Mendoza

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ISRAEL MENDOZA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1054-MSS-LSG

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________________/

O R D E R

Mendoza filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging his state court convictions for conspiracy to traffic cocaine and money

laundering. (Doc. 1) After reviewing the response (Doc. 13), the reply (Doc. 15), and

the relevant state court record (Doc. 14), the Court DISMISSES the petition as

untimely.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mendoza pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine and money laundering,

and the trial judge sentenced Mendoza to ten years in prison for the cocaine trafficking

conspiracy conviction and five years in prison for the money laundering conviction.

(Doc. 14-2 at 58–65) The judgment and sentences entered on March 25, 2022

(Doc. 14-2 at 58), and Mendoza did not appeal.

On March 28, 2024, Mendoza filed a motion for post-conviction relief.

(Doc. 14-2 at 82–97) On April 23, 2024, the post-conviction court denied relief

(Doc. 14-2 at 98–100), Mendoza appealed, and the state appellate court dismissed

Mendoza’s appeal because he untimely filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. 14-2 at 130)

Mendoza’s federal petition followed. In his petition, Mendoza asserts that

police arrested him and conducted a search with a defective warrant, the trial judge

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by denying a motion to suppress his statements

recorded by a confidential informant, and the trial judge violated his federal right to

due process by accepting his guilty plea without a factual basis. (Doc. 1 at 6–9)

ANALYSIS

A one-year statute of limitation applies to a federal habeas petition challenging

a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins to run

“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

The judgment entered on March 25, 2022. (Doc. 14-2 at 58) Fla. R. App. P.

9.020 (explaining that rendition of a judgment occurs “when a signed, written order is

filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal”). Mendoza did not appeal, and the time to

appeal expired thirty days after rendition of the judgment — April 25, 2022.1

1 Because thirty days after the rendition of the judgment was Sunday, April 24, 2022,

the time to appeal extended to Monday, April 25, 2022. Fla. R. Jud. Admin.

2.514(a)(1)(C).

Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3). Consequently, the limitation started to run the next day.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A). Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002).

The limitation period ran for a year and expired on April 26, 2023. Because

Mendoza filed his Section 2254 petition almost two years later, on March 12, 2025

(Doc. 1 at 16), the petition is untimely. Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301

(11th Cir. 2001) (“Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other

records, we will assume that Washington’s motion was delivered to prison authorities

the day he signed it . . . .”).

“[A] properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review” tolls the limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On March 28, 2024, almost a year

after the limitation period expired, Mendoza placed in the hands of prison officials for

mailing a motion for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14-2 at 82–97) Haag v. State, 591 So.

2d 614, 617 (Fla. 1992). Because Mendoza filed his post-conviction motion after the

limitation period expired, the motion did not toll the limitation. Sibley v. Culliver, 377

F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a deadline has expired, there is nothing left

to toll. A state court filing after the federal habeas filing deadline does not revive it.”).

Mendoza contends that his petition is timely because (Doc. 1 at 14–15):

In order to exhaust my claims through all remedies

provided through the State, it took time and consistent effort

researching, writing, and filing. I have followed all state

procedural rules seeking justice through the provided

remedies. I have not prevailed and now seek justice from a

higher court. There is a clear showing of evidence that there

has been a constitutional error, and I am imprisoned in

violation of the Constitution. The facts presented in my case

show the conception of federal [and] state relations that

undervalued procedural rules and Constitutional rights.

A result of the alleged violation of federal law is

fundamental, and the failure to consider these claims will

result in a miscarriage of justice.

In his reply, Mendoza further asserts that the one-year federal limitation that

applies to a Section 2254 petition violates the Suspension Clause of the United States

Constitution, that the limitation equitably tolled, and that actual innocence excuses

the time bar. (Doc. 15)

Suspension Clause

Mendoza asserts that the one-year federal limitation that applies to a Section

2254 petition violates the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. (Doc.

15 at 3–7) He contends that the federal limitation suspends the writ by categorically

barring an untimely claim, despite any diligence by the petitioner or the merit of the

claim. (Doc. 15 at 4) He further contends that the federal limitation suspends the writ

by requiring a petitioner to exhaust his remedies in state court within one year, even

though state procedural rules provide a defendant two years to seek relief in state court.

(Doc. 15 at 5)

As Mendoza acknowledges (Doc. 15 at 6), Wyzykowski v. Dep’t Corrs., 226 F.3d

1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000), concluded that “as a general matter, the Section 2244(d)

limitation period does not render the collateral relief ineffective or inadequate to test

the legality of detention, and therefore is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus.”

Also, Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2001) (omitting

footnotes three and four), rejected the argument that Section 2244(d) violated the

Suspension Clause:

Alternatively, Tinker argues that if his claim is time barred,

Section 2244(d) is unconstitutional as applied to him

because it violates the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art.

I, § 9, cl. 2., and forces him to choose between exercising

his right to meaningful access to the state courts which

provide a two-year limitation period and the right to

petition for federal habeas relief.

We find no merit in Tinker’s argument. In Wyzykowski v.

Dep’t Corrs., 226 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2000), we said that “as

a general matter, the Section 2244(d) limitation period does

not render the collateral relief ineffective or inadequate to

test the legality of detention, and therefore is not an

unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”

Id. at 1217.2 Thus, “Section 2244(d) does not per se

constitute an unconstitutional suspension” of the writ. Id.

See also Lucidore v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 113

(2d Cir. 2000); Molo v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 773, 775 (5th Cir.

2000) (per curiam); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th

Cir. 1998). Moreover, the availability of equitable tolling in

cases “when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable even with diligence,” Steed, 219

F.3d at 1300 (quotation and citation omitted), ensures that

Section 2244’s limitation is constitutionally applied, as it

was here.

2 The Suspension Clause provides: “The

Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall

not be suspended, unless when in Cases of

Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may

require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Despite

this restriction, the Supreme Court has held

that “judgments about the proper scope of the

writ are ‘normally for Congress to make.’”

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)

(quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323

(1996)). In Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372

(1977), the Supreme Court held that “the

substitution of a collateral remedy which is

neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the

legality of a person’s detention does not

constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus.” Id. at 381.

Further, we reject Tinker’s “impermissible choice”

argument. By virtue of statute, Tinker is provided both a

state and federal forum in which to seek post-conviction

relief. Despite his argument to the contrary, he need not

forego his state remedy entirely in order to avail himself of

the federal remedy. However, he must exercise it within one

year of the date his judgment became final and do so in a

manner that leaves him sufficient time to timely file his

federal petition.

However, Mendoza argues that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), holds

that any substitute for habeas relief must provide an adequate and effective remedy

and that a restriction that denies meaningful review violates the Suspension Clause.

(Doc. 15 at 3–4) Mendoza’s reliance on Boumediene is misplaced.

In Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–35, the petitioners, who were enemy combatants

detained at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, challenged a

statute that prohibited an enemy combatant from seeking habeas relief. Boumediene,

553 U.S. at 771, 792, held that the statute that prohibited an enemy combatant from

seeking habeas relief suspended the writ of habeas corpus and that a military tribunal

created to provide an enemy combatant due process was an inadequate substitute for

habeas relief.

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782–83, distinguished between detention authorized by

a judgment in a criminal case and detention authorized by an executive order:

Accordingly, where relief is sought from a sentence that

resulted from the judgment of a court of record, as was the

case in Watkins and indeed in most federal habeas cases,

considerable deference is owed to the court that ordered

confinement. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)

(opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (noting that a federal habeas

court should accept a state court’s factual findings unless

“a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such

facts in the State court”). Likewise in those cases the

prisoner should exhaust adequate alternative remedies

before filing for the writ in federal court. See Ex parte Royall,

117 U.S. 241, 251–252 (1886) (requiring exhaustion of state

collateral processes). Both aspects of federal habeas corpus

review are justified because it can be assumed that, in the

usual course, a court of record provides defendants with a

fair, adversary proceeding. In cases involving state

convictions this framework also respects federalism; and in

federal cases it has added justification because the prisoner

already has had a chance to seek review of his conviction in

a federal forum through a direct appeal. The present cases

fall outside these categories, however; for here the detention

is by executive order.

Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than,

say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for

collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in

the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a

tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to

procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These

dynamics are not inherent in executive detention orders or

executive review procedures. In this context the need for

habeas corpus is more urgent. The intended duration of the

detention and the reasons for it bear upon the precise scope

of the inquiry. Habeas corpus proceedings need not

resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention is by

executive order. But the writ must be effective. The habeas

court must have sufficient authority to conduct a

meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the

Executive’s power to detain.

Because Mendoza challenges his detention authorized by a judgment in a state

criminal case, Boumediene does not entitle Mendoza to relief.

Even though Section 2254(b) requires Mendoza to exhaust his remedies in state

court, Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the federal limitation while a properly filed post-

conviction motion and post-conviction appeal are pending. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d

1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000). Even if Mendoza fails to timely file a federal petition, he

may argue either that the limitation equitably tolled or that actual innocence excuses

the time bar. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).

Because Congress has the authority to narrow the scope of the writ of habeas

corpus by enacting the one-year limitation and because statutory tolling under Section

2244(d)(2), equitable tolling, and actual innocence ensure that the remedy is both

adequate and effective, Mendoza’s claim based on the Suspension Clause is meritless.

See Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Just as Congress can expand

the availability of habeas relief, so can it add some restrictions to the issuance of the

writ without effectuating its suspension. . . . AEDPA falls on the permissible restriction

side of the Suspension Clause line.”). Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“[T]he one-year limitation period of section 2244(d)(1), as embellished by the tolling

provision of section 2244(d)(2), does not suspend the writ because, when read in

tandem, these provisions neither gut the writ of habeas corpus nor render it impuissant

to test the legality of a prisoner’s detention. Tolling the limitation period during the

pendency of state post-conviction proceedings leaves habeas petitioners with a

reasonable opportunity to have their claims heard on the merits.”) (citations omitted).

Equitable Tolling

Mendoza asserts that “[t]he conflicting time frames — Florida’s two-year Rule

3850 window versus AEDPA’s one-year [window] — constitute an extraordinary

circumstance” that justifies equitable tolling. (Doc. 15 at 7–8) He contends that a

diligent Florida prisoner who files a timely Rule 3.850 motion becomes “trapped” by

missing the deadline for a Section 2254 petition. (Doc. 15 at 7–8)

Equitable tolling applies to a Section 2254 petition and requires the petitioner

to demonstrate “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland,

560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).

The two-year limitation under Rule 3.850 and the one-year federal limitation

under Section 2244(d) apply to all state prisoners in Florida. “[P]ro se litigants, like all

others, are deemed to know of the one-year statute of limitations.” Outler v. United

States, 485 F.3d 1273, 1282 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007). Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 172

(5th Cir. 2000) (“[M]ere ignorance of the law or lack of knowledge of filing deadlines

does not justify equitable tolling or other exceptions to a law’s requirements.”).

Mendoza’s confusion about the difference between the two-year limitation

under Rule 3.850 and the one-year limitation under Section 2244(d) is not an

extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from timely filing a Section 2254

petition. Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t Corrs., 513 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[F]ederal

habeas petitioners who rely upon the timeliness of state post-conviction proceedings

to satisfy the requirements of AEDPA do so at their peril.”); Cole v. Warden, Ga. State

Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Determining whether a factual

circumstance is extraordinary to satisfy equitable tolling depends not on ‘how unusual

the circumstance alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of prisoners, but

rather how severe an obstacle it is for the prisoner endeavoring to comply with

AEDPA’s limitations period.’”) (citation omitted); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d

1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (“As for the ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prong, like the

Supreme Court’s articulation in Holland, we too have required a defendant to show a

causal connection between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and the late filing

of the petition.”).

Also, on April 26, 2023, the limitation period expired. On July 15, 2024, the

state appellate court dismissed as untimely Mendoza’s appeal of the order denying

post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14-2 at 130) Almost eight months later, on March 12,

2025, Mendoza filed his Section 2254 petition. (Doc. 1 at 16) Because Mendoza did

not diligently seek federal habeas relief, the federal limitation did not equitably toll.

Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (“And not only did petitioner sit on his rights for years before he

filed his [state post-conviction] petition, but he also sat on them for five more months

after his [state post-conviction] proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief

in federal court. Under long-established principles, petitioner’s lack of diligence

precludes equity’s operation.”) (italics in original and citations omitted); Melson v.

Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t Corrs., 713 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2013) (“While a petitioner is

only required to exercise ‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible

diligence,’ Melson took no independent steps to ensure that his federal habeas petition

was timely filed.”) (citation omitted).

Miscarriage of Justice

To obtain relief based on a miscarriage of justice, Mendoza must demonstrate

actual innocence. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392. “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway

pleas are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he

persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)).

“To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was

not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Mendoza fails to submit any new reliable evidence that demonstrates his

actual innocence. He instead contends that unreliable and unproven allegations

supported the factual basis for his guilty plea. (Docs. 1 at 9 and 15 at 8–9)

An affidavit by an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration

demonstrated a factual basis for Mendoza’s guilty plea (Doc. 14-2 at 9–13):

Since August 2015, the DEA Tampa District Office, the

Manatee County Sheriff’s Office, [the] Sarasota County

Sheriff’s Office, and [the] Bradenton Police Department,

hereinafter referred to as Investigating Agency, have been

investigating a drug trafficking organization operating

throughout Manatee and Sarasota Counties. The

investigation identified that Israel Mendoza was

responsible for acquiring narcotics outside the State of

Florida, then distributing those narcotics throughout

Manatee and Sarasota Counties.

Most recently, Israel Mendoza obtained a supply of cocaine

in Houston, Texas, which he ultimately planned to

distribute throughout Manatee and Sarasota Counties. This

was supported by lawfully recorded communications in

conjunction with physical and electronic surveillance, and

lawful stops that led to [a] seizure of cocaine from Israel

Mendoza and Norma Mendoza.

In February of 2017, a confidential source of the DEA

reported to your affiant that Israel Mendoza intended on

acquiring a supply of cocaine from Texas. During this time,

the CS met with Israel Mendoza in Sarasota County,

Florida. The CS recorded the meeting; your affiant has

reviewed the recording. During the meeting, Israel

Mendoza informed the CS that the cocaine was in Houston,

Texas and he intended on picking up “five.” The CS told

your affiant that he [or] she knows “five” to be in reference

to five kilograms of cocaine. Throughout the meeting, Israel

Mendoza directed the CS to rent a vehicle for travel to

Houston, Texas, and return to Florida with the cocaine.

In March 2017, the CS met with Israel Mendoza in

Manatee County, Florida. During the meeting, Israel

Mendoza provided the CS with $580.00. The CS advised

the funds were to be used for expenses incurred for travel to

Houston, Texas.

Throughout March 3, 2017, the CS was in [a] recorded

conversation with Israel Mendoza reference the pending

cocaine transaction. Also, on March 3, 2017, the CS

recorded a conversation between Israel Mendoza and

Norma Mendoza. The conversation was in the Spanish

language and summarized by a Spanish speaking law

enforcement agent. Throughout the conversation, Norma

and Israel Mendoza discussed the arrangements concerning

the transport of the cocaine they were expecting. Norma

Mendoza conveyed to Israel Mendoza that she had a

conversation with her contact and that she commented,

“How is that kid going to hide that?” Your affiant believes

that Norma Mendoza is referring to the CS as “kid.” In

regards to “[ ] hide that,” your affiant believes that Norma

Mendoza asked Israel Mendoza how the CS would conceal

the cocaine. Norma Mendoza also mentioned she

explained to her contact that he [or] she (the CS) will have

to accommodate [and] hide that (cocaine) in a good

manner. Israel Mendoza commented to Norma Mendoza,

“What about if I ask them to bring it to a hotel?” Norma

Mendoza stated to Israel Mendoza that she will tell her

contacts that they should rent a hotel room; Israel Mendoza

commented that they (Israel and Norma Mendoza) will rent

the hotel room. Norma Mendoza immediately asked,

“Why us?” (referring to the room rental). Norma Mendoza

then told Israel Mendoza that they should rent an

inexpensive room.

Israel Mendoza suggested that they should rent a room

nearby and then he commented to Norma Mendoza, “Why

the fuck are we going to transport that (cocaine), they

should take that (cocaine) over there to the room at the hotel

and we will move over there, [ ]1, we get to the room and

they bring it (cocaine) to us over there so that we don’t have

to take it to the hotel.”

1 Your affiant has removed the name of the CS

from this statement by Israel Mendoza to

protect the identity of the CS.

Furthermore, Norma and Israel Mendoza discussed their

displeasure as to how the arrangements were made by their

source of supply. Israel Mendoza asked Norma Mendoza

to give him the phone so that he could call “Huero” to

explain to him how unhappy he was with the arrangements.

During this exchange [ ], Norma Mendoza explained to

Israel Mendoza that we cannot go and open these things

(referring to the cocaine). Norma Mendoza further stated

that she is going to give them (her contacts) the address so

that they can come over (referring to the hotel) and that it

would be better if he [or] she (the CS) rented the hotel room

near a highway exit.

Subsequently, Israel Mendoza told the CS that he intended

on acquiring the supply of cocaine, which was to occur in

the parking lot of an Academy Sports in Houston, Texas.

On this date, law enforcement conducted physical

surveillance of Israel Mendoza, and his wife Norma

Mendoza. Surveillance observed the Mendozas arrive in the

Academy Sports parking lot. They parked and exited their

vehicle, a 2008 Dodge Caravan displaying Florida license

plate 777QJT. Surveillance watched both Israel and Norma

Mendoza enter the Academy Sports business.

A short time later, Norma Mendoza was observed exiting

the store with Veronica Soto2. Soto was observed removing

a bag from a vehicle parked next to Norma Mendoza’s van.

Soto then entered Norma Mendoza’s van with the bag.

A short time later Soto exited the van and returned to her

vehicle. Norma Mendoza exited a parking space and drove

the van to the front entrance of the store. Israel Mendoza

then exited the store along with Jaime Soto Vaca. Israel

Mendoza entered the front passenger seat of the van.

Norma and Israel Mendoza then departed the parking lot.

2 Veronica Soto was subsequently identified

during a traffic stop.

After the aforementioned meeting, Israel Mendoza

contacted the CS and notified him [or] her, “I already got

the family and everything.” The CS told your affiant that

“got the family” is in reference to receiving the cocaine.

Surveillance was maintained on Norma and Israel

Mendoza’s van. Harris County Sheriff’s Office (Houston,

Texas) subsequently made contact with Norma and Israel

Mendoza in a business parking lot, located in Houston,

Texas.

During the contact, a drug alerting canine was deployed on

van; the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics. A search

of the vehicle yielded [ ] the seizure of approximately 4.664

kilograms of cocaine. The cocaine was later field-tested by

law enforcement and [was] positive [for] the presence of

cocaine.

Your affiant and Task Force Officer Jonathan Sandel

interviewed Israel Mendoza later [on] this date. During the

post-Miranda interview, Mendoza advised his wife did not

know what was going on. TFO Sandel explained to

Mendoza if she (Norma Mendoza) assisted in any way, she

was involved in the cocaine transaction. When asked again

who[m] he (Mendoza) obtained the cocaine from,

Mendoza stated Veronica Soto.

Your affiant has not included every detail known to your

affiant, but merely enough information to establish

probable cause.

In conclusion, your affiant believes there is probable cause,

and does believe, that Israel and Norma Mendoza

conspired with each other and others to bring into the State

of Florida a quantity of cocaine in excess of four-hundred

grams, and that an overt act furthering the conspiracy

occurred in Manatee County, Florida. Furthermore, your

affiant believes there is probable cause, and does believe,

that Israel Mendoza transported funds exceeding $300.00

with the intent to promote [a] specified unlawful activity

(trafficking in cocaine).

“‘A conspiracy is an express or implied agreement or understanding between

two or more persons to commit a criminal offense.’” Gould v. State, 251 So. 3d 1034,

1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citation omitted). “‘To prove the crime of conspiracy, the

state must prove an agreement and an intention to commit an offense.’” Gould, 251

So. 3d at 1036 (citation omitted). Statements in the affidavit demonstrate that Israel

and Norma Mendoza agreed to purchase cocaine from Veronica Soto and intended to

commit the offense by hiring the confidential informant to assist with the drug

transaction and by traveling to Texas and purchasing from Soto almost five kilograms

of cocaine. Consequently, the affidavit demonstrates that Mendoza engaged in a

conspiracy to traffic cocaine. Green v. State, 999 So. 2d 1098, 1099–1100 (Fla. 5th DCA

2009) (“The jury could reasonably have inferred that Gibson conspired with Green to

purchase cocaine based on the evidence that they travelled together from Pennsylvania

to Orlando for a short visit, that they met the purported seller at a prearranged meeting,

that they were both present throughout the negotiations, that Green indicated that

‘they’ were there to purchase cocaine, and that they walked together back to their hotel

room to retrieve the money necessary to purchase the cocaine.”).

Section 896.101(3)(b)(1), Florida Statutes, criminalizes promotional money

laundering as follows: “It is unlawful for a person [t]o transport or attempt to

transport a monetary instrument or funds [w]ith the intent to promote the carrying

on of specified unlawful activity.” A specified unlawful activity includes drug

trafficking. §§ 895.02(8)(a)(49) and 896.101(2)(h), Fla. Stat. Statements in the

affidavit demonstrate that Mendoza transported money from Florida to Texas to

purchase the cocaine. Consequently, the affidavit demonstrates that Mendoza

engaged in money laundering. See, e.g., United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 680

(2d Cir. 1994) (“Section 1956(a)(2) contains no requirement that ‘proceeds’ first be

generated by unlawful activity, followed by a financial transaction with those

proceeds, for criminal liability to attach. Instead, it penalizes an overseas transfer

‘with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.’”).

Because Mendoza fails to demonstrate that, in light of any new reliable

evidence, “‘no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt,’” he fails to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice based on actual

innocence excuses the time bar. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 329).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Mendoza’s (Doc. 1) petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DISMISSED as time barred. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a

judgment against Mendoza and CLOSE this case.

DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Because Mendoza neither makes a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right nor demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find debatable

both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues that he seeks to

raise, a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on. Noyember5, 2025.

MARYS. SORIVEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17