 342 F. App’x at 584. “To establish a prima facie case of

disparate treatment under the FHA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) her rights

are protected under the FHA, and (2) as a result of the defendant’s discriminatory

conduct, she has suffered a distinct and palpable injury.” Price v. Howard, 2023 WL

2767770, at *3 (citing Raymond v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2022 WL 2826454,

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited

when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th

Cir. 2022).

at *13 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2022), appeal dismissed, 2022 WL 10704871 (11th Cir.

Sept. 2, 2022)).

Here, the Court finds that Horton has not sufficiently pleaded a prima facie

case of disparate treatment under the FHA. Taking the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, the HOA recreation rules (Dkt. 21-1) govern the usage of certain

facilities in the Barrington Woods subdivision and establish additional rights and

obligations that Plaintiff accepted when moving into Barrington Woods. Dkt. 21 ¶¶

4, 14. These additional rights included access to “club facilities.” Dkt. 21-1 at 1. As

such, “[t]hese rights fall squarely within the common usage definitions of

‘privileges, services, and facilities associated with a dwelling.’” Watts, 133 F.4th at

1042. Plaintiff has also satisfactorily alleged that he is a “Black/African-American

male,” and therefore a member of a protected class under the FHA. Dkt. 21 ¶ 12.

However, Plaintiff has also not sufficiently pled facts suggesting that Horton’s

treatment by Defendants Armstrong and Skene, when expelling and barring him

from entering the clubhouse, stemmed from racial discriminatory animus. See id. ¶¶

12–32. While a plaintiff who has his “use of privileges, services or facilities

associated with a dwelling” limited because of his race may have a claim for

disparate treatment under the FHA, 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4), Hortin has not alleged

facts showing that he was actually treated any differently than non-black residents

who were allowed into the clubhouse to without being accosted. Instead, all of

Plaintiff’s allegations suggest a discriminatory animus stemming from his disability

and that he was treated differently from non-disabled residents.

For example, when Defendant Armstrong accosted Plaintiff in the restroom,

“Armstrong repeatedly harassed and threatened Horton to leave the premises, . . .

asserting that Horton’s [service] dog was prohibited at the Clubhouse.” Dkt. 21 ¶ 23.

Furthermore, the alleged verbal statements made by Defendant Armstrong all refer

to Plaintiff’s disability, not his race: “Sir, you can’t have that dog in the building,”

saying Plaintiff needed to “prove” he has a disability, telling Plaintiff that he does

not have a disability because he is “fit,” claiming “anyone could buy the [service]

vest [for a dog],” and “that [having a service vest on a dog] didn’t prove anything.”

Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 33. During the incident, Plaintiff repeatedly informed Defendant

“Armstrong that his dog was a certified service animal to no avail.” Id. ¶ 25. As to

Defendant Skene, Plaintiff plainly alleges that “being aware of the dog’s designation

as a service animal, Skene acquiesced in the discrimination and harassment of

Horton by further denying access to the Clubhouse facilities to Horton and also

demanded that Horton leave the premises.” Id. ¶ 28. Put simply, Plaintiff has not

established that “race played some role” in Defendants Armstrong and Skene’s

actions. Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991). Because

none of the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint can support a claim for

unlawful race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), the Court dismisses Count

III for stating an insufficient claim.

b. Count IV—Unlawful Race-Based Interference under the FHA, 42

U.S.C. § 3617

The FHA also makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere

with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected

by Section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. However,

“[t]he Eleventh Circuit has recognized that § 3617 does not require proof of an

independent violation of §§ 3603–3606 to create liability.” Petricca v. Saxony

Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 23-CV-81581, 2024 WL 5683535, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 25,

2024) (citing Sofarelli, 931 F.2d at 722). As such, to state a § 3617 interference

claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the plaintiff exercised or enjoyed ‘any right

granted or protected by’ Sections 3603–3606; (2) that the defendant’s conduct

constituted interference; and (3) a causal connection existed between the exercise or

enjoyment of the right and the defendant’s conduct.” Moore v. Camden Prop. Tr.,

816 F. App’x 324, 335 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3617).

Here, as discussed above, the Court has already found that there is no

underlying § 3604(b) violation for racial discrimination. While Plaintiff likely

alleged a claim for unlawful disability-based interference under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 in

Count II, see Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 47–52 (showing “Count II UNLAWFUL DISABILITY

INTERFERENCE”), Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that any interference by

Defendants was connected to Plaintiff’s race. Again, Plaintiff’s allegations about

being expelled and barred from the clubhouse all relate to Plaintiff’s disability and

his use of a service animal, not his status as an African American. Id. ¶¶ 23–33. As

for the few instances where the Amended Complaint mentions “race” and “racial

animus,” they are all conclusory statements devoid of any factual support. Id. ¶¶ 19,

20, 60. Nor is Plaintiff’s unsupported allegation that Defendants Armstrong and

Skene were “patronizing” to Horton and considered him to be a “Black, disabled

simpleton” enough to survive dismissal. Id. ¶ 32; see Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.

Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions of facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will

not prevent dismissal.”).

As another district court has noted, “[i]nterference is more than a quarrel

among neighbors or an isolated act of discrimination, but rather is a pattern of

harassment, invidiously motivated.” LaGrasso v. Seven Bridges Homeowners Ass’n,

Inc., No. 20-81163-CV, 2021 WL 3417809, at *9 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2021) (quoting

Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Amended Complaint is

devoid of any allegations showing an invidious pattern of harassment as it relates to

Plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff cannot pigeonhole a one-time incident concerning the use

of a service animal in the clubhouse into a race-based interference claim. As such,

because none of the factual allegations can support a claim for unlawful race-based

interference under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, the Court dismisses Count IV.

c. Count V—Unlawful Race Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Next, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 states that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the

United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981(a). The statute defines the right to “make and enforce contracts” as

“includ[ing] the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts[]

and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.” Id. § 1981(b). “Unlike the FHA, Section 1981 applies to the creation

and enforceability of all contracts.” Watts, 133 F.4th at 1044. “To state a claim of

race discrimination under § 1981, plaintiffs must allege facts establishing: (1) that

the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) that the defendant intended to

discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one or

more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1270.

Here, Horton—as an African American—is a member of a racial minority,

and the Amended Complaint alleges discrimination concerning an enumerated

activity: the right to enjoy the benefits and privileges (i.e., the clubhouse) of the

contractual relationship. Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 4, 12, 14. Thus, the central issue of Plaintiff’s

Section 1981 claim is whether Horton has alleged facts sufficient to support the

second element—that Defendants engaged in intentional racial discrimination and

that it caused construal injury. See Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1270; Gen. Bldg.

Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (holding that “§

1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can only be violated by purposeful

discrimination”).

As to element two, “a plaintiff may establish racial discrimination directly or

circumstantially.” Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.

2021) (citing Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)). “To

state a claim for direct racial discrimination, a plaintiff must allege the overt

invocation of race by the alleged discriminator—for instance, the use of a racial slur

or racially charged language.” Id.; see Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc.,

490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding intentional discrimination established

directly where defendant’s employee used a racial slur).

Here, Horton’s has not adequately alleged direct discrimination. The

Amended Complaint contains no allegations that Defendants ever disparaged his

race, used racially charged language, or otherwise said anything about race to

anyone. To be sure, Plaintiff alleges plenty of disparaging comments made by

Defendant Armstrong regarding his disability and use of a service animal, but

nothing suggests these comments stemmed from Horton’s race as an African

American. “Because not all discrimination based on appearance is based on race,”

Horton has not alleged facts that would establish direct discrimination. Ziyadat, 3

F.4th at 1296.

The Court also concludes that Plaintiff failed to allege a plausible

circumstantial case of racial discrimination. A Section 1981 plaintiff seeking to

prove racial discrimination by circumstantial evidence may proceed under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, originally developed for Title VII

claims. See Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 n.5 (11th Cir.

2019) (en banc). “To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must point to

comparators of a different race who were ‘similarly situated in all material respects’

and were not subject to the same mistreatment.” Ziyadat, 3 F.4th at 1296 (citing

Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1229). “[T]his typically means that the comparators must have

engaged in the same basic conduct or misconduct, been subject to the same policy,

worked under the same supervisor, and had similar work experience and disciplinary

history.” Id. (citing Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–28).

However, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified that the McDonnell Douglas

framework is “an evidentiary rather than a pleading standard” and “pleading a

McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was not necessary to survive a motion to

dismiss.” Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1270–71. Nevertheless, a plaintiff’s complaint must

still comply with Rule 8(a), as “unsupported conclusions of law or of mixed law and

fact are not sufficient to withstand a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 1271

(citation omitted). Put simply, “[t]he liberal standard of notice pleading still requires

a plaintiff to provide the defendant with fair notice of the factual grounds on which

the complaint rests.” Id.

Here, even under the liberal notice pleading standard, Plaintiff has failed to

adequately allege that he was treated differently from comparators who were

similarly situated to him in all material respects. Horton argues that the allegations

in the Amended Complaint are sufficient, Dkt. 40 at 7, yet the only allegation to

support comparators reads: “Located in Pasco County, Florida, the Beacon Woods

communities, including subdivision Barrington Woods, are comprised of ‘99%’

White/Caucasian residents where the disturbing conduct towards Horton mirrors the

historical segregation of American Black citizens.” Dkt. 21 at ¶ 15. Even if the Court

considered the other residents present at the clubhouse on May 20, 2023, to be

comparators, Horton does not allege how he and the proffered comparators were

similarly situated. Instead, Plaintiff only vaguely states that the incident happened

in the “presence of other residents.” Id. ¶¶ 24, 27, 29. Thus, Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged that any similarly situated residents were treated differently.

While Plaintiff is correct that a substantive assessment of comparators is

generally left to later stages of a case (i.e., summary judgment), see e.g., Lewis, 918

F.3d at 1218, Plaintiff must still comply with Rule 8(a) and plead a facially plausible

claim of race and national origin discrimination. See Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1270–71.

And courts often dismiss complaints for failing to allege sufficient factual support

for the comparators. See Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1270–71; see also Mallory v. Gartner,

Inc., No. 2:21-CV-462-SPC-MRM, 2021 WL 3857652, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30,

2021) (“[Plaintiff] has not plausibly alleged that any similarly situated employees

were treated differently.”); Halstrbrison, LLC v. Se. Overtown/Park W. Cmty.

Redevelopment Agency, No. 24-21786-CIV, 2024 WL 5493421, at *3 (S.D. Fla.

Dec. 18, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 928766 (S.D. Fla.

Mar. 27, 2025) (“Plaintiff has not provided sufficient comparators and thus has not

alleged a predicate constitutional injury.”); Henley v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 267

F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (citation modified) (“[Plaintiff] does not

identify any specific, similarly situated, non-minority individual who was treated

better in a similar situation.”). The same result applies here. Thus, because none of

the factual allegations can support a claim for unlawful racial discrimination under

42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Court dismisses Count V.

d. Count VI—Unlawful Race Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982

Section 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the

same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens thereof to

inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1982. “In contrast to the FHA, Section 1982 protects ‘broadly defined’ property

rights.” Watts, 133 F.4th at 1045 (quoting City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100,

122 (1981)). Similar to a Section 1981 claim, the first two elements of a Section

1982 claim require a plaintiff to “‘adequately allege the same first two elements,’

namely, (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority, and (2) that the

defendant intended to subject the plaintiff to racial discrimination.” Howard v. Gucci

Am., Inc., No. 23-CV-20886, 2023 WL 5747716, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2023)

(quoting Prestige Restaurants & Ent., Inc. v. Bayside Seafood Rest., Inc., No. 09-

23128-CIV, 2010 WL 680905, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2010), aff’d, 417 F. App’x

892 (11th Cir. 2011)). “The third element requires plaintiffs to allege that

defendant’s discrimination amounts to ‘interference with the rights or benefits

connected to the ownership of property.’” Id. (quoting Prestige Restaurants & Ent.,

2010 WL 680905, at *7).

Here, only the second element is in question, whether Horton “was deprived

of his property interest because of an intentional act based on racial animus.”

Humphrey v. United Parcel Serv., 200 F. App’x 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing

Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla. 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint, taken in the most favorable light possible, merely

demonstrates that any intentional act by Defendants was based on animus stemming

from Plaintiff’s disability, not his race. See Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 23–33. Again, Plaintiff failed

to state facts sufficient to show that the restrictions on entering the clubhouse were

imposed on him because of his race or to compare his treatment to that of other

residents. As such, Horton’s Section 1982 claim fails, and the Court dismisses Count

VI.

e. Count VII—IIED Claim

Finally, to state a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

under Florida law, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: ‘(1) the

defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous,

beyond all bounds of decency, and odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress

was severe.’” Plowright v. Miami Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th 1358, 1367–68 (11th Cir.

2024) (quoting Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036, 1053 (11th Cir. 2015)); see also

Gallogly v. Rodriguez, 970 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

As to the second element, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the standard

from § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, explaining “that liability for

intentional infliction of emotional distress attaches ‘only where the conduct has been

so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community.’” Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1368 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co.

v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278–79 (Fla. 1985)). To determine whether this

standard is met, a court considers “whether the recitation of the facts to an average

member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead

him to exclaim, Outrageous!” Id. (citation modified). “Whether conduct is

outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress

is a question of law, not a question of fact.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968

So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citations omitted). This must be evaluated on

an objective basis, and the plaintiff’s subjective response to the conduct does not

control. Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff points to Defendant Armstrong’s action, noting that Armstrong

“followed Horton into the clubhouse restroom and opened the bathroom stall when

Horton was defecating and demanded his removal[,] in the presence of other

attendees Horton was treated like a stranger and denied entrance to the HOA

meeting[,] and was further literally forced out of the building with everyone

witnessing the spectacle.” Dkt. 40 at 12.

While the Court agrees that verbally demanding Plaintiff leave the premises

while using the restroom is demeaning, disrespectful, and unnecessary, these words

and actions alone do not sufficiently establish a claim of IIED, as required by Florida

law. Defendant Armstrong’s conduct was not “so outrageous in character, and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Metro. Life Ins.

Co., 467 So. 2d at 278–79 (citation omitted). Indeed, not only are Florida courts

generally “reluctant to find claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress

based solely on allegations of verbal abuse,” Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230,

1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting De La Campa v. Grifols Am., Inc., 819 So. 2d 940,

943–44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)), but “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, or false

allegations” are not enough. Id. (quoting Williams v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc.,

877 So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)); see also Koutsouradis v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc., 427 F.3d 1339, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Florida case law has consistently

held that mere insults and indignities do not support a claim for the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress.”).

In other words, “Florida courts have rejected IIED claims based on allegations

of conduct far worse than that alleged by [Horton].” Lopez, 676 F.3d 1230, 1236

(11th Cir. 2012); see Lay v. Roux Lab’ys, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA

1980) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s IIED claim where

defendant threatened plaintiff with the loss of her job and began using “humiliating

language, vicious verbal attacks, [and] racial epithets” because, while the court

found the conduct to be “reprehensible,” it did “not think that the alleged conduct

reaches the level of outrageousness and atrociousness,” required by Florida law);

Koutsouradis, 427 F.3d at 1345 (“[O]bscene and sexually explicit comments, verbal

invitations for sex, questions as to a plaintiff’s sexual behavior, sexually suggestive

gestures and the like do not rise to a level sufficient to support the [IIED] tort alleged

here.”). The verbal abuse suffered by Horton from the moment he entered the

clubhouse—while being reprehensible—does not rise to the level of

“outrageousness” necessary to state an IIED claim under Florida law. See Nims v.

Harrison, 768 So. 2d 1198, 1199 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (permitting an IIED claim

based on profane and racially derogatory language that included threats to kill the

plaintiff and to rape her and her children).

As to the allegations of being unable to enter the clubhouse and attend a

meeting with his service animal, such allegations also fall well short of constituting

an IIED claim. See Gutman. v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., No. 09-22939-

CIV, 2010 WL 11505460, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2010) (finding the plaintiff failed

to sufficiently plead an IIED claim when she was “forced to wait an hour and then

refused entry into a diagnostic laboratory and forced to receive blood tests in a

parked car because she was dependent on a service dog”); Hawn v. Shoreline Towers

Phase 1 Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 347 Fed. Appx. 464, 469 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Having

disposed of the Fair Housing Act claims, we need not separately analyze [the

plaintiff’s] tort law claim for [IIED] because his argument as to this issue is wholly

premised on the allegation that [the defendant] recklessly refused to allow [the

plaintiff’s] service animal on the premises.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

IIED claim in Count VII.

II. Defendant Armstrong’s Motion to Dismiss Counts VIII–X

Turning to Defendant Armstrong’s motion to dismiss, Armstrong seeks to

dismiss the following counts against him: the race discrimination claim under

Section 1981 (Count VIII), the race discrimination claim under Section 1982 (Count

IX), and the IIED claim under Florida law (Count X). See Dkt. 32; Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 80–

95. Specifically, Defendant Armstrong argues that all three counts must be dismissed

“because Plaintiff’s lawsuit is entirely premised on Mr. Armstrong’s alleged

discriminatory conduct towards him as it relates to Plaintiff’s unidentified disability,

not his race.” Dkt. 32 at 1–2. Because much of the discussion on each count mirrors

the Court’s prior analysis in the counts against Defendant Beacon Woods, the Court

will incorporate and reference that analysis when relevant.

a. Counts VIII and IX—Unlawful Race Discrimination under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981, 1982

As to Plaintiff’s unlawful race discrimination claims under Sections 1981 and

1982, the Court incorporates its discussion dismissing the same claims against

Defendant Beacon Woods in Counts V and VI. Again, applying the previously

articulated standards for Section 1981 and Section 1982, Plaintiff fails to adequately

allege that he was treated differently from comparators or deprived of any property

interest because of an intentional act based on racial animus. See Ziyadat, 3 F.4th at

1296; Humphrey, 200 F. App’x at 952. None of the allegations in Counts VIII and

IX provide additional facts that would alter the Court’s previous finding that

Plaintiff’s Section 1981 and Section 1982 claims are due to be dismissed. See Dkt.

21 ¶¶ 80–89. Therefore, Horton’s claims in Counts VIII and IX against Defendant

Armstrong are also dismissed.

b. Count X—IIED claim

Plaintiff’s IIED claim against Defendant Armstrong does not fare any better.

In Count X, Plaintiff summarily alleges the following: “Horton brings this Count X

against Defendant Armstrong[;] Armstrong engaged in deliberate or reckless

conduct to inflict emotional distress upon Horton[;] Armstrong’s conduct was

outrageous[;] Armstrong’s conduct caused Horton to suffer emotional distress[;]

[and] Horton’s emotional distress was severe.” Id. ¶¶ 91–95. Again, the Court will

incorporate its prior discussion, as none of the allegations in Count X provide any

additional facts that would alter the Court’s previous finding that the Amended

Complaint falls well short of constituting an IIED claim under Florida law. At most,

Plaintiff’s allegations for this count are a “formulaic recitation” of the IIED

elements, which “will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IIED

claim against Defendant Armstrong is also dismissed.

III. Defendant Skene’s Motion to Dismiss Counts XI–XVI

As to Defendant Skene’s motion to dismiss, Skene seeks to dismiss the

following six counts: the Section 1981 conspiracy to commit racial discrimination

claim (Count XI), the aiding and abetting unlawful race discrimination claim under

Section 1981 (Count XII), the Section 1982 conspiracy to commit racial

discrimination (Count XIII), the aiding and abetting unlawful race discrimination

claim under Section 1982 (Count XIV), the conspiracy to commit IIED under

Florida law (Count XV), and aiding and abetting IIED (Count XVI). See Dkt. 27;

Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 96–133. Because much of the discussion on each count mirrors the

Court’s prior analysis in the counts against Defendants Beacon Woods and

Armstrong, the Court will also incorporate and reference that analysis when relevant.

a. Counts XI–XIV—Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting Claims under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982

As an initial matter, the Court is unsure whether Plaintiff is raising additional

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 claims against Defendant Skene or a 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

claim that Defendant Skene conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his federal rights or

privileges. Interestingly, Plaintiff’s response cites to Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of

Escambia Cnty. Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 317 (11th Cir. 1989), which discussed whether

the plaintiffs adequately alleged a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Dkt.

39 at 10. As such, the Court construes Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims as one under 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3).

To state a claim under Section 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege to following:

“(1) defendants engaged in a conspiracy; (2) the conspiracy’s purpose was to directly

or indirectly deprive a protected person or class the equal protection of the laws, or

equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) a conspirator committed an act

to further the conspiracy; and (4) as a result, the plaintiff suffered injury to either his

person or his property, or was deprived of a right or privilege of a citizen of the

United States.” Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.

2010) (citation omitted).

As discussed above, the Court has already found that the Amended Complaint

failed to allege any violation of Section 1981 or Section 1982 by Skene’s co-

defendants. Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit has already found that conspiracies to

violate rights protected by Section 1981 are not cognizable under Section 1985(3).

See id. (“[W]e hold conspiracies to violate rights protected under § 1981 are likewise

insufficient to form the basis of a § 1985(3) claim.”). As to Section 1982, the Court

cannot find, nor does Plaintiff cite, any binding caselaw showing that a Section 1982

claim is cognizable under Section 1985(3).

The same conclusion applies to Plaintiff’s so-called “aiding and abetting”

counts. The Court cannot find a single case within the Eleventh Circuit holding that

“aiding and abetting unlawful race discrimination” under Section 1981 and Section

1982 are real causes of action. Plaintiff’s sole citation to Romero v. Drummond Co.,

Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) is totally irrelevant, as the appeals court

was determining whether a plaintiff could plead a theory of aiding and abetting

liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Dkt. 39

at 10. Even if “aiding and abetting” under Section 1981 or Section 1982 were

cognizable claims, for the reason discussed above, the Court has already found that

Co-Defendants Beacon Woods and Armstrong did not violate Section 1981 or

Section 1982. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims in Counts XI–XIV against Defendant Skene

are dismissed.

b. Counts XV–XVI—IIED Claims

Regarding the “conspiracy” and “aiding and abetting” IIED claims against

Defendant Skene, the Court need not spend much time discussing these counts.

Under Florida law, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims both require an

underlying tort. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1217 (11th Cir.

1999) (citation modified) (“Under Florida law, an actionable conspiracy requires an

actionable underlying tort or wrong.”); Taubenfeld v. Lasko, 324 So. 3d 529, 543–

44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“To state a claim for aiding and abetting a tort in Florida,

a plaintiff must allege . . . an underlying violation on the part of the primary

wrongdoer[.]”). Here, the Court incorporates its previous analysis articulating why

Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead an IIED claim against Skene’s co-defendants.

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for IIED under Florida law, he likewise

fails to state a claim for “conspiracy” to inflict emotional distress and “aiding and

abetting” IIED under Florida law. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims in Counts XV–XVI

against Defendant Skene are dismissed.4

4 In Plaintiff’s response, there seem to be citations to a totally different amended complaint with different parties. Dkt.

39 at 11. There is neither a defendant “Vople” nor a plaintiff “West” in this case. Id. Nor are there any allegations that

Defendants schemed to control the “LSDS Club.” Id. (“The [Amended Complaint] alleges sufficient facts from which

a reasonable inference could be drawn that Vople participated in a conspiracy to control the LSDS Club.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants Skene, Beacon Woods, and Armstrong’s Motions to Dismiss the

Amended Complaint, Dkts. 27, 28, 32, are GRANTED. Counts III–XVI are

DISMISSED. If Plaintiff seeks to amend, this is due within SEVEN (7) days.

2. If no amendment is forthcoming, Defendant Beacon Woods must file a

responsive pleading to the remaining counts within FOURTEEN (14) days

of the entry of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on November 5, 2025.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record